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ABSTRACT
While American policy makers needed three years after 
World War II to recognize the importance of re-educating 
German youth and to develop a consistent policy, a look at 
Nuremberg reveals that American representatives in the field 
started positive and constructive programs immediately after 
the war. American soldiers ignored non-fraternization, the 
Army became heavily involved in helping German communities 
survive, while the Youth Section of the Office of Military 
Government was the first to focus on persuasion instead of 
coercion in its re-education efforts. It designed long range 
programs to introduce young Germans to a democratic culture. 
Official American policy simply confirmed the new direction 
months later. The Army introduced a completely new concept 
of youth work, offering alternatives for those who refused to 
join traditional German clubs with their membership 
requirements. It also provided almost all transport and 
equipment for youth activities in the American zone. Private 
organizations and Washington's child feeding program reached 
additional German youths. In spite of administrative 
shortcomings and a constant shortage of personnel, these 
Americans were able to make significant contributions to 
youth work and even schooling in Germany, although the effort 
fell short of institutional reform, especially in 
recalcitrant Bavaria. With American power and support behind
xi
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them, progressive Germans in key positions adopted American 
ideas and models for youth work and explored new ways of 
integrating young Germans into the international community. 
American youth programs and the presence of substantial 
numbers of soldiers and civilians in Germany had a positive 
and long lasting effect which went beyond immediate material 
gains. Many young Germans became acquainted with American 
culture, ideas, and ideals. Most of those who participated 
in exchange programs with the United States served as 
multipliers, introducing American concepts to German schools, 
social work, and even the churches. American efforts in 
youth work succeeded because their programs and the mere 
presence of so many Americans offered different and 
attractive approaches without dictating them at a time when 
most young Germans and open-minded members of the older 
generation were looking for new ideas and alternatives to a 
discredited ideology and lifestyle.
xii
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INTRODUCTION
The United States developed a special relationship with 
the Federal Republic of Germany during the first decade after 
World War II. The quantity and quality of historical 
research in this field reflects the importance of this 
relationship. The analytical focus of most studies, however, 
does not go beyond the political and institutional level, 
discussing the various roles the Office of Military 
Government (OMGUS), the High Commissioner for Germany 
(HICOG), or the European Recovery Program (ERP) played in the 
creation of the Federal Republic.1 A few scholars assess the 
cultural dimension of German-American relations, but do not 
venture beyond the traditional topics such as theater or 
literature.2
‘Jeffry Diefendorf et al., eds., (American Policy and 
the Reconstruction of West Germany 1945-1955 (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993)) and Michael Ermarth, ed., 
(America and the Shaping of German Society (Herndon, VA: 
Berg, 1993)) represent the most recent research trends over 
the last decade. The former essay collection is dedicated 
entirely to political history, whereas the latter includes 
essays on culture, the economy, consumption, and everyday 
life as well as personal accounts of American participants in 
the occupation.
2Michael Ermarth, "The German Talks Back: Heinrich
Hauser and German Attitudes towards Americanization after 
World War II," America and the Shaping of German Society, ed. 
Michael Ermarth (Herndon, VA: Berg, 1993) 101-31; Hermann
Glaser, The Rubble Years: The Cultural Roots of Postwar
Germany 1945-1948 (New York: Paragon House, 1986) ; Ralph
Willett, The Americanization of Germany, 1945-1949 (New York 
and London: Rout ledge, 1989) . I am only concerned here with 
scholarly historical works.
1
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2German youth after World War II has only very recently 
received attention by the historical profession, apart from 
the standard photos and accounts of American soldiers who 
supplied children with candy and chewing gum.3 In the course 
of the occupation Americans in Germany realized early on the 
importance reaching out to the youth with their programs. 
Bringing American ideas and ideals directly to young Germans 
provided a feasible alternative to American institutional and 
administrative reform attempts which encountered determined 
resistance. This study will seek to determine the range and 
the results of American policy towards German youth on the 
grassroots level between 1945 and 1955.
The topic involves a political and a social component. 
In the realm of politics it will be necessary to follow the 
policy making process in the United States and in Germany.4
3Hermann-Josef Rupieper (Die Wurzeln der vrestdeutschen 
Nachkriegsdemokratie: Der amerikanische Beitrag 1945-1952
(Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1993)) and Karl-Heinz Fiissl, 
Die Umerziehung der Deutschen: Schule und Jugend unter den 
Siegermachten des Zweiten Weltkriegs 1945-1955 (Paderborn: 
Schoningh, 1994)) approach the subject from different angles, 
but agree that American reorientation efforts towards German 
youth important and much more successful than the Military 
Government's attempts at institutional reform and 
denazification.
4In spite of a considerable number of accounts of 
American policy in Germany I have not been able to find a 
satisfactory general study of American policy formulation for 
post-war Germany. Most works are concerned only with partial 
aspects of the issue, some reveal a surprising lack of 
accuracy in dealing with the decision making process in 
Washington and the constantly changing administrative set-up 
of Military Government during various stages of the 
occupation.
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3To determine the impact of these policies, their 
interpretation and implementation by Americans in charge of 
everyday operations in the field will receive special 
attention. On the social level the study will explore the 
effects of American policies and policy implementation on 
youth work in a community. It will also examine the nature 
of every day contacts which young Germans and Americans 
developed after the war. The main objective is to draw a 
clearer picture of everyday relations at the grassroots and 
compare them with the political arena, in which victors and 
vanquished became partners in little less than a decade.
Until the 1960s the study of German-American relations 
after the Second World War remained almost entirely in the 
hands of American scholars. A surprisingly large number of 
those who participated in the American occupation in 
prominent positions published their evaluations of the 
venture.5 Later scholars, many of whom had served in Germany 
in less important positions, focused on the military 
occupation of Germany. Almost all of them agreed that 
American programs were not successful during the occupation.6
5See, for example, Lucius Clay, Decision in Germany (New 
York: Doubleday and Company, 1950; Hajo Holborn, ed.,
American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies 
(Washington, D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947); Marshall 
Knappen, And Call it Peace (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1947) .
6See, for example, Edward N. Peterson, The American 
Occupation of Germany: Retreat to Victory (Detroit: Wayne 
State University Press, 1977) .
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4John Gimbel's study of Marburg was the only case study among 
the early publications and in many ways still serves as a 
model for such an approach.7
When OMGUS documents were declassified in the late 
1970s, interest in German-American relations after World War 
II revived, especially in Germany. Historians have edited 
and published important primary materials which dealt with 
the American presence in Germany after 19458 and several case 
studies have shed new light on various problems.9
Many of these scholars shared the skepticism of earlier 
works. Their accounts indicate that American re-education 
and denazification efforts may not have been as successful as
7John Gimbel, A German Community under Occupation: 
Marburg 1945-52 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1961).
*For example Udo Winkel,ed., Niirnberg 1945-1949: Quellen 
zur Nachkriegsgeschichte (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: Stadtarchiv, 
1989) or Klaus-Dietmar Henke and Hans Woller, eds., Lehrjahre 
der CSU: Eine Nachkriegs partei im Spiegel vertraulicher
Berichte an die Amerikanische Militarregierung (Stuttgart: 
Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1984). See also the publication of 
a great number of documents in Vierteljahreshefte fiir 
Zeitgeschichte.
Wolfgang Eckart, Amerikanische Reformpolitik und 
deutsche Tradition: Niirnberg, 1945-49: Nachkriegspolitik im 
Spannungsfeld zwischen Neuordnungsvorstellungen, Notlage und 
pragmatischer Krisenbewaltigung, Niirnberger Werkstiicke zur 
Stadt-und Landesgeschichte 42 (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: 
Stadtarchiv, 1988); Elmar Ettle, Die Entnazifizierung in 
Eichstadt: Probleme der politischen Sauberung nach 1945
(Frankfurt/Main: Lang, 1985); Hans Woller, Gesellschaft und 
Politik in der amerikanischen Besatzungszone: Die Region 
Ansbach und Fiirth, Quellen und Darstellungen zur 
Zeitgeschichte, herausgegeben vom Institut fiir Zeitgeschichte 
25 (Miinchen [Munich]: Oldenbourg, 1986).
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5the occupiers had hoped them to be,10 but the most recent 
studies tend to draw a more differentiated picture. Winfried 
Muller, for example, documents that even American efforts at 
school reform in conservative Bavaria were not entirely 
unsuccessful. While conservative Bavarians were able to 
frustrate American efforts to completely remodel the 
structure of their traditional school system, American 
educators were able to influence the curricula for the 
different school types, to improve teacher training for 
primary schools, and to support various groups of reform 
minded teachers who had set out to change the traditionally 
authoritarian classroom behavior of the teachers.11
l0James A. Tent (Mission on the Rhine: Reeducation and 
Denazification in American Occupied Germany (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1982)) finds that Germans 
successfully resisted American efforts to reform the 
educational and economic system. Ettle confirms Lutz 
Niethammer's earlier findings that German Spruchkammern, 
courts and authorities were in fact reluctant to carry 
through the process of denazification rigorously (Lutz 
Niethammer, Die Mitlauferfabrik: Entnazifizierung am Beispiel 
Bayerns (Berlin: Dietz, 1982)). According to Peterson,
German society came to fit American expectations only after 
they had given up their efforts to reform it. Wolfgang 
Eckart shows that American efforts to reform society and 
politics soon gave way to an arrangement with the German 
political elites that was based on pragmatism, not on 
idealism on both sides.
“Woller, Fiissl, and Rupieper interpret OMGUS and HICOG 
activities in such a manner. For schools in Bavaria see 
Winfried Muller, Schulpolitik in Bayern im Spannungsfeld von 
Kultusbiirokratie und Besatzungsmacht, 1945-1949, Quellen und 
Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte herausgegeben vom Institut 
fiir Zeitgeschichte 3 6 (Miinchen [Munich] : Oldenbourg, 1995) . 
See also Wolfgang Krieger, General Lucius D. Clay und die 
amerikanische Deutschlandpolitik 1945-1949, Forschungen und 
Quellen zur Zeitgeschichte 10 (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1987) 
and Thomas Alan Schwartz, America's Germany: John McCloy and
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6Although a number of case studies on the post-war 
situation in Germany are available, historians have barely 
begun to explore the interaction between Americans and 
Germans in the communities. The authors of these case 
studies have limited their approach mainly to the relations 
between local administrations and American Military 
Government officials. A number of scholars provide useful 
insights into some aspects of everyday relations, but the 
subject needs more detailed assessment. Gimbel points out 
that the experiences of the social and political elites in 
Germany with Americans were different from those of other 
parts of society. The wide range of youth programs which 
OMGUS and its successor HICOG as well as private 
organizations such as the churches introduced in German 
communities provide ample material for the investigation of 
American activities and their results on the political as 
well as the non-political level at the grassroots.12
While early authors of the military occupation covered 
the period from 1945 to 1954, most of the more recent studies 
limit their time frame even more, concentrating either on the 
four years of Military Government after the war, or on the
the Federal Republic of Germany (Cambridge, Mass. and London: 
Harvard University Press, 1991) .
I2Fussl provides a first model of what can be done 
combining political history with a look at the grassroots. 
See also Maria Hohn, "GIs, Veronikas and Lucky Strikes: 
German Reactions to the American Military Presence in the 
Rhineland-Palatinate during the 1950s," diss. U. of 
Pennsylvania, 1995.
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subsequent reign of the High Commissioners. This enables the 
authors to deal with their topics in depth, but makes it 
difficult to evaluate the impact of American policies and 
programs on Germany, since HICOG continued the course which 
OMGUS had charted and also did not modify its objectives. 
This study therefore will return to the initial periodization 
that treated OMGUS and HICOG as a unit.
The nature of the subject imposes a limit on the scope 
of the study and makes a case study approach necessary. The 
city of Nuremberg in many ways reflected West German society 
from the beginning of the American occupation in 1945. The 
city's connection with the National Socialists who had 
selected it to be the permanent site of their party rallies 
and the stage for implementing their new racial order in
1935, made it in the eyes of many the representative of an
evil Germany. The Allies reenforced this image when they
held the war crimes trials in the city. Yet the situation in
Nuremberg as well as in the rest of Germany was far more 
complicated than the appearance suggested. The National 
Socialists' dramatic gains there at the end of the 1920s were 
undeniable, but the city had shown considerable resistance to 
the Nazis before 1933, with the Social Democrats dominating 
local politics until the Nazis forced them out.13
Together with the surrounding region Nuremberg displays 
a remarkably diverse social and political structure. It had
I3Eckart 3 0-48.
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8a large population of industrial workers, as well as small 
craft-oriented businesses, and served as administrative and 
commercial center of the region, with close ties to the 
hinterland. Nuremberg and the region also had to absorb 
large numbers of refugees after 1945 and had to accommodate 
American army units. They remained in the city for five 
decades and are still present in the region today.
Since a significant part of the study is concerned with 
Alltagsgeschichte. oral history became an integral part of my 
research. After an initial wave of enthusiasm, historians 
have become more cautious about the possibilities this new 
source offers to the profession, but for any project of 
recent history which is concerned with social history and 
individual attitudes, there are no alternatives to using 
interviews when they are available.14
l4For a good introduction to the problems, limits and 
possibilities of oral history see Lutz Niethammer, ed., 
Lebenserfahrung und kollektives Gedachtnis: Die Praxis der 
>Oral Historv<. 1985. Frank Stern, The Whitewashing of the 
Yellow Badge. Oxford, Pergamon Press 1992, is an outstanding 
example for the creative and responsible use of oral history 
and the possibilities it has to offer.
Locating interviewees is a major problem for the 
practitioner of oral history. Since Germans are generally 
not as mobile as Americans, it has been possible to find many 
interviewees in Nuremberg itself but I interviewed others in 
communities as far away as Bremen. The city of Nuremberg has 
conducted a number of oral history projects which I also 
incorporated in this study (City of Nuremberg, ed., 
Erinnerungen aus der Stadtverwaltunq (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: 
Karl Frey, 1989) and Siegfried Kett, Das Niirnberqer 
Kiinstlerhaus: Eine Stadtoeschichte von 1867-1992 (Niirnberg
[Nuremberg]: Verlag Niirnberger Presse, 1992)).
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9The oral historian distinguishes himself from the 
sociologist by relying less on a quantitative and more on a 
qualitative approach— without neglecting the statistical 
information available. Apart from locating people who were 
involved in youth work at the time, I attempted to find 
people of both sexes who lived in different subdivisions and 
in the surrounding region, represented different ages, and 
reflected the social stratification within the city. 
Interviews with native Nurembergers as well as former 
refugees helped to determine the experiences of insiders and 
outsiders. Apart from providing me with their recollections, 
many of the interviewees also made available to me such 
valuable material as diaries and photographs. In conjunction 
with traditional sources such as the city's records, the 
records of the Military Government and the High Commissioner 
for Germany, newspapers, and archival records of the Lutheran 
Church, the interviews added depth and a human dimension to 
this study. The interaction between the interviews and the 
traditional sources turned out to be one of the most fruitful 
features of my research. Archival sources helped me 
formulate my questions and verify the recollections of the 
interviewees who provided personal details on written sources 
or were able to recall important details on specific events. 
The interviews often directed my attention to issues and 
sources which I was able to pursue in the archives. The
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interviewees' experiences and perceptions form a vital part 
of the story that is about to follow.
Since "re-education," "democratization," and 
"Americanization" appear frequently in the sources of the 
time, in the interviews as well as in scholarly accounts, a 
word about terminology is in order. Not surprisingly, the 
definitions and interpretations of these terms vary widely. 
It is therefore necessary to present the reader with the way 
I defined the terms for this study.
"Re-education" was used in two contexts before it became 
one of the features of American policy in post-war Germany. 
During the 193 0s psychotherapists attempted to correct 
neurotic behavior by trying to replace abnormal ideas with 
new and healthy concepts. In this way a therapist could lead 
a patient back to the mainstream path from which he had 
strayed. Educators developed a similar concept, but for them 
victims of accidents needed to re-learn the abilities which 
they had forgotten.15 We will see that Americans applied 
both concepts to the problem they were trying to solve in 
Germany throughout the occupation with much idealism and 
sometimes even with missionary zeal.16 Although their views 
of the roots of the problem may have differed, those in
15Muller 113-114.
16Muller 111-113. Tent (Mission) argues that this 
missionary zeal lay at the heart of American educators' 
attempts to reform the school system in their zone of 
occupation.
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charge of the American re-education program agreed that the 
Germans could and should be cured from their exaggerated 
nationalism, militarism, chauvinism, and their inclination 
towards totalitarianism. In the long run young people were 
the group most in need of re-education, not only because they 
had only known National Socialist doctrines, but also because 
they offered the best chances to achieve American goals, 
since it is easier to change the outlook of a young person 
than that of an adult. To be successful, the Americans' 
concept of re-education went beyond schools and universities 
in Germany, which John Dewey had identified as hotbeds of 
reactionary ideas and exaggerated nationalism as early as 
1915. His book was republished in 1942, just in time to have 
an impact on people who would be in charge of the German 
educational system after the war.17 I define re-education as 
the American effort to change the minds and attitudes of 
young people. This could happen by means of official 
programs to teach them the values of an open and democratic 
society through schools, youth offices, youth organizations, 
and the Army as well as by means of informal and formal 
personal contacts between the occupiers and the occupied.
American efforts to "democratize" German society provide 
a different challenge for the researcher. Although the issue
170tto Schlander, "Der Einflufi von John Dewey und Hans 
[sic!] Morgenthau auf die Formulierung der Re-educations- 
politik," Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau: Die Bildungspolitik 
der Besatzungmachte in Deutschland und dsterreich, ed. 
Manfred Heinemann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981) 40-52.
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remained high on the agenda and played a prominent part in 
official American rhetoric throughout the occupation, the 
occupiers never defined their concept of democratization. 
Scholars still debate whether Americans simply equated their 
own political and economic system with democracy and wanted 
to establish very much the same in their zone of occupation 
and ultimately in the Federal Republic, or if they intended 
to teach Germans democracy based on a much broader concept, 
in which hands-on-experience with generally recognized 
principles of fair play, respect for other opinions, and 
practical lessons such as discussions or practicing 
democratic procedures played a central role. The latter 
approach would have taken Germany's own democratic traditions 
into account. Looking at American efforts of teaching 
democracy to the young generation will help to answer this 
question.
Introducing democracy to the Germans was just one field 
of the occupiers' alleged attempts or successes to 
"Americanize" the people under their control. Germans and 
Americans alike have used the term in many ways to describe 
the material and ideological impact of the United States on 
the culture, politics, and the economy of the Federal 
Republic. The common denominator in this usage seems to be 
the assumption that Germans not just adopted American ideas 
and concepts but rather exchanged at least parts of their own 
culture and traditions for that of the occupiers. This
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concept of Americanization, however, is not very helpful in 
describing the situation in post-war Germany. First, it 
neglects the diversity of the American political, cultural, 
and educational landscape which is arguably the very essence 
of American culture. This study will show that in fact no 
agency in the United States was able to develop a clear cut 
'American' model for the re-education of the Germans which 
could have served as the basis for American policy after the 
war. Consequently a great variety of ideas and concepts 
about education and youth work coexisted among American 
government and private agencies which were operating in 
Germany. Furthermore, the necessity of cooperation with the 
other Allies as well as with an atomized German 
administrative structure made a flexible and highly pragmatic 
approach on all sides imperative. In addition to that, the 
states, not the Federal government had been traditionally in 
charge of formal education. This constellation most probably 
would have prevented the Americans from realizing many of 
their goals, even if they had formulated just one program for 
Germany.
If Americans had problems creating and pursuing one 
consistent policy, the Germans had problems finding out what 
'American' exactly meant. Undoubtedly Hollywood did much to 
disseminate a specific if not altogether accurate image of 
the United States to the Germans, but wherever they met GIs 
or other Americans, Germans had an opportunity to test their
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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images of the United States and her people. American 
diversity ultimately meant that Germans from all social 
groups and many political convictions could find something 
attractive in American society, politics, and culture. In 
music, for example, the choices during the first post-war 
decade ranged from Aaron Copeland and George Gershwin via Big 
Bands and Jazz to Elvis Presley and Rock 'n Roll. All three 
music styles were and remained tremendously successful with 
different people of different ages, and all three were 
distinctively "American."
The "Americanization" concept poses yet another problem. 
It assumes that two mutually exclusive monolithic cultural, 
political, and economic systems existed which remained 
antagonistic, giving Germans only the choice of either 
defending their old ways or adopting the new ones which the 
occupiers introduced. The model allows people to draw clear- 
cut conclusions about American policies in Germany which 
either failed or succeeded, but it does not provide any room 
for pragmatism, synthesis, or compromise. Not surprisingly, 
scholars, popular writers, and ordinary people operating 
under these assumptions either found an Americanization of 
Germany absolutely necessary and good or rejected it in 
equally strong terms. Such a rigid definition of mutually 
exclusive cultural, political, and economic concepts does not 
reflect the necessities and possibilities for improvisation 
in every day affairs in Germany after hostilities had ended.
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The political and ideological vacuum which the complete 
military and moral collapse of the Third Reich had created 
opened up opportunities for individuals as well as 
administrations to explore new approaches to problems in 
which occupiers and occupied could combine old and new ideas 
in flexible, creative ways. This give and take— the very 
essence of democracy— might not entirely have satisfied 
either side, but in the long term both parties involved could 
achieve much as long as they found ways to cooperate.18 The 
following pages will tell how Americans and Germans who were 
involved in youth work in the field quickly found pragmatic 
and very fruitful ways of cooperation. Their actions at the 
grassroots ultimately determined Washington's policy 
formulation and provided American authorities in Germany 
early on with a practical and realistic re-education concept 
which Military Government and the High Commission adopted as 
a model for all of their dealings with the Germans.
,8This model of pragmatic interaction between occupiers 
and occupied is by no means my own. Wolfgang Eckart argues 
in his case study of Nuremberg that the dire post-war 
situation forced German administrators and politicians as 
well as the Americans to approach all issues pragmatically at 
the cost of ideological and idealistic convictions on both 
sides. Eckart seems to overlook that pragmatism is the very 
essence of the American political culture. Flexible 
cooperation with the Germans did not mean that the occupiers 
gave up their long-term goals of re-education, but simply 
that they chose a different, more realistic, and ultimately 
quite successful approach to reach them. In politics as well 
as in youth work the form of the system was not important (as 
long as it was democratic) , but rather the convictions of its 
constituents.
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Preparations for an Occupation, 1942-45
Throughout the Second World War preparations for the 
occupation of Germany did not have a high priority among 
Washington planners, although they began to develop 
blueprints almost immediately after hostilities officially 
began in December 1941. President Franklin D. Roosevelt's 
policy was to defeat the Axis Powers, which meant essentially 
Germany, first. The President directed all of his and the 
country's energy towards this goal. He and his
administration, however, did not develop a consistent long 
range policy for the postwar period. Preparing the 
occupation of Germany remained rudimentary, because the White 
House did not provide the necessary leadership. Therefore 
the different departments involved in planning were unable to 
reconcile their objectives and coordinate their efforts. 
Important parts of the American policy directive for the 
occupation of Germany known as JCS 1067, hastily assembled in 
the fall of 1944, when German defeat seemed imminent, derived 
directly from Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau's 
infamous and largely punitive blueprint for the country. 
Morgenthau, however, dealt predominantly with economic and 
political issues. Reorienting the German population away 
from extreme nationalism, racism, and militarism towards the 
ideals of a democratic society did not figure prominently in
16
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the planning of any government agency in 1944, although the 
concept of reeducating the Germans had been introduced in 
early 1943. All three Departments agreed on the necessity of 
such a program, but its timing and its priority remained a 
source of discussion. Its punitive economic provisions 
notwithstanding JCS 1067 provided the basis for a positive 
and reconstructionist approach in the American zone of 
occupation.
Between 1942 and 1944 the military had to create a civil 
affairs section which would be capable of taking over 
government functions in liberated and occupied areas and of 
implementing Allied or American policies. Military planners 
had to operate in unknown territory and without much guidance 
from Washington, but they succeeded in organizing and 
integrating a new organization into the military command 
structure. Military government detachments accompanied the 
tactical units in the cross channel invasion and provided 
liaison between civilian agencies and the troops. Their main 
purpose in Germany, however, was to assume government 
functions on the local, state, and zone levels. Their first 
duties consisted of denazification, maintaining or 
reestablishing law and order, as well as starting the local 
economies to provide the necessities for the occupiers and 
the occupied. Youth and educational affairs received only 
marginal attention and resources.
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Preparing the Peace: No Guidance from the White House
Franklin D. Roosevelt approached planning for the 
occupation of Germany in the same manner in which he had 
orchestrated the New Deal.1 He had never developed a 
consistent program for getting his nation out of the 
depression, but rather sought pragmatic solutions as the 
problems arose. The President disliked delegating
responsibilities and almost never took a firm stand on issues 
that divided his subordinates. His administration was known 
for a lack of coordination and a surprising amount of 
interagency rivalries. The President preferred informal and 
personal communications to written accords which might limit 
his freedom of action. He believed that he could get along 
well with Joseph Stalin, the Soviet Dictator, and would be 
able to negotiate the terms for postwar Europe and Germany on 
a personal and friendly basis.2
‘David Schoenbaum, "Deutschland in der amerikanischen 
Nachkriegsplanung, " Westdeutschland 1945-1955: Unterwerfung, 
Kontrolle, Integration, ed. LudoIf Herbst (Munchen [Munich]: 
Oldenbourg, 1986) 33-34.
2John Lewis Gaddis, The Origins of the Cold War 1941- 
1947 (New York and London: Columbia University Press, 1972) 
8-12; Gaddis is still one of the best accounts of American 
foreign policy during the 1940s; Paul Y. Hammond ("Directives 
for the Occupation of Germany: The Washington Controversy," 
American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, 
ed. Harold Stein (Birmingham: University of Alabama Press, 
1963) 311-464) is the most authoritative and understandable 
account of American policy making for post war Germany 
between 1942 and 1945.
Since this dissertation does not deal with the Cold War 
per se, but rather with American treatment of German youth, 
the discussion between realists and revisionists is only of 
marginal importance. Both schools maintain that American
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Roosevelt's own rather negative experiences in Germany 
as a schoolboy as well as the political developments between 
1918 and 193 3 which led to the rise of Hitler held important 
lessons for him. He was convinced that leniency toward the 
Germans was useless. Although German forces had requested an 
armistice at the end of World War I, Hitler and his political 
allies had been able to take advantage of many Germans' 
belief that their army actually had been undefeated in the 
field, but had been stabbed in the back by democratic forces 
at home. Unconditional surrender of the German forces this 
time would not only satisfy Stalin's never ending need for 
reassurance, but would also demonstrate to the Germans that 
they had really lost.3
The aftermath of the previous war also convinced the 
President that another American retreat into isolationism 
would be disastrous. The United States would have to remain 
actively involved in international affairs if it did not want 
to return to the battlefields. Roosevelt envisioned a
policy towards Germany changed due to the tensions between 
the Soviet Union and the United States. The reader will see, 
however, that American policy towards German youth remained 
consistent throughout the ten years under discussion here.
3Gaddis 8-12; Hammond 3 55-57; James Tent (Mission 14) 
and Edward N. Peterson (21) comment on FDR's negative 
experiences with Germany; Klaus-Dietmar Henke (Die
Amerikanische Besetzung Deutschlands, Quellen und 
Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte herausgegeben vom Institut 
fur Zeitgeschichte 27 (Munchen [Munich]: Oldenbourg, 1995) 
53-69) provides an excellent summary of FDR's policy between 
1941 and 1943.
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postwar world in which cooperation between the big powers 
would assure peace.4
The President's third lesson from the past was that 
without a healthy economy there would be no political 
stability in the world. The Great Depression had created an 
atmosphere of despair which in Germany and in Japan had 
helped radical and undemocratic forces into power. The
United States would have to take up the responsibility and 
assume world leadership in this realm as well.5
Roosevelt's views about postwar Germany were less clear. 
The President did not think it appropriate to start planning 
details of this occupation before the war was won. He had 
four reasons not to commit himself to any clear definition of 
postwar policy. First he considered it to be detrimental to 
the war effort because it might burden the rather fragile 
alliance among Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United 
States with unnecessary preoccupations which could be 
discussed once the war was over. The conferences at Teheran 
and Moscow in 1943 and even in Yalta as late as January 1945 
had shown that the allies agreed on defeating and occupying 
Germany, but that neither side was ready or willing to 
discuss postwar policy.6 Second, Roosevelt did not want to
4Gaddis 8-12.
sGaddis 8-12.
6Hammond (315-17) on Moscow and Teheran, (410) on Yalta 
and the President's general attitude.
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formulate any policies which he would have to base on unknown 
or constantly changing factors. Nobody could foresee exactly 
what the situation in Germany would be like at the time of 
surrender. The Army had assumed, for example, that there 
would be a central government and that the German economy 
would still be functioning when hostilities ended. Due to 
the Americans' rapid gains after the invasion of France and 
the German officers' attempt to dispose of Hitler in July of 
1944, this possibility seemed to materialize, but Hitler 
remained in power. The German counteroffensive during the 
winter of 1944 made it clear that the Americans would have to 
fight their way into Germany and that planning would have to 
be based on completely different assumptions. The President 
consistently refused to discuss issues on such shaky 
grounds.7 The postponement strategy also was much in line 
with Roosevelt's political philosophy. He had shown during 
the New Deal that he preferred to tackle problems when they 
arose on a trial and error basis and indicated that he would 
follow the same strategy in Germany.8 The public discussion 
of the Morgenthau plan which he and Churchill had endorsed 
during the Quebec conference in September 1944 finally showed 
that a premature commitment on any postwar position could
7Hammond 398-400; Earl F. Ziemke, The US Army in the 
Occupation of Germany 1944-1946, Army Historical Series 
(Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, United States 
Army, 1975) 100.
8Hammond 315, 324; Ziemke 12-18.
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cost Roosevelt votes which he needed in his bid for a fourth 
term that year.9
The White House's refusal to take the lead in planning 
for postwar Germany left a void that three departments tried 
to fill. The Department of State, the Department of the 
Treasury, and the War Department approached the issue with 
different conceptions of their own role in the occupation as 
well as of the role the Germans were to play in the future. 
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), however, a body that George 
Marshall had created to coordinate and control different 
military bureaus, would have to approve any policy statement, 
since they were directly responsible for planning and 
carrying out operations in Europe.
First Designs: The State Department
The State Department was the logical choice for the 
formulation of post war policy planning for Germany. It had 
a trained staff that was well acquainted with affairs in the 
country and was in the best position to assess the 
international ramifications of American activities in 
Germany. Secretary of State Cordell Hull, however, had grown 
old and was unable to provide the energy and leadership 
necessary for the task. He also did not have the close 
personal ties to the President that would have given the 
State Department's reconstruction plans some weight at the 
White House or in the public. Planning for postwar Germany
9Hammond 377-379; Ziemke 105.
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did not seem to enjoy a high priority within the Department, 
either. Hull left it in the hands of the Department's lower 
ranks, who operated without much guidance or interference.10
State Department officials began their search for a 
policy for postwar Germany in 1942. It was clear from the 
start that they would base their policy on a 
reconstructionist approach. Germany would be defeated and 
occupied, stern measures would be necessary to punish war 
criminals and eliminate National Socialism, but ultimately 
the country would have to be reintegrated into the 
international community. In the summer of that year State 
Department officials started out with some brainstorming. 
They formed the General Advisory Committee for Postwar 
Germany (GAC) to informally collect ideas and opinions from 
educators, politicians and members of different departments 
on how their general ideas could be implemented.11
Reeducating Germans was one of the topics in these 
meetings and the discussions of this issue left a lasting 
impression on Archibald MacLeish, who attended them in his 
function as Librarian of Congress. MacLeish, who would 
become Assistant Secretary of State in January 1945, had by 
February 194 3 reached the conclusion that a program of
,0Schoenbaum (32-3 3) maintains that between the summer of 
1943 and the fall of 1944 only about 6% of government 
publications dealt with the German future in the broadest 
sense.
"Tent, Mission 17-23.
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reeducating the Germans would be necessary as soon as the 
process of denazification and demilitarization could be 
finished.12 The aftermath of World War I had shown that 
merely introducing a democratic political system would not be 
enough to affect profound and lasting changes. Germany could 
only be successfully integrated into a peace-loving 
international community if her citizens could be convinced 
that militarism, racism, and National Socialism were bad and 
if they would change their political and cultural outlook. 
This meant that a reeducation program would have to play an 
important role in the occupation and needed careful planning. 
MacLeish did not have much information on the President's 
position on the issue, but Roosevelt consistently made it 
known that he did consider it possible for the Germans to 
return to the family of civilized nations. The Atlantic 
Charter of 1941 made this possibility the basis of Anglo- 
American cooperation. At the Casablanca conference in 
January 1943 Roosevelt and Winston Churchill issued a 
statement that they wanted to destroy enemy philosophies, but 
not peoples.13 To his dismay MacLeish also had become aware
12Scott Donaldson, Archibald MacLeish: An American Life 
(Boston: Houghton Miflin, 1992) 379-383. Neither Donaldson 
nor R.H. Winnick, the editor of his letters, (Letters of 
Archibald MacLeish 1907 to 1982 (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 
1983)) dedicate any space to the important role MacLeish 
played in finding and formulating an American policy for 
postwar Germany.
I3Roosevelt and Churchill maintained this attitude 
throughout the war and also committed Stalin to this stance. 
During the 1944 presidential campaign Roosevelt made clear
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in the GAC meetings that in February 1943 no agency was 
planning for a reeducation program or working on the 
formulation of an official policy statement in this realm. 
Political and economic issues were much higher on the 
agendas.14
By the summer of 1943 the State Department was satisfied 
with the information it had gathered from the committee's 
meetings and proceeded to a more formal stage of discussion. 
It set up the Interdivisional Committee for Postwar Germany, 
which consisted of specialists on that country from different 
divisions of the State Department.15 Under David Harris it 
developed the first official policy papers for organizing 
postwar Germany, based on the reconstructionist approach. In 
March 1944 the group had to direct its attention to 
educational matters. Prodded by his English counterpart, the 
chief of the War Department's Civil Affairs Division (CAD), 
General John Hilldring, asked the State Department to develop 
a policy guideline for the American military government.
that the Germans would have to pay a price for their 
aggression, but he also indicated his willingness to readmit 
the German people into the fellowship of law-abiding nations 
if they showed that they deserved it. The final communique 
of the Big Three in Yalta again stated that Germans were 
expected to remain outlaws for quite some time, but that they 
could hope to be reintegrated in the international community 
after the elimination of Nazism and militarism.
I4Tent, Mission 17-23; the campaign speech is in Hammond 
(394) , the communique at Yalta in Hammond (413); see Ziemke 
(85) for the Atlantic Charter.
ISHammond 318.
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Proceedings of a joint committee of the Allies, the European 
Advisory Commission (EAC), which was planning for the 
occupation of Germany in England seemed to indicate that the 
Americans might be the only ones who had not developed any 
policy in this realm. Harris' committee wrote a paper along 
reconstructionist lines, but emphasized that education could 
succeed only as part of an overall policy toward the Germans 
that apparently included denazification, demilitarization and 
cooperation between the Allies. The committee further 
insisted that Germans not only would have to participate in 
the process, but would have to initiate it and carry it out 
on their own. At that stage of the planning the committee 
only considered reeducation to be "scholastic reform," which 
clearly meant that all efforts should be directed towards the 
German educational system. Further work came to a standstill 
because in August and September the Morgenthau Plan forced 
the State Department to divert its attention and placed in 
doubt the underlying approach on which it planned to build 
its policy.16 
The Morgenthau Plan
In August 1944 Secretary of the Treasury Henry 
Morgenthau became aware of the State Department's 
reconstructionist approach. He was appalled by the 
Department's leniency and immediately decided to develop his 
own plan. Morgenthau had always disliked and distrusted the
l6Tent, Mission 29; Fiissl 85.
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Germans. Furthermore, he was in close contact with the 
Jewish community and by the end of 1944 was not only fully 
informed about the magnitude of Hitler's '•Final Solution", 
but also deeply disturbed by the State Department's alleged 
obstructionist course which had prevented many European Jews 
from escaping to the United States.17 Although the Treasury 
Department had no obvious role to play in policy formulation 
for postwar Germany, its influence was considerable. 
Morgenthau was a good friend and neighbor of the President in 
New York. His personal bond with Roosevelt made access to 
the White House easy. In addition to that, Roosevelt shared 
Morgenthau's dislike of Germany and agreed that elimination 
of the German threat would require drastic measures. 
Morgenthau became the most visible and vocal proponent of a 
very different concept for treating postwar Germany. He 
envisioned a country that would be deprived of its industry 
and divided into a number of weak agrarian states.18
I7Hammond 448; he seems to underestimate the influence of 
events related to the Holocaust on Morgenthau's position, 
especially his animosity towards the State Department. 
Richard Breitman and Alan M. Kraut (American Refugee Policy 
and European Jewry, 1933-1945, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: 
Indiana University Press, 1987), esp. chap. 9) argue that 
German atrocities and the State Department's apparent 
indifference to the plight of the Jews or even to making the 
facts known to the public in 1943 deeply impressed and 
angered the Secretary of the Treasury. Thomas Alan Schwartz 
(17) provides a more balanced evaluation of Washington's 
reaction to the Holocaust.
18Hammond 348-378; Peterson 37-39; Ziemke 102-105; Eugene 
Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the 
American Occupation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959) 6.
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Initially Roosevelt was ready to accept it as the 
official American policy. Morgenthau had brought to the 
President's attention the Handbook for Military Government in 
Germany that the Supreme Headquarters of the Allied 
Expeditionary Forces (SHAEF) under General Eisenhower was 
about to release. The book instructed Military Government 
officials to make sure that the economy and the bureaucracy 
in occupied Germany would continue to function. This policy 
implied that the Germans would be treated leniently and would 
not suffer any major inconveniences. Roosevelt agreed with 
Morgenthau that this was not what he had in mind. The 
Germans would have to pay the price for the misery they had 
brought upon Europe and would have to feel that they had lost 
the war. The Americans therefore should shut down German 
industry and remain aloof of internal German affairs, even if 
it meant economic and social chaos and starvation. The 
President instructed the War Department to revise the book in 
September 1944. That same month he made Morgenthau's 
blueprint official American policy, when, at the Quebec 
conference, he initialled with Winston Churchill the document 
which came to be known as the Morgenthau Plan.19 It 
envisioned the complete deindustrialization of Germany and a 
division of the country into several states. Roosevelt,
l9United States, Department of State, Foreign Relations 
of the United States, Diplomatic Papers [hereinafter FRUS]: 
The Conference at Quebec 1944 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1971) 390-91, 466-67.
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however, had not counted on the ensuing and largely negative 
public response in the United States, which was very 
inconvenient in an election year, as well as strong 
resistance from the State and War Departments. He quickly 
distanced himself from the document, even though he continued 
to see merit in Morgenthau's plan and avoided endorsing any 
other policy proposal. Morgenthau's plan nonetheless came at 
a time when German collapse seemed imminent and SHAEF 
urgently requested a directive for military government in 
Germany. The American policy directive, which came to be 
known as JCS 1067, incorporated its tone, if not its 
content.20
Morgenthau's position on the German economy was clear, 
but he had not developed a plan for German youth. He shared 
the State Department's view that special attention should be 
given to education. The Secretary even proposed a 
"fundamental reorientation of German educational 
institutions." To accomplish that, schools would have to 
remain closed until teachers, textbooks, and curricula were 
purged of all negative influences. Institutions of higher 
education would remain closed longer, but students would have 
the opportunity to study at universities abroad. Morgenthau, 
however, did not discuss the issue at length, which is 
understandable, since the new German agrarian society would
20Hammond 348-378; Peterson 37-39; Ziemke 102-105; 
Davidson 6.
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not require a large number of academically trained 
specialists. Furthermore, he did not regard the Germans as 
capable of changing their minds. The Secretary's ideas, 
which he outlined in his book in greater detail, indicate 
that he thought that drastic educational reform in Germany 
would be necessary to eliminate militarism and Nazi ideology. 
He doubted, however, that even a stern program would ever be 
able to cure German thought. Nevertheless his thinking did 
not challenge the State Department's more constructive 
approach towards education.21 
The War Department
The War Department was the third agency in Washington 
that became involved in making plans for postwar Germany, 
since it was clear that army troops would be the first 
American representatives in Germany. Some type of military 
government would be necessary to control liberated and 
occupied areas as long as the fighting continued and to make 
sure that military requirements were met. Serious planning 
for the formation of a military government began as early as 
1940. The War Department based its planning on the
210tto Schlander, 1 Der EinfluB von John Dewey und Hans 
Morgenthau auf die amerikanische Re-educationspolitik," 
Umerziehung und Wiederaufbau: Die Bildungspolitik der
Besatzungsmachte in Deutschland und Ost&rreich, ed. Manfred 
Heinemann (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981) 41-43. Schlander's 
assessment of American policy is somewhat simplistic, but he 
summarizes Morgenthau's views on German re-education well. 
See also Tent, Mission 17; Hammond 385. The quote is from a 
memorandum dated l Nov. 1944 in which Morgenthau accuses the 
British of ignoring this issue which apparently he thought 
was important.
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assumption that the military would be in charge of all 
civilian affairs only during hostilities and then would turn 
over its military government responsibilities to civilian 
authorities, presumably the Department of State. This did 
not mean, however, that the military in any way intended to 
become involved in policy formulation. On the contrary, 
throughout the negotiations for a postwar policy statement, 
the military tried to maintain a position of absolute 
neutrality. It built up an administrative apparatus that 
would carry out whatever directives would come from 
Washington, as long as they could be implemented. The 
military's main goals therefore were practical and limited in 
scope and content. Military government would have to 
maintain order, to control local authorities and to ensure 
that military operations would not be hindered by civilians 
in liberated or occupied areas. Some of the traditional 
mandates, however, already carried with them clear political 
implications. The military could best operate when the 
administration and the economy of the region it occupied were 
reconstructed as fast as possible. Traditional military 
government doctrine instructed soldiers to take care of the 
"welfare of the governed." These principles were bound to 
collide with other requirements Washington imposed on 
military government for Germany. Dismissing Nazi officials, 
for example, would have an immediate impact on local 
government functions, because most of the administrators were
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members of the Nazi party and could not be replaced easily. 
But not dealing with the Nazis harshly would have serious 
political consequences in Germany and would cause 
repercussions in the United States. It also took time to 
realize that every military government action that relied on 
any form of cooperation from the Germans would from the start 
have implications for the political and social life in 
Germany. This would make it difficult to change the course 
of events once a long-range program could be agreed on in 
Washington.22
Experiences in North Africa showed that sharing the 
burden with civilian agencies during military operations was 
not feasible. The need for exclusive military control of all 
aspects of government functions during operations in a 
theater became painfully clear. The President's decision to 
divide the responsibilities for government activities between 
military and civilian agencies caused considerable 
difficulties. General Eisenhower complained at one point 
during the campaign that he had more trouble dealing with 
competing American civilian agencies than with the enemy.23
22Hammond 319, 324-26; Henke 96-102; Eckart 220-278.
Eckart's is one of various studies which document that this 
conflict actually became one of the major problems with which 
MG detachments had to deal during the immediate aftermath of 
the war.
“Ziemke 14-15; Henke 95; see also William R. Swarm, 
'•Impact of the Proconsular Experience on Civil Affairs 
Organization and Doctrine," Americans as Proconsuls: United 
States Military Government in Germany and Japan, 1944-1952, 
ed. Robert Wolfe (Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern
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The problems in Africa led the War Department on 1 March 1943 
to create the civil Affairs Division (CAD) to control every 
aspect of civilian affairs in occupied areas. Consistent 
with the War Department's philosophy about military 
government, both Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Chief of 
Staff George Marshall instructed the head of CAD, General 
John Hilldring, to avoid taking part in policy formulation as 
far as possible. CAD would organize the administrative and 
logistical apparatus and solicit a policy statement 
presumably from the state Department or the President as soon 
as the military would find it necessary.24 In the realm of 
postwar treatment of youth and education CAD followed these 
orders and relied on the State Department's guidance.25
The fact that the Americans did not fight the war in 
Europe alone and envisioned a joint occupation with Great 
Britain and the Soviet Union further complicated formulating 
a policy. During 1942 the Anglo-American Combined Chiefs of 
Staff (CCS) created various committees in Washington and in 
London which dealt with civilian affairs of occupied 
territories and therefore could become involved in policy 
making. Matters became worse when the three Allies decided 
to establish a commission that would be responsible for a 
joint post war policy formulation in November 1943 at the
Illinois University Press, 1984) 399-400.
24Hammond 320-321; Swarm 399-400; Peterson 31-34.
25See pp. 25-26 above.
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Moscow conference. The European Advisory Commission was 
based in London and represented by the State Department. 
Washington now not only had to take the opinions of one more 
ally into account, but also needed to take care of constant 
friction between its own civilian and military agencies in 
London. In the end, the commission had not been able to 
agree to more than the boundaries of the zones the respective 
Allies would occupy. In the field of education and the 
treatment of youth it repeatedly served as a catalyst that 
CAD used to prod the State Department into action.26 
JCS 1067
With many different committees and conflicting opinions 
involved, it is not surprising that American planners for 
postwar Germany had to settle for the smallest common 
denominator. They managed to agree only on a short term 
policy statement when German defeat seemed imminent and 
Eisenhower insisted on obtaining guidance for the occupation 
of Germany.27
Although the Morgenthau Plan did not occupy the 
President and the headlines for more than a few weeks, it 
became the basis of American policy in Germany between 1945 
and 1947. The Secretary of the Treasury wielded his greatest 
influence in September 1944 at a time when the German 
collapse seemed imminent and SHAEF pressed for a policy
26See pp. 25-2 6 above; Tent, Mission 3 0-31.
27Henke 104.
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statement. The different departments, however, continued to 
present the President with contradictory policy drafts. When 
German resistance stiffened in fall and winter, Roosevelt 
created yet another committee to solve the problem. The 
Informal Policy Committee on Germany consisted of the state, 
war, and treasury secretaries. It initially based the new 
policy directive in tone and content largely on Morgenthau's 
plan, but during the next months the State Department managed 
to infuse it with changes that would leave a number of 
matters up to the discretion of the commander of the 
occupational forces. Truman approved the document after 
Roosevelt's death in May 1945 as the basis for American 
negotiations in the Allied Control Council.28
The directive's impact was limited in several ways. 
Since the British had not agreed to the statement, it could 
go into effect only after the dissolution of SHAEF and would 
be valid only for the American Zone of Occupation. As long 
as hostilities lasted, the Americans would have to follow the 
CCS's Directive 551 which treated military government actions 
from the standpoint of military feasibility. This meant that 
British and American forces would try to return life to 
normal as quickly as possible.29
28Hammond 408-427; Henke 110-115; Peterson 37-44; Tent, 
Mission 31-32; Ziemke 91-92, 106, 214.
29Ziemke 91-92, 106, 214. It is important to emphasize 
in this context that JCS 1067 was written as a stopgap 
measure. Only events in Germany extended its life and Lucius 
Clay certainly used it in ways not intended by the Treasury.
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JCS 1067 defined four basic objectives for the military 
government in Germany.30 First, the Germans needed to become 
aware that they had brought the destruction of their country 
upon themselves and that suffering would be inevitable. The 
directive also made clear that Germany would not be 
considered a liberated, but rather an occupied country. This 
provision ensured that military government in Germany would 
enjoy absolute authority. The primary objective of the 
occupation was "to prevent Germany from ever again becoming 
a threat to the world."31 To accomplish this goal the 
Americans would denazify and demilitarize Germany and punish 
all war criminals. Military government would keep German 
industry under close control, but the ultimate goal would be 
"an eventual reconstruction of German political life on a 
democratic basis."32
Even though the tone of the directive sounds harsh and 
it was partially based on Morgenthau's ideas, the document
30JCS 1067 went through a number of revisions before it 
reached the field and after. The eighth version became the 
basis for American policy in the American zone after the 
German surrender (for the History and various versions of JCS 
1067 see Ziemke 214). Scholars disagree about the influence 
Morgenthau actually had in drafting JCS 1067. Ziemke's 
interpretation that the tone of the directive was harsh, but 
that its actual provisions were of a much less vituperative 
nature than Morgenthau would have wished, seems to be the 
most plausible explanation.
31James K. Pollock and James H. Meisel, eds., Germany 
under Occupation: Illustrative Materials and Documents (Ann 
Arbor: George Wahr, 1947) doc. X.
32Pollock and Meisel doc. X.
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reveals a consensus in some areas. The State Department, for 
example, at no time opposed denazification, demilitarization, 
or the punishment of war criminals. The provisions regarding 
education reveal a constructive side of the directive. JCS 
1067 ordered all educational institutions temporarily closed. 
Only all National Socialist educational facilities had to be 
permanently closed. Schools opened under Allied authority 
could continue their operations. All schools would be 
reopened at the earliest possible time after the purge of 
Nazi personnel, ideology and books. The directive permitted 
the American Military Governor to go ahead with an interim 
school program until the Allied Control Council would 
formulate a general policy for Germany.33
One of the first objectives of Military Government would 
be to assert control over the German educational system. 
Section 14 b of the directive, however, was worded in such a 
way that the Military Government's educational mission could 
be interpreted to be far more than simply supervising or even 
reforming schools and universities:
A coordinated system of control over German 
education and an affirmative program of reorientation 
will be established designed completely to eliminate 
Nazi and militaristic doctrines and to encourage the 
development of democratic ideas.34
33Pollock and Meisel doc. X. It would be interesting to 
compare the texts of the various drafts to see at what stage 
of the development sections may have been included in the 
document, but for this study it is important that the 
provision was included from the start.
^Pollock and Meisel doc. X.
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It is not clear who drafted this section of the 
directive, but Archibald MacLeish was certainly not unhappy 
with the provision. Upon his appointment as Assistant 
Secretary of state in January 1945 he set out to make his 
opinions known. Section fourteen provided a basis for
further planning and implementation of policies directed 
towards reeducating German youth in and out of schools in the 
American Zone, but Washington still had not been able to 
formulate a long-range policy towards Germany. At the time 
of MacLeish's appointment the War Department's CAD was not 
satisfied with the most recent State Department proposals on 
education. The military planners thought that German 
participation and responsibilities were overemphasized and 
would nullify any chances for reform from the start.35
In view of the CAD's criticisms MacLeish returned to the 
drawing board. He resurrected the policy paper that David 
Harris' Interdivisional Committee had drafted shortly before 
Morgenthau interrupted its work. MacLeish thought that it 
formed a good basis for discussion, but that especially its 
provisions for administering a reeducation program needed 
additional work. CAD, however, advised MacLeish that a
general policy statement was urgently needed, whereas the 
Army's field manual for military government was providing 
sufficient guidance for handling the educational system for 
the time being. To accomplish this goal, MacLeish returned
35Tent, Mission 30.
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to a suggestion he had made during the meetings of the German 
Advisory Council two years earlier. He invited a number of 
specialists in education to Washington who in one way or 
another were acquainted with the German educational system. 
MacLeish was able to gather a number of outstanding 
educators. Staff from the Departments of State and War 
supplemented the committee. It needed two meetings in May 
1945 to agree on recommendations for a policy statement for 
Germany.36
The educators first weighed the options the United 
States had in regard to Germany. The United States would not 
be able to control Germany's industrial potential or the 
Germans themselves in the long run because that would mean 
either the complete annihilation of the German people or a 
permanent occupation. The American public would support 
neither option. The committee argued that attempts to 
deindustrialize Germany would not eliminate the threat, since 
the real problem lay in the people themselves. The only 
feasible policy would therefore have to focus on a change of 
Germans' attitudes and social behavior. Decision makers in 
the United States and in Germany should direct all military,
36Tent, Mission 31-34; he erroneously assumes that the 
meetings took place in May and June, but State Department 
memoranda indicate that the committee met on May 12-13 and 
again on May 28-29. This gave the Department a whole month 
to have the document approved before the Potsdam conference. 
For the memoranda see National Archives [Hereinafter NA] , 
Record Group [hereinafter RG] 59 Department of State, Central 
Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345, Annex II.
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economic, political and social decisions towards that end. 
Such a course of action would make an extensive reeducation 
program the heart of American policy in Germany. The 
committee further suggested that such a program needed to go 
hand in hand with the elimination of militarism and National 
Socialism. The recommendations departed from the traditional 
understanding that reeducation would simply follow the 
punitive phase of the occupation by making it a top priority. 
The educators thought that the Americans should rely as far 
as possible on German initiative to implement the programs on 
the local, state and national levels. To reintegrate Germany 
into the international community, Germans should be permitted 
to resume cultural activities with other countries as well. 
MacLeish adopted the committee's recommendations without 
changes and began to lobby for incorporating it into the 
American policy formulation at Potsdam.37
To speed up the decision-making process within the 
administration, MacLeish sidestepped the Informal Policy 
Committee for Germany, in which the Secretary of the Treasury 
still had a voice, and circulated the draft within the 
administration for further consideration. His position, 
however, did not go uncontested. One State Department 
official, for example, pointed out that the Morgenthau plan 
indeed was a serious alternative for eliminating the German 
threat forever. More to the point, he suggested that the
37NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345.
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United States had other interests in Europe that would quite 
possibly conflict with reeducation plans for Germany. 
Nevertheless, the Department of State accepted the 
committee's recommendations as the basis for its own long- 
range policy for Germany. During the first week of July 
Hilldring, McCloy, and Secretary of War Patterson gave their 
informal approval to the new directive.38
The new position within the lower echelons of the 
administration could not accomplish anything yet, because it 
needed the approval of the Secretary of State and ultimately 
of the President. Like JCS 1067, it could not be implemented 
because any agreement the Allies would reach at the Potsdam 
Conference in July would supersede it. On 12 July MacLeish 
therefore sent an telegram to Secretary of State James Byrnes 
in Potsdam urging him to make the new American position the 
basis for Allied policy. The undersecretary's communication 
deserves notice because it anticipated and outlined the 
course the State Department would finally come to follow in 
Germany during the next decade and beyond. In that document 
MacLeish pointed out that the Allies had agreed to ensure 
that Germany would never be a threat to the peace of the 
world again, but that up to that date there existed no
3iFRUS: The Conference of Berlin (The Potsdam Conference) 
1945 (In Two Volumes) (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1960) vol I, docs. 349, 350; Tent, Mission 37-38;
Hammond 431; Ftissl 86-89; see also an office memorandum dated 
5 July 1945 which records McCloy's, Hilldring's and 
Patterson's informal approval (NA RG 59 Central Files 1945- 
49, 862.42/6-1345).
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definition of what concrete steps would be taken to convert 
the agreement into a tangible plan. He correctly stated that 
there existed a policy vacuum, because no plans had been made 
to go beyond the immediate war aims. The Undersecretary 
argued that in order to achieve the goal of permanently 
preventing the Germans from waging another war, the United 
States needed to be clear about its own and its allies' 
objectives. It would further be necessary to develop a long 
range policy based on these objectives. MacLeish then 
outlined the committee's recommendations with its emphasis on 
changing the German mind by reforming the educational system. 
He admitted that short and long term policies could be at 
odds at times (a clear reference to Morgenthau and JCS 1067) , 
but that the long range objectives should always be kept in 
mind and ultimately should determine American policy. The 
Undersecretary went on to say that it was not enough to get 
rid of attitudes, but that Americans needed to fill the 
vacuum with new ideals which they should draw from their own 
history, just as the Russians might try to influence the 
Germans to become more sympathetic to their own ideas and 
ideals.39
MacLeish's efforts were in vain. The participants at 
Potsdam dedicated almost all of their time to far more 
concrete and immediate issues such as the German eastern
39Memoranduir., Central Secretariat to Secretary of State, 
18 July 1945; FRUS: The Conference of Berlin, vol. II, doc. 
855.
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border, reparations, and a common allied administration. The 
final communique of the conference simply stated that Nazism 
and militarism needed to be eliminated before democratic 
ideas could take root. Since it delegated more power to the 
zonal commanders, MacLeish would be able to implement his 
plan if he found enough support in Washington to make it 
official American policy and the Military Governor would be 
willing to implement it.40
It is not clear why the directive disappeared from the 
agendas of the higher echelons in Washington during the next 
months. It seems to be plausible that Washington and Berlin 
officials seriously believed that the Allied Control Council 
would be able to function and take care of reeducation in all 
of Germany. This would make an American directive 
unnecessary. John McCloy discussed the issue with MacLeish 
in a telephone conversation on July 5, 1945. He thought that 
it would be "highly desirable" for the United States to reach 
an agreement with the other Allies on this subject. 
Throughout 1945 and well into 1946, General Lucius D. Clay, 
Deputy Commander of Military Government in Germany, was in 
charge of setting up the Allied Control Council and making it 
operational in Berlin. Clay had faith in the joint 
administration of Germany by the four occupying powers and 
consequently wanted to defer reeducation to the Allied
*°FRUS: The Conference of Berlin, vol II, doc. 1417;
Tent, Mission 39.
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Control Council. In addition to that, denazification and 
punishment of war crimes as well as practical issues, such as 
food, reconstructing basic social services and reparations, 
seemed to be far more pressing. The rather abstract ideas of 
reeducating the Germans would have to wait until the other 
matters were settled. It appeared that MacLeish had not made 
any headway with his suggestions in Washington or in
Berlin.41
In the context of this study it is equally important to
note that planners in Washington only thought about a
reeducation policy for schools and their administration.
Even the most serious proponents of psychological change did 
not go beyond administrative reforms. People did not seem to
“Memorandum on a telephone conversation between MacLeish 
and John McCloy on 5 July 1945 which seemed to discourage 
MacLeish considerably. A handwritten comment on the 
memorandum that recorded the conversation reads: "I guess I 
won't send in another [draft] today. Cancel + Forget" (NA RG 
59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/7-545). Obviously he
changed his mind not long afterwards and decided to continue 
the fight for his plan. Fiissl argues that, according to 
MacLeish, the State Department did not want to come forward 
with a directive yet because it was not directly involved in 
the operations in Germany. This is implausible, because 
MacLeish made this statement at the end of May 1945. Had he 
really not had any interest in making his views official 
policy, he would not have forwarded them to Byrnes at 
Potsdam, which was six weeks after he had made the statement 
Fiissl relates to. Fiissl also does not take into account the 
agreement between the State and War Departments, according to 
which the former would provide the policies for the latter's 
organization.
For Clay's unwavering attempts to make the Control 
Council work and treat Germany as an entity in 1945 and the 
beginning of 1946 see Krieger 72-85, 101-104 and Jean Edward 
Smith, ed., The Papers of Lucius D. Clay: Germany 1945-49, 2 
vols. (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1974) I: docs. 
26, 122, 137.
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be aware that young Germans spent a lot of time away from 
schools even when the system functioned. MacLeish's advisory 
commission carried the approach a step further and included 
adult education and information control on its agenda for 
reeducation, but only a small group in the field seemed to 
recognize at that time that the young generation would need 
more than just school reform.
In April 1945 the technical manual published for the 
Welfare Division of Military Government dealt with the issue 
in depth. It described German youth work before and during 
the Third Reich. The authors of the manual concluded that 
youth activities would become one of the most important tasks 
of Military Government which would have to initiate its own 
program for German youth. The field manual for the Education 
and Religious Affairs Division, published two months earlier, 
however, did not advocate such a course at all. The manual 
instructed officers of this division not to encourage the 
formation of youth groups unless they would serve the 
purposes of military government. It did not take into 
consideration that young Germans had never known anything 
else but Nazi ideology. At the same time most had been too 
young to experience the horrors of the battlefields 
firsthand. The complete collapse of Nazi Germany would leave 
them in a void that needed to be filled. This meant that 
this generation also offered a chance for American policy 
makers because it would be most susceptible to the type of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
46
re-education MacLeish envisioned, but to achieve this goal 
American policy makers would need to widen their approach 
beyond the schools. For the time being the Americans in 
Washington and Europe focused exclusively on the educational 
system and consequently assigned youth work to the agency 
which also would be in charge of the educational system. The 
Education and Religious Affairs Branch within the Internal 
Affairs and Communications (IA&C) Division became responsible 
not only for the schools, but also for taking care of German 
youth in the American zone of occupation. Since for the time 
being no policy other than controlling the educational system 
was in place, much would depend on the quality of military 
government and the first encounters between the American 
troops and German civilians.42 
Organizing Military Government
The War Department recognized early on the need for 
organizing military governments for various countries. This 
meant that a huge number of qualified people had to be found, 
recruited, and trained. The Army had administered military 
governments during and after the Civil War, in the 
Philippines, and most recently in the Rhineland after World 
War I. The task that lay ahead, however, was not only larger 
than any previous assignment, but also far more difficult.
42Charles Campbell (German Youth Activities and the 
United States Army (Frankfurt/Main: Office of the Chief
Historian, European Command, 1947) 2) discusses the two field 
manuals.
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The occupation of the Rhineland had shown the need for 
training personnel in establishing and maintaining the 
functions of a military government. The Judge Advocate 
General therefore issued Field Manual 27-5 under the title 
Military Government which had gone through some revisions by 
December 1943. The manual did not provide any policy 
statements, but rather concentrated on the practical issues 
of military government in general. It established some 
guidelines about the treatment of the population and 
recommended the retention of existing laws and customs. It 
made no distinction between liberated countries and occupied 
enemy territory. The main objective of military government 
units was support of the tactical operations and ensuring a 
minimum of interference from the local populations.43
To have an adequate supply of trained military 
government personnel at hand, the War Department founded a 
School of Military Government at the University of Virginia 
in July 1942. Most officers who attended this school were 
Army regulars who would later serve in staff positions.44
When it became clear that the Army would bear the entire 
responsibility for Military Government operations in Europe 
and Asia, it expanded its educational activities for Military 
Government officers in 1943. To satisfy the demand for field 
officers the Army had to replenish its ranks with non­
43Swarm 399.
44Henke 220; Ziemke 3-12.
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professional soldiers which it commissioned directly from 
civilian life until 1943. The Army's attempts to recruit 
experienced personnel were handicapped from the start, 
because it could only offer them field grade positions which 
paid considerably less than what qualified people had come to 
expect in their civilian careers. Nevertheless it managed to 
obtain about two thousand mature and rather dedicated civil 
administrators, some of whom came from education. These 
officers received a month of rigorous basic military and 
military government training at Fort Custer, Michigan. They 
were then assigned to three additional months of training at 
Civil Affairs Training Schools attached to universities 
throughout the country. By the end of 1943 as many as seven 
hundred officers per month passed through the courses. Apart 
from becoming acquainted with the intricacies of the military 
bureaucracy, the officers received information about the 
countries they were expected to serve in and went through 
some basic language training. Since nobody knew, however, in 
which country or countries they would ultimately serve, the 
training had to remain very general. Much of the information 
the officers received, especially about Germany, was 
outdated. Three months also proved to be too little time for 
preparing the officers adequately for their jobs. Although 
they obtained some rudimentary knowledge of the different 
countries' histories, cultures, political systems and 
languages, they were not prepared for the highly complex task
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of supervising local government that lay ahead of them. A 
serious handicap also was a lack of specialists to train them 
in specific fields. In addition, important up to date 
information almost never reached the schools, although it was 
at hand. The Army did not find it necessary to provide the 
schools with information and experiences it was obtaining 
during its operations in Europe. The schools ended their 
courses in the spring of 1944. Officers were transferred to 
Shrivenham, England, to continue their training overseas, to 
receive their special assignments, and to be deployed after 
the invasion. The officers' patience and morale, however, 
was severely tested overseas. Training could not continue 
due to the lack of teachers, space and teaching materials, 
and the sudden influx of huge numbers of Military Government 
officers who were shipped from the United States in 
anticipation of quick deployment after the invasion. Because 
of security concerns, SHAEF was unwilling to disclose the 
future assignments of the units, so that individual 
assignments for Military Government detachments could not be 
made before the invasion. Once they joined their tactical 
units in the field, Military Government detachments often 
found themselves doing odd jobs until they could move to 
their final destinations.45
45Henke 221-226; Tent, Mission 23-24; Ziemke 3-23; Harold 
Zink, American Military Government in Germany (New York: 
Macmillan, 1947) 6-12; Harold Zink, The United States in
Germany (Princeton, N.J.: Van Nostrand, 1957) 5-26. It is
interesting to note that Zink's assessment of the quality of
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When the first Civilian Affairs Officers arrived at 
England at the end of 1942, they found that the staffs were 
not yet prepared for them. Nobody was quite sure how to 
integrate this relatively new task of the military into a 
command structure which was in flux anyway due to the 
preparations for the Normandy invasion. Civilian Affairs 
initially became part of the American command in the European 
theater, but with the creation of SHAEF and the appointment 
of Eisenhower as its commander, planning responsibilities 
were transferred to the Joint Command and Civilian Affairs 
became G-5, Military Government (MG). Planning for Germany 
became the responsibility of the German Country Unit (GCU) 
from February 1944 on.46
G-5 faced a formidable task. It had to create a 
military government organization within a very short period 
of time. Cooperation between British and American officers 
proved to be more difficult than had been anticipated. In 
addition to that, practical experiences in Italy and in 
Germany itself made adjustments in the organizational 
structure necessary. It was not until the end of 1945 that 
the Americans were able to resolve their problems in this 
field. In December 1945 the Office of Military Government,
the training of MG officers was much kinder in 1947, when the 
occupation was still going on and his own memory was still 
fresh, than it was in 1957. Political events as well as a 
disillusion about American accomplishments in Germany after 
the war may have changed his attitude.
46Ziemke 25-30, 81.
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U.S. Zone of Occupation (OMGUS) had taken over all G-5 
functions. OMGUS was completely separated from tactical 
commands, but remained under the Commander-in-Chief's 
authority.47
Reeducation received only marginal attention. Just ten 
officers were assigned to the Education and Religious Affairs 
Branch of the U.S. Group Council Commission. During the 
first three years of the occupation the branch did not 
receive division status and had no direct access to the 
Military Governor. MacLeish's efforts to make reeducation 
the central task of the American occupation did not have any 
impact on operations in the field during the first year of 
the occupation.48
The lack of a clear-cut policy in Washington, 
differences of opinion between British and American policy 
makers, as well as constantly changing assumptions about the 
condition Germany would be in after her surrender, made 
defining a mission for military government and providing 
specific instructions a daunting task for GCU throughout 
1944. The GCU was ready by August to distribute the handbook 
which Morgenthau took to the President. Roosevelt's 
objections delayed its distribution, although they did not 
change its content in any significant way. It remained the
47Ziemke chapters II, IV, VII, XXII-XXIV.
48Tent, Mission 3 6-37.
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only guide for Military Government until July 1945, since the 
British did not accept the provisions of JCS 1067.
Coordination between civilian agencies and the military 
remained a constant problem throughout the preparations for 
the occupation of Germany in spite of the creation of CAD in 
1943. After their negative experiences in Africa the War 
Department and SHAEF were reluctant to permit contacts 
between the military and civilian agencies,' although they 
were necessary to coordinate Military Government actions with 
long term objectives and policy making which the military had 
explicitly delegated to civilian authorities. The physical 
separation between SHAEF and Washington as well as the fact 
that communications had to go through a cumbersome 
communications system and had to pass several clearance 
hurdles further aggravated the situation.49
Since Civil Affairs staff officers could not communicate 
directly with civilian agencies in Washington and also were 
unwilling to concede the lead to the British, they had to 
rely on American resources available in England for writing 
a handbook that would help their officers once they were in 
Germany. With little updated information about Washington 
politics at hand and no guidance in form of a policy, they 
based their Handbook for Military Government on FM 27-5 and 
adapted it to conditions they were expecting to find in 
Germany. Their instructions were in line with the little
49Hammond 318-322.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
53
information Ambassador Winant received from the Working 
Security Committee in Washington which Roosevelt had created 
after Moscow to determine the American position in the 
negotiations of the European Advisory Committee. The 
Military Government detachments' main task initially was to 
facilitate tactical troop operations. When it became clearer 
that the military would be responsible for military 
government also for a period after the end of hostilities, 
the detachments' tasks were broadened. In July 1944 
education and religion became additional responsibilities. 
Apart from that, the book applied the general directions for 
military government of FM 27-5 to the situation it expected 
in Germany. The manual also was in line with military 
government policy the Combined Chiefs of Staff had agreed on 
in their directive CCS 551 late in May 1945. As we have 
seen, the handbook caused a considerable stir in Washington 
and triggered the Morgenthau plan in September 1944, but it 
survived even the President's requests to revise it 
surprisingly unharmed. The War Department resented this 
interference in its internal operations and therefore did not 
pursue the issue diligently. Since the manual was a joint 
venture between British and Americans, one side could not 
simply change it at its own convenience. The British never 
agreed to the provisions of JCS 1067, so the manual remained 
the basis of operations until the dissolution of SHAEF in
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July 1945, guiding officers in the field through the first 
crucial phase of military government activities.50
The authors of the handbook did not regard youth as a 
special problem and focused exclusively with the educational 
system. Since the instructions the State Department had 
prepared for CAD never were sent because of the Morgenthau 
episode, planners in London had even less to draw on in this 
field than in others. The handbook therefore provided some 
general guidelines which sought to minimize American control 
and interference. The authors assumed that, especially in 
such a delicate area, too much American interference would 
alienate even the Germans who had not supported the Nazis and 
whose responsibility it would be to rebuild and reform the 
system. Schools were to be closed only temporarily. They 
were to be reopened at the earliest possible moment to keep 
young people away from black market or resistance activities, 
to feed them, and to provide them with medical services if 
necessary.51
Eisenhower's staff realized that the handbook needed 
modifications. JCS 1067 not only demanded the elimination of 
National Socialism and militarism in schools, but also 
envisioned a comprehensive system of reeducation that went 
beyond them. The Americans' first experiences in Germany may 
have convinced them as well that some ways had to be found to
50Hammond 355-357; Tent, Mission 23-28; Ziemke 83-91.
5lTent, Mission 25-28.
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occupy German youth when they were not in school. On March 
10, 1945 Eisenhower's Civil Affairs Adviser, Robert Murphy, 
sent a revision of the handbook's education and religion 
section to American headquarters in Europe, which broadened 
the scope of the Education Branches in the field. Apart from
supervising the educational system, the revised manual
instructed educational officers to permit initiatives of 
youth organizations that would not be connected to schools 
and to support the introduction of new pedagogical ideals. 
The new handbook actually initiated a process in which 
conflicts would be inevitable. It permitted a revival of the 
traditional German way of organizing youth, but it promoted 
new departures in youth work at the same time. The directive 
also revealed that American staff planners from the start 
pursued dual objectives towards German youth which aimed at 
eliminating Nazism and militarism in the German educational 
system, and at the same time laid the foundation for a 
constructive program of re-education.52
Setting up an organization that would be capable of
carrying out the duties of a military government in Germany
was a difficult task that did not receive a high priority 
before the invasion of France. Since this would be the first 
time that a military force actually would completely take
52Ambassador Murphy, London, to State Department, 10 
March 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 740.00119/3-1045, 
quoted in Fiissl 98. Fiissl is the first scholar to make this 
argument for the treatment of German youth.
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over control of local, state and a central government, 
planners in Europe had to start from scratch. They developed 
an organization that was well suited to tactical support of 
troops during operations, but proved to be inadequate for 
Military Government activities after the end of hostilities. 
When American troops set foot on German soil at the end of 
1944, Military Government detachments accompanied them, 
prepared to take over local government for some time to come. 
The training these detachments had received was mostly 
technical. Their field manuals and instructions provided 
them only with broad guidelines but in general stressed that 
Germans should do the work and Americans would supervise it. 
Due to problems of communication between Europe and America 
and in part as a result of the nature of the binational 
command structure, policy decisions in Washington had little 
impact on the concrete planning for the occupation and would 
not be in effect during the first two months of the 
occupation, when many crucial decisions in regard to the 
Germans would have to be made in the field.
Like politicians and administrators in Washington, 
military government planners initially focused their 
attention exclusively on the educational system. They had 
practical reasons to do so. First, there would not be enough 
personnel to do more than supervise school activities. 
Secondly, schools were best suited to keep young people off 
the streets where they might cause trouble for the tactical
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troops. Thirdly, school buildings would be the most 
convenient places to administer services to young people, 
such as health care or food. Consequently the only necessary 
action would have to be to purge schools and teachers of Nazi 
ideology and textbooks. Furthermore Military Government 
would encourage administrative reform by the Germans. 
Organizing youth along democratic principles entered the 
picture relatively late in the process. Washington and 
European Headquarters neither envisioned nor desired direct 
contacts between Americans and young Germans.
Once American troops occupied Germany, however, American 
policy and its implementation towards youth never remained at 
a standstill. In Washington the Department of State 
continued to press for a policy statement that would 
implement its policies of a comprehensive and positive 
reeducation of Germany's younger generation. In Germany 
Military Government leaders faced the task of building an 
Allied Control Council. Redeployment to Japan and to the 
United States after August 1945, as well as setting up a 
functioning administration for the occupation forces and for 
military government, became major concerns for Lucius D. Clay 
and his staff. At the same time Military Government would 
have to take care of desolate economic, political and social 
conditions in the American zone of occupation that nobody had 
expected. The rehabilitation of youth consequently received 
scant attention and resources by the leading men in Germany,
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
58
although they recognized the importance of the task. 
Nevertheless youth work became an important factor in the 
communities throughout the American zone of occupation. 
Military Government officials in charge of education never 
gave up the fight. In the end they received support from 
some quite unexpected and not always welcome quarters.
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CHAPTER II 
Becoming Acquainted; 1944-45
The initial phase of the American presence in Germany 
taught valuable lessons to three groups: the occupiers, the 
older generation of reform minded Germans, and to the younger 
generation itself. Initiatives for contacts with the German 
population came from the over 1.5 million soldiers stationed 
in Germany and encompassed far more than meeting Frauleins. 
These initial contacts in many ways set the tone for future 
relations and left lasting impressions on the German side. 
The individual experiences with the American soldiers became 
a crucial ingredient in the formation of attitudes toward 
Americans, particularly for the younger generation and those 
who became involved in youth work after the war.
Occupying Germany
The first months of the American occupation of Germany 
were more difficult than the Americans had expected because 
they had not anticipated dealing with a complete political 
and social vacuum as well as an unimaginable scale of 
destruction. Military Government detachments in general 
found the population docile, often eager to serve their new 
masters. There was no resistance to speak of once the 
fighting was over. The problems were the same all over 
Germany: Nazis had fled the premises, often destroying
valuable town records before they abandoned their posts.
59
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Where fighting had been heavy, the infrastructure as well as 
utilities were interrupted. In almost all the bigger cities 
looting took place before the Americans could reestablish 
order. As long as the fighting lasted in Germany, a 
community could be confronted with different Army units and 
Military Government detachments who might issue contradicting 
orders. At the same time the tactical troops and their 
commanders, who were usually higher in rank than Military 
Government officers, pursued their own objectives which 
sometimes were detrimental to the occupational objectives. 
Looting by the troops initially was rather widespread. GIs, 
however, seemed to be interested in souvenirs rather than 
doing harm to the people.
By the end of 1944 Americans advanced into Germany. 
They found the same picture everywhere. Civilians awaited 
the end of hostilities in cellars, air raid shelters or in 
the countryside. Most of them simply waited for the ordeal 
to be over and wanted it to pass quickly. Usually heavy 
artillery and intense air raids prepared the advance of the 
Americans. Then the tanks came in and finally infantry 
cleaned up and advanced to the next community.1
Nuremberg had suffered greatly from repeated bombing 
raids. The British targeted the city as a whole, whereas the 
Americans focused their strategic bombing mainly on
lZiemke 225-226; Klaus-Jorg Ruhl, Die Besatzer und die 
Deutschen: Amerikanische Zone 1945-1948 (Diisseldorf: Droste, 
1980) 7-53.
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Nuremberg's industry, marshalling yards, and the train 
station. By April 16, 1945 American forces had reached the 
outskirts of the city, but even that late in the war, German 
soldiers did their duty and defended the city. Typically for 
the National Socialists, their most prominent representative, 
Julius Streicher had fled, but in a rare display of loyalty 
to Hitler and probably with no illusions about the fate that 
awaited them after the war, the mayor and the Gauleiter 
decided to participate and die in the city's last battle. 
Fighting lasted for five days, with approximately five 
thousand German defenders, many of them too young, too old, 
or too inexperienced to be effective and with hardly any 
equipment left. They faced almost ten times their number of 
battle-hardened GIs on the American side who could count on 
air support and artillery. Fighting was bitter and fierce, 
but by April 20 the Americans had broken German resistance. 
They celebrated their victory on Hitler's last birthday at 
the site of his party rallies. The price for this final and 
unnecessary bloodshed was the almost complete destruction of 
everything in the inner city which the bombing raids had left 
intact, not to mention a long list of casualties. Nuremberg 
had become a heap of rubble. The remnants of the defending 
forces marched off to the infamous Rhine valley prison camps. 
Nevertheless, the civilian population felt relief that the 
war was over for them. Not quite three weeks after the
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battle of Nuremberg Germany surrendered and the occupation 
officially began.2 
First Encounters
The Second World War created misery and death all over 
Europe. The Germans had demonstrated that warfare could be 
carried to a new level of destruction with their racial and 
scorched earth policies in the Soviet Union. Soviet troops 
encountered fierce resistance all the way to Berlin. 
Governments in Moscow and Berlin intensified hatred and fear 
with propaganda campaigns that preached nothing but hatred. 
German atrocities during the preceding four years undoubtedly 
contributed to a complete breakdown of any restraints by Red 
Army soldiers and, when the Soviets finally fought their way 
into Germany, turned into a nightmare for German civilians. 
Atrocities occurred on all sides, but on the western front 
the belligerents adhered far more to the rules of the Geneva 
Convention than in the East. American soldiers perceived 
their German counterparts as troops doing a job and usually
2Karl Kunze, Der Kampf um Nurnberg (Nurnberg 
[Nuremberg]: Verein fur Geschichte der Stadt Nurnberg, 1995) 
provides an extremely detailed, but at times not well 
organized account of the battle of Nuremberg. In his attempt 
to do justice to the German side, he tends to overemphasize 
American atrocities.
It is interesting to note that Kunze actually 
participated in the final battle as a very young man. He 
later became a teacher and in this capacity was selected to 
travel to the United States in the very first exchange group 
under the auspices of the Fulbright program in 1952. See 
also Henke (813-843) for a detailed picture of the 
disintegration of the Nazi party and its effects on the 
German population.
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did not harbor any deep hatred for them. There were attempts 
on both sides to arrange for a modus vivendi at times when 
the fronts were stalled, to take care of the wounded, or to 
observe Christian holidays. Initially GIs reacted strongly 
to German atrocities they witnessed in concentration camps, 
but the memories of most were surprisingly short.3
The first encounters between Germans and Americans 
during the final phase of the war should not be 
underestimated in their significance. No German knew what to 
expect from the American soldiers. Goebbels' propaganda 
machine had painted a gruesome picture of rape and looting. 
Racial prejudices made many people especially apprehensive 
about African-American troops. The soldiers' behavior
3Lee Kennet, GI: The American Soldier in World War II 
(New York: Warner, 1987) 155-162; Oliver Frederiksen (The 
American Military Occupation of Germany 1945-1953 
(Headquarters: United States Army, Europe [Heidelberg]:
United States Army, Historical Division, 1953) 130-132); also 
Henke 244. Frederiksen, an official Army historian, stated 
that Nazi atrocities initially had an impact on the soldiers' 
behavior towards the Germans but that many GIs changed their 
attitude almost immediately after the end of hostilities. 
This very interesting fact has escaped the attention of some 
scholars who deal with German-American grassroots relations 
after the war. Wolfgang Eckart, for example, maintains that 
American soldiers in general harbored strong anti-German 
sentiments throughout the occupation without substantiating 
his claim.
Ernst Volland and Heinz Krimmer, ed., Von Moskau nach 
Berlin: Bilder des russischen Photographen Jewgeni Chaldej, 
2nd rev. ed. (Berlin: Nicolaische Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1995) 
is an impressive documentation of the fighting and suffering 
on the Eastern front. Norman M. Naimark (The Russians in 
Germany: A History of the Soviet Zone of Occupation, 1945- 
1949 (London, Cambridge, Mass.: The Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press, 1995) 69-141) approaches the behavior of
the Soviet soldiers when they reached Germany in a scholarly 
way.
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towards civilians would set the tone for future relations 
between the victors and the vanquished. Young people who had 
not known anything else but a Germany that was shut off from 
the rest of the world by the National Socialists would be 
especially impressed during their first encounters with a new 
world.4
Some Germans had become acquainted with the United 
States as early as 1943. The soldiers of the Afrika Korps 
who were captured by the Americans ended up in POW camps in 
the United States. Those of the early prisoners who 
maintained strong Nazi convictions were able to obtain 
control of the camp populations and to install a system of 
military order which also maintained much of Nazi thought and 
propaganda. Anti-Nazis were usually segregated and sent into 
special camps. Americans failed to realize that between the 
two extremes existed a large number of prisoners who 
expressed nationalism but were not ardent followers of the
4Rolf Schorken (Jugend 1945: Politisches Denken und
Lebensgeschichte (Frankfurt/Main: Fischer, 1994) 29-31) and 
Ruhl (7-53) show that people in Germany were much less 
apprehensive about an American occupation than they were 
about falling into Soviet hands. The fears towards the 
Soviet armies were justified. Apart from Naimark, Guido 
Knopp (Das Ende 1945 - Der verdammte Krieg (Munchen [Munich]: 
Bertelsmann, 1995)) presents a less scholarly account 
containing photos, interviews, and documents from German and 
Russian sources which draw a stark picture of the realities 
in the East. Knopp successfully strikes a balance between 
the German racial warfare in the Soviet Union and the fate of 
German refugees and civilians once the Red Army caught up 
with them in 1944 and 1945. Eckart (122-123) emphasizes that 
Germans only had Goebbels' propaganda as a source and as a 
result were rather apprehensive about their first encounters 
with American troops.
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National Socialists. Initially the Army was only interested 
in maintaining order and getting the German POWs to work, 
mainly in agriculture. It was not until 1945 that Americans 
made attempts to make re-education a feature in German 
Camps.5
Germans in POW camps displayed considerable curiosity 
about the United States and got to know America through their 
work and their contacts with the local population. Since 
many of the camps were located in the South, the prisoners 
became acquainted with a society in which African-Americans 
were disfranchised and both races were strictly segregated. 
Their experiences tended to reinforce the racial prejudices 
many had come to accept in National Socialist doctrine. The 
men who were exposed to American racial realities would 
certainly find it difficult to perceive American re-education 
and democratization programs in their camps as well as in 
Germany as more than mere and insincere propaganda.6
A number of the German prisoners, however, did take 
advantage of the chance to learn something new while they 
were in the United States. Willy Gensmantel, who had lived 
in Nuremberg before enlisting in the German army and would
sArnold Krammer (Nazi Prisoners of War in America 
(Chelsea: Scarborough, 1991)) is a very well illustrated and 
documented account of the German POW experience in the United 
States; see also Rafael Zagovec ("German Prisoners of War and 
the Homefront in Louisiana, 1943-46: A Cultural
Interpretation", M.A. Thesis, Louisiana State University, 
Baton Rouge, 1995) 179-256.
6Krammer 151; Zagovec 179-256; Fussl 66.
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return there after his release, was one of the veterans of 
the African campaign. He was not the typical POW. Born in 
1919, Gensmantel came from a working family and had been a 
member of the trade union youth before 1933. After he had 
finished his apprenticeship, Gensmantel decided to volunteer 
for the Reichsarbeitsdienst, the massive Nazi job program for 
young Germans. After his service there Gensmantel enlisted 
in the army. His motive for volunteering was that a worker 
in Germany could not get full pay until he was twenty one 
years old.7
The Americans took Gensmantel prisoner in Africa in 
1943. He spent the next three years of his life in the 
United States. Initially he shared the fate of most German 
prisoners and went to a number of camps in the South where he 
worked in agriculture. He decided that the best way to pass 
the time without getting homesick was to participate in as 
many camp activities as possible. Gensmantel played in a 
band, sang in a choir, became a member of a theater group, 
and volunteered for kitchen work.8
7Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995. 
Gensmantel was one of various leading trade union members 
whom I was able to interview at the unions' headquarters 
thanks to the efforts of Horst Klaus, a retired trade union 
youth secretary, who has been working very hard to make the 
trade unions' postwar history available to the younger 
generation.
8Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; 
Krammer 50-78.
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These activities were the only positive aspect 
Gensmantel could find in his captivity. Officers, non­
commissioned officers, and enlisted men lived different 
lives. What he found most objectionable was that Americans 
made it very clear to the prisoners that they regarded them 
all as Nazis and made no attempt to differentiate between 
those who served in the armed forces because they had no 
choice, and those who had actually supported Hitler. On the 
contrary, it seemed to Gensmantel that the officers, without 
whose support Hitler would not have been able to take over 
the reins of Germany, got the better end of the deal.
Officers, for example, always had enough to eat but never
bothered to share their food with the enlisted men who had to 
work hard and got just 1200 calories per day. Gensmantel
recalled that the American Army did not react kindly to
guards who became friendly with the prisoners. He thought 
that the Americans were Germany's equal when it came to 
punishing soldiers who deviated from the norm.9
Gensmantel spent time in various states throughout the 
deep South. The people of German ancestry especially 
disappointed Gensmantel, because he found many ardent Nazi 
supporters among them, but he also became aware of the evils 
of a segregated society. According to him, however, the low
9Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; 
Krammer (148-151) documents a wide range of attitudes towards 
German prisoners which went from hatred to aiding POWs in 
their escape attempts.
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status and discrimination of the African-Americans had its 
advantages for the German prisoners. Both groups were 
exploited by the same masters, so many African-Americans did 
not seem to have problems in helping the prisoners whenever 
they could, above all by providing them with food. Germans 
who benefitted from this support tried to return the favors. 
Whenever white persons became aware of the system, however, 
they did everything to disrupt these ties.
After the first year Gensmantel was sent to a special 
prison camp because he refused to work. He and others sent 
there argued that every German who worked in the United 
States freed an American for war duties that ultimately would 
kill Germans. Although his argument was consistent with the 
Geneva convention, the Americans did not like it. Living 
conditions in Camp Alva, Oklahoma, were considerably worse 
than anywhere else. His situation improved when he 
volunteered for one of the re-education and democratization 
courses which the Army offered to over 23,000 of the 370,000 
German prisoners in the United States from 1945 on. 
According to him, the Americans only accepted people in the 
courses who had not been members in any Nazi organizations. 
Since he had participated in the trade union youth, the Nazis 
had excluded him from membership in the Hitler youth. This 
enabled him to take part in the program and stay on to the 
end. He witnessed that others were sent back to their camps 
as soon as the Americans learned about their membership in
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party organizations. Gensmantel was impressed with the 
personalities and the professional instruction he received. 
According to him, it was in those camps that he obtained the 
foundation for his democratic convictions and the motivation 
for his political activities in Germany. He came back to 
Germany convinced that the best way to make a German a good 
democrat was to teach him disobedience.10
The Americans had instructed participants in the courses 
to look for jobs either in the Counter Intelligence Corps, in 
agriculture or in the public sector when they got home. When 
Gensmantel left the United States, American soldiers took 
away everything he had. He arrived at Nuremberg in May 1946, 
weighing only 37 Kilos (about 80 American pounds). Working 
as an American agent was out of the question for him, so he 
opted for the public sector. Gensmantel immediately found a 
job in a railroad yard and became an organizer for the trade 
unions' youth work after just four weeks on the job. At the 
same time he began to build a youth section in the workers'
10Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; 
Krammer (219-227) provides additional details on Fort Eustis 
and the re-education program; see also "Anti-Nazi PW 
Returns," Office of Military Government for Germany, U.S., 
Weekly Information Bulletin [hereinafter OMGUS Information 
Bulletin] no. 37, 15 Apr. 1946: 9. The bulletin served as a 
link between headquarters and the field. It must have been 
a vital and welcome source for the field officers because it 
highlighted, summarized and interpreted the never ending flow 
of orders. The bulletin's section on German reactions to 
American policies provided background information for those 
Americans who did not speak German. Headquarters also 
included stories on detachment activities it considered 
exemplary.
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sports club in Fiirth, Nuremberg's neighbor city. He would 
later become one of the most outspoken youth representatives 
in Nuremberg. The Nuremberg trade unions later appointed him 
full time youth secretary. His goal was to make the trade 
unions a second home for young people, because they could 
offer them support. He knew that the unions could count on 
American help.11
Although Gensmantel's experiences were rather extreme in 
some respects, most German prisoners returned to Germany with 
an appreciation for the United States, its people, but also 
its power. The Army's re-education courses provided men like 
Gensmantel, who were willing to listen to new ideas and had 
a clean past, with an opportunity to rethink their political 
and social attitudes and motivated them to actively 
participate in Germany's reconstruction along democratic 
lines.
While German and American soldiers encountered each 
other on the battlefields from 1943 on, it was not until the 
late summer of 1944 that German civilians got to know the 
Americans. In August American troops established their first 
bridgehead in Germany. They got a surprisingly friendly 
reception. Once the immediate danger of the fighting was
“Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995. MG 
headquarters informed its field officers about the purpose of 
the program in April 1946 and instructed them to give the 
Germans who had participated in it priority over any others 
in the clearance process they had to go through when they 
applied for a job in the public sector. "Anti Nazi PW 
Returns," OMGUS Information Bulletin no. 37, 15 Apr. 194 6: 9.
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over, Germans came out to have a closer look at the 
conquerors. They greeted GIs on the streets and permitted 
their children to wave at them.12
Keeping their attitude towards German soldiers in mind, 
it is not surprising that GIs quickly established contact 
with the population once they entered Germany. It did not 
take long until pictures showing Germans and American 
soldiers celebrating the end of the war together reached 
Washington. Chief of Staff General Marshall informed SHAEF 
that Washington did not look kindly upon these events. 
Eisenhower immediately issued orders that prohibited any form 
of fraternization.13 The soldiers were not happy. Arthur 
Goodfriend, editor-in-chief of the Army's official newspaper, 
the Stars and Stripes, conducted an unofficial opinion survey 
among the troops shortly after the orders came out. He found 
that the soldiers in general were favorably impressed with 
the Germans. Some even thought that the Germans were 
"cleaner and damned sight friendlier than the Frogs 
[French]". Stars and Stripes described the situation in 
Aachen:
1) German Civilians are giving Yanks the V-sign, the 
glad hand, the free beer, big smiles and plenty of talk 
about not being Nazis at heart, and hurray for 
democracy.
12Ziemke 138-139; on September 14, 1944 the London Times 
published an article under the headline "Germans Welcome the 
Invaders" (quoted in Woller 57-58).
I3Henke 284-297; Ziemke 97-99.
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2) Some G.I.s and plenty of officers are returning the 
smiles, flirting with the Frauleins, drinking the beer 
and starting to think what nice folks the Germans really 
are.
The headline admonished the readers not to "Get Chummy With 
Gerry," but Goodfriend and other officers did not think that 
the soldiers would obey the order for more than a month.14
The American occupation of Aachen and its surroundings 
took place before the Battle of the Bulge and the discovery 
of Nazi concentration camps in Germany. Aachen was a border 
region and overwhelmingly Catholic. Some Americans thought 
that it was not typical and justified their friendly behavior 
towards the Germans there in this way. One might assume that 
the Battle of the Bulge, German atrocities, and the discovery 
of concentration camps might have changed the initial 
friendly inclinations of American GIs once they arrived at 
the heartland of Germany. The region of Middle Franconia in 
Bavaria seemed to be more representative of Nazi Germany. 
The biggest community in the region was Nuremberg, infamous 
for hosting the Nazi party rallies and for the antisemitic 
laws of 19 3 5 which came to bear its name. Middle Franconia 
had been a Nazi stronghold with Julius Streicher as its 
Gauleiter until even the Nazi party could not tolerate his 
excesses anymore. Americans got there by April 1945, at a 
time when Nazi atrocities in concentration camps were widely
I4Ziemke 142-143; Davidson (54-56) documents the 
intensive campaign against fraternization in the Stars and 
Stripes.
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publicized among the troops. The units involved in the 
operations in that region had fought in the Battle of the 
Bulge and, more recently, had to break strong German 
resistance between Heilbronn and Crailsheim in Wiirttemberg 
before they could enter Bavaria. They had to fight their 
last major battle in the ruins of the city. Their behavior 
towards the Germans could be expected to be less friendly 
than that of the Americans who had come into Aachen.15
In Middle Franconia, just as everywhere else, the first 
indication of the impending arrival of American troops was a 
steady stream of German units and individual soldiers who 
sought a last defensive position or tried to avoid being 
captured. It was obvious to everyone that this army was 
completely disintegrating. Young and old people were 
painfully aware of the sorry physical and mental condition of 
most soldiers as they stole through forests in an attempt to 
escape American troops and planes.16
If there was any fighting for villages or towns it did 
not last long. Even the city of Nuremberg held out for only 
five days. Often the Americans entered the communities 
without having to fire a shot. This was the case in
15Woller (27-44) provides an excellent overview of the 
history of region between 1933 and 1945; for American troop 
movements in the region during the last weeks of the war see 
Woller 46.
16Georg Bergler, Zwischen Ende und Anfang: Die Erlebnisse 
des Herrn Jedermann im Jahre Null (Nurnberg [Nuremberg]: 
Frankenverlag, 1963) 88-93; Henke 958-964; Woller 46;
Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
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Hersching, near Munich. H. Wisura, an eighteen-year-old 
refugee from the Sudetenland in 1945, was there and witnessed 
the American occupation. According to him, the Americans 
came to town more as visitors than combat troops. Parts of 
the population even welcomed them. All little children 
received Hershey chocolate. In general Wisura thought that 
the Americans were exceptionally well behaved, especially in 
comparison with the French troops who were just across the 
river and did not display the restraint and discipline of the 
Americans.17
Middle Franconia was no exception. As may be expected 
from a defeated nation, Germans tried to please the victors. 
The official history of the 42nd Division, which was involved 
in the operations in the region, recorded the eagerness with 
which the Germans tried to serve their new masters. Tank 
barriers disappeared in a matter of minutes, and many natives 
offered to help the Americans move into their villages and 
towns. When the Germans were ordered to turn in their
nH. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994. The events 
during the initial phase of the Russian occupation are the 
topic of numerous accounts published above all by German 
refugee organizations. Knopp and Naimark are the latest and 
most balanced accounts of the final months of the war in the 
East; Henke (200, especially fn 191) and F. Roy Willis 
(France, Germany, and the New Europe 1945-1967, revised and 
expanded edition (Oxford, London: Oxford University Press, 
1968) 32-33) provide information on the French and Soviet
troops' behavior; see also Clemens Vollnhals, "Die 
Evangelische Kirche zwischen Traditionswahrung und 
Neuorientierung," Von Stalingrad zur Wahrungsreform: Zur
Sozialgeschichte des Umbruchs in Deutschland, eds. Martin 
Broszat et al. (Mtinchen [Munich]: Oldenbourg, 1990) 153 .
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weapons, they brought guns, pistols, helmets, gas masks, Nazi 
party insignia and everything else they thought might 
incriminate them as a Nazi or a soldier. German behavior 
went a step further than just fulfilling orders. The Army 
historian reported that the Germans displayed considerable 
curiosity and friendliness towards the occupiers. This 
behavior stood in marked contrast to the attitude the Germans 
displayed towards their own soldiers who marched by to 
prisoner of war camps. The civilians did not even seem to 
notice their presence.18
The behavior of the American soldiers during and 
immediately after the fighting did much to disperse initial 
apprehension. A little village about forty miles away from 
Nuremberg, for example, was hit by American planes when 
remnants of SS units fired at the advancing American troops. 
The German civilians certainly could not expect American 
benevolence after the incident, but the story of a seventeen- 
year-old Hitler Youth leader in full uniform is symptomatic 
of the GIs' attitude. The young man was so absorbed with 
firefighting and cleaning up the rubble that he did not 
realize that an American tank had stopped right behind him. 
When he became aware of the tank, he allegedly made an 
awkward attempt to cover his insignia, fearing for his life. 
He need not have worried, since, according to him, the tank's 
trap door opened and a black soldier came out laughing,
l8Woller 57.
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apparently delighted by the little prank he had just pulled 
on the German. Almost forty years after the event the man 
recalled that the American had reversed years of Nazi 
propaganda with one non-blow.19
The situation was the same throughout the region. A 
resident of Fiirth, a city adjacent to Nuremberg, recalled her 
first experiences with the Americans. Some children first 
left a bunker once the fighting stopped and soon returned 
with candy and chocolate. Everybody in the bunker agreed, 
the eyewitness reported, that the Americans could not be mad 
at the Germans if they treated the children so well.20 On 
the other end of Fiirth Hanns Bader, a sixteen-year-old Hitler 
Youth member, had been ordered to report to a Nazi 
indoctrination camp in nearby Cadolzburg, supposedly to 
prepare him for subversive actions. In one of Fiirth's 
suburbs he was unable to continue his journey because the 
Americans had already occupied the road. A German soldier 
prevented him from trying to get through the lines and sent 
him home, where his mother took away his uniform and hid it.
I9Woller 58. Apparently African-American combat troops 
operated in and around Nuremberg. Many Germans remembered 
that Nazi propaganda had made them especially apprehensive 
about the behavior of African American soldiers. The 
positive experiences of many Germans, however, provided a 
stark contrast to Goebbels' indoctrination. We will see in 
the course of the dissertation that especially encounters 
with black Americans could do much to disperse racial 
prejudices and to undermine the very foundations of Nazi 
propaganda in young people.
20Woller 58.
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Bader recalled that the first encounter with Americans was 
rather tense, but that the GIs behaved correctly and many of 
them spoke German. When Americans found out about his 
leadership position in the Hitler Youth, they took him to the 
courthouse for questioning. Bader could go after the session 
and did not have to endure any physical or emotional abuse. 
He recalled that the American who interrogated him turned out 
to be a former citizen of Fiirth. The city had a large and 
quite wealthy Jewish community when Hitler took over Germany 
in 1933 . It is possible that a number of these Jews were 
able to emigrate before Hitler went to war and decided to 
embark on the complete destruction of the European Jews. A 
good number of emigres seemed to return as Allied soldiers to 
their home country. They not only provided vital services as 
interpreters, but many also seemed to have developed an 
interest in participating actively in reforming Germany.21
21Hanns Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994. Henry 
Kissinger is probably the most prominent member of this 
group. He was a member of an American military government 
unit after the war and certainly visited Fiirth, where he was 
born and spent the first years of his life. Many others may 
have ended up in combat units or even may have volunteered to 
participate in the occupation of their former home towns. It 
made perfect sense for the army to rely on people who were 
familiar with the region and the language. I have not been 
able, however, to substantiate these assumptions. A study of 
the military's use of German emigres in combat units and in 
the occupation of Germany is long overdue. So far only the 
Germans who were active in the Office of Strategic Services 
in Washington have received some of the historians' 
attention. Fiissl (62-66) bases his account of the Americans' 
initial experiences with young Germans entirely on OSS 
reports. Although they undoubtedly convey accurate 
information about individual cases, they may not be 
representative for the entire population. A study on the
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Many Nurembergers had left the city before the Americans 
arrived. They had either been evacuated or bombed out, or 
they simply had left before the last battle began. Since 
they were widely dispersed, their first encounters with 
Americans took place under many different conditions and
represent the initial experiences between Germans and
Americans in general quite well.
Helga Arnold, at the time twenty-one years old, had been 
evacuated from Nuremberg to Pappenheim, a small town in the
Altmiihl valley, where she met the first American troops. She
remembered that she had apprehensions, especially about 
African-American soldiers, but that nothing happened to the
field operations would be necessary to help evaluate the 
reports. In view of the past experiences and the very 
pessimistic view most of the emigres had towards Germany, it 
is not surprising that their reports seemed to have the 
tendency to draw a very stark picture of the effects of Nazi 
indoctrination on the population, which included youth. To 
my knowledge nobody has examined the backgrounds of the men 
who conducted the interviews and wrote these reports. An 
oral history project which Petra Marquardt-Bigman, an expert 
on the OSS reports, is conducting for the German Historical 
Institute is conducting at the moment (fall 199 6) may shed 
more light on these questions. Fiissl (78-81) himself points 
out that many emigres were understandably not at all 
favorably inclined towards Germany. It would have been 
natural for them to look for evidence which reaffirmed their 
attitudes. Arno Hamburger, for example, had experienced Nazi 
discrimination against Jews in Nuremberg firsthand. He 
joined the British army in Palestine after he had been able 
to escape from Nuremberg and Nazi prosecution. Hamburger did 
not make it into Germany during the war, but returned to 
Nuremberg immediately after the end of hostilities. He did 
not find that the adults had changed at all. He did think, 
however, that the young people might offer a chance for 
changes and became involved in the Army's German Youth 
Activities program later (Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 
11 Aug. 1994) .
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civilian population. Americans entered the house where she 
was staying and searched it, but did not break anything.22 
Friedrich Voigt, thirty-three years old in 1945, worked for 
the telecommunications branch of the German postal services. 
Together with his wife he had brought some furniture to the 
little town of Wassertriidingen, about thirty miles away from 
Nuremberg. He managed to be there when the Americans came. 
The inhabitants of this village decided to hoist white flags 
which they had taken from a train American planes had just 
destroyed when American troops approached the village. Voigt 
had thrown his uniform and rifle in a nearby river long 
before two white and three black Americans entered the house. 
His wife greeted them in English and Voigt offered the 
soldiers some fresh eggs. When they saw that he was smoking 
a cigarette with French paper, they thought that he was a 
displaced person and left cigarettes for him and chocolate 
for his daughter. The GIs returned after a few days for more 
eggs and left more food.23
When fighting actually occurred, Germans in Franconia as 
well as everywhere else, waited for its end in the basements 
of their houses or in bunkers. Many met the first American 
soldiers in these retreats. Heinz Fiegl, at the time fifteen 
years old, was in Nuremberg during the battle. He remembered 
that he was a little worried about the safety of the women
22Helga Arnold, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
23Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 26 July 1994.
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when the Americans came in, because he was alone with his 
mother and a female friend in the basement. All other 
neighbors had gone to a public bunker. Fiegl recalled that 
one could tell that Americans were in the house, because 
their boots had rubber soles and could hardly be heard in 
contrast to the German army boots with leather soles. 
Initially the Fiegl's apprehensions seemed to come true. The 
two soldiers approached the women, but after some tense 
moments the Germans were able to change the GIs' intentions. 
The Americans even became very friendly, although nobody 
spoke the others' language. First both soldiers unpacked 
some chocolate for the Germans. Then one of them went away, 
while the other played with the neighbor's cat. Soon the 
second soldier returned with some food for the Germans and 
then both left to continue the fight.24
Even those people who were very skeptical about the 
Americans or suffered damages from denazification and 
requisitions of their houses or property later, remembered 
that the first troops they met behaved correctly. Helga 
Kohler, for example, was twenty-five years old when the 
Americans came. Troops searched her house and came 
downstairs to look for German soldiers. When they did not 
find any, they left. She recalled that the owner of the 
house, a small shopkeeper, recognized a number of the 
American soldiers. They had actually been his Jewish
24Heinz Fiegl, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
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neighbors before they had had to flee the Nazis in the 
thirties.25
Some adults were not afraid to show their relief and 
happiness about the end of the war. Women hugged the first 
American soldiers they saw when they were allowed to leave 
the bunkers after the end of hostilities. Their behavior did 
not meet the approval of the German men who witnessed it.26
The younger the Germans were at the time, the less 
apprehensive they seemed to have been. Many of them had 
their first encounters with Americans in the countryside, 
where they had been evacuated to protect them from bombing 
raids and fighting. No fighting meant that Americans and the 
children of their enemies could meet under more favorable
^Helga Kohler, personal interview, 13 July 1994. She 
was not the only person to observe this. The director of a 
vocational school, for example, reported that he met an 
American officer who spoke fluent German while looking for 
hospital supplies immediately after the end of the fighting. 
He struck up a conversation and found out that this officer 
was the son of a Jewish toy shop owner who had emigrated to 
the United States in 1933 (Nuremberg City Archives 
[hereinafter NCA] C36/I no. 322). See also Hanns Bader, 
personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994, for neighboring Fiirth. It 
seems that many former Germans returned with Allied troops to 
Germany, but so far there are no numbers at all to 
corroborate the impressions of the German interviewees. Arno 
Hamburger's experiences may not have been typical for most 
emigres, but they illustrate well the strange ways in which 
Germans found their way back into Germany. After the war he 
found that his parents had miraculously survived the 
Holocaust. Hamburger became an interpreter at the Nuremberg 
trials. His parents convinced him not to leave Germany again 
and so he became one of the few German Jews who actually 
decided to return to Germany for good. (Arno Hamburger, 
personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994).
26Reports of Rolf Goetzinger and Vocational School 
Director Hehl; NCA C36/I no. 322.
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circumstances. Winfried Blumel, for example, was twelve 
years old when he met the first American soldiers in Tirol, 
Austria. He was impressed with the stark contrast between 
German and American troops at the end of the war. Blumel 
remembered German troops herding what looked like 
concentration camp inmates passed his house just a few days 
before the Americans arrived. They entered the town exactly 
on the same street with their guns ready for action. 
According to Blumel, the initial contacts usually came 
quickly between children and American soldiers, especially 
African-American GIs. The children usually were not afraid, 
and Blumel thought that it was more a matter of mentality how 
quickly one would leave the house and make contact. The 
children were interested above all in oranges, chocolates, 
and the jeeps.27
Gerhard Springer was eight years old in 194 5. His 
father was an engineer in a Nuremberg motorcycle factory. 
Springer spent the last months of the war in Weissenbronn, a 
little village between Nuremberg and Ansbach, about fifteen 
miles away from Nuremberg. He lived with the local butcher, 
who was a World War I veteran, head of the fire brigade, and 
in this function automatically the commander of the local 
Volkssturm, Hitler's last attempt to mobilize old men and 
children for the last battle. Springer remembered the steady 
stream of German soldiers walking through the woods. His
^Winfried Blumel, personal interview, 28 July 1994.
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host parked a gas truck of an SS unit behind his house for a 
while, but these German troops just like all others just 
passed through.28
Springer observed that the Americans made their presence 
felt first with artillery which they directed towards a small 
street junction behind the village. Then an American tank 
with four soldiers arrived to negotiate the surrender of the 
village. As soon as that was done, a tank barrier the 
villagers had been ordered to construct at the end of the 
street disappeared within minutes. The Americans arrived 
with the Germans in the houses watching the scene from behind 
the windows. Soon the first Germans left their houses, but 
the situation was still tense. Finally Yugoslav displaced 
persons who had worked in the fields for the villagers and 
apparently had been treated well broke the ice. They talked 
to the soldiers and suddenly the atmosphere changed. The GIs 
descended from their vehicles to greet the population and to 
distribute candy. The children inspected the American 
vehicles. Springer was impressed, because he never had been 
able to get so close to any German unit and their equipment. 
These combat troops left almost immediately. The next day 
Springer saw the first African-American soldiers who drove 
ammunition trucks at breakneck speed through the village.29
28Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
29Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
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The villagers' initial experience ended on an unpleasant 
note. An American infantry unit marched in and ordered the 
entire village population out into two barns where they had 
to spend the night. When they were allowed to return to the 
village the next day, the soldiers had cut featherbeds in all 
houses open and emptied all preserves they could find on 
them. Since these soldiers were not motorized, Springer 
suspected later that they either belonged to a unit that was 
being punished or that they were displaced persons wearing 
American uniforms.30
Springer apparently was one of relatively few young 
people who witnessed negative actions by men in American 
uniforms. Two years after the war Nuremberg's school 
superintendent Barthel had students write about their most 
memorable experiences. It is not surprising that most of the 
students wrote about the war and the bombing of Nuremberg. 
A number of the surviving essays, however, also deal with the 
first encounters the children had with the occupiers. One 
girl, born in 1934, remembered the bombardment of the village 
where she was living with her mother by American planes. 
Soon after the attack the first American tanks appeared on 
the street. Their crews distributed candy and chocolate 
while the mother was occupied until the night with helping
30Gerhard Springer, personal interview, l Aug. 1995. 
Springer's assumption about the supposedly American troops is 
probably correct. The Americans had difficulties all over 
their zone with displaced persons who committed crimes in 
American uniforms (Ziemke 355-356).
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the farmers to control the fires the attacks had caused. A 
boy, who was eight years old at the time, recorded that 
American artillery severely damaged his family's house. 
Nevertheless he thought that the end of the war meant the 
beginning of a "nice time", because the children received 
lots of food from the Americans. A nine year old boy who had 
been evacuated to another village recorded a similar 
experience. After heavy artillery bombardments the Americans 
came. People left the cellars to watch the new rulers 
occupying their village. American kindness seemed to help 
children cope with the destruction of the fighting around 
them and did much to counteract Goebbel's negative propaganda 
of impending rape and looting. The boy wrote that the 
children went up to the Americans and got chocolate. His 
final remark adequately sums up the young people's 
experiences: "I had imagined that it would be much worse."31
Refugees who came mainly from Silesia and the 
Sudetenland made their acquaintance with Americans during 
their flight from the Russians. Johannes Wahner was sixteen 
years old in 1945. He and his mother had escaped the 
Russians in Breslau. Just like Hanns Bader in Ftirth, Wahner 
was ordered to present himself at a camp in the Riesengebirge
3INCA E10/1 no. 21, essay numbers 41, 20, and 12.
Numerous stories the Niirnberger Nachrichten collected for 
special issues in 1985 (Trummerj ahre 1945-1950 [hereinafter 
Trummerjahre]: 1-3) and 11 Nov. 1994 (Erinnerungen 1935-
1945-1995 [hereinafter Erinnerungen]: 25-26) confirm the
information above.
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camp learned of Hitler's death, they obviously realized that 
the war was all but over and sent the youngsters home. Like 
so many refugees, Wahner and his fatherless family spent much 
time on trains without knowing where they were going. They 
went to Prague and finally ended up in the Sudeten mountains. 
His first encounters with Americans were unpleasant. 
American fighter pilots shot at anything that moved on the 
streets at the end of the war. Wahner had tc dive for cover 
on various occasions. He remembered that the planes were 
flying so low that you could actually see the pilots' faces. 
According to him, young people, who apparently often still 
regarded the war as an exciting adventure as long as they did 
not have to confront death directly, did not take those 
attacks very seriously or personally, whereas adults began to 
harbor very negative feelings.
Wahner met Americans for the first time when they 
occupied Mies, where his and his family's odyssey had ended 
for the time being. Influenced by the Nazi propaganda, he 
and his family were initially afraid of the African-American 
soldiers who came and searched their basement. Wahner 
recalled that the only place where he ever had seen black 
people was the circus in Breslau, Silesia's capital. The 
Czechs greeted the liberators enthusiastically. GIs threw 
candy and chocolate to them from their vehicles. It did not 
take the German children long to emulate the behavior of the
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Czechs and get their share of goodies. Wahner was impressed 
with the fitness and the size of the soldiers. He recalled 
that hunger and curiosity overcame any reservations he may 
have had, so he went with other youngsters to the hotel the 
Americans had requisitioned. The soldiers wanted to meet 
Frauleins. Wahner and his friends were able to provide the 
contacts and received chocolate in return. According to him, 
there was no fear once the Germans realized that the 
Americans looked the same and acted the same as everybody 
else. Language problems apparently were no barrier against 
becoming acquainted.32
Since African-American soldiers were physically 
different and had received much negative publicity by the 
Nazi propaganda machine, they attracted special attention 
from the Germans. Some people also remembered the deplorable 
behavior of Moroccan troops the French had deployed in 
Germany after World War I, a fact that Goebbels used 
extensively to instill fear in the German population. Events 
during the initial phase of the occupation, however, often 
tended to reverse the apprehensions. Even today black 
soldiers have a special place in many German recollections. 
One lady, at the time six years old, remembered the American 
occupation of Buch, a small suburb of Nuremberg. American 
tanks stopped right in front of their house and two African- 
American soldiers knocked at the door with their submachine
32Johannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
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guns ready. The girl's mother opened the door, but panicked 
and locked it again. The girl's father, a handicapped man, 
showed better judgement and let the soldiers in. The 
children, impressed by Nazi propaganda that depicted black 
Americans as cannibals and subhumans, were scared to death 
and remained in the basement. After the two GIs had 
satisfied themselves, however, that no German soldiers were 
hiding in the house, they relaxed and ordered coffee. They 
did not accept the Germans' coffee substitute made of roasted 
barley, but provided their own instant coffee which they 
shared with their hosts. After he had finished his coffee, 
one of the GIs pulled a roll of drops out of his pocket which 
he offered to the children in exchange for a kiss. The 
lady's younger sister was the first one to get the idea and 
immediately complied. Her older sister followed suit and was 
rewarded in the same manner. All these experiences left 
lasting impressions on children and adolescents in the region 
which they remembered vividly. While in other regions of 
Germany the war ended in a nightmare, their memories were 
much more positive. They may not have perceived the 
Americans as liberators, but the candy, the openness, and the 
friendliness of many GIs made the beginning of the occupation 
something positive, may be, even desirable. Instead of bombs 
and fear there was candy and peace.33
33"KuJ3 fur eine Rolle Drops," Trummerj ahre: 10.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
89
What Germans may not have realized at the time was that 
these experiences bore special significance for the African- 
American GIs who came from a segregated society and had to 
fight the war against Hitler in a segregated army in which 
they had to face many instances of discrimination. Looking 
at a white woman or being friendly to a white child could 
have dire consequences even for a man in uniform in the Deep 
South. Going out with a German Fraulein or demanding a kiss 
for some candy from a German child may have meant much more 
for African-American than for white GIs. It provided a 
possibility to transgress race barriers without being 
punished for it. The soldiers who were able to enjoy these 
kinds of opportunities in Germany certainly formed a pool of 
men that was very perceptive to the call of the civil rights 
movement of the fifties at home. The popularity of 
assignments to Europe among African-American troops showed 
that they were certainly aware of these possibilities and the 
lack of discrimination.34
^The role of African-Americans in the occupation of 
Germany has not received the attention it deserves. American 
historians recognized African-American discontent with 
segregation and discrimination in the Armed forces. It is 
well established now that African-Americans clearly realized 
the discrepancy between fighting oppression abroad and their 
own misery at home. Historians also found that a great 
number of African-American GIs and officers, especially if 
they were from the north, began to protest the strict 
segregation and discrimination they found in training camps 
and in Southern communities where most of the camps were 
located.
While there exist excellent studies on the African- 
Americans' experiences with discrimination and on the 
integration of the armed forces, nobody has examined how the
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The rather good behavior of many American soldiers did 
not mean that Germans got away completely unharmed. One 
little girl witnessed how four GIs entered their apartment 
and threw beds and mattresses from her parents' sleeping room 
on a truck in front of the house. Everybody fled to the 
basement with the exception of the grandfather. At first the 
family feared that the soldiers had also taken him along. To 
everybody's relief the damage was just material. The GIs had 
left him unharmed in the apartment. It seemed that during 
the combat phase every GI wanted to take home some souvenir. 
For many Germans who happened to run into Americans during 
the operational phase, "USA" quickly acquired a new meaning: 
Uhrensammler Armee (watch collector army) or Uhren stehlen's 
auch (they also steal watches) .3S
black soldiers' experiences overseas actually may have 
influenced them in their further lives. Richard Dalfiume, 
Fighting two Fronts: Desegregation of the U.S. Armed Forces,
1939-1953 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1969) 
provides interesting and provocative insights into the 
African American soldiers' experiences during World War II. 
Morris J. MacGregor, Jr. (Integration of the Armed Forces
1940-1965 (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History,
1981) 17-57) is a scholalry account of the problem of race
relations during World War II. He mentioned the popularity 
of assignments in Europe (214). William Gardner Smith made 
these problems the topic of his novel Last of the Conquerors 
(New York: Farar, Straus, and Company: 1948). Interestingly, 
I became aware of the novel through a review of 1949 in one 
of Nuremberg's newspapers.
35Essay by a Nuremberg elementary school student: "An
Experience which I will not forget;" NCA E 10/1 no. 21, 
essay no. 44; report of vocational school director Hehl; NCA 
C36/I no. 322; Woller (57-59) detected the same pattern in 
the region around Nuremberg; see also Ziemke 250-252, 
"Uhrensammler unterwegs: Amerikaner interessierten sich fur 
Wertgegenstande," Trummerjahre: 6. The Germans' postwar
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There were, of course, American soldiers who did not 
show any restraint or friendliness towards the Germans. Rape 
and serious looting as well as wanton destruction of property 
did occur.36 An elderly lady who was not at all well 
disposed towards the occupiers reported that parts of the 
troops quartered in her house displayed rather rude behavior 
and stole whatever they could. She also noted that
occasionally the soldiers destroyed property for no reason. 
The woman concluded, however, that she "was sorry to say that 
German soldiers calmly admit that they had not behaved better 
in enemy countries." She paid special attention to African- 
American GIs, observing that "niggers" camped on the former 
party rally grounds, but that one "did not have to be afraid 
of the 'Blacks.'"37
definition of USA is still very much a commonplace among the 
people who experienced the American occupation. If many 
years of listening to stories in the family and among friends 
in Germany are any indicator, the immense interest for 
watches seemed to have been one of the few things GIs and 
Russian soldiers had in common. The difference seems to have 
been that Russians were more inclined to resort to violence 
if they encountered resistance, whereas Americans just took 
the items they wanted without harming anyone seriously. 
Looting by American troops also usually did not last longer 
than a few days.
36Woller states that during 1945 only about 1000 rapes 
were reported in the entire region the Americans had 
occupied. The Army prosecuted sex offenders of all races and 
punished them severely. According to Woller (59-60), forty- 
four soldiers were executed because of sex related crimes, 
several hundred were sentenced to years of forced labor. 
Henke (200-201) arrives at the same conclusions, although his 
numbers are slightly higher.
37Diary entry of a lady 30 April 1945; NCA F5 no. 488.
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Nevertheless, Army headquarters and most white officers 
throughout the war and in its aftermath alleged that African- 
American troops lacked the discipline of their white 
counterparts.38 Among Germans rumors about African-American 
savagery persisted.39 German authorities in Middle Franconia 
seemed to corroborate these stories. They complained to the 
new masters in an official report that sexual transgressions 
of GIs in the region had not become a serious problem during 
the initial phase of the occupation, but that some black 
units which were stationed in the vicinity of Fiirth seemed to 
be the notable exception to the rule. The Germans reported 
that African-American GIs banded together in groups of six to 
eight men, looted the houses and molested the women. In 
another village black GIs allegedly "...hunted women and 
girls whom they even dragged out of the houses. "40
While black troops certainly had their share of criminal 
elements in the armed forces, their combat experience and 
their position of occupiers of a society of Caucasian people 
with an extremely racist leadership also may have instilled
38MacGregor 138-39.
39See, for example, Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 
23 Aug. 1995. Although her family had rather positive 
experiences with African-Americans, she recalled the town 
gossip and rumors which dealt with alleged or possible 
African-American transgressions and behavior towards the 
opposite sex.
40Woller 59. It is not quite clear what the African- 
Americans actually did. The German miBbrauchen can mean 
either "abuse" or "rape."
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a new sense of superiority in some African-American GIs or 
units that could have resulted in some transgressions. It 
may well be, however, that other factors played a role in 
determining the image of African-American troops as well. 
Nazi propaganda had undoubtedly impressed many Germans enough 
to expect that black GIs would behave worse than white 
soldiers. This expectation made sure that African-American 
behavior would come under much closer scrutiny than that of 
white troops. The American, especially the African-American, 
code of conduct towards the opposite sex also was far more 
open than anything Germans would find acceptable. This could 
easily lead to false assumptions and perceptions. In 
addition to that, Germans may have suffered from the same 
fears and phantasies regarding the treatment of white women 
that the white population in the Deep South harbored when 
they had to confront the specter of free slaves before and 
during the Civil War. An observer in a little town in Baden, 
for example, noted in his diary in April 1945 that reports 
about rapes of German women by African-American soldiers 
"without exception" turned out to be "all the results of
unproven phantasies of overheated brains."41
Official investigations brought to light interesting 
facts regarding German views of African-American soldiers.
“Quoted in Henke 200, fn 192. Many of the interviewees 
in Nuremberg made special references to Black soldiers and 
the effects of Nazi propaganda in this respect. See, for 
example, Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995;
Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995.
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In October 1945 a survey conducted in the city of Giessen by
the Military Government's Information Control Division
revealed that 40 per cent of the people asked had held
negative views towards African-Americans before the
occupation. Only sixteen per cent said that they had a
favorable attitude before the Americans came. The survey
indicated that many Germans revised their negative feelings
once they actually came in contact with black soldiers.
Younger Germans with a better education seemed to be more
inclined to think that African-Americans were as respectable
citizens as white soldiers. Interestingly enough the Germans
were aware of the inequality and often discriminating
attitudes displayed by many white soldiers towards their
brothers in arms. The survey concluded that
[t]he favorable shift in opinion was attributed by the 
Germans largely to the striking impression which the 
personal, human qualities of the Negro had made. Above 
all.. .they had been impressed by the fact that the Negro 
soldiers loved (German) children and got along so well 
with them.... Other qualities frequently cited were 
that the Negroes were "good natured," "friendly," "eager 
to help," "decent." In addition, a few Germans had 
changed their opinion because the Negroes had done them 
no harm.
Investigators further reported that Germans considered white 
soldiers "more self-confident," "better educated," "more 
disciplined regarding women," but also "more reserved," 
while African-Americans were "more friendly," but "less 
restrained." The pollsters even found one German who thought
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that African-Americans forgave more easily and acted less 
like victors.42
On the whole the black and white combat troops behaved 
surprisingly well and often displayed a benevolence that the 
Germans had no reason to expect. Their behavior stood in 
remarkable contrast to the experiences Germans had with 
Soviet and French soldiers when they entered Germany. 
Although he was still fighting the remnants of the German 
army, the average GI did not seem to think that all Germans 
were Nazis or should be held responsible for Nazi crimes and 
acted accordingly.43
Even Lutheran pastors, conservative and not afraid to 
voice and display their strong nationalism, initially had 
nothing negative to say about the Americans. Already during 
the combat phase American soldiers showed a special deference 
towards the representatives of the Lutheran Church who had 
been active in the Confessing Church that had openly resisted 
Hitler. Julius Schieder, for example, a leading member of
42Information Control Intelligence Summary (ICIS) No. 16, 
27 October 1945; NA RG 260 Records of United States 
Occupation Headquarters, World War II, section A2, Records of 
the Office of Military Government, U.S. Zone (OMGUS) 
[hereinafter OMGUS], Information Control Division 
[hereinafter ICD], Opinion Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2.
43None of the interviewees had anything negative to say 
about the American combat troops they met in April and May of 
1945. Apart from the above interviews see also Erinnerungen: 
19-26. During the twenty five years I lived in the Nuremberg 
region I did not meet a single civilian who had suffered any 
serious crime committed by an American soldier during the 
combat phase.
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the Confessing Church, was in charge of the Lutheran 
congregations in and around Nuremberg. One week after the 
end of hostilities in the region he could report to his 
superiors in Munich that the work in the congregations 
continued. There was only minor damage to church property. 
Schieder noted that American soldiers were behaving 
correctly, displaying a great respect toward the Church. 
Houses of pastors were not requisitioned or were immediately 
vacated by American troops.44 Two weeks later he had a
44Landeskirchliches Archiv Nurnberg [Lutheran Church 
Archives for the State of Bavaria, Nuremberg, hereinafter 
LCA] Kreisdekan Nurnberg 6, Berichte aus dem Kirchenkreis: 
Umsturz 1945; see also Woller 58-59.
Schieder talked frankly about his political convictions 
to an information control officer in the summer of 1945. 
According to the officer, Schieder said that he had almost 
joined the National Socialists in 1923 because he subscribed 
to many of Hitler's ideas, especially that of the need for 
living space. Schieder also did not think that the Germans 
had demonstrated a singular kind of barbarianism during the 
preceding twelve years. He compared German behavior during 
the war to British massacres in their colonies, to the Soviet 
behavior in the east (apparently unconcerned about the laws 
of cause and effect), and even to the American treatment of 
German prisoners of war. Schieder did not consider himself 
to be a democrat but rather indicated that he would prefer 
the revival of an authoritarian state in Germany: "Somebody 
should be able to give clear orders and they should be 
followed". In view of the fact that Schieder belonged to the 
group which had resisted Hitler and that almost fifty percent 
of the Lutheran reverends in Nuremberg had belonged to the 
Nazi party, Schieder's views probably represent the more 
moderate views among the Lutheran clergy at the time. 
(Military Government Detachment for Nuremberg, Annual 
Historical Report from 21 April 1945 to 20 June 1946, section 
4 e. 3 and Appendix no. 1, Nurnberg 1945-1949 doc. 5) . 
Vollnhals (113-168) is an excellent introduction to the 
problems the protestant churches in Germany were facing and 
the attempts of the leading men to solve them. See 
especially pp. 118-123 for the protestant clergy's attitudes 
and the American reaction to them. For events in and around 
Nuremberg see also Johannes Kiibel, Erinnerungen: Mensch und
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better idea of the events in his region. According to him, 
only two pastors displayed a negative attitude towards the 
occupiers, which only in one case manifested itself in 
extensive grumbling. Schieder wrote that lives were lost 
only occasionally and the Americans turned out to be very 
humane. They provided first aid for civilians wounded during 
combat activities and transported them to the nearest 
hospitals. The only trouble in his district came from 
displaced persons. Schieder reported to Munich that the 
occupiers wanted church life to continue.45
When the Germans officially capitulated on 8 May 1945, 
the first phase of the American occupation came to a 
successful conclusion. Without being aware of it, American 
soldiers soothed initial apprehensions and tore down some of 
the racial fears and prejudices Hitler's propaganda had tried 
to implant in the minds of the Germans. The soldiers' 
behavior made it easier for many Germans, but especially for 
young people, to accept their new occupiers and to cooperate 
with them. It also raised hopes and expectations of 
leniency, however, which official American policy was not 
prepared to fulfill.
Christ, Theologe, Pfarrer und Kirchenmann (Villingen- 
Schwenningen: Martha Frommer, 1973) 113-114, 133-41.
45Report of 11 May 1945; LCA Kreisdekan Nurnberg 6, 
Berichte aus dem Kirchenkreis.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER III 
Organizing the Occupation; 1945
During the first eight months after the war Americans 
confronted a daunting task. They were facing an extent of 
destruction as well as social and political disarray which 
they had not anticipated. Americans immediately needed to 
pay attention to reestablishing the most basic social 
services, such as functioning utilities or securing food as 
quickly as possible to prevent the outbreak of diseases and 
to assure the survival of the German population. At the same 
time, however, American military commanders had to deal with 
several internal problems before they were able to devote 
their entire attention to the occupation as such. In view of 
these basic necessities the part of the staff which dealt 
with German re-education and especially with youth did not 
enjoy a high priority during the initial phase of the 
occupation. Nevertheless Clay's headquarters soon developed 
directives which officially recognized the importance of 
youth work and provided the foundation for American youth 
policy in Germany without any guidance from Washington. 
Organizing an Effective Occupation Administration
In May 1945 American troops had accomplished the 
immediate goal in Germany. Hitler's army was defeated and 
the country completely occupied by Allied troops. The war in 
Japan, however, was not yet over. It is symptomatic that
98
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General Clay, who officially was in charge of American 
Military Government in Germany, spent most of his time during 
the first months after V-E day organizing the redeployment of 
American troops either to Japan or to the United States. By 
August troop strength in Europe was down from over three 
million to 1.6 million soldiers.1
As long as hostilities in the Pacific lasted, 
redeployment was merely an organizational problem, but the 
Japanese surrender in August 1945 created the public demand 
in the United States and among the troops to demobilize at 
once. The Army's point system assigned priority to those 
soldiers who had served longest, no matter where they served. 
This created an immense amount of restructuration and flux at 
the unit level which also caused considerable problems for 
Military Government outfits. The constant reshuffling, 
together with the expectation to be home soon, diminished 
troop morale and discipline. Replacements were hard to come 
by and usually did not have the quality the fighting troops 
had.2 Many capable MG officers left Germany when they came 
up for redeployment at a time when their services would have 
been most useful. Some field detachments lost as much as 80 
per cent of their original personnel to redeployment. Since 
the Army constantly had to adjust its expectations for troop
‘Ziemke 328-330; see also Robert Murphy, Diplomat Among 
Warriors (Garden City: Doubleday & Company, 1964) 281-283.
2Ziemke 422-23; Henke 970-71; Murphy 281.
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strength in Germany downwards, Clay decided to reduce 
Military Government strength accordingly. He wanted to 
achieve his goal mainly by dismantling the Field Operation 
units which were scheduled to relinquish all direct control 
over German administrations by 31 December 1945. They would 
not interfere directly in local government anymore, but 
rather supervise the Germans and intervene in cases of 
emergency.3
The end of the war with Japan caused additional problems 
for Military Government. Many regular Army officers faced 
the prospect of losing the rank they had acquired during the 
war if they remained with the tactical troops after the 
hostilities. Military Government offered a way to maintain 
their rank and status. In this way many division and branch 
chiefs who had participated in the planning from the outset 
suddenly had to work with superiors who usually did not have 
any clear ideas about military government and often did not 
display any interest in becoming acquainted with their 
duties. These problems extended all the way down to the 
field detachments and resulted in a very uneven 
interpretation of directives and a widely varying quality 
within local MG units.4
While dealing with redeployment, General Clay faced 
additional problems. During the initial phase of the
3Ziemke 404-406; Henke 983.
4Knappen 73-74.
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occupation, Military Government did not function efficiently. 
Clay had to address a number of issues in this realm. 
Military Government detachments were integrated into the 
tactical command structure which even under normal 
circumstances was a cumbersome institution. Redeployment 
made matters worse, as did the fact that many commanders of 
tactical units were professional soldiers who at best 
assigned a very low priority to civilian tasks or at worst 
frequently meddled in Military Government's affairs. They 
usually outranked MG personnel and had ready access to 
resources which made the work of field detachments sometimes 
impossible. In addition to that, military districts did not 
coincide with the Military Government detachments' areas of 
jurisdiction. This led to confusion, since MG detachments 
often had to deal with more than one tactical command. Since 
commanders at that time enjoyed much discretion over their 
own fiefdoms, MG units often were confronted with orders that 
contradicted those in the neighboring districts or undermined 
their own objectives.5
Clay recognized the problem. Since he and General 
Joseph T. McNarney, who replaced Eisenhower as Commander-in- 
Chief of the American troops in Europe in the fall of 1945, 
wanted to turn the military's civilian duties over to the 
State Department as soon as possible, they created an 
independent command structure with its own communications
5Ziemke 206-207, 273-274, 312-314.
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channels. The final version, which lasted from April 1946 to 
June 1949, completely separated the Military Government units 
from the tactical troops. They were designated Office of 
Military Government for Germany (United States)(OMGUS) from 
December 1945 on and absorbed the functions and some of the 
personnel from the Army's G-5 section which became 
superfluous. Tactical and Military Government units were 
united only by the Commander-in-Chief who would also function 
as military governor. Clay remained deputy military 
governor, but in practice McNarney left him in charge of all 
Military Government affairs.6
Clay's policy went further than simply separating the 
two organizations. From the end of the war on it was no 
longer possible to commission officers for military 
government duties, since it was anticipated that the State 
Department soon would take over these tasks. As a result 
OMGUS had to rely on recruiting civilians in the United 
States. This meant that important members of the staff had 
to spend much precious time during 1945 in filling their 
depleted ranks. Since they were only authorized to offer one 
year contracts and nobody knew how long the appointments 
would last, many potential candidates preferred secure 
positions in a less troubled environment at home. Even those 
who agreed to remain in Germany had to be discharged from the
6Ziemke 396-403 and charts on 309, 426; Henke 981-984; 
Knappen 77-78.
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Army. They were employed as civilians under the same 
conditions as new recruits from the United States. This was 
hardly an incentive to stay on.7
The decision to separate Military Government from the 
tactical command and to give it a civilian status may have 
been necessary from an administrative standpoint, but 
together with the downsizing of the field units Clay deprived 
his men early on of all resources they may have needed to 
take an active part in local events. Of course tactical 
troops were still available in many communities, but their 
cooperation depended either on the goodwill of the local post 
commanders or on orders from headquarters which would be very 
hard to obtain when only local or regional affairs were 
involved. In spite of all admonitions from Clay, frictions 
between Military Government personnel, which became 
increasingly civilian, and tactical troop commanders could 
not be avoided. Professional soldiers sometimes resented 
having to help out civilians in uniform, while Military 
Government representatives often displayed considerable 
contempt for military red tape, regulations, and professional 
soldiers already during the war. Throughout his tenure Clay 
repeatedly had to remind his civilians in uniform that it was
7Henke 997-1003; Knappen 76; Murphy 282; Ziemke 424.
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wiser to ask local officers for help instead of demanding 
their services.8
American officials faced another dilemma in Germany. 
They did not have any detailed directives regarding their 
conduct in the field. JCS 1067 only provided the framework. 
The situation became more complicated after the Potsdam 
Conference in July 1945. The Potsdam agreements delegated 
many responsibilities to the Allied Control Council which was 
yet to be installed. During the following months Clay tried 
hard to overcome all resistance he encountered— especially 
from the French— and initiate policies that would be binding 
for all of Germany. This meant that local detachments had to 
wait for specific instructions as long as Clay thought that 
the control council would ultimately be able to produce 
policy guidelines for all of Germany.9
Clay had to deal with an additional problem in the 
summer of 1945. Fraternization in Aachen had caused a public 
outcry in the United States in 1944 and stern admonitions 
from Washington. The negative press in the United States,
8Ziemke 441-442; Knappen's And Call it Peace provides an 
excellent contemporary example of a civilian taking a very 
critical view of the Army. I will discuss specific incidents 
or actions that affected American youth activities in and 
around Nuremberg in the course of the dissertation.
9Clay's correspondence with the War and State 
Departments during 1945 and the first half of 1946 provides 
ample evidence for his attempts to make the Allied Control 
Council work for all of Germany. Clay Papers Docs. 2 0 (9 
July 1945), 39 (24 Sept. 1945), 109 (11 Apr. 1946), 136 (18 
July 1946).
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together with JCS 1067 which ordered the Commander-in-Chief
of the American forces to "strongly discourage fraternization
with the German officials and population," induced the Army
to make sure that American soldiers would be ready for their
j obs once the war was over.10 As we have seen above, the
Stars and Stripes warned its readers not to trust the
Germans. The Aachen experience showed that GIs would quite
naturally abandon their caution and become friendly with the
Germans. The War Department's Morale Services Division
printed a Pocket Guide to Germany for soldiers. To make sure
that the GIs did not misunderstand the guide's contents, the
Army had the following disclaimer glued on the cover:
This booklet is issued in the interest of informing you 
about the country you occupy. Nothing contained herein 
should be considered a relaxation of the Non- 
Fraternization Policy.
Keep Faith with the American Soldiers who have died to 
eliminate the German Warmakers.
DO NOT FRATERNIZE
In spite of the stern warning the guide provided the soldiers 
with contradictory information. On the one hand the authors 
admonished GIs to remain watchful after the end of 
hostilities. The Americans were in Germany to make sure that 
the Germans would not again become a threat to the world. 
Only after their task would be accomplished would the Germans 
be able to return into the community of peace loving nations. 
The authors did not paint a very favorable picture of German 
history and the people. According to them, Germany and the
10JCS 1067, par. 4. Pollock and Meisel, eds., doc. X.
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P O C K E T  G U I D E  TO
This booklet is issued in the interest o f  
informing you about the country you 
occupy. Nothing contained herein should 
be considered a relaxation o f the Non 
Fraternization Policy.
Keep fa ith  w ith the American 
soldiers who have died to elim inate  
the Germ an w arm akers.
DO NOT FRATERNIZE
3. Cover of U.S. Army's Pocket Guide to Germany (Source: 
Ulsamer 67)
Germans had embarked on a militaristic and expansionist 
course ever since Bismarck had founded the new empire with 
"blood and iron" in 1871. The former SS soldiers and German 
youth were two groups against whom the occupiers would have 
to be especially alert. The guide claimed that "German youth 
has been carefully and thoroughly educated for world
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conquest, killing and treachery." At the same time, however, 
the guide told GIs that Americans did not "like to kick 
people when they are down." Furthermore, German curiosity 
would lead to questions about the United States and the 
customs at home. As far as non-fraternization permitted the 
Americans would be able to give the Germans a first taste of 
the democratic and equal society at home. Soldiers should 
not try to convince Germans in discussions, but rather should 
let their behavior and pride speak for themselves. The 
course of time and other influences (possibly a reference to 
envisioned Military Government actions) would have their 
effects. In an appendix the booklet contained a brief guide 
to conversational German.11 This contradictory message, 
together with criticism at home, probably convinced 
Eisenhower initially not to authorize the guide's 
distribution, but by May 1945 every soldier had orders to 
carry the booklet in his helmet liner.12
The Army Information Branch also participated in the 
efforts to see that soldiers would not become involved with 
Germans. In May 1944 production for a film was underway that 
would tell American soldiers more about their "Job in 
Germany" once the fighting was over. George Marshall and
uWilli Ulsamer (Bewegte Tage in einer kleinen Stadt vor 
und nach dem Einmarsch der Amerikaner 1945: Ein Beitrag zur 
Zeitgeschichte der Stadt Spalt (Spalt: [n.p.], 1987) 66-71)
provides a detailed description of the handbook's contents.
12Frederiksen 129-130.
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John McCloy approved it for showing to all troops in the 
European theater in December 1944, but the Battle of the 
Bulge postponed its official release. After the discovery of 
Nazi concentration camps early in 1945 the film makers 
decided to include footage of these incredible German 
atrocities. The final product was ready for American 
soldiers in April 1945. The film further documents the 
American attempts to impress GIs with their task. It was 
mandatory viewing for every American soldier in the European 
Theater.13
In many ways Your Job in Germany seemed to follow the 
example the pocket guide had set, only this time leaving out 
the more conciliatory passages. GIs first got a lesson on 
recent German history. Just as their pocket guide, the film 
described all Germans as a people infected with the disease 
of conquest from 1871 on, no -matter who their leaders were. 
During phony peace periods her population was deceptively 
peaceful, enjoying dances and fun with a glass of beer or 
wine. The film went on to explain that after World War I the
l3David Culbert ("American Film Policy in the Re­
education of Germany after 1945," The Political Re-education 
of Germany & her Allies after World War II, eds. Nicholas 
Pronay and Keith Wilson (London, Sydney: Croom Helm, 1985) 
175-176, 180-185) not only reconstructs the making of the
film, but also tells the very interesting story of its fate 
in the hands of Hollywood tycoon Jack Warner. Warner was not 
above selling this Army production as his own. He even 
accepted awards for it without giving the original film 
makers any credit or a share in the revenue. The following 
information is taken from the film Your Job in Germany, U.S. 
Army Information Branch, [Apr. 1945].
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
Americans fell for the scam and withdrew. In 1945 they would 
do a better job which would make it unnecessary to fight the 
Germans a third time. The narrator admonished GIs not to 
drop the guard they had needed while the fighting was still 
going on. Every German could be a potential enemy waiting 
for his chance to rise again and continue where Hitler had 
left off.
The film makers depicted young people as the greates
threat. Showing pictures of marching Hitler Youth and other
party associations, the narrator told GIs:
These are the most dangerous: German youth. Children, 
when the Nazi party came into power. They know no other 
system than the one that poisoned their minds. They are 
soaked in it. Trained to win by cheating. Trained to 
pick on the weak. They have learned no free speech, 
read no free press. They were brought up on straight 
propaganda. Products of the worst educational crime of 
the entire history of the world. Practically everything 
you believe in, they have been trained to hate and 
destroy. They believe they were born to be masters, 
that we are inferiors, designed to be their slaves.14
He reminded soldiers that they were not in Germany on an
educational mission, but rather to guard an entire people.
To do that would require a specific conduct. They would
respect German property rights and customs. They would take
the people seriously, but they would not become friendly with
Germans. Soldiers were told not to accept public or private
invitations.
14Your Job in Germany; see also Culbert's transcript of 
the same passage (201) .
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Every German is a potential source of trouble; 
therefore, there must be no fraternization with 
any of the German people. Fraternization means 
making friends. The German people are not our 
friends. You will not associate yourself with 
German men, women or children.15
The film closed with an impressive sequence showing the
consequences of the war all over Europe and for American
soldiers. Footage shot on location just weeks earlier
reminded the soldiers of German atrocities and concentration
camps. The film makers wanted to make sure that their lesson
would hit a raw nerve.16
The War Information Branch faithfully reflected JCS 1067
and public opinion in the United States, but the men in
Germany were facing a very different reality. As early as
May 1945 officers in the field arrived at the conclusion that
a ban on fraternization did not make any sense once the
hostilities were over. The public outcry against the
friendliness which American officers allegedly displayed
towards Hermann Goring, whom they permitted to retain his
insignia and to give interviews, however, made it almost
impossible for headquarters to advocate a more lenient course
in May and June. American generals therefore found
themselves in the position of having to enforce a policy they
lsYour Job in Germany
16Culbert 181.
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regarded as senseless and unenforceable. Under the 
circumstances, the ban would not last long. The first breech 
in the regulations came in regard to young children. After 
checking with George Marshall in Washington Eisenhower, 
decided to lift the fraternization ban for children in June. 
According to him, the soldiers in general observed the 
fraternization ban quite well, but "could not be stern and 
harsh with young children." Eisenhower thought that 
upholding the ban for young people might justify further 
illegal contacts and ultimately would undermine the whole 
nonfraternization effort. The partial lift, however, had 
exactly the same effect. The Army struggled for another four 
weeks before it permitted American soldiers to engage in 
conversation with adult Germans on the streets and in public 
places. Although the order was cautiously worded and 
officially permitted only formal contacts, the soldiers 
dubbed the new directive the "Fraternization Order" and acted 
accordingly. The non-fraternization policy lingered on, but 
finally died in October 1945.17
17Ziemke 321-327. He maintains that Eisenhower's 
argument reflected a rather curious myth about 
fraternization. According to Ziemke, soldiers were not so 
much interested in children, but in the opposite sex. His 
evidence consists of court martial cases tried for 
fraternization, none of which dealt with children. 
Eisenhower's perception, however, may have been correct. 
Children usually were the first ones to get in contact with 
Americans soldiers. It may be that officers, knowing the 
attitude of their superiors, either sympathized with the 
behavior of the soldiers in the field towards children or 
found it impractical to prosecute a large number of GIs for 
cases of a rather innocent and beneficial kind of
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First Steps
In the midst of the administrative reshuffling, 
relocation, and a complete German breakdown, Military 
Government detachments went to work. They had to take care 
of a completely shattered economy, of several million 
displaced persons coming and going in all directions, and of 
a critical shortage of housing. In many cities basic 
utilities, such as water, electricity, or garbage disposal 
did not function and threatened to become a factor in 
spreading disease. Immediately after hostilities ended, 
looting by Germans, American troops, and displaced persons 
was widespread. The initial frenzy, however, soon abated on 
the German side. Americans repeatedly expressed surprise, 
but were pleased with German docility and readiness to 
cooperate.18
Young Germans did not become the security threat that 
Americans had anticipated. Those teenagers who were found to
fraternization which the soldiers initiated often even when 
the shooting still was going on. This interpretation does 
not say that American soldiers were saints, but rather may 
reflect the realities of the day more adequately. Becoming 
involved with German adults may have been an altogether 
different matter. For JCS 1067 see Pollock and Meisel, eds., 
Germany doc. X. Clay's "fraternization order" is in Smith 
(ed.) doc. 22. See also Edward B. James, The U.S. Armed 
Forces German Youth Activities Program 1945-1955 (United 
States Army, Europe: Historical Division, 1956) 4.
18ziemke 138-144, 206-208, 251-252, 354-355; Murphy 283. 
Neither Gimbel in his A German Community under Occupation nor 
Woller nor Eckhard find any German obstruction or resistance 
by German administrators during the initial phase of the 
occupation.
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be suspicious were taken in for questioning about possible 
resistance activities which Goebbels had called werewolf. 
Americans usually found it easy to coax them into 
cooperation. They seemed to be quite willing to betray their 
comrades once they were convinced that somebody else had 
already talked. The Army quickly raided alleged or real 
werewolf facilities without ever meeting any resistance. The 
raids occasionally revealed that from the start soldiers did 
not take nonfraternization orders seriously. The raiding 
parties did not discover any major plots, but they did find 
a number of GIs in compromising situations with the opposite 
sex.19
The only serious security problem for the occupiers was 
and remained the large number of displaced persons. They 
were hard to control because they enjoyed a special status, 
the sympathetic ear of the press, and much public sympathy in 
the United States.20
The food situation became the overriding problem during 
the first three years of the occupation. In 1945 Americans 
observed that many fields had not been worked on even after 
the fighting was over. Young people had been drafted by the 
Wehrmacht and either were dead or in POW camps. Foreigners 
who had been pressed into agricultural service by the Nazis 
left the fields and their jobs and tried to get home as soon
19Ziemke 245-246; Fussl 58-67.
20ziemke 284-291, 356-358; Woller, 60-61.
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as American troops came in. The Wehinaacht had almost 
depleted the horse supply. Americans considered the 
situation to be so serious that Eisenhower began to import 
food from the United States to Germany in June. In July he 
issued orders that American trucks and drivers help bring in 
the harvest of that year. In the winter of 1945 Military 
Government set up soup kitchens that passed out four and a 
half million meals a month. Still the situation remained 
precarious for the next three years and only improved 
considerably after the currency reform in the summer of 
1948.21
OMGUS and Education
All of the events in 1945 had a direct impact on the 
development of American re-education efforts during the 
entire occupation period and beyond. The problems that Clay 
was facing on all sides made re-education a minor issue which 
would have to wait. From the outset Major John Taylor, the 
head of the United States Group Council's Education and 
Religious Affairs Branch and his staff faced tremendous 
obstacles. During the initial phase of the occupation OMGUS 
organizers did not deem his branch important enough to give 
it division status. During 1945 Education and Religious 
Affairs was not more than a section; in January 194 6 it was 
promoted to branch level. While this probably saved Taylor 
the embarrassment of having to put up with a higher ranking
21 ziemke 274-276, 346; Clay 263-281.
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regular officer, it had its drawbacks. Taylor only 
occasionally had direct access to Clay or any other 
influential officers apart from the usual channels. This 
meant that his section was unable to secure sometimes even 
essential things, such as transportation. It was not until 
spring and summer 1945 that Taylor received permission by 
SHAEF headquarters to expand his staff from five American 
officers to about fifty. Even with this authorization in 
hand he did not have the necessary clout to have the men who 
originally had been assigned to the Education and Religious 
Affairs Branch transferred back to his section.
The situation was even more desperate in the field. 
When Germany officially surrendered in May 1945, detachments 
in charge of states were supposed to have three full time 
educational officers, smaller detachments no less than two. 
In reality, however, no local Military Government detachment 
had an officer assigned full time to education and only one 
state detachment had one education officer. During the 
following months demobilization and demoralization caused 
many education specialists to return home after two years of 
waiting in the wings without recognition or promotions. This 
depletion of ranks aggravated the situation to such an extent 
that Taylor had to go to the United States to recruit more 
personnel. The one year limits and conditions in Germany did 
not attract the outstanding educators Taylor had hoped for 
during a time when opportunities opened up in the United
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States, but he managed to hire competent and idealistic 
people. Due to complicated clearance procedures a number of 
the recruits needed more than three months of their first one 
year contracts to make it to Germany.22
While Taylor was in the United States he did not just 
look for new recruits. He also participated in the 
discussions of the State Department's Advisory Committee on 
German Re-education in June 1945. Taylor was present when 
Frank Graham, prominent educator and president of the 
University of North Carolina, showed the policy statement 
which became SWNCC 269 the following year to the Civil 
Administration Division's chief, General Hilldring, to 
Secretary of War, Robert Patterson, and to Assistant 
Secretary, John McCloy. It was Taylor who transmitted their 
informal approval to the Department of State.23 This meant 
that he knew the direction in which American policy would 
ultimately go long before it became official almost a year 
later. Taylor was probably aware of MacLeish's efforts to 
make the Advisory Committee's recommendations the base of 
official American policy and must have been disappointed by 
the lack of interest in this issue at the Potsdam conference. 
It is safe to assume, however, that he did not need any 
official directives to induce him to implement a policy of 
positive action in the American zone. He had personally
22Ziemke 277; Tent 46-50; Knappen 76.
mNA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/6-1345.
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contributed to its formulation and knew that it enjoyed the 
support of the State and the War Departments.
Clay's decision to reduce Military Government personnel 
drastically and to separate MG from tactical commands did not 
seem to have the far reaching consequences for the Education 
and Religious Affairs Section that it had for other 
divisions, although it adversely affected the numbers of the 
already understaffed educators. Actually it was in line with 
the approach the Advisory Committee had recommended in 
Washington, with the CAD's policy, and with SHAEF's Technical 
Manual of Education and Religious Affairs of 1944. The 
reduction made it imperative to leave the initiative to 
Germans and to operate merely as supervisors.24
24Fussl maintains that the separation of Army and OMGUS 
robbed OMGUS of the possibility to start a meaningful youth 
program of its own. His analysis does not evaluate the 
situation in 1945 correctly. OMGUS as well as CAD in 
Washington from the start expected the Germans to do the job. 
They never included the Army's manpower and equipment in 
their planning. Hilldring, for example, explained in a 
letter to an American teacher who had expressed his interest 
in teaching the Germans in Germany that American policy was 
and would be to let the Germans reeducate themselves under 
American supervision (NA RG 59 State Department Central Files 
1945-49, 862.42/10-1545). Military Government planners did 
not recognize the merits of an independent American youth 
program during the initial phase of the occupation. We will 
see in the course of the dissertation that the Army's program 
never enjoyed wholehearted support within Military Government 
circles, but that in many ways the Army laid the foundation 
for a completely new way of working with youth which had far 
reaching consequences. For the SHAEF manual see Tent, 
Mission 45.
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Headquarters and German Youth
According to JCS 1067 and the agreement in Washington, 
the Education and Religious Affairs Branch focused its 
efforts towards German youth on the educational system. The 
first task Taylor and his staff had to master was the 
reopening of German schools. After hostilities had ended 
Military Government officials had closed all schools that 
were still functioning in accordance with Eisenhower's and 
SHAEF directives. The Army found, however, that it was in 
its own interest to reopen schools at the earliest possible 
moment. Young people did not have anything to do and were 
confronted with many temptations, such as black marketing. 
Loitering could foster prostitution or criminal behavior. 
Army commanders also felt that adolescents actually might 
band together and become a serious security threat once 
returning POWs might assume leadership of youth gangs on the 
streets. Schools would be the places to control them, to 
provide them with food and health care, and to channel their 
energies away from criminal activities.25
Taylor and his staff had to work hard to comply with the 
Army's wishes. They faced tremendous obstacles. Many school 
buildings in German cities had been reduced to rubble. When 
they remained intact, the Army had requisitioned them to 
house the troops who were not inclined to give them up for 
German school children. At the same time the American
^Ziemke 358.
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educators had to replace all old textbooks. During the Third 
Reich the Nazis had even used math books for instilling the 
young generation with its ideology. Paper shortages and the 
lack of printing presses made the undertaking almost 
impossible. Textbooks were finally printed on the presses of 
the former official Nazi newspaper, the Volkischer Beobachter 
which bombing raids had never taken out of commission.26
The biggest obstacle, however, was a serious shortage of 
teachers. A disproportionate number of teachers had joined 
the Nazis. Of course there existed many enthusiastic 
National Socialists among them. Julius Streicher is the most 
notorious example. But many had had different reasons to 
join the party. They were state officials and therefore 
often faced considerable pressure during the Third Reich to 
become a member of at least one of its teacher subsidiaries. 
The denazification mechanism automatically disqualified large 
numbers of teachers from returning to schools. The Education 
officers recognized the dilemma, but the public outcry in the 
United States after Patton's infamous remarks regarding Nazi 
party membership in the fall of 1945 made a lenient approach 
impossible. Taylor and his staff had to resort to drastic 
measures to revive at least a semblance of schooling in spite 
of the ongoing denazification process. They commissioned
26Knappen 82-93 ; Ziemke 358-60.
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retired teachers. Many women had found it less difficult to 
escape Nazi organizations and could be employed.27
On l October 1945 elementary schools in the American 
zone reopened. Secondary education and universities followed 
in the next months. Taylor was satisfied with his branch's 
efforts. In December 1945 he thought that the negative phase 
of the educators' mission, the denazification of the school 
system, was almost over and that it was time to think about 
a constructive program for German education. He therefore 
proposed to send a fact finding mission from the United 
States to Germany as soon as possible. Such a group of 
educators would review the progress up to date and would 
point out shortcomings of his branch's work. Still, the 
Germans would have to do the work.28
The reopening of schools did not resolve a basic flaw of 
the planning. Concentrating entirely on the school system 
would not take care of young people's free time. Given the 
shortage of classrooms, teachers, plus the fact that German 
schools traditionally dismissed their students by noon, these 
young people would be without supervision for extended 
periods of time. Reopening the schools would only partly 
achieve the Army's goal of keeping them occupied so that they 
would not be tempted to get into illegal activities.
27Knappen 121-133; Tent 51-57; Ziemke 277.
28Tent 69-71.
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Educational Reform is not Enough
Americans soon realized that they had to do more than 
just try to implement educational reform. They had to find 
ways to replace the Nazi ideas of a generation, which had 
never known anything but Hitler youth organizations, with 
democratic concepts. New curricula and free tuition alone 
would not be sufficient to get the job done. Americans 
correctly believed that little could be expected from parents 
who had lost much control and authority over their children 
over the previous twelve years.29
The first problem for the Americans was to keep young 
people under control and occupied while the schools were 
still closed. The abolition of the Hitler Youth and its 
affiliates created a void that needed to be filled. The Army 
quickly enlisted the aid of the German churches in its 
attempt to control young people. A theater directive of 7 
July 1945 permitted religious groups to engage in youth 
activities and to receive contributions for their support.30 
Church leaders of the Lutheran Church in Bavaria were most 
satisfied with the directive. It gave the Churches a head 
start over other youth organizations and did not interfere 
with their own policy. The Bavarian Church Council had 
decided already at the end of May to advise the deans of the
29According to Fiissl (102-103) , modern research bears out 
American assumptions about education patterns in German 
families at that time.
30Campbell 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
122
different Bavarian church districts that they should not
attempt to find new ways of youth work outside the
ecclesiastical framework.31
Probably aware that the churches would not be able to
take care of all young people, headquarters ordered all
German communities under its control in July to prepare work
programs for children until schools could be reopened. The
directive suggested cleaning of streets and public buildings,
agricultural work, gathering medicinal plants, and cleaning
and sorting building materials from the rubble for keeping
the children occupied.32
Since the Army regarded loitering youth as a serious
problem that could lead to unrest, the issue got the
attention of the higher echelons of Military Government, in
spite of the rather inconspicuous position of John Taylor's
Education and Religious Affairs Branch. On 10 August 1945
Robert Murphy informed the State Department that
The Deputy Military Governor [General Clay] has advised 
the War Department that it is believed desirable to 
establish movements in Germany which would encourage 
youth in democratic ways of thinking and that the 
restoration of the Boy Scout movement in Germany might 
prove a real contribution. General Clay has suggested 
that it might be well to ask the head of the Boy Scout 
movement in the US if it would be possible for him to 
supply a small group of trained Scout executives to
3IMinutes of a meeting of the Bavarian Church Council 
from 31 May to 2 June 1945; LCA, Landeskirchenrat, Akten des 
Landesjugendpfarrers VI, 1178a, vol III, 1940-45.
32Campbell 3.
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investigate possibilities here and to aid in the
establishment of Scout units.33
Clay was obviously unaware that there had been a Boy Scout 
movement in Germany before 1933. Apparently he also did not 
pay much attention to details, such as the fact that Boy 
Scouts wore uniforms and rank insignia not unlike the 
military's. Both were prohibited in Germany after the war. 
Even Clay would have found it difficult to bring the right 
kind of experts to Germany at that time. It is therefore not 
surprising that initially nothing came of the proposed fact 
finding mission. The memorandum nevertheless marks an 
important departure in several ways. First, Clay recognized 
the need for an educational program that took care of young 
people when they were not at school. For a professional 
soldier and an American it was natural that he would think 
about the Boy Scouts' organization and ideals. Second, Clay 
for the first time expressed the desire to bring experts to 
Germany who would help the Germans to set a program in 
motion. Clay clearly embarked on a positive and constructive 
approach from the start and tackled problems in a pragmatic 
way. It took over a year to realize his idea of an American 
expert program, but Clay had suggested a feasible way of 
getting American expert help to Germans on the road to reform 
and re-education.
33Telegram from Robert Murphy to State Dept. , 10 Aug.
1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.4081/8-1045.
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Generals in the field and Military Government
headquarters in Berlin were quick to react to Clay's
suggestions. Lieutenant General Geoffrey Keyes, commander of
the Seventh Army's western military district, which comprised
Hesse and Wurttemberg-Baden, was the first to pick them up.
On 14 September he announced to his field commanders that he
expected them to take an active interest in organizing local
youth activities. In lieu of a Military Government policy
directive, Keyes issued his own. He pointed out that many
German youths remained idle and therefore became "susceptible
to organization by subversive agencies". Keyes believed that
officers and enlisted men would
eagerly seize this opportunity to assist in the 
regeneration of German youth through the medium of 
acquainting them with the activities and interests 
normal to youths of their own age in our country. 
Woodcrafts and other interests which have been developed 
by the Boy Scout and Girl Scout movements at home, as 
well as athletics should...form the major interests in 
our organized youth activities.
The general also strongly encouraged the troops to develop
their own ideas. In a significant departure from
denazification practice, Keyes announced that he did not want
the soldiers to "differentiate between children of Nazi
parents and anti-Nazi, since we are definitely interested in
the re-education of the Nazi youth." The general thought
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that the Army chaplains should take an active part in the 
program.34
Keyes' letter contained in a nucleus the basis for the 
German Youth Activities Program the Army officially adopted 
in April 1946. It marked the first time that American 
military personnel officially were asked to do something 
positive for a part of the German population that went beyond 
providing practical necessities. The General recognized that 
young people might be the best group to start a re-education 
program, and he insisted on incorporating those with a 
National Socialist background. Interestingly enough Keyes 
did not find it necessary to issue an order, but rather 
appealed to the units to go out and start programs on their 
own initiative.
The directive did not sit well with MG officials who 
realized that Keyes departed from the Military Government's 
policy to make the Germans responsible for their own 
reeductation. Military Government officials also thought 
that the use of Army chaplains for youth activities would 
deprive the Army of their services. While these arguments 
certainly had merit, one may wonder why MG officials were so 
concerned about these off duty activities of American 
soldiers which provided them with an alternative to black
^Headquarters Seventh Army, Western Military District, 
14 Sept. 1945, letter from Geoffrey Keyes, Commanding General 
to Corps, Division, Regional Military Government Commanders, 
and Separate Unit Commanders, in Campbell 31-3 2, Appendix I.
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market activities or becoming involved with the opposite sex.
Military Government officials in Clay's headquarters seemed
to place policy concerns, protecting their own prerogatives,
and matters of principle higher on their agendas than
practical solutions to problems in the field.35
Possibly stimulated by the field commander's initiative,
Military Government acted as well. On 21 September Major
General M.C. Stayer, John Taylor's Division Chief, submitted
a "Directive for the Control of Youth Activities" to Clay.
Stayer was clearly in line with MacLeish's and the Education
Commission's thinking. The directive bluntly stated that
[t]he children of Germany are probably the most 
important raw material out of which a regenerated 
Germany can be built. Therefore a positive program 
should be allowed to develop which will give German 
youth opportunities to prepare for the eventual 
reconstruction of German life on a democratic and 
peaceful basis.36
Stayer's proposal picked up the Army's approach and went
beyond the educational system. Traditional youth groups,
such as Boy and Girl scouts, YMCA and YWCA would be revived
under the supervision of denazified persons, but Military
Government officers were instructed also to permit the
formation of new groups. They would exist "for purposes of
culture, religion and education" and should "cultivate the
ideals of fair play, tolerance and honesty". Political
35Campbell 6.
36Draft of Directive [handwritten], 21 Sept. 1945; NA RG 
260 OMGUS, Education and Cultural Relations Division [herein­
after E&CRD], Community Education Branch, Box 145, 5/296-2/6.
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activities were not deemed desirable. Stayer had secured the
approval of the Army's G-5 Division (Civil Affairs) and then
presented the memo to the Group Control Council. Apparently
the leading men assumed that the issue was important for Clay
and acted surprisingly fast. The Legal, Political, and
Public Safety Divisions approved the directive within twenty
four hours. Clay approved and signed it on 3 October 1945.37
On the same day Robert Murphy cabled the contents of the
directive to the State Department. Murphy apparently needed
to justify the Military Government's new approach to policy
towards youth which expanded the traditional focus on formal
education. He explained that
[f]ormal education, as such in the narrow sense of the 
term, will only partially solve the tremendous problem 
of what to do with defeated Germany's youth, to give 
them hope, to form them into decent citizens, and, from 
a very practical point of view, to keep them 'out of 
mischief'" .38
Clay's new directive appeared in German on 28 October 
1945. It admonished American officers to make sure that no 
youth organizations similar to Hitler youth or militaristic 
organizations would resurface. Germans would be permitted to 
form voluntary groups for cultural, religious or 
entertainment purposes. The target group were boys and girls
37Memo, US Group Control Council, 26 Sep. 1945, with 
Clay's signature and the date of the approval on it; NA RG 
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 145, 5/296- 
2/8 .
38US Political Adviser for Germany to State Department, 
dispatch 1047, 3 Oct. 1945; quoted in Fiissl 100.
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between ten and eighteen years. These youth groups should 
foster the development of democratic ideas, independence in 
thought as well as ideals such as "inner decency, tolerance, 
and honesty". Military Government officers also were to take 
care of forming youth committees which would initiate and 
supervise the youth organizations. Only people who had gone 
through denazification would be able to become involved in 
youth work. The directive further stipulated that youth 
groups had to have a Military Government permit. The 
Americans would work through the committees to implement 
their policies. Youth groups were not permitted to become 
involved in politics and would be severely punished if they 
tried to revive or justify Nazi or militaristic ideas. They 
were also not permitted to wear uniforms or to do any 
paramilitary exercises. German authorities were responsible 
to implement the directive and were instructed to send men 
and women to the youth committees who represented different 
interests, such as welfare agencies, health offices, the 
Churches and members of the economic community. Germans 
should also initiate parent and teacher associations which 
were to assist the committees in an advisory function. The 
committees would review applications of youth groups and 
forward them to the American authorities. The directive
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
129
emphasized that youth work basically was a service rendered 
to society which should not be paid.39
The Germans reacted favorably to the new Military 
Government directive. Since it only talked about youth 
organizations, it was in line with their traditional way of 
bringing young people together in clubs or associations. By 
May 1946 over 2,500 youth groups had formed with 
approximately 240,000 members. Marshall Knappen, OMGUS 
Religious Affairs Officer from 1945 to 1946, however, found 
in 1947 that much remained to be done. Especially the 
Bavarians did not seem to show much enthusiasm for organizing 
young people. According to him, only the Army offered an 
alternative by embarking on an altogether new terrain in 
German youth work. The soldiers did not require young people 
to formally join an organization, but rather conducted their 
activities on an informal basis. Its programs were open to 
everyone regardless of social background or previous 
activities. The next years would show if the Germans and 
Military Government were willing to accept this new kind of 
youth work.40
Soviet activities in Berlin actually opened up a third 
field of American youth activities in 1945. Soviet 
authorities had requisitioned about twenty houses all over
39Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater 
[hereinafter USFET] to Commanding Generals, 25 Oct. 1945, 
Copy-Translation [German]; LCA, Personen CLXV, Dollinger 10.
40Knappen 139-140.
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Berlin which they transformed into community youth centers 
under the supervision of the communist Free German Youth 
before they permitted Americans to occupy their sector of the 
city. The Americans soon realized that closing the centers 
in their sector would cause friction with Soviet authorities. 
They therefore decided to continue them under a different 
management. Stars and Stripes reported on 20 December 1945 
on page one about the youth centers. Under the headline 
"Youth Homes Added to Plan for Rehabilitating Germans" GIs 
all over Germany were informed that the Berlin centers had 
good attendance records, that the rooms were open after 
school hours and were heated. The paper further reported 
that troop participation had made many of the centers' 
activities possible. It was therefore in Berlin that 
Americans for the first time— and not altogether in a well 
thought out plan— embarked on running youth centers which did 
not belong to any specific youth group, but rather were open 
to everyone. It was obvious that such homes would be more 
compatible with the Army's emerging program than with 
Military Government's policy, although in the case of Berlin 
the local Education and Religious Affairs officer was in 
charge of running the centers. Stars and Stripes made sure 
that the idea spread throughout the American zone.41
4IHoward W. Johnson, "United States Public Affairs 
Activities in Germany 1945-1955," diss. Columbia University, 
1956, 197 FN 7; "Youth Homes Added to Plan for Rehabilitating 
Germans," Stars and Stripes [Altdorf] 20 Dec. 1945: 1. Fiissl 
overlooks this very early American engagement in Berlin in
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During the first months of the occupation General Clay 
had do dedicate almost all of his time to creating a 
functioning administrative apparatus and dealing with the 
chaos of redeployment. He concentrated his resources and 
manpower on helping Germans in his zone survive and restoring 
order, leaving the staff assigned to education and youth work 
with a constant shortage of men and resources. Clay did 
manage to stimulate his staff to think about the problem 
which led to the formulation of a directive on youth work for 
the American zone of occupation just four months after the 
war ended. After abolishing the Hitler Youth and all other 
youth organizations under Nazi control, they set out to 
prevent the German youth leadership of the Third Reich from 
regaining any influence in postwar Germany. Their decision 
to leave most of the work up to the Germans seemed to restore 
the traditional German youth activities structure that had 
existed before 193 3. Grassroots activities initiated by 
tactical units, however, and an unexpected inheritance from 
Soviet troops in the American sector of Berlin opened the way 
for new approaches to German youth work.
his otherwise excellent Die Umerziehung der Deutschen which 
focuses on events in Germany's capital.
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CHAPTER IV 
Working in the Field: Nuremberg, 1945
As soon as Americans had taken over the responsibility 
for Nuremberg in April 1945, they successfully set out on a 
course of reconstruction. In the midst of the struggle to 
help people survive, the Nuremberg Detachment was unable to 
dedicate much time or thought to youth. Nevertheless, the 
Americans managed to appoint competent officials and 
established a solid base of cooperation which did not always 
please the Germans, but helped them to survive. In spite of 
extremely difficult conditions Nuremberg's schools reopened 
on schedule. In its attempts to take care of young people 
the city administration built on its progressive traditions 
from the Weimar republic and took advantage of the political 
vacuum to initiate its own, community oriented program.
The presence of a large number of tactical units in 
Nuremberg was a mixed blessing. On the one hand, generous 
Army requisitions aggravated the difficult housing situation, 
especially when large numbers of allied personnel came to 
assist in the Nuremberg trials. On the other hand the Army 
helped Military Government and the city by providing the 
facilities, the tools, and the logistic support for securing 
the city population's survival. In most cases GIs maintained 
their generous and open attitude toward young Germans, often 
helping them in their struggle to improve their lot. Their
132
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actions contributed to awakening the young generation's 
curiosity and to creating a friendlier attitude towards the 
United States.
Military Government in Action
Immediately after the American victory parade on 20 
April 1945 the Military Government Detachment for Nuremberg, 
E1B3, began its work. Proclamation Number One issued by 
Military Government officially introduced the new masters to 
the citizens of Nuremberg. General Eisenhower made clear 
that the Allied soldiers under his command came as a 
"victorious army, but not as oppressors." All Nazi and 
militaristic institutions would be destroyed and people 
suspected of crimes would be imprisoned, tried, and, if found 
guilty, severely punished. The proclamation made American 
officers the highest local authority which operated under 
direct instructions from headquarters. Germans were expected 
to follow all orders without hesitation or objections. 
Eisenhower emphasized that any resistance would be broken 
immediately and without mercy. Proclamation Number One 
ordered schools to be closed together with all courts. 
German administrators were admonished to appear at work and 
to obey and execute all orders from Military Government.1
Detachment E1B3, which in the course of reorganization 
changed its designation to F-211, started its work with
•The German text of Proclamation No. 1 is reproduced in 
its original version in Erinnerungenz 26.
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fifteen officers and ten enlisted men. By July 1945 it 
reached its peak strength with forty-five officers and fifty 
enlisted men. The Americans employed 260 Germans to help 
with the task. Between July and November these officers made 
vital decisions that had long lasting effects on the city 
long after most of the men had gone home.
On first sight and by their own judgement, the quality 
of the men in charge of the Nuremberg detachment was not 
impressive. All of the commanding officers were career Army 
soldiers who did not speak German, which meant that from the 
start they had to rely on Germans to obtain most of their 
information. Finding capable interpreters was not an easy 
task at a time when the great majority of Germans did not 
speak any English at all. Headquarters realized the problem. 
It disseminated information on the German reaction to the 
Americans or American policy from the second issue of its 
weekly Information Bulletin on. The information came from 
surveys Military Government's intelligence section conducted. 
Since the bulletin also contained condensed versions of the 
latest regulations and explained occupation policies in 
detail, Military Government officials in the field probably 
consulted it frequently.2
2See, for example,- "Denazification and the Anti-Nazis," 
Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-5 Division, USFET, 
Reports and Information Branch, Weekly Information Bulletin 
no. 1, 28 July 1945: 16. The article was a summary of a
German opinion survey conducted by the intelligence section. 
The problem with this source of information was that the 
surveys may have provided good insights but were not
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Some detachments were lucky and had officers who were 
able to communicate in German. Apart from the commanding 
officers many of these men became the most prominent and 
respected American representatives. To what extent the local 
commanders were aware of these reports or took advantage of 
these native speakers cannot be assessed. It seems that the 
detachments' capacity to function effectively depended 
largely on the ability of the commanding officers and luck in 
having an adequate staff. Finding and appointing capable 
German administrators who would be able and willing to 
cooperate with the Americans certainly was important as 
well.3
necessarily generally applicable, especially in view of 
Germany's cultural and political diversity. What was true in 
Catholic Munich and upper Bavaria, for example, could not 
easily be applied to conditions in Protestant Franconia and 
Nuremberg. The surveys could only provide some general 
guidelines. Nevertheless, MG headquarters and its successor, 
the High Commissioner for Germany, must have considered it an 
effective means of communication with the field officers. 
Even though the publisher repeatedly changed names, the 
Information Bulletin appeared first weekly and from December 
1947 on bi-weekly until 1952, when the dissolution of the 
field detachments rendered the bulletin superfluous.
3There is considerable disagreement about the quality of 
Military Government personnel. Woller draws a very positive 
picture of the detachments he investigated in Ansbach and 
Ftirth. Zink (American Military Government in Germany 22-44) 
came to the conclusion in 1947 that the Military Government 
personnel in Germany performed quite well on the whole. Lutz 
Niethammer ("Die amerikanische Besatzungsmacht zwischen 
Verwaltungstradition und politischen Parteien in Bayern 
1945," Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeitgeschichte 15 (1967) 2:
153-211) agreed to Zink's statement for the Bavarian 
Detachments. Henke (235-251) draws a generally positive 
picture of Military Government detachment activities. Basing 
his evaluation mostly on Karl-Heinz Bungenstab's study ("Die 
Ausbildung der amerikanischen Militaroffiziere nach 1945,"
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The Nuremberg detachment did not seem to be blessed with 
the outstanding personnel from which the nearby cities of 
Fiirth and Ansbach or the Bavarian capital of Munich 
apparently benefitted. None of the soldiers had volunteered 
for the job. Redeployment also severely curtailed this 
detachment's efficiency, as much as all the others, during 
the first year of the occupation. Between April 1945 and 
June 1946 the Nuremberg detachment had three commanders. 
Lieutenany Colonel Delbert Fuller headed the unit for just 
the first four weeks of the occupation. Army inspectors 
found him a tired man who was burnt out and ready to go home 
to his wife. Colonel Charles H. Andrews succeeded Fuller in 
July. Andrews did not have an outstanding personality, but 
he had been an administrator for the Army and a welfare
Jahrbuch fiir Amerikastudien 18 (1973) : 173-211) and on
Peterson's rather negative account of the Military Government 
officers he interviewed in the 1960s, Eckart does not think 
very much of the quality of the men in the Nuremberg 
detachment, especially during the first year. Eckart simply 
adopts Bungenstab's findings from the time after 1945 to the 
situation in 1945. Peterson's account, however, is highly 
critical of American policy and of the two other detachments 
he discusses, but does not find the Nuremberg detachment at 
fault. Eckart seems to be unaware of the subtleties of this 
argument. Generally the historians' criticism or praise 
often focuses on the ability of military government officers 
to speak German, which undoubtedly was important for finding 
the right people for restarting the political process or 
taking care of denazification. As we will see below, 
however, the Nuremberg detachment did in 1945 exactly what it 
had been trained to do regardless of the lack of language 
specialists. With the exception of denazification, which was 
not part of the original agenda in the form it acquired 
during 1945, the detachment was able to get the city out of 
the worst post war troubles surprisingly quickly and played 
a crucial part in assuring the city's survival during the 
next two winters.
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officer in civilian life. He had gone through one of the 
schools for Military Government in the United States in 1943 
and spent some time in Shrivenham before he came via France 
to Germany. Like so many others Andrews was discharged when 
Military Government actually would have needed his services 
most. In December 1945 his deputy commander, Lieutenant 
Colonel Carlisle Klise took over the job of commander. Klise 
had also gone through the Army's Military Government school 
program and was highly disillusioned by it. He recalled that 
the Military Government instructors at Shrivenham had to use 
fifty year old maps because the Army would not grant them 
access to the latest intelligence and information it had 
collected in its aerial bombing surveys.4
Although the Nuremberg detachment was plagued by 
turnover, it actually pursued a consistent policy from the 
start. All three commanders had gone through the Army's 
training program for Military Government officers, which 
familiarized them with the reconstructionist and pragmatic 
approach the Army had taught while JCS 1067 was composed in 
Washington. Eisenhower got the directive just in time for 
the German surrender in May 1945. It did not become official 
American policy until July 1945 when the Allied combined 
command ceased to exist. This meant that during the first 
three months of the occupation Military Government officers 
in the field acted under orders to make the reconstruction
4Peterson 318-319; Eckart 148-149.
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and rehabilitation of the communities in which they operated 
their priority.5
At the end of the war Germans were without local, state 
or a central government. Since the traffic and
communications systems also were completely paralyzed, the 
detachments initially operated within a virtual vacuum. As 
we have seen above redeployment took much of General Clay's 
time and energy during the initial phase of the occupation. 
He did not resolve the administrative confusion and 
cumbersome chain of command of Military Government until the 
end of 1945. This situation threw the local detachments
5Eckart adopts Bungenstab's thesis that the lack of 
political indoctrination of Military Government officers was 
a serious mistake. This thesis, however, overlooks that 
ideological indoctrination at a time when Morgenthau still 
had the ear of the President almost certainly would have 
resulted in a far less positive attitude towards the Germans. 
Morgenthau based his plans on the assumption of Germany's 
collective guilt, so they almost certainly would not have 
resulted in any positive steps towards reconstruction or 
bringing anti-Nazis into power. Since the Army would not 
have agreed to such an approach for practical reasons, 
Military Government officials from the start would have been 
civilians, possibly well versed in politics, but without the 
expertise and the equipment the Army was able to provide for 
the physical survival of the Germans. Neither Peterson nor 
Eckart take notice of the fact that the Army's pragmatic 
approach, which it had consistently advocated in its manuals 
and courses, actually aimed at rehabilitating Germany, 
although this was done purely for practical reasons. As we 
have seen above, even the President was unable to change the 
course. All field officers who had gone through Military 
Government training therefore were programmed from the start 
to set out on a course which would quickly help the Germans. 
With the exception of Henke (986-87) historians generally 
have overlooked the positive results of the Army's pragmatic 
and reconstructionist approach for the German population. 
Peterson realized that field detachments had a constructive 
outlook which helped the Germans, but thought that 
headquarters destroyed this approach quickly.
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almost entirely on their own resources and interpretations of 
general directives. It was bound to lead to discrepancies 
between official Washington policy and American actions in 
the communities. Lacking specific guidance from their own 
headquarters, field detachments had to rely on the general 
instruction they had received at the Army's Military 
Government schools, on their field manuals, and on their 
officers' common sense. Klise had to learn the hard way that 
Washington's expectations could be very different from the 
instructions he had been given in the United States and 
England shortly after he assumed his duties in Nuremberg in 
June 1945. When John McCloy visited Nuremberg in the summer, 
he inquired about the activities of Klise's detachment. 
Klise was happy to report the progress he and his men had 
made in rehabilitating the city, but McCloy became enraged 
and told him in no uncertain terms that he did not care about 
reconstruction and the prevention of diseases, but wanted 
Military Government to take care of demilitarization and 
denaz ification.6
6Peterson 318-319; Eckart 149-150. It is interesting to 
compare the detachment's reports of September and October 
1945 with the annual report for the first year of the 
occupation. While all mention denazification, it seems that 
the officers who wrote the first reports treated 
denazification just as one of many issues. They also voiced 
their concerns about the effect the denazification program 
had on their reconstruction efforts. The early reports 
clearly show the detachment's interpretation of its mission 
in Nuremberg. In September the author concluded his report 
the following way: "In general [...] the rehabilitation and
rebuilding of the city of Nuremberg is being carried on with 
remarkable speed, if one remembers that it was one of the
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McCloy was not alone in making denazification a top 
priority. A new directive of the United States Forces of the 
European Theater (USFET) from 7 July and Military Government 
Law No. 8 of September, which regulated the denazification 
process, added denazification to the agendas of Klise's and 
all other filed detachments.7 In October the detachment 
dutifully reported that "from the beginning denazification 
was the priority job." According to the report, Military 
Government had dismissed over two thousand city employees and 
checked the rest of the city administration for their ties to 
the Nazi party, but it seems that during the initial phase of 
the occupation the professional soldiers handled the issue 
pragmatically.8 The Nuremberg commanders received lists from 
their superiors that contained all people who were to be 
removed from their offices, but they tended to grant local
most destroyed cities in Europe." The annual report 
dedicates more space to denazification and lacks the 
enthusiasm of the earlier papers; see Niirnberg 1945-49, I, 
docs. 2 (Headquarters MG Nuremberg on 1.9.45: Survey of
Activities since Occupation) , 4 (MG Nuremberg, IV. The Fall 
and Occupation, 7-11), 5 (Military Government Detachment for 
Nuremberg, Annual Historical Report 21 April 1945 to 20 June 
1946).
7Boyd Dastrup (Crusade in Nuremberg: Military
Occupation, 1945-49 (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1985) 
23-28) provides a useful summary of American denazification 
policies.
8MG report, about Oct. 1945; Niirnberg 1945-1949, I, doc.
4.
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German administrators whom they trusted considerable leeway.9 
Often it was not the local detachment that forced the 
dismissal of an official, but Counter Intelligence Corps 
(CIC) units. They were staffed by many German emigres and 
seemed to have a different agenda. They did not share the 
training or the concerns of the field officers, but rather 
were much more in line with Morgenthau's punitive ideas. By 
October 1945 the situation stabilized and many of the 
appointees remained in office for the next years in spite of 
repeated denazification efforts by the Americans.10
9Dastrup 33-36. A longtime member of the city
administration recalled his experiences in 1988: He had been 
a member of the Nazi party. In June of 1945 he found his name 
in a list of people to be dismissed which the Americans 
published in the official city bulletin. Mr. K., however, 
was transferred to a different section within the
administration, where he shared the room with the newly
appointed director of the Nuremberg police, Stahl, a 
politically clean social democrat whom the Nazis had
dismissed. Stahl intervened on K.'s behalf arguing that he 
was indispensable. When K's name appeared a second time in 
the American lists, Nuremberg's second mayor Levie, who had 
developed a cordial relationship with Military Government 
officers, was able to maintain him in office. By the third 
time, however, K. had to leave the administration. He started 
working for the American Army. Since he was born in 1925, he 
fell under the youth amnesty and returned to the city of 
Nuremberg at the end of 1946 (NCA C104 no. 2, Interview K., 
29 Nov. 1988) . Another member of the city administration 
recalled that her boss did not seem to take the whole issue 
very seriously. He appeared every day at work with a smile 
and asked if he was still employed or had been fired already 
(Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1994).
10Eckart 159-161; Peterson 316-317; Triimmerjahre: 27-28; 
see also Woller (95-110) who detects the same pattern for the 
surrounding region. Lutz Niethammer's Die Mitlauferfabrik is 
the best study on denazification in the American zone. 
According to Eckart (238-248), city administrators of all 
political convictions argued that administrators were 
specialists who could not be replaced. He shows that
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Germans and Youth Work
Theodor Marx in many ways typified the administrators on 
whom the Americans relied to get the cities in the American 
Zone functioning again. Born in 1892, he served in World War 
I, where he was wounded. Marx entered the Nuremberg city 
administration in 1916, where he initially served in the 
section for wounded veterans and surviving dependents. In 
1925 Marx was appointed vice director of Nuremberg's welfare 
services. He also became active in nationwide community 
organizations and devoted much time to private welfare 
organizations. After the Nazi seizure of power Marx was 
charged in a disciplinary court, but the city permitted him 
to retire before the trial came to an end. The Americans 
reactivated Marx in June 1945. By September he had become 
director of Nuremberg's youth and welfare department, where 
he remained until an accident in the Alps ended his life in 
1958. Marx shaped Nuremberg's youth policy more than any 
other person in Nuremberg after the war, but his influence 
went far beyond the city boundaries. He resumed his 
activities in the Deutsche Stadtetag, the interest group of
American Military Government officials took these arguments 
seriously and often granted the desired exemptions, 
undermining the denazification efforts of the special 
branches.
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all larger German cities, where he became one of the chief 
promoters of new approaches to youth activities.11
Marx faced a challenging task. The war had not only 
destroyed much of the living space in Nuremberg but also 
drastically increased the number of young people who needed 
help or got in trouble with the law. To complicate things 
further the youth administration's offices with all their 
papers and documents had been destroyed, together with almost 
all the dormitories the city had erected for young people who 
came from the surrounding region to serve their 
apprenticeships in the city's industries. The Americans had 
requisitioned the one dormitory that was still intact.12
Not all was bad, however. Before the Third Reich, 
Nuremberg had been one of the most progressive communities in 
the field of youth work and youth welfare. The idea for an 
office which dedicated its time and resources entirely to 
young people and took youth welfare out of the hands of 
private organizations had been born in Nuremberg in 1910. 
During the Weimar Republic the city considerably expanded its
llNCA C18/II no. 4508, Theodor Marx; see also "Dr. Marx 
berufsmafiiger Stadtrat," [Dr. Marx Full Time City Council 
Member] Niirnberger Nachrichten, 18 Jan. 1947: 5. As we will 
see in the course of the dissertation, Marx developed his own 
concepts in youth work, but also relied very much on American 
ideas and material help in his attempts to restructure youth 
activities in Nuremberg which he tried to make a model for 
German communities.
12City of Nuremberg, ed., Die deutschen Stadte und ihre 
Jugend: Niirnberg (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: [n.p.], 1950) 2.
Cited hereinafter as Die deutschen Stadte.
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services to young people. In 1920 it opened the first office 
which was dedicated entirely to taking care of the problems 
of Nuremberg's young people. Jugendpflege or youth work 
became an integral part of welfare services. Progressive men 
in charge of youth welfare regarded it as an essential tool 
for preventing jeopardized young people from getting in 
conflict with the law.13
In December 1924 the German parliament passed the first 
German law for the welfare of youth, the only law the 
Reichstag was able to pass unanimously before 1933 . For the 
first time in German history the law assigned the state a 
general responsibility for the upbringing of young people. 
In view of the dire economic situation of Germany, however, 
the newly introduced youth offices never were able to expand 
their activities beyond welfare. Nuremberg faced additional 
challenges. Instead of giving communities a free hand, the 
Bavarian state government decided to assume control of the 
entire youth sector. This decision hampered the work of the 
youth administration within the community and made innovative 
and progressive programs almost impossible to realize.14
Hilter's rise to power in 1933 saw the complete demise 
of independent youth work of the communities. The only realm
13Erwin Stein, ed., Monographien deutscher Stadte: 
Darstellung deutscher Stadte und ihrer Arbeit in Wirtschaft, 
Finanzwesen, Hygiene, Sozialpolitik und Technik XXIII: 
Niirnberg (Berlin: Deutscher Kommunalverlag, 1927) 273-277;
see also Die deutschen Stadte 1-2.
l4Die deutschen Stadte 1-2.
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in which the city was permitted to operate was youth welfare. 
All other aspects of youth work became part of the Hitler 
Youth. Marx clearly recognized in 1945 that the city's 
isolation immediately after the war, with no state or central 
government at hand to intervene in welfare and youth affairs, 
offered him the chance to reorganize the entire area of youth 
work, including the welfare system and social services as 
well as youth care, without restraints from above. Before 
193 3 he had been a prominent advocate of making the 
communities responsible for youth work. The new situation 
gave him the opportunity to put his plans into action.15
Youth work actually was reviving in the city. The 
Catholic and Protestant churches had taken advantage of their 
right to organize immediately after the end of hostilities. 
The trade unions and the socialist Falken began to get 
together again as soon as they were permitted to do so. 
Nevertheless the start was slow. In January 1946 a mere 
7,400 young people had found their way back into seven of the 
traditional youth organizations whose formation Clay had 
authorized in October. The two churches initially had the 
strongest following, but the trade unions soon caught up with 
them.16
lSDie deutschen Stadte 1-2.
l6Nuremberg Military Government Detachment, Annual 
Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June 1946, section
4.e.(2), Youth Activities; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 5.
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The October directive also mandated the initiation of 
youth committees in which all youth organizations together 
with different community representatives could learn to work 
and solve their problems together on a democratic basis. The 
directive seems to have been in line with Marx's thinking. 
Nuremberg's youth organizations also reacted positively to 
the suggestion. American policy did not seem to be in line 
with the thinking of the Lutheran Church, however. Church 
leaders had met in Munich at the end of May 1945. They 
decided to explicitly instruct all deacons in the state that 
they should not do anything that would deviate from the 
traditional youth activities of the church.17
The city's youth committee came together for the first 
time in January 1946. Marx's ideas of the committee's 
structure and mission were initially identical with those of 
the American educators. He tried to foster close cooperation 
between the city administration and the youth committee. 
Youth organizations apparently accepted the experts' lead. 
During the first years, for example, they elected the 
director of the city's youth administration to the chair of 
the committee. It is important to note in this context, 
however, that traditionally Germans organized in Vereine, or 
clubs which dedicated themselves to a specific purpose such
17Direktive USFET zu Jugendbewegungen, 25 Oct. 1945; LCA 
Personen CLXV Dollinger 10; minutes of the full meeting of 
the State Church Council 31 May-2 June 1945; LCA Landes- 
kirchenrat, Akten des Landesjugendpfarrers VI, 1178a 1940-45, 
vol. Ill Jugendarbeit.
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as sports, hiking, singing, or even politics. Military 
Government officials as well as the Germans initially did not 
take those young people into account who refused to organize 
in any way. These people had no way of participating in any 
youth activities and therefore also had no voice in the 
committee during the initial phase of its existence.18 
First Aid
Neither McCloy nor Klise regarded youth as a high 
priority in Nuremberg during the first months of the 
occupation. McCloy and many people in Washington wanted to 
see denazification carried through. The immediate concern of 
the Nuremberg detachment was, and for the next years 
remained, the city population's survival. Denazification as 
well as youth matters became additional burdens for field 
detachments which hampered their more important tasks. 
Nuremberg was completely paralyzed and even the most
liDie deutschen Stadte 4; Nuremberg Military Government 
Detachment, Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 
June 1946, section 4.e.(2), Youth Activities; Niirnberg 1945- 
49, I, doc. 5. In his report on Nuremberg's youth activities 
of 1950 Marx states that the Nuremberg Youth Committee 
actually preceded Military Government directives. The 
sources do not bear his claim out. Clay signed the directive 
on 3 Oct. 1945 and it was published in German on the 28th of 
the same month (A copy of the German version of the original 
directive is in LCA Personen CLXV, Dollinger, 10) . Since the 
city administration repeatedly reported to various American 
offices that the Germans had initiated the youth committee in 
Nuremberg, it seems plausible that city administrators and 
youth leaders had come together on an informal basis and 
agreed on a similar institution prior to the American 
directive. Even though, one of the early participants 
remembered that the American influence on the committee's 
policies and its structure was considerable (Willy 
Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995).
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essential services had collapsed during the final battle. 
The officers and enlisted men needed to revive a city that, 
according to their own estimates, was 90 per cent destroyed 
and had no water, gas, or electricity. Military Government 
had to fill the void the Nazi administrators had left behind. 
At the same time the food situation within the city was 
alarming. The complete transportation breakdown cut the city 
off from the surrounding region which normally provided the 
supplies for its population. Officers found supplies for 
about ten days when they took stock in Nuremberg in May 
1945.19
The Nuremberg detachment immediately went to work. 
During the summer of 1945 it reinstalled the city's 
administration, supervised the reopening of hospitals and
19Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June 
1946, Nuremberg Military Government Detachment; Niirnberg 
1945-49, I, doc. 5. I agree with Peterson that field 
officers regarded instructions from higher echelons, which 
often reflected Washington's priorities, as a nuisance which 
did not help with their tasks in the communities. Clay soon 
realized that JCS 1067's economic provisions were completely 
out of touch with realities in Germany. The economy had to 
be revived to ensure at least a subsistence level that would 
take care of paying for the American Zone's food imports 
which so far were a part of the American occupation budget. 
This is why he began to argue in favor of a limited 
resumption of German industrial activities. See, for example 
the year end speech Clay prepared for General McNarney, in 
which he summarizes his position and the Military 
Government's achievements in 1945 (Clay Papers doc. 77) and 
Krieger 98-101. The Nuremberg Field Detachment's actions 
were typical for the intial phase of the occupation in which 
Army regulars were in charge (Lutz Niethammer, "Die 
amerikanische Besatzungsmacht zwischen Verwaltungstradition 
und politischen Parteien in Bayern 1945," Schriftenreihe der 
Vierteljahreshefte fur Zeltgeschichte [hereinafter cited as 
VJfZ] 2 (1967): 185-186).
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tried to make sure that food would be at hand. American 
engineers helped their German counterparts to rehabilitate 
the utility works and the public transport system. The 
Germans got passes which permitted them to move freely in 
spite of the curfew, vehicles, gasoline and even building 
materials that otherwise were not available. It was 
certainly no drawback that all three commanders were 
professional soldiers who apparently got along well with the 
tactical troop commanders. Whenever German administrators 
were unable to provide vital materials deemed necessary for 
maintaining the population healthy and quiet, the Army helped 
out. Hospitals received penicillin for treating the German 
venereal disease cases. Military Government rearmed the 
police with American guns to reestablish law and order. 
American tank trucks provided parts of the population with 
water and went out to the surrounding region to collect milk 
to feed the children. The transportation breakdown as well 
as JCS 1067, which initially closed down German coal mines, 
also prevented the city from obtaining the coal it would need 
to keep its citizens from freezing during the winter. In 
accordance with Eisenhower's instructions American forces 
provided transportation for bringing wood into the city. In 
Nuremberg they also made sufficient tools available to do the 
job. When the city could not get enough people to cut the 
wood, the Military Government officer in charge of the action 
simply requested and got several thousand prisoners of war to
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
151
do the job, organized the necessary tools and picked the site 
for the cutting. The Army's wood transports continued 
throughout the winter of 1945-46.20
German refugees from Eastern Germany and the Sudeten 
mountains received the special attention of the occupiers. 
In view of the acute shortage of housing the city of 
Nuremberg had imposed a ban on returning Nurembergers if they 
could not prove that they had a job and a place to stay, but 
the Americans were not bound by those rules. Shortly after 
the fighting ended they began to ship large numbers of 
refugees whom they picked up in their trucks to Nuremberg 
without even advising the administration of these shipments. 
The city obviously was not pleased with the developments. In 
the course of the next months Military Government officials 
tried their best to make the situation in the camps bearable 
by providing bedding materials and other necessities for the
20The detachment's report of May 1945 describes the milk 
action in Niirnberg 1945-1949, I, doc. 6a; see also the 
detachment's various reports covering the time between April 
1945 and June 1946; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, docs. 3,4,5. 
"Tankwagen als Heifer in der Not: Menschen standen in langen 
Schlangen an," ([Tank Trucks Helped in Emergencies: People 
Stood in Long Lines] Triimmerjahre 1945-1950: 3) contains the 
information on utilities from a German perspective. Apart 
from the annual report see Peterson (319-3 20) for the wood 
cutting action. Peterson's eyewitness account is not quite 
correct. Capt. Richard Mershon, who apparently became Civil 
Affairs Officer some time in the summer of 1945, recalled in 
an interview that he had to steal the tools. The city 
administration, however, maintained a record of the tools it 
had received in 1945/46. All of them had either come from 
German captured stocks or from the local American Army units 
who lent them to the city of Nuremberg. The city bought the 
tools from the Army in Oct. 1947 (NCA C28 no. 43, 44; details 
of the transports are in NCA C28 no. 39, Dec. 1945-May 1946).
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hopelessly overcrowded camps, cooperation from the city was 
not easily forthcoming. The city did not pasteurize the milk 
it provided for the camp until the refugees complained to the 
Americans in June and refugee representatives reported in the 
same month that without the help of the Americans they would 
not have been able to disinfect the camp. Four weeks later 
the refugees once again had to appeal to the Americans. 
Health inspectors had found that the toilets were completely 
inadequate, but the city only went into action when the 
Americans intervened.21
Initially nobody knew how long these refugees actually 
were going to stay in Nuremberg. Captain Mershon of the 
Nuremberg Militaryu Government detachment informed the 
Germans in June that the city would not have to provide 
additional space for the refugees since the Americans would 
soon begin to return them to their homes. In response to 
this information about 800 expellees from the Sudeten sent a 
petition to the American authorities in which they made clear 
that they had actually not fled their homes, but rather had 
been deported and come to Nuremberg on American trucks. They 
inquired when the political circumstances would enable them 
to return home. Lieutenant Callicott informed them in August 
that he had forwarded their inquiry to the appropriate higher 
authorities. In the meantime the city reported to the
21Reports of 28 June, 2 July, 8 July 1945; NCA C25/I no. 
1087; monthly report for Schafhof and WitschelstraBe, 23 June 
1945; NCA C25/I no. 1086b.
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Bavarian Government's representative, the President of Middle 
Franconia's regional government, that the Americans did not 
return any of the refugees and did not even permit them to 
leave the camps. The author thought that "these people will 
most probably remain in Germany in the foreseeable future." 
Since most of the refugees either were women or children, 
additional problems loomed large on the horizon. With the 
men absent the women would have to go to work, but nobody 
knew what to do with the children.22 
Struggle for a New Start: Reopening the Schools
In view of the more pressing tasks of assuring the 
survival of the city it is not surprising that Military 
Government officials only dedicated as little time and 
resources as possible to youth, but the Army regarded 
functioning schools as essential for getting young Germans 
off the streets where they might get into trouble and cause 
problems. The Education and Religious Affairs Branch in 
Berlin set l October 1945 as the deadline for the field 
detachments to reopen the first four grades of elementary 
schools. Eisenhower informed the Germans in August 1945 that 
their schools and courts would be reopened "as soon as they 
are cleansed from Nazi influences." Eisenhower promised that 
a judicial and an educational system which would be based on
“Reports, Welfare Office Nuremberg on the situation of 
the refugees of 26 June, 5 July, 26 July, 15 Aug. 1945; NCA 
C25/I no. 1087.
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"real democratic principles" would find strong American 
support.23
Policy formulation and orders are one matter, their 
implementation is another. The field officers in charge of 
the task did not always carry out their orders in a way which 
headquarters would have approved. In Eichstatt, a town
halfway between Nuremberg and Munich, for example, the 
education officer did not seem to care at all about his task. 
He simply ordered that the schools be opened by the deadline. 
When the German school superintendent objected because 
denazification had eliminated most teachers, the officer told 
him to employ housewives. This was in line with the letter 
of his directives, but certainly not with the spirit. The 
superintendent later recalled that the officer was not at all 
inclined to offer suggestions or to listen to German 
problems. He brushed all legal or administrative objections 
aside and was only interested in meeting the deadline he had
^Proclamation of General Eisenhower to the German people 
in the American Zone of Occupation of 6 Aug. 1945, in 
Amtsblatt der Militar-Regierung Deutschland, Niirnberg no. 23, 
15 Aug. 1945: 1 (reproduction in Nurnberger Nachrichten,
special issue, 40 Jahre Bundesrepublik Deutschland: 
Wiederaufbau 1945-49: 5) . It should be noted here that this 
proclamation addressed the Germans in the second person, 
"Ihr", instead of the formal and customary "Sie". Germans, 
especially the members of the middle class, regarded the use 
of the second person as a serious offense which clearly 
demonstrated a lack of respect towards the person addressed 
in such a way. Although headquarters may not have been aware 
of the difference, the authors of the German version of the 
proclamation demonstrated in this way that the Americans not 
only came as victors, but that they also had lost their 
respect for all Germans and had no intention of meeting them 
on equal terms.
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gotten from headquarters. His only help consisted in a car 
and gasoline for the German administrator. When the schools 
opened, he convened the teachers and told them in no 
uncertain terms that he considered them all as Nazis and 
would not help them in any way even if regulations permitted 
him to do so. In spite of his apparent lack of interest and 
documented hostility towards the Germans the officer remained 
with Military Government in the region for the next four 
years, but was hardly seen in Eichstatt.24
The situation in Nuremberg was similar in some respects, 
but had much better results. Education and religion did not 
seem to enjoy a high priority even for a major city like 
Nuremberg. In May 1945 the position of the Education and 
Religious Affairs Officer in detachment B-211 remained 
vacant. Subsequent reports indicate that the Monuments and 
Fine Arts Section, which was established after May, also was 
taking care of schools and the Churches. First reports from 
the field show, however, that the officer in charge of this 
section had to devote much of his time to the enormous art 
treasures stored in Nuremberg, some of which had to be 
returned to their original locations in Poland, the Soviet
24Peterson 312-313. As we have seen above, Education and 
Religious Affairs Branch had no officers who could devote 
their full time and attention to education. It is most 
likely that the officer in charge of Eichstatt had been 
ordered to take on the opening of schools as an additional 
duty on which he was not inclined to waste any more time than 
absolutely necessary. His anti-German feelings only worsened 
a potentially bad situation.
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Union and in Austria. He therefore had to limit his other 
activities. His only action in the religious and education 
realm consisted of a meeting with church leaders in April 
1945. He ordered them to resume their activities and to 
register with Military Government.25
In the course of the city administration's 
reorganization and denazification Military Government 
appointed the new superintendent for schools in Nuremberg, 
Dr. Hans Raab, on 25 May. Raab had been an English teacher 
and served as interpreter for the city administration. 
Former school director Otto Barthel joined him as head of 
elementary schools in June.26
“The telephone directory of the Nuremberg detachment 
from May 1945 shows that there was an office and a telephone 
reserved for the education and religious affairs officer, but 
that nobody was in charge of the office at the time. 
Detachment reports from April 1945 list education and 
religious affairs under the arts section. It seems that Lt. 
Col. James Barnett, the detachment's deputy commander, who 
remained in Nuremberg until 1948, early on took an interest 
in education and religious affairs and may have taken over 
the duties of the position when it was vacant. Niirnberg 
1945-49, I, docs. 5 (Nuremberg Detachment Annual report 20 
Apr. 1945 to 21 June 1945) , 6a (Summary Det. E1B3 Functional 
Work in Nuremberg on 22.4.1945), 6b (Summary Det. E1B3 
Functional Work in Nuremberg on 23.4.1945); information on 
Barnett is in Eckart 125. Nuremberg seemed to be harder hit 
than smaller communities, but basically had to deal with the 
same problems. See Muller (55-100) for a general assessment 
of the school situation in Bavaria at the time.
26Dastrup 55-56; Nuremberg Military Government 
Detachment, Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 
June 1946; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 5; monthly report of the 
Lord Mayor of Nuremberg for June 1945; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, 
doc. 99a.
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Finding and reconstructing classrooms became the first 
obstacle Germans and Military Government had to overcome for 
the reopening of schools. Just as the rest of the city, 
school buildings had suffered considerably during the war. 
Looters did not spare public buildings in April. They took 
everything from furniture to electrical appliances from the 
schools the war had left intact. American troops, refugees 
or parts of the city administration moved into the buildings 
that could still be used. Since no other facilities were 
available, butchers and milk distributors had to open their 
shops in some school houses.27
The city took stock in June 1945: fifty-six of the
existing 123 school buildings in Nuremberg were completely 
destroyed. Another twenty could not be repaired in the 
foreseeable future. The administration thought that twenty- 
four buildings could be restored fairly easily, provided that 
it could obtain the necessary materials. Only two smaller 
buildings had escaped any damage. Seventy-two of the 
buildings had been elementary schools. Twenty-one of those 
were considered to be repairable within the time limit.28
^"Metzgerei zog ins Schulhaus: Kinder bekamen nur
diirftigen 'Betreuungsunterricht'," [Butcher Shop Moved into 
School: Children Received only Meager 'Maintenance Lessons'] 
Triimmerj ahre: 31.
28Monthly report of the Lord Mayor of Nuremberg for June 
1945; Niirnberg 1945-1949, I, doc. 99a; Nuremberg Military 
Government Detachment, Annual Historical Report from 21 Apr. 
1945 to 20 June 1946, section 3e; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc.
5.
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Since the schools were closed, the city administration 
ordered all teachers to participate in the rehabilitation of 
Nuremberg's school houses from May on. A number of teachers 
who had not survived denazification and were dismissed 
returned to the schools in construction crews during the 
summer. Military Government helped where it could. It tried 
to clear school buildings the Army had requisitioned for 
housing soldiers. By May 1946 the Army had returned to the 
Germans most of the ten school buildings it had occupied. To 
facilitate the acquisition of materials Military Government 
opened a dump for captured German materials on the Nazis' 
former rally grounds. The Germans could pick up whatever 
materials they needed. This help was only a drop in the 
bucket, however, because everybody needed the materials. 
Utility companies or hospitals certainly had priority status. 
The city reported that a lack of building materials prevented 
even the most urgent repairs. Two days before the deadline 
Nuremberg had about one hundred rooms in twenty-nine 
buildings ready, less than one tenth of the peace time 
number. These rooms had to accommodate almost 24,000 
elementary school children. Only a part of them had windows, 
so there would be problems as soon as temperatures began to 
fall in October.29
29Monthly report of the Lord Mayor of Nuremberg for Sept. 
1945; Niirnberg 1945-1949, I, doc. 100; Nuremberg Military 
Government Detachment, Annual Historical Report 21 Apr. 1945 
to 20 June 1946, sections 3.e and 9.d.4.(l); Niirnberg 1945- 
49, I, doc. 5; see also a report of 7 July 1945 in the
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Nuremberg also had to deal with the serious shortage of 
textbooks and teaching materials. The Education and 
Religious Affairs Branch in Berlin had been able to produce 
a considerable number of books, but they were not nearly 
enough to satisfy the demand. Once more each detachment had 
to rely on its own resources. In the case of Eichstatt 
nothing happened at all in this respect. Nurembergers were 
luckier. Although the number of textbooks remained a 
constant worry for the next three years, the field officers 
did their best to help out. When the schools opened in 
October, for example, the Americans had organized from 
Magdeburg in the Soviet Zone math books which had been used 
there before 1933 .30
Nuremberg faced an equally difficult task in finding 
teachers for the children. Since teachers were entrusted 
with the future citizens of Germany, it was logical that 
Military Government was particularly eager to rid the 
profession of all Nazi and militaristic influences. German 
Church and city officials, however, argued for leniency, and 
above all for an evaluation of each individual case, not a
Bayerischer Tag, a MG information bulletin for the Bavarian 
population, about the conditions in Nuremberg. The 
reconstruction work of the Nuremberg teachers apparently 
found its way into the report as an example that should be 
emulated by other Bavarian communities (Nurnberg 1945-49, I, 
doc. 9a).
30Triimmerjahre: 31. Raab acknowledged American efforts 
during the next years, especially the support of a Major 
Morell, but found that MG only enjoyed limited success in its 
attempts to provide new textbooks (NCA C3 6/I no. 3 24) .
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blanket wave of dismissals based on party membership. On 
July 19, 1945 Raab sent a "Memorandum of Removal of 
Administrative and Teaching Personnel" to the Americans. 
According to him, all German officials, including the proven 
enemies of the Nazi regime, asked Military Government
officials to discriminate between the real criminals and 
those party members who had been "non-aggressive" and
"inoffensive." He wrote that not entering the Nazi Party or 
one of its affiliations could have serious consequences for 
members of the civil service which ranged from dismissal all 
the way to the deportation to a concentration camp. Raab 
proposed that those Nazi members who had not harmed anybody 
or had entered the party under pressure should be retained 
and be "subject to an adequate period of probation," possibly 
accompanied by salary cuts. He also suggested that the whole 
procedure could be handled much better if the Americans 
consulted German authorities before they decided on
dismissals. Echoing a wide spread conviction among leading 
Nurembergers, Raab predicted dire consequences for the future 
relations between the Germans and the occupiers and even for 
world peace if Military Government did not moderate its 
denazification policy.31
31Raab's own summary and conclusion of the memorandum is 
in Nurnberg, 1945-49, I, doc. 10c. Eckart (112, FN 12) 
evaluates additional parts of it. Raab himself discussed 
text and impact of his memorandum for the city chronicler in 
1948 (NCA C36/I no. 324). Eckart (112-121) shows that Raab's 
allegations were far from correct. It had been possible 
throughout the Third Reich in Nuremberg to remain in the city
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In August the city repeated its plea with the Americans. 
In his monthly report Martin Treu, an old and respected 
Social Democratic leader whom the Americans had appointed 
Lord Mayor in July, downplayed the importance of the 
teachers' involvement in Nazi organizations. According to 
him, the Americans should regard membership in lesser Nazi 
organizations as a sign of evasion or even camouflage of 
anti-Nazi feelings rather than active participation. Treu 
insisted that an individual evaluation of each case was 
indispensable. The American denazification policy was 
leaving many older teachers without pensions at a time and 
age when they could not be expected to change professions. 
Treu further argued that the American directives also were 
draining the city of the experienced specialists it so 
urgently needed in those difficult times.32
administration without becoming a party member, since even 
the Nazi Lord Mayor to a surprisingly large extent accepted 
the administrators' argument which they would use for the 
Americans again: civil servants were apolitical specialists. 
This does not imply, however, that many of them were not 
attracted to the Nazis who had incorporated many nationalist 
and conservative ideas into their program. Even Nazi 
antisemitism was not unwelcome to many (Eckart 72-74). 
Schieder severely criticized the American denazification 
policy as well. He thought that it should be carried out on 
an individual basis. If the Americans continued their 
course, they would cause communism and even renazification of 
the people. (Nuremberg Military Government Detachment, Annual 
Historical Report 21 Apr. 1945 to 20 June 1946, Appendix No. 
1; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 5)
32Die Situation der Lehrer, monthly report of the Lord 
Mayor for Aug. 1945; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 99b.
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Nuremberg officials, like those in other communities 
under American control, did not get the desired response. By 
August 1945 the Americans had dismissed ninety-six teachers. 
Two days before the schools opened the number had swollen to 
160, compared to 139 teachers who could start working. The 
city had little hope that Military Government would permit 
more than 50% of the remaining forty-one teachers who were 
still under investigation to return to the classrooms.33
The Nuremberg detachment tried harder than their 
counterpart in Eichstatt to remedy the situation along the 
lines permitted by headquarters. In good American tradition 
the officers looked for practical and quick solutions. They 
began to train substitute teachers without any regard for 
German civil service regulations or educational 
prerequisites. Only those could apply who had never been 
members of the Nazi party or its affiliations. The new 
teachers got their training in crash courses which lasted 
eight to twelve weeks in 1945. The city did not find the 
crash program in any way adequate. Lord Mayor Treu thought 
that many of the new teachers accepted the post only out of 
economic considerations without having the necessary 
inclinations or capabilities. The long term experience, 
however, proved him wrong. Many of those who went through
33Die Situation der Lehrer, monthly report of the Lord 
Mayor for Aug. 1945; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 99b.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
163
the courses remained in the profession in spite of prejudices 
and obstacles they had to overcome as outsiders.34
Raab's and Treu's attitude towards denazification brings 
an important difference between German and American educators 
to light. The Germans maintained that schools were part of 
a body of civil servants who, as apolitical experts, had to 
do their duty regardless of the political environment to 
which they had to adapt. They simply had to be reprogrammed, 
that is, made acquainted with the new rules and they would 
function adequately. It was in line with this thinking that 
Raab convened his teachers once a week not only to discuss 
practical questions, but also to familiarize them with the 
new ideology. Teachers listened to presentations dealing 
with "educational goals, democracy and school, and 
fundamental ideas about the curriculum." Americans did not 
share this "apolitical" interpretation of the German civil 
service, and especially teachers. No matter where they stood 
on Germany's future, they agreed that German schools had been 
crucial during the Third Reich and earlier in disseminating 
militarism, antisemitism, and Nazi ideology. Those who did 
not regard Germans as capable of being reeducated wanted the
34Die Situation der Lehrer, monthly report of the Lord 
Mayor for Aug. 1945; Niirnberg 1945-49, I, doc. 99b; "Lehrer 
mit reiner Weste: Schulhelfer absolvieren ihre Ausbildung in 
einem Schnellverfahren," [Teachers with a White Vest: School 
Helpers Receive Training in a Hurry] Triimmerj ahre: 31;
"Nothelfer in Schulen: Kurs von zwolf Wochen fur Ersatz- 
Padagogen," [Emergency Helpers in Schools: Twelve Week
Courses for Substitute-Educators] 40 Jahre Bundesrepublik: 
15; Dastrup 56.
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Nazis to be punished and the schools closed with no further 
action afterwards; those in favor of rehabilitation regarded 
denazification as the essential first step towards reform. 
JCS 1067 as well as Eisenhower's directives reflected this 
common denominator. Schools were as important as the law 
courts which the Nazis had corrupted. A look at Nazi 
textbooks, which even treated math problems in militaristic 
terms, confirmed the Americans' view. If Raab had assessed 
the teaching profession's involvement in National Socialist 
propaganda realistically, he might have realized that his 
interpretation of the teachers as apolitical servants did not 
hold. Americans could not accept the rather cosmetic changes 
he was proposing. The occupiers initially neglected the 
fact, however, that they would not be able to carry out 
structural reform without convincing German educators about 
the validity of their views and rather different attitudes 
towards the goals and meaning of education. Ultimately 
democratic values and less authoritarian teaching methods 
might be more important for re-education than the reform of 
the educational system itself, but the success of either 
approach depended on the Americans' ability to break up old 
patterns of thinking and teaching.
GIs and Germans
Nuremberg's city administration continued to function 
with almost no interruption and was in close and daily 
contact with American Military Government officials.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
165
Ordinary men, women and children, however, were more likely 
to make their acquaintance with the occupiers on the streets 
or in their apartments. During the immediate postwar period 
practically all Nurembergers had to face American soldiers in 
one way or another. Germans had to deal with Americans who 
searched or even requisitioned their apartments and houses 
after the fighting ended. Since schools did not open until 
October, German children and adolescents had much time to 
spend for organizing food, becoming familiar with the new 
situation and with the occupiers as well.35
Hans Eckstein, born in 1913, had worked in the supply 
department of a unit throughout the war. He was one of the 
many German soldiers who resolved not to fall into Russian
35Gimbel (A German Community) was the first scholar who 
examined this aspect of the American occupation. Ziemke also 
dedicates much space to the development of German-American 
grassroots relations. The more recent German case studies by 
Eckart and Woller, however, almost entirely ignore this 
issue. While Eckart is mainly concerned with the American 
influence on Nuremberg's city administration, he occasionally 
ventures into the realm of opinion and perceptions of the 
population in general. He argues, for example, that the 
withdrawal of Military Government from active management of 
German affairs in many ways removed it from the German 
population. According to him, this permitted special branch 
activities, above all denazification, to penetrate German 
society and perceptions much more profoundly than Military 
Government actions (160-162) . While this interpretation may 
have its merits, Eckart never bothers to test it. He also 
does not take into account the presence of many thousand 
American soldiers in Nuremberg who certainly contributed in 
one way or another to the German perception of Americans in 
the city.
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hands.36 In May 1945 he escaped the Russians who had 
captured him and began to march towards the west. During the 
first few days of his journey he became responsible for a 
small group of refugees, consisting of civilians and soldiers 
like himself who all wanted to make it to the region 
controlled by the Americans. When they had finally reached 
their destination, the group dispersed. Since Eckstein was 
still in uniform, he decided that it would be best to give 
himself up to an American soldier. He marched in the next 
village and shook hands with the first GI he encountered, 
making it clear that he considered the war to be over for 
him. The GI did not seem to have any apprehensions, but 
rather gave Eckstein part of his rations and sent him to the 
local courthouse for further processing without any guard. 
Before he entered the courthouse, Eckstein, who had worked in 
the development section of a car factory before he was 
drafted, helped an American to adjust the engine of a German 
truck. He waited with a number of other German soldiers for 
an American officer who, according to rumors, could provide 
them with discharge papers that would return the soldiers 
officially to civilian life. Eckstein was able to obtain the 
coveted paper ahead of everyone else because the American NCO 
who accompanied the officer had been the man who had had
36Henke (674-693) provides a detailed account of the 
attempts of German soldiers and civilians to make it to the 
American lines. Of course not all Germans were lucky, but on 
occasion American troops provided considerable assistance to 
their undertaking.
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trouble with the truck. He recognized Eckstein, and after a 
short conversation with the officer, the German obtained his 
release paper and was allowed to leave.
Eckstein continued his journey towards Nuremberg. On 
the way he made his discharge paper available to other 
soldiers who managed to get their discharges by simply having 
a local teacher copy it for them. Since the paper stated 
that he was from Nuremberg, he did not have problems with 
American patrols. On the contrary, Eckstein was able to 
fetch a ride on a German bus driven by a former SS-man and an 
American soldier. In a typical display of American behavior 
at the time, the GI did not stop for Eckstein, but rather for 
a German lady with a child who needed a ride. Eckstein was 
able to sneak up on the roof of the bus. At the next 
American road block the Americans discovered him. They 
inquired about his destination and he was permitted to ride 
inside, much to the chagrin of the driver. When the GI 
became aware that the driver and Eckstein did not like each 
other, he made it a point in taking Eckstein directly to his 
house in Nuremberg, where he arrived on 27 May 1945, his 
wedding anniversary.37
Friedrich Voigt also decided that he needed to return to 
Nuremberg after the end of hostilities. In his village 
Americans ordered all former soldiers to register at the town 
hall, but just like others Voigt preferred to wait and see
37Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
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what happened. Those who did register were taken to France, 
where they would have to work for the next years. Armed just 
with his official telecommunications identification card and 
fresh eggs, he walked back to Nuremberg in spite of 
regulations which did not permit Germans to leave the 
communities in which they were staying. Voigt knew the 
region very well, but even when he met American patrols, he 
presented his ID together with the eggs and continued his 
journey unmolested. GIs even provided him with cigarettes. 
He thought that African-American soldiers generally were 
friendlier than their white counterparts.
Once in Nuremberg, Voigt immediately reported back to 
work. Since his skills as a telephone repairman were in 
urgent demand, his superiors simply ignored the fact that he 
was not eligible for work because he had not been officially 
discharged. Voigt remained on his job without any 
interruptions until he retired over thirty years later.38
Heiko Kistner, eighteen years old in 1945, fought the 
war beyond the cease fire. Russians took him prisoner two
38Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 26 July 1994. 
Americans usually seemed to have ordered German soldiers to 
appear in uniform at the courthouses. Those who did often 
marched into prison camps, but GIs did not seem to be overly 
worried about netting all former soldiers of the Wehrmacht. 
Those who did not appear usually seemed to have been left 
alone. See "Soldaten verwohnen 'Blondy' mit Schleckereien: 
Die kleine Waltraud vergafl bald alle Warnungen vor den 
Feinden - Ihr Bruder beneidete sie sehr," [Soldiers Spoil 
'Blondy' with Goodies: Little Waltraud Soon Forgot All
Warnings about the Enemy - Her Brother Envied Her a Lot] 
Triimmerj ahre: 10.
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days after the official German surrender. He managed to find 
his way back to the west as well. Kistner did not have any
problem finding a job as a messenger for an American unit in
Oettingen, about forty miles south of Nuremberg, where he had 
located his family. He decided to enlist American help for 
his return trip to Nuremberg. In his spare time Kistner 
worked for a farmer who paid him with homemade schnapps. 
African-American soldiers were happy to exchange this 
commodity for gasoline. As soon as Kistner had enough to 
provide for the trip and pay the driver, he was able to move
the family back to Nuremberg in fall of 1945. Kistner
recalled that he got along with the African-Americans "very 
well."39
Everywhere American soldiers searched houses for Nazi 
materials and hidden soldiers immediately after the end of 
hostilities, but often also took along other desirable 
objects. A seventeen-year-old girl discovered her favorite 
stuffed animal in a jeep on her way home from work. Although 
GIs were standing nearby she ran to the jeep and took her 
tiger back without any interference. The GIs apparently were 
more interested the opposite sex than in keeping their war 
trophies. The girl walked away accompanied by whistles and 
shouts. When Americans searched her apartment for a second 
time, one soldier decided to take along one of the two eggs 
the girl and her mother still had. The girl took the egg out
39Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
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of his hand and put it back in its place. The Americans left 
the dwelling without any further incidents.40
Marianne Hassel, at the time twelve years old, recalled 
a similar incident. Her first contact with Americans was in 
Schwabisch Hall, a small town in Wiirttemberg. African- 
American soldiers searched their house, but did not display 
any hostility. On the contrary, she found a black soldier in 
the kitchen who had picked up her little sister and carried 
her around. Another GI, however, had taken her recorder. In 
spite of her fear Ms. Hassel decided to negotiate with the 
soldier and was able to persuade him to return the recorder 
to her. During the next months Americans repeatedly left 
food at her house or gave the children chocolate, but her 
family remained reserved towards the occupiers. She 
overheard adults discussing rumors of rape or venting their 
disapproval of German girls and ladies going out with 
American soldiers, especially African-Americans. Although 
she had a number of encounters with GIs, Hassel never got to 
know them by name or got into closer contact with them.41
Once again the refugees had their own very special 
experiences with Americans. Johannes Wahner's family resumed 
their odyssey shortly after hostilities ended. They joined
40" 'Maunzerle' als Kiihlerfigur: Madchen entdeckte
Lieblingsstofftier am Jeep," ["Maunzerle" as Radiator Mascot: 
Girl Discovered Favorite Stuffed Animal in Jeep] Triimmer- 
jahre: 3.
41Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995.
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the thousands of people whom the Czechs expelled from their 
homes. Apparently anticipating the Potsdam agreement that 
this operation had to be carried out as humanely as possible, 
American trucks and troops came to the region to pick the 
Germans up and bring them to Germany. Many of the refugees 
had been able to save some of their belongings and gathered 
them at the assembly points. Wahner remembered that GIs in 
charge of the transports actually prevented Czechs from 
stripping the Germans of their last belongings. From Mies 
they went directly to Nuremberg and found themselves in a 
camp that during the war had served as air defense command in 
a Nuremberg suburb. In June 1945 alone the city became 
responsible for several thousand refugees in this way. As we 
have seen above, the refugees had to rely on Americans to 
receive some of the necessities of life and help from the 
Nurembergers.42
The refugees soon seemed to develop a special 
relationship with the occupiers. Just four weeks after the 
GErman surrender African-American soldiers blasted a hole in 
the wall surrounding a German refugee camp, apparently to be 
able to visit their girlfriends undisturbed. The refugees' 
representatives notified Nuremberg's city administration 
which in turn alerted Millitary Government. The following
42Johannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995; for 
a brief history of the camp see Knud Willenberg, Rudolf Groh, 
Schafhof- ein Stadtteil im Abseits? (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: 
Korn und Berg, 1993) 19.
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day Lieutenant Callicott inspected the scene. He became 
especially concerned about the contacts between children and 
African-American troops. Callicott, who was in charge of the 
local detachment's youth section, was unhappy about refugee 
children begging for food when the GIs were having lunch or 
dinner. The city tried to do something and reported a month 
later that it had stopped those activities. Johannes Wahner 
and his friends, however, continued their visits of the 
American kitchens in spite of the admonitions, because they 
provided them with food they needed to survive. Wahner 
recalled that black soldiers maintained their goodwill 
towards young people and shared their food with them. If the 
children were lucky and spotted an African-American cook, 
they could be sure that he would save some food for them. 
The city officials also could not stop American soldiers from 
visiting the camp. During the next months reports about 
American visits from annoyed camp inhabitants repeatedly 
reached the city administration.43
Not all American GIs were so well disposed towards young 
Germans. Gerhard Knochlein, seventeen years old in 1945, 
recalled that not all attempts to begin a friendly 
conversation with GIs were successful. He and a friend had 
begun to talk to an American soldier at the entrance of a 
requisitioned house when suddenly another soldier showed up
43Reports by welfare office 28 June, 29 June, 25 July, 28 
July, 4 Sept., 6 Sept. 1945; NCA C25/I no. 1087; Johannes 
Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
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and began beating Knochlein's friend without warning. The 
two Germans decided to retreat rapidly in view of such 
adversity. Ironically the incident took place at the 
building which later on became the home of the Nuremberg 
Post's largest and best equipped youth center.44
Wahner, his brother, and his friends also found out the 
hard way that not every American was well disposed towards 
young Germans. According to him, white GIs generally 
preferred throwing their leftovers in the trash to giving 
them to the children. When one of them caught Wahner's 
brother picking raisins from a container with leftovers, he 
decided to dip the boy's head in the unappetizing slop. A 
little later, a Mexican-American soldier invited Wahner and 
a friend to pick up laundry from a requisitioned house. The 
two soon found themselves thrown down the stairs and locked 
up with a native Nuremberger in the basement of the house. 
They discovered a large collection of German arms there, but 
were more interested in boxes with tuna cans stored in the 
room. All three boys ate until they were sick. They had to 
pay a price for the delicacies, however. In the evening the 
American opened the door. All three boys had to run a 
gauntlet made up of GIs before they made it back to freedom. 
The Germans learned quickly to stay away from this kind of 
company.45
“^Gerhard Knochlein, personal interview, 24 July 1994.
4SJohannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
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Even those who kept their distance from the occupiers at 
times could not help being surprised. In Nuremberg the lady 
who had recorded the rude American behavior in April confided 
to her diary in May that she had given some juice and dessert 
to her neighbors who in return presented her with little 
boxes of American coffee. She went on to say that "we are 
enthused. We haven't had something this wonderful for
decades.1,46
Some of the Germans who were offended by the Americans' 
contacts with the opposite sex decided to resort to more 
drastic actions to show their disapproval. In September 1945 
Military Government's Intelligence Division reported that 
relations between GIs and German Frauleins "have been more 
than some young Germans, particularly returning P[risoners 
of] W[ar] have been able to stand." In Heidelberg, for
example, posters went up which not only denounced the 
fraternization in very drastic terms, but also threatened the 
German girls involved with dire consequences. In and around 
Nuremberg flyers appeared which expressed the hope that the 
girlfriends of African-American soldiers would have "black 
and white speckled children." The poem that followed 
described women who went out with GIs in the worst possible 
way. Make-up, improper dresses as well as smoking American
“^Diary of an elderly lady, 5 May 1945; NCA F5 no. 488.
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cigarettes seemed to be trademarks of this kind of 
betrayal.47
The authors of the report noted that German officials 
could not agree on what the posters actually meant. German 
girls reacted to them on an entirely individual basis. Those 
from "good" (middle class?) backgrounds at least understood 
the German men's motives and respected them by not going out 
with Americans, even when they were employed by the Army or 
Military Government. They also pointed out, however, that 
going out with an American soldier was very attractive, 
because GIs were easy going and did not have marriage in 
mind. The girls revealed that many families actually 
supported liaisons with Americans because of the material 
benefits. The young women, whose names and addresses were 
made public on the posters, had nothing but contempt for the 
GErman purists. Military Government investigators reported 
that "German women thus pilloried poutingly indicated their 
determination to carry on now with even greater 
enthusiasm.1,48
47United States Group Control Council [hereinafter 
USGCC], Information Control Service, ICIS #12, week ending 29 
September 1945: 9; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Survey
Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2; the Nuremberg flyer is in Henke 
(199). According to him (198-200), this phenomenon occurred 
throughout the American zone.
48USGCC, Information Control Services, ICIS #12, week 
ending 29 September 1945: 10; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion 
Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2. Henke 199 also points out 
that a number of the women attacked in this way justified 
their behavior with equal creativity. Liselotte Arnold, who 
worked for the Americans from 1945 to the sixties,
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The ladies did not have to worry too much about the 
threats. Nobody would touch them as long as they were with 
their boyfriends. Some neighbors certainly kept their moral 
reservations to themselves because they also benefitted from 
the generosity of the GIs who came to see their girl­
friends.49 In addition to that, the Americans were eager to 
maintain law and order, especially in regard to men who might 
form a threat to the security interests of the occupiers. 
Counter Intelligence officers kept a close eye on male 
teenagers who followed ladies fraternizing with Americans. 
In Heidelberg a twenty year old man who had just been 
released from a POW camp, was the first to be tried for 
attacking a fraternizing girl. He had watched her talking to 
a GI at the train station, then attacked her and tried to cut 
off her hair. Since this was the first case of this kind on 
trial, the American judge set a precedent and found a unique 
justification for his sentence. Since it would have taken 
the girl nine months to regrow her hair if the young man had
corroborated this information. According to her, girls from 
reputable families could work for the occupiers, but should 
not date American GIs. Serious relationships, however, were 
generally accepted (Lieselotte Arnold, personal interview, 18 
Aug. 1995; see also Helga Kohler, personal interview, 13 July 
1994).
49When asked if the neighbors did not object to the 
relations between African-American soldiers and German girls 
in his neighborhood, Friedrich Voigt pointed out that the 
generosity of the GIs certainly served to appease any hard 
feelings the neighbors may have had (Friedrich Voigt, 
personal interview, 26 July 1994).
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succeeded, the offender would spend the same time in 
prison.
Fraternization was not the only issue that led to 
irritation in some German circles. Army requisitions from 
the start became a bone of contention in German communities. 
Nurembergers, for example, lost control of their opera house 
which had escaped the bombing. Apart from enjoying the
traditional German repertoire, the Americans used the 
building as a club, a boxing arena, a movie theater, and as 
a stage for their own shows. The Army permitted German 
functions twice a week, but continued operation of the club. 
German actors had to put up with sometimes rather rude 
behavior or at least an informality they were not accustomed 
to. On the positive side the Americans often provided the 
artists with food and other luxury items.51
In spite of widespread destruction and the influx of 
refugees, the Americans initially did not exercise any 
restraint in requisitioning buildings. Although the Army 
targeted mainly Nazi property, it also expanded into many 
private dwellings with no apparent connection to the Nazis. 
Usually the occupants of the buildings were given short 
notice and were not allowed to take anything but the most 
necessary items along. The situation in Nuremberg became
50Henke 199-200.
s,"Gejohle empfing Kiinstler: Junge Sangerin muBte sich an 
US-Sitten gewohnen," [Hooting welcomed Artists: Young Singer 
had to Get Used to US-Behavior] Triimmerjahre: 38.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
178
even more unpleasant in the fall of 1945 because the 
Americans needed room for the Allied personnel participating 
in the Nuremberg trials. Erlenstegen, a rather wealthy 
Nuremberg suburb with nice houses which had escaped much of 
the destruction, became their prime target. House owners 
found themselves and the people they were accommodating out 
in the streets. Some of the new occupants permitted 
landlords to return to their houses to retrieve additional 
items or to use their gardens, but many others did not. The 
issue remained a much resented feature of the occupation in 
Nuremberg and in other cities of the American zone for almost 
a decade.52
Having the house requisitioned, or at least sharing it 
with Americans during the initial phase of the occupation, 
could result in not entirely undesired consequences and 
sometimes even led to unexpected displays of goodwill. One 
family found food which the American occupants had left for
52Eckart 170, fn 64; "Amerikanerin enttauscht: Sie wollte 
Goring hangen sehen," [American Lady Disappointed: She
Wanted to See Goring Hang] Triimmerjahre: 34; Helga Kohler, 
personal interview, 13 July 1994. Ms. Kohler lived in 
Erlenstegen and was well acquainted with a number of people 
who had to give their houses up for the Americans. John 
Gimbel (A German Community 54-57) detected similar 
difficulties in the city of Marburg. Not everybody, however, 
regarded the requisitions as unjustified. Two of my 
interviewees, obviously not members of the middle class, 
thought that American policy hit just the right people in 
suburbia who had supported Hitler and complained bitterly in 
spite of the fact that their property was still intact and 
they got rent for the requisitioned properties. (Hans 
Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Friedrich Voigt, 
personal interview, 28 July 1994)
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them when they temporarily returned to their apartment to get 
items they needed. Another family had to put up with an 
American officer who showed considerable reserve towards the 
Germans in whose house he was living. Significantly it was 
the young people who were able to break the ice. The boys of 
the family thought that it would be a nice gesture to give 
the soldier a little present for Santa Claus' day in November 
1945. Apparently impressed by their kindness, the soldier 
opened up and began to provide the children with chocolate, 
chewing gum, oranges, and many other things. The children 
found out that he had a German grandmother who seemed to have 
told him much about the way she had celebrated Christmas. 
The officer began to inquire what one would need to make the 
upcoming holiday a typical German one. Much to the 
astonishment of the Germans, he began to organize the things 
he had heard about. The family, including the American, 
feasted on a goose their benefactor had requisitioned in the 
countryside and a barrel of beer on Christmas eve of 1945.53
"Chewing gum" or "Hershey's Chocolate" became household 
names for German children who also learned to appreciate 
American oranges. Even the Stars and Stripes took notice of 
the phenomenon. Side by side with a story about the very
53"Wohltater brachte eine Gans: Die guten Taten von
"Laddy" an einer Familie," [Benefactor Brought a Goose: 
'Laddy's' Good Deeds for a Family] Triimmerjahre: 7. Marianne 
Hassel's family in Schwabisch Hall also benefitted from food 
the Americans who lived in their house left for the family 
(Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995).
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bleak Christmas Germans were facing in Frankfurt in 1945 the 
paper printed a cartoon which depicted two American soldiers. 
One of them had children sitting on both arms and his 
shoulders who obviously enjoyed his company while the other 
was running from an angry mob of youngsters. The caption 
read: "Out of Chewing Gum again, Bill?" Just a few days 
later another cartoon captured the conversation of two German 
women commenting that GIs were replacing nannies in their 
neighborhood. The background showed a smiling and obviously 
good-natured American sentry at a car pool playing with 
children.54
Providing children with chewing gum and candy was just 
one facet in the relations which GIs and young Germans began 
to develop in 1945. Boys and girls often found the casual 
behavior of the soldiers attractive. We have already 
discussed the little boy who had to wait for Americans to be 
able to get hands-on experiences with military equipment.55 
Another lady recalled her astonishment when she watched for 
the first time how an American soldier did his sentry duty in 
front of a former German military installation. She 
remembered vividly the contrast between the behavior of the 
German sentries and that of the Americans. Whereas the
54Stars and Stripes [Altdorf], 3 Dec. 1945: 2. In the 
interviews I conducted the GIs' generosity was one of the 
most frequent associations German interviewees had when I 
asked them about their first encounters with Americans.
55Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995.
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Germans always displayed the Prussian drill and discipline, 
the American leaned his rifle in a corner, organized himself 
a chair, and put his feet with boots on a desk. Even 
officers who passed could not disturb the soldier's 
tranquility and utterly unmilitary manners.56
In the long run the most important asset of many 
American soldiers was their uncomplicated and casual behavior 
which helped to build bridges to the young Germans. As early 
as June 1945 GIs began to teach German children American 
games, such as baseball, basketball or American football. In 
the Bremen enclave the soldiers pioneered the work which 
general Keyes recommended to the commanders in his district. 
Under the headline "Germany Hears 'Play Ball' as Yanks teach 
U.S. Games" Stars and Stripes reported in November that many 
German children were learning American games thanks to the 
willingness of American soldiers to teach them. The GIs 
probably had no idea that they were actually introducing an 
entirely new concept of youth work to Germany. Their open 
house policy would have a lasting impact not only on the 
children who participated in the programs, but also on people 
who were thinking about new ways of taking care of the large 
part of the younger generation which refused to participate 
in any new form of youth organization. In December Stars and 
Stripes reported the first numbers. 22,000 German boys and 
girls were taking part in the soldiers' programs under the
56Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1994.
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guidance of Military Government education officers and Army
chaplains.57
Old Demons Die Hard
Although many German children and adolescents did not 
seem to have any problems in befriending American soldiers 
and seem to have been impressed with the behavior of the 
occupiers, they still had to deal with the legacy of the 
previous twelve years. The war had uprooted many and 
burdened them with experiences most adults would find 
difficult to digest. A great number of them had lost their 
homes and their families. Many teenagers had participated in 
the fighting in one form or another. The complete military 
defeat, unconditional surrender, and the occupation by 
foreign troops as well as the Allies' efforts to acquaint the 
Germans with Nazi atrocities had shattered their belief in 
the greatness of the Fiihrer and the superiority of Germany.58
The American Group Control Council's Information Control 
Section which later was integrated into OMGUS dedicated
57Campbell 4-5; Stars and Stripes, 16 Nov. 1945: 3, 8
Dec. 45: 2. It is interesting to note that many of the most 
successful basketball clubs during the nineteen sixties and 
seventies actually did not come from big cities, but rather 
from towns with large army bases, such as Heidelberg, 
Bamberg, Rosenheim etc. When I learned to play basketball in 
the seventies, our older coaches and trainers, who had been 
teenagers after the war, once in a while talked about their 
trips to basketball games on American Army trucks. It only 
became clear to me in the course of my research that the 
basketball program of my home town probably had its roots in 
the postwar Army programs.
58Schorken, 7-54.
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several surveys to youth in 1945. It examined the re­
education potential of German teachers and the situation in 
schools after their reopening in October. In August 1945 the 
researchers tried to find out more about young people's 
attitudes. The secret final report of the survey revealed 
that many young Germans were living in a world of internal 
conflicts and contradictions. On the one hand, they accepted 
the fact that old ways needed to make room for new ideas and 
systems; on the other, they were unable to shed the ideas 
which they had learned under Hitler. Apparently their first 
encounters with Americans had positive effects. A majority 
of the young people thought that Germans were not better than 
Americans. Significantly they still regarded Germany as 
their undisputed homeland in which they wanted to live, but, 
according to the survey, the United States was the next 
country after Germany that attracted them. Anti-communism 
was a striking feature in young people's attitudes. The 
Soviet Union proved to be the country they disliked most. 
Although an overwhelming majority considered National 
Socialism to have been a good idea that had been poorly 
executed, they recognized that that system certainly would 
not return to Germany and assumed that it would be replaced 
with a democratic system in the American zone of occupation. 
Almost half of the boys and girls thought that Germany would 
need another Fiihrer to emerge from her present crisis. For 
the time being, however, political problems seemed to occupy
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a rather low spot on their agendas, compared to the
challenges the struggle for survival offered. An
overwhelming majority considered the lack of food their most
pressing problem.59
Undoubtedly much to the relief of American officers, the
pollsters neither found any danger of a continuing threat
based on Nazi ideology or organizations nor a hatred towards
the Western Allies. On the contrary, young Germans quite
willingly had thrown their old leadership overboard and
replaced it with the Americans. Intelligence officers made
clear, however, that for them the rest of the picture offered
little ground for optimism.
Anti-Nazi and pro-American lip service, however, should 
not be construed as evidence that those youth are now 
young democrats - they are still totalitarian youth in 
search of a new leadership. They now echo what they 
consider to be the official view of their current 
masters. In a sense, the very manner in which they 
quickly pick up and express democratic and pro-American 
views reveals their attitude of implicit and uncritical 
submission to authority, ingrained by Nazi education and 
German tradition.... Untrained in democratic action, 
many of these youths presume that American leaders will 
now solve their problems in an authoritarian fashion... 
without the youth themselves having to do any more than 
obey orders and profess adherence to the official creed.
Moreover, the fact that these youth have doffed one 
coat and put on another does not mean that they have 
changed their basic character, and quickly discarded
59USGCC, Information Control Service, ICIS #7, week 
ending 24 Aug. 1945: 7-14; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion
Surveys Branch, Box 157 5/234-2/2. Only a limited number of
the surveys survived in the branch records. The titles of 
all others are in the Index to the Information Control 
Review, 14 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Surveys
Branch, Box 158, 5/234-2/5. Eckart (181-220) also identifies
the daily struggle for survival as the major concern in 
Nuremberg in 1945.
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those Germanic and Nazi traits that have caused trouble 
in the past and may cause trouble in the future: hyper­
nationalism, subservience and blind obedience to 
superiors plus domineering over inferiors [a point not 
covered in this survey!], lack of personal 
responsibility for group action , undue reliance upon 
state authority, excessive admiration for power, lack of 
respect for individuals' rights as against group values, 
political fanaticism, uncritical mass thinking, etc.60
In December another intelligence report summed up the 
situation of German youth and American policy at the end of 
1945. According to the researchers, a lot of German 
community leaders were worried about their young people whom 
they found to be in a state of utter confusion over ideas and 
ideals. Many of them could not find jobs, training, or even 
go to school, since secondary schools were still not open. 
The report pointed out that some Germans illegally had begun 
to form youth organizations to help these young people, among 
them the churches and political parties. The authors briefly 
discussed the USFET directive which had led to the creation 
of the Kreis Youth Committees. Their main point of criticism 
was that the directive had as its objective only keeping 
German youth out of trouble, instead of approaching the task 
of "denazifying their minds." As far as execution of the 
directive was concerned, there was much room for improvement. 
The pollsters maintained that the prohibition of political 
activities from the start stifled any attempts at re­
educating German youth, since people were afraid to go
60USGCC, Information Control Services, ICIS #7, Week 
Ending 24 Aug. 1945: 7-8; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion
Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/2.
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against American directives. They further thought that 
cooperation between Military Government and the tactical 
troops did not function very well. Frequent shuffling of 
units, redeployment, the lack of German speaking personnel 
and indoor facilities, as well as the reliance on volunteers 
instead of assigned officers, made the tactical troops' 
program hard to realize, given the enormity of the task. The 
pollsters also found that some soldiers still did not want to 
become involved in activities to help people at whom they had 
been shooting just a few months earlier, although they 
allegedly liked to give children candy.
According to the authors, one of the largest obstacles 
to better results was the lack of a clear cut overall policy 
and directives that would guide units in the field. Such a 
policy would ensure greater uniformity and less insecurity on 
the side of American officials. The pollsters found that 
American interpretations of the youth directive varied 
considerably and led to much confusion and frustration on all 
sides at the end of 1945. As far as the Germans were 
concerned, the pollsters reported that the churches had taken 
advantage of their preferred position and organized youth on 
a decentralized basis. According to their sources, YMCA 
leaders were being trained and plans were made to provide 
Germans with the opportunity to meet Americans on a different 
basis than that of fraternization with soldiers.
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ICD submitted its own evaluation of the state of mind of 
German youth in the conclusion of the report. Apart from the 
features already mentioned, the authors found that young 
people largely rejected the idea of collective guilt and 
still thought that National Socialism basically was a good 
idea. The Germans suspected that their present hardships 
were much more of a punishment than the result of the war 
Hitler had brought upon Europe. The report also found that 
young persons displayed a remarkable lack of compassion for 
the victims of the Nazis at home or abroad. On a more 
positive note the researchers stated that, while completely 
rejecting the Soviet Union, young Germans appeared to have 
open minds for ideas emanating from Great Britain or the 
United States.61
Although the report confirmed that the Nazis had been 
able to deeply implant their ideology in the minds of the 
younger generation, its authors did not consider the case 
hopeless. On the contrary, their main point of criticism 
about American occupation policy was that the United States 
had not yet embarked on any positive re-education efforts. 
This clearly implied that the researchers considered the 
young people in the American zone of occupation capable of 
escaping the old German traits of militarism, blind obedience 
and racism. Although the boys' and girls' motives for
6iOMGUS, Information Control Intelligence Summary no. 23, 
15 Dec. 1945: 1-7; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion Research
Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/3.
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fraternizing with Americans were far from idealistic, the 
pollsters apparently thought that this was a chance Military 
Government should not let slip. The doors were open for a 
more encompassing re-education effort.
The first months of the American occupation were crucial 
for setting the tone for the future. Military Government in 
the communities was unable to dedicate many resources to 
youth work during the initial phase of the occupation, but 
rather had to concentrate on restarting the city's life by 
reconstructing utilities, reopening the vital connections 
with the hinterland on which Nuremberg depended for food, and 
by providing the city with fuel for the winter. American 
officials followed a pragmatic course and rendered generous 
help in the form of experts, equipment, and transport. They 
did not even let Washington's denazification program 
interfere too much with their work. Schools and education 
were the only notable exception to this rule. In spite of 
strong German objections, education officers weeded out most 
Nazis from schools and youth organizations during the first 
months after the war. This made the difficult task of 
reopening schools at the earliest possible moment even harder 
to accomplish. Nevertheless, most children got off the 
streets and into schools by October 1945. Once again the 
field detachments did much to alleviate the situation 
although field officers could not dedicate much time to youth 
work. They managed to appoint capable administrators for
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schools and for youth work in Nuremberg who reestablished a 
progressive youth office with a mandate to expand its 
activities into youth work apart from administering the 
traditional welfare programs. Germans and Americans found 
that they shared many ideas in this field and quickly 
established a functioning youth committee in the city which 
initially tried to revive and coordinate youth activities 
along the traditional pre-193 3 lines.
The most radical departure in dealing with youth in the 
field came from American soldiers. Their casual, 
uncomplicated and— despite their uniforms— very civilian 
behavior stood in marked contrast to the experiences and 
drill young Germans had seen and experienced in the Hitler 
Youth. Without knowing it American GIs opened the door to an 
entirely new approach to youth work for many young Germans 
when they began to introduce American games to German 
children. Taking stock at the end of 1945, the Americans 
realized, however, that they had to do much more to provide 
the guidance necessary for eliminating old ideas and 
replacing them with new ideals. Many young Germans clearly 
understood that they needed to reorient their lives, but they 
still did not know where to go. During the next years the 
seeds that the occupiers had sown would have to receive a lot 
of American water and nurturing in order to germinate.
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CHAPTER V
Washington. 1946-48; A New Policy Emerges
Between 1946 and 1948 it became clear that a new 
constellation was emerging in world politics. The United 
States and the Soviet Union became increasingly involved in 
controversies which soon resulted in the creation of two huge 
power blocks that defined the Cold War for the next forty 
years. At first glance American policy did not show any 
signs of vitality or direction during the one and a half 
years after the end of the war in Europe. The rapid 
succession of secretaries of state between 1945 and 1947 
apparently reflected this lack of direction. It would be 
wrong to assume, however, that nothing of importance happened 
during this lull in American diplomatic activity. Behind the 
scenes American diplomats and politicians were trying hard to 
evaluate the new state of the world and to come to terms with 
the role the United States should play in it.1
George Kennan's long telegram, dispatched from Moscow in 
February 1946, marked the beginning of a new departure in 
American foreign policy although it would take over a year to 
become official. President Truman based his new approach of 
containing the Soviet influence in Europe and wherever else 
it might threaten American interests on Kennan's analysis.
‘Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, The American Secretaries of 
State and Their Diplomacy Ser. XVI (New York: Cooper Square, 
1972) 25-26.
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Revisionist historians argue that American policy makers 
wanted to rebuild Western Germany as a bulwark against Soviet 
aggression. According to this interpretation, the fight 
against the Nazis and for reform in Germany became the victim 
of the Cold War. In spite of growing concerns over Soviet 
actions and motives, however, the problem of Germany remained 
on the agenda. The concept of totalitarianism linked the two 
forms of undemocratic regimes together. If anything, the 
additional threat of communism provided a strong motive for 
many Americans to proceed with the re-education of the 
Germans at an accelerated speed.2
Since Roosevelt had consistently blocked all attempts to 
develop a long range American policy statement regarding 
Germany, the Truman administration had to start from scratch. 
After the unconditional surrender in May 1945 Americans took 
their time to assess the situation there and to develop a 
comprehensive policy. While still trying to make the Allied 
Control Council work through its representative in Berlin,
2John Lewis Gaddis (Strategies of Containment: A
Critical Appraisal of Postwar American Security Policy 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1982) chapters I, II) deals 
with Kennan and the Truman administration. Although Kennan's 
argument was far more sophisticated than described here, it 
basically arrived at the same conclusion and had the same 
consequences for the situation in Germany. For a recent and 
thoughtful appraisal of the American Cold War historiography 
see John Lewis Gaddis, "The Tragedy of Cold War History," 
Diplomatic History 17 (1993): 1-16. In Germany the
discussion for a long time remained fixed on the allegedly 
punitive American policy symbolized by the Morgenthau plan 
and the alleged sudden change of American policy towards the 
Germans from 1947 on. A good German summary is in Fiissl 15- 
17.
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Washington embarked on a number of fact-finding missions to 
survey what was happening in Germany, or at least in the 
American zone of occupation. It was not until January 1947 
that Military Government in Berlin finally got a binding 
directive for German youth.
Truman rather quickly began to pay attention to the 
problem of German re-education.3 Henry Morgenthau's 
dismissal before the Potsdam Conference made clear from the 
start that the President wanted the State Department to 
regain its prerogative in foreign policy planning and 
formulation. As we have seen above, the group that promoted 
re-education of the Germans as a central objective of 
American policy was unable to get the ear of either Secretary 
of State Byrnes or the President during the Potsdam 
Conference, but at least they had been able to present their 
views to the highest echelons without being blocked by the 
Treasury. Free from outside interferences, the State 
Department staff could resurrect its plan for re-educating
30f course any general account of the Truman years would 
not be complete without discussing the Truman Doctrine, the 
Berlin Blockade, the Marshall Plan, or NATO. Nevertheless 
one wonders why one of the largest attempts to reform an 
entire people with vast amounts of American money and 
manpower usually does not even seem to merit mention in a 
footnote. One of the most recent examples of this trend is 
Robert H. Ferrell, Harry S. Truman: A Life (Columbia and 
London: University of Missouri Press, 1994) 246-267.
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the Germans with the ultimate goal of re-integrating Germany 
in the international community.4
Alarmed by negative publicity Military Government got in 
the American press especially with regard to denazification, 
Truman decided to send a special envoy to Germany to assess 
the situation. In the fall of 1945 Byron Price travelled to 
Germany to study the relationship between the victors and the 
vanquished firsthand. In December the President's envoy 
submitted his report to the White House. Price addressed a 
number of issues: he criticized the denazification process 
and suggested that Military Government be transferred to the 
State Department as quickly as possible. As far as young 
Germans were concerned, he thought that they needed far more 
attention than Americans had given them so far. According to 
him, the Nazi ideology and membership in the Hitler Youth had 
made a lasting impression on the younger generation. The 
United States could only hope to counter this brainwashing 
with an extensive youth program which was only at its very 
modest beginnings in the American zone of occupation at that 
time. Apparently the White House thought that the report 
could do something to set the record straight and released it 
to the press, which commented favorably on Price's findings.5
“Ferrell 186-87; see also pp. 40-43 above; for 
Morgenthau's dismissal see Henke 116.
sThe Department of the Army sent the report and the 
press comments on to General Clay in Berlin who deemed them 
important enough to disseminate the information to the field 
detachments. "The Price Report," OMGUS Information Bulletin
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
196
Truman seemed to be especially concerned with Price's 
discussion of German youth. To find out more about the 
specific problems of young Germans, the President decided to 
send Bishop Bernard J. Sheil of Chicago to Germany to conduct 
a survey. Sheil was well known in Washington. As the head 
of the Catholic youth organizations in the United States, he 
had already served as expert counsel on youth questions for 
the Roosevelt administration. In Mid-december 1945 the 
bishop went to Germany to investigate the problems German 
youth was facing in all four zones of occupation and to 
become acquainted with the different approaches of the other 
three occupying powers. He remained in Germany for four 
weeks and returned to the United States with a rather 
optimistic report. Sheil acknowledged that there were 
serious problems, but according to him, these problems had 
their roots in the social and economic destruction of the 
war, not in Nazi ideology. Contrary to the assumption of 
collective guilt on which American policy had so far been 
based, Sheil thought that Hitler and his henchmen had only 
been able to brainwash a small part of the young Germans. 
Still, much would depend on the action of the occupiers who 
would have to work hard to bring German youth into the fold 
of a democratic and peace loving community. Sheil criticized 
denazification, which in his eyes severely hampered all 
efforts at democratization and re-education. Just like
no. 21, 15 Dec. 1945: 23; see also Fiissl 111.
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Price, Sheil advocated an extensive and long-range youth 
program for Germany. The bishop recommended that Americans 
pay special attention to the selection and training of youth 
leaders. MG officials should look to the well developed 
youth activities of the churches as fine examples for such 
work. To bring Germans out of their isolation it would be 
necessary to initiate international exchange programs with 
the United States and to publish youth magazines which would 
disseminate new ideas. Truman got Sheil's report in January 
1946. Apparently the President approved the recommendations. 
In February the War Department forwarded the report to 
General Clay.6
OMGUS reacted quickly, but not very positively to the 
Bishop's report. John Taylor did not agree with many of 
Sheil's specific recommendations. Taylor only liked the 
Bishop's proposal to open club houses and youth hostels. 
According to the chief of the Education Branch, all other 
recommendations were either unfeasible at the time or not in 
accordance with current OMGUS policies.7 Clay also made 
clear that he was not happy with the criticism of the 
denazification process in his own official reply to the 
report. He thought that the Bishop was too focused on 
Christian religion as the only way of saving young Germans.
6Fussl 110.
7Memo from John Taylor, Chief Ed. Section, OMGUS, 5 Mar. 
1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br. , Box 
147, 5/296-3/16.
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Nevertheless, the Military Governor agreed with Sheil that 
youth was important and that an extensive program would be 
necessary to re-educate them, but took no further action.8
Apart from re-education, the churches also became 
involved in the question of humanitarian aid to Germany. 
Sending relief supplies to Germany became an issue soon after 
the war. Apparently unaware of Eisenhower's policy not to 
grant entry permits to Americans into the American zone of 
occupation, Truman had authorized L.W. Goebel, the President 
of the American Evangelical and Reformed Church to travel to 
Germany on a fact finding mission. It took the State 
Department a week to clarify the matter, but in September 
1945 Acting Secretary of State Dean Acheson informed the 
White House that of course the President had the right to 
override any decisions of his military staff and in fact had 
done so in Goebel's case, who should be free to go.9
To obtain a clearer picture of the situation and to find 
ways to start a relief program, Truman dispatched another 
personal mission to Germany in January 1946. It consisted of 
representatives of private relief agencies who were to decide 
what they would be able to do to diminish the misery in the
8Report to President Truman of Bishop Sheil's Visit to 
Germany in Dec. 1945 and Jan. 1946; Clay to Washington, 11 
Mar. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., 
BOX 138, 5/295-2/7.
’Memo from Matthew Connelly, Secretary to the President 
to Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State, 7 Sept. 1945; 
reply Acheson to Connelly, 14 Sept. 1945; NA RG 59 Central 
Files 1945-49, 862.404/9-745.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
199
country. They did not receive a warm welcome from Clay, but 
upon their return Truman himself took action. On 13 February 
1946 he created the Committee of Relief Agencies Licensed to 
Operate in Germany (CRALOG) . Over the next years this 
institution not only provided vital food and clothing 
supplies, but, led by the example of the American Friends 
Services Committee, CRALOG members also became actively 
involved in social programs for young Germans in the American 
zone and Berlin.10
Clay's cool reception of the committee was due to the 
fact that additional agencies only complicated his problems. 
If they had their way, he would have to house and feed more 
American civilians over whose work he would have no control. 
In addition, the general never deviated from his conviction 
that the Germans should be responsible for their own 
rehabilitation. Help would be welcomed as long as the 
Germans wanted it and would be in charge of it. Clay wanted 
to avoid any attempts by outsiders to patronize them. Many 
weeks passed before the relief agencies were able to overcome 
OMGUS resistance and administrative hurdles.11
The arrival of CRALOG agencies in Germany was one of the 
smaller problems the Deputy Military Governor was facing. An
10James F. Tent, "Simple Gifts: The American Friends
Services Committee and the Establishment of Neighborhood 
Centers in Post-1945 Germany," Kirchliche Zeitgeschichte 2 
(1989) 1: 64-82. The following chapter will deal in detail 
with the Friends' and CRALOG activities.
"Tent, "Simple Gifts" 69.
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important issue in Washington was the definition of the roles 
which the War and State Departments would play during the 
further occupation of Germany. Clay had based his decision 
to separate Military Government and tactical troops in 1945 
on the assumption that this would be the first step towards 
transferring the former's responsibilities to the State 
Department. Releasing personnel from the Army and rehiring 
them as civilians was another step in the same direction. 
When the Patton scandal and denazification caused negative 
headlines in the United States in the fall of 1945, 
Eisenhower and Clay decided that it was high time to let the 
State Department assume responsibility for Military 
Government. Although they initially were able to convince 
President Truman that it was "not a job for soldiers," they 
finally had to give up their hope for a quick withdrawal of 
the Army from these duties. The ensuing discussions in 1945 
and 1946 ended in an agreement between the State, War, and 
Navy Departments in April that reaffirmed the State 
Department's policy-making prerogative, while continuing the 
War Department's role in carrying them out.12
This agreement did not ensure smooth cooperation, 
however. In order to develop a specific policy directive for 
German youth, for example, State Department officials needed 
to gather data on the situation in Germany. Bishop Sheil and 
Byron Price had undoubtedly provided some useful insights,
I2Henke 997-1004.
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but Eugene Anderson, in charge of Germany and Austria in the 
Department's division for occupied areas, found it useful to 
learn as much as possible from the field. The administrative 
setup proved to be a considerable obstacle to this 
undertaking. A meeting between Anderson and Hilldring, who 
was about to leave his CAD position to become a member of the 
State Department in February 1946, dealt exclusively with the 
cooperation between the two departments in the fields of 
information control, religion, and education. Anderson 
complained that the Army simply did not provide his 
department with much information about conditions in Germany. 
Without such information writing a useful policy was out of 
the question.13
Although Anderson had to develop a policy that took the 
specific situation in Germany into consideration, he acted in 
a much broader context with its roots in the 193 0s. To make 
Roosevelt's good neighbor policy with Latin America more 
effective, the State Department had created a special 
Division of Cultural Relations which developed an extensive 
exchange program between Latin American countries and the 
United States.14 This first program was so successful that
l3Fiissl 111.
14J. Manuel Espinosa, Inter-American Beginnings of U.S. 
Cultural Diplomacy, Cultural Relations Programs of the U.S. 
Department of State Historical Studies 2, International 
Information and Cultural Series 110 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Dept, of State, Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs, 
1976).
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educators and politicians thought about expanding it to other
countries after World War II. Senator William Fulbright
solved the problem of financing such an endeavor in a unique
way. Many countries needed the surplus material American
armed forces had used and left behind. Bringing the material
back to the United States would be too costly and would
burden the American economy. Another way of getting rid of
the material was to sell it to the countries where it was.
They usually had suffered from war damage and needed the
materials. Since they usually were not able to convert their
currencies into dollars, Fulbright thought that it would be
a better idea to invest the profits of sales of military
surplus in trust funds in these countries. The funds could
be used in two ways: First, they could pay for the stay of
American students abroad. Second, they would provide the
money for financing the journeys of foreign students to the
United States. The Senator's rationale for bringing foreign
persons to the United States was straightforward:
My belief in the program is based on the assumption that 
when foreigners come to our shores what they see will be 
good. In spite of our occasional strange aberrations,
I believe that America is a great country, that its 
virtues outweigh its faults. If the people of the world 
can understand us, they will throw in their lots with 
us.15
Fulbright received strong support from the Department of 
State and American educators. The Institute of International
l5Tristram Coffin, Senator Fulbright: Portrait of a
Public Philosopher (New York: E.P. Dutton & Co., 1966) 84-87 
(the quote is on 86); Kellermann 173.
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Education and the State Department cosponsored a conference 
with university professors from all over the United States to 
discuss the possibilities of expanding the American cultural 
exchange activities which the United States had initiated 
with Latin America to other countries. The delegates 
discussed practical problems they had encountered so far with 
the exchange programs. They also officially recommended and 
supported the expansion of the existing programs. The 
educators promised to support US information policy abroad 
with all means at their disposal and endorsed the bills by 
Fulbright and Bloom that would provide financial support for 
such an expansion. These bills became the famous Public Law 
584 a little later and provided the basis for one of most 
successful efforts to promote goodwill towards the United 
States through first hand information and experience in the 
United States. Apparently the delegates were confident that 
the bills would pass, because they immediately began to 
tackle the practical problems which the expansion of the 
exchanges would bring.16
The Fulbright Act was the culmination of a sustained 
effort by the Department of State to expand its information 
activities after the war. In December 1944 Roosevelt created
l6Abstract of the Proceedings of the Conference of 
Foreign Student Problems and Policies, called by the 
Institute of International Education and the Department of 
State, Chicago, 111. 29 Apr. to 1 May 1946; NA RG 84 Foreign 
Service Posts, Munich Consulate General, General Records, 
842.
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the post of Assistant Secretary of State for Public and 
Cultural Affairs to which he appointed Archibald MacLeish. 
When MacLeish left, William Benton took over his post. 
Within the Department, the Office of International 
Information and Cultural Affairs emerged to coordinate the 
Department's efforts in this field. By December 1945 it had 
defined its mission. Its main task was to maintain and 
service sixty information centers the State Department had 
established all over the world and to supply American 
diplomats with documents and all other available information 
and materials about life in the United States. The 
Department of State would supplement the traditional 
diplomats with public affairs officers whose sole task was to 
provide information about the United States. The office 
also began to develop a program of documentary and newsreel 
films about the United States. Finally, the State Department 
also would establish its own world wide short wave radio 
broadcast program which came to be known as Voice of 
America.17
During trips to various parts of the world in 1947 a 
considerable number of members of Congress experienced first 
hand that people in many countries, not just the former 
enemies, did not have a clear picture of the United States.
l7Henry Pilgert, The History of the Development of 
Information Services Through Information Centers and 
Documentary Films ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. High 
Commissioner for Germany, Historical Division, 1951) 1-2.
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Their experiences led to the Smith-Mundt Act which the 
President signed in January 1948. The Act considerably 
broadened Fulbright's initial objective by establishing the 
United States Information Service in addition to an 
educational exchange service. Substantial appropriations 
during the following fiscal years document that Congress 
indeed saw an urgent necessity for these programs. The 
emerging Cold War probably provided sufficient justification 
for these new expenditures. By April 1948 sixty-eight 
centers were operating in all corners of the globe such as 
Ankara, Warsaw, Cairo, and Bangkok. Latin America had an 
additional twenty-eight centers, established on the basis of 
the 1938 act which had provided the basis for the good 
neighbor policy.18
Germany, however, did not appear on the initial list of 
countries that would benefit from the new programs. For the 
time being the United States still had to come up with a 
policy that would outline re-education in the American zone. 
Nevertheless, the State Department made it clear as early as 
June 1945 that it intended to encourage cultural contacts 
between carefully selected Germans and other countries at the
l8Pilgert, Information Centers 2-3; for the details of 
the program in April 1948 see list of educational materials 
sent to US Information Libraries and Cultural Centers, 8 Apr. 
1948; NA RG 84 Consulate General Munich, General Records, Box 
26, 842 Education Dispatches 1948; more information on the 
Smith-Mundt Act and its predecessor of 1938 is in a dispatch 
from Dept, of State to Consul General, Munich, 27 Jan. 1948; 
NA RG 84 Consulate General Munich, General Records, Box 26, 
842 Student Exchange 1948.
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earliest possible moment. It wanted to avoid yet another 
isolation of Germany from the rest of the world after the 
Nazis had interrupted almost all cultural contacts for twelve 
years.19
To formulate this policy Anderson may not have been able 
to count on direct information from Germany, but advice from 
fellow Americans abounded. The topic of re-educating the 
Germans seemed to intrigue many Americans. In the course of 
1946 numerous letters from all over the country reached the 
State Department. They offered a wide range of suggestions 
which differed considerably in tone, content, and quality. 
Vera Petschek, for example, was a naturalized citizen 
originally from Czechoslovakia. She had been able to witness 
events in Germany and Europe firsthand before she came to the 
United States in 1941 from Central Europe. She wrote the 
Department on 5 February 1946 about the necessity of 
supplying Germans with reading materials. State Department 
officials were not above taking advice from the population. 
Hans Speyer, then the chief of the division for occupied 
Europe, reacted promptly. Five days after Petschek had 
written her letter, he invited her for further elaboration of 
the proposal. Most of the correspondence, however, never 
received more than a brief reply.20
^Secretary's Staff Committee, Long Range Policy for 
German Re-education, 13 Jun. 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 
1945-49, 862.42/6-1345.
20NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/2-546.
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Another American, Edward Hascall, had just returned from
Germany, where he had been MG education officer in a small
town in Upper Franconia. Hascall reported in a letter he
directed to Archibald MacLeish, who was then representing the
US in the founding procedures of UNESCO, that the Americans
had just finished weeding out the Nazis in time for opening
the schools in October 1945, but that many of the teachers
they had selected were young and needed further guidance. He
felt that the Americans apparently were forgetting about the
re-education of the Germans and suggested that the United
Nations should arrange for educators to go to Germany to
support the Germans with the task because they were "quite
helpless" if left to their own resources. Hascall felt
strongly about re-education and probably represented well the
views of his fellow officers who were still struggling in
Germany. He concluded:
It is important that those children who are just 
beginning in school have a different start than did 
their older brothers and sisters; and, although the 
older brothers and sisters seem far from help, we must 
try to bring them back. We are not trying now; not 
nearly hard enough. Are we quitters? Do we turn our 
backs to a job half done?21
The State Department's initial answer must have 
disappointed Hascall. Two months after he had sent his 
letter, Anderson informed him briefly and in a very formal 
fashion that his idea was unfeasible since Germany was still
21Edward O. Hascall to Archibald MacLeish, 25 Feb. 1945; 
NA RG 59 central Files 1945-49, 862.42/2-2546.
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under four power control and the UN did not have anything to 
do with the problem. Hascall, however, apparently was not 
satisfied with the answer. In May he replied to Anderson's 
note and seems to have reiterated his ideas of the necessity 
of a cultural exchange. This time he aroused the State 
Department's interest. In June Anderson inquired whether 
Hascall knew of any evidence that the American people, as 
well as college and university professors, would welcome a 
plan that would send German educators to the United States 
for one or two years.22
In his search for information Anderson also engaged the 
Department's intelligence section. By the end of March 1946 
he got a preliminary report. As far as youth was concerned, 
its author first described the desolate situation for young 
people in postwar Germany. They did not have nearly enough 
school hours or materials. Their teachers were overworked 
and their homes either devastated or overcrowded. In view of 
those conditions it would be good for Americans to focus 
their special attention on extra-curricular activities. The 
author had more in mind than the sports program the Army had 
started just a few months earlier. He envisioned that 
outside institutions would have to come to the rescue of 
schools by providing young people with information about
^Eugene Anderson to Edward O. Hascall, 22 Apr. 1946; NA 
RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/2-2546; Eugene Anderson 
to Edward O. Hascall, 11 June 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 
1945-49, 862.42/6-1146.
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international affairs and foreign countries. Young people 
also should have the opportunity to participate in cultural 
activities. In one important aspect the report did not 
provide any fresh ideas. It was not the author's aim to 
develop a new and positive approach to dealing with German 
youth. Just as with the Army's disease and unrest formula, 
he justified such a program with the argument that it was in 
the interest of maintaining the security of the armed forces 
to keep young Germans off the streets and out of trouble. 
According to him, extra-curricular activities provided the 
best way to do just that. The report found a lack of almost 
everything necessary for youth activities in Germany. There 
were no suitable leaders. The author further argued that MG 
had composed youth committees in such a way that they could 
do little to help young people. Not enough club houses and 
sports facilities were available. His recommendations swept 
the whole range of youth work: young Germans should have
sufficient equipment for their sports activities, but also 
should have arts and crafts materials as well as libraries at 
their disposal. Recreational facilities and activities 
should be guided by qualified youth leaders who would be 
trained by skilled American teachers and social workers. 
International contacts also would be advisable.23
^"Notes on the Problem of American Aid to Education in 
Post-War Germany," Frederick F. Burkhardt, Office of Research 
and Intelligence to Eugene Anderson, 28 Mar. 1946; NA RG 59 
Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/3-2846.
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By April 1946 Anderson was ready for a preliminary 
report to his superiors. Contrary to Taylor's and his 
staff's thinking and actions in 1945 he advocated a two-fold 
approach to German re-education which would greatly expand 
American responsibilities and activities in Germany. First, 
Americans should try to eliminate militarism and 
authoritarianism from the German character, and then they 
should try to reform the institutions that promoted these 
attitudes, a clear reference to school reform. Obviously 
Anderson rejected the notion that there would be any capable 
Germans available who could be trusted with the task. He 
suggested that reaching these goals would require a massive 
effort which could only be sustained with the help of private 
institutions. In line with MacLeish's and the Advisory 
Committee's previous recommendations on re-education, but 
borrowing more from psychiatry than from educational ideas, 
he thought that it would be necessary to explain to the 
Germans what the Americans were trying to do with them so 
that they would be able to adapt to the new conditions. 
Clearly a cure for the disease could only be prescribed by 
the doctor and required the cooperation— but not the input—  
of the patient. Anderson went on to develop a very 
sophisticated system of committees in the United States that 
would address each German weakness, find a cure and send 
experts to Germany to discuss the cure with "selected 
Germans". He estimated that about 250 experts would have to
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go to Germany on such a mission in the following fiscal year 
and reported that the War Department's CAD had requested that 
funds for these experts be included in the War Department's 
budget. In addition to the experts Americans would have to 
use all resources available such as films, radio programs, 
books, and magazines to help the Germans in the process of 
recuperation. Anderson finally informed his superiors that 
he was working with the Department's intelligence section on 
"a list of weaknesses in the German character which we might 
try to overcome."24
Although this draft probably did not reach the State 
Department's highest echelons and obviously was never 
implemented in this form, it contained a number of thoughts 
and suggestions on which Anderson, who became one of the 
chief architects of American re-education policy, continued 
to build. First, Anderson thought that in fact all Germans 
possessed a militaristic and authoritarian mind, but at the 
same time he was convinced that massive outside intervention 
could change that. Second, he clearly realized that the task 
was so big that it would require resources in personnel, 
material, and expertise which the American government could 
not muster alone. Anderson introduced all the ingredients 
which would become part of the American reorientation effort:
24Memorandum from Eugene Anderson to Messrs. Leverich and 
Speyer (for Hilldring), 5 Apr. 1946; NA RG 59, Central Files 
1945-49, 862.42/4-546; see also Tent (Mission 256) for a very 
brief summary of the memorandum.
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Visiting experts, information and education centers which 
offered literature, practical help, as well as extensive 
documentary film collections with the necessary projectors. 
Anderson also seems to have assumed from the start that the 
policy should not be directed towards all Germans but should 
rather target an elite which then could serve as multipliers.
A few days later Anderson added another dimension to 
his plan. In yet another memo he suggested reviving the 
Advisory Committee on German Re-education. The primary 
purpose of this revival would be to discuss the feasibility 
of bringing carefully selected German leaders and students to 
the United States whom private organizations would sponsor. 
Anderson pointed to the Federal Council of Churches' plan to 
bring Martin Niemoller, a pastor who had resisted Hitler and 
spent time in concentration camps, to the United States. He 
suspected that other organizations soon would follow suit and 
that the State Department needed to be prepared. Anderson 
clearly favored such an exchange, but wanted to gather 
information and support with regard to American and German 
public opinion as well as the possible costs involved in such 
a program. The committee would be ideally suited for 
recruiting the private sector as well as coordinating private 
with government activities. According to him, various
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foundations had already set aside substantial sums for the 
revival of cultural relations with Germany.25
Other events in the first half of 1946 helped Anderson 
to get closer to his goals. Early in the year the Americans 
had sent an education mission which consisted of a number of 
high ranking educators from the United States to Japan. 
General MacArthur highly commended the mission for its work 
and thought that its recommendations would be very useful for 
reforming the Japanese school system. American educators had 
suggested a similar mission to Germany as early as the summer 
of 1945, but had not received a positive reply.26 In the 
spring of the following year and with the success of the 
mission to Japan to back them, they tried again.27
This time the State and War Departments reacted 
favorably. Clay had no objections, but insisted that such a 
mission had to be very small. Initially the State Department
^Memorandum Eugene Anderson to Messrs: Leverich and
Speyer, 9 Apr. 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 
862.42/4-946; also Tent, Mission 257.
26Williard E. Givens, Executive Secretary, National 
Education Association of the United States to Henry Stimson, 
Secretary of War, 14 Jun. 1945; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945- 
49, 862.42/6-2845. The War Department referred his request 
for a mission to State, but informed Givens that at that time 
travel to and from Germany was restricted to the "absolute 
essential minimum."
^William Carr, Assistant Secretary of the National 
Education Association of the United States to David Harris, 
Dept, of State, 6 May 1946; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 
862.42/5-646; letter from Friends Committee on National 
Legislation to Secretary of State, James Byrnes, 3 May 1946 
and Anderson's reply of 21 May; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945- 
49, 862.42/5-346.
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wanted to have only highly qualified educators who would not 
only be familiar with German education but also with its 
political system.28 At the same time, however, the State 
Department had to satisfy political demands at home. The 
educators had to represent a number of organizations, various 
educational branches, and different regions of the United 
States. As a result only one of the mission members, 
Reinhold Niebuhr, had been involved in the formulation of 
German re-education policy from the start. The State 
Department tried to make up for this deficiency by sending 
Anderson along with the delegation as its liaison officer. 
A second mission member, T.V. Smith, was familiar with the 
German situation. The others were competent educators whose 
judgment could be valuable although they were not thoroughly 
acquainted with the conditions in Germany. The State 
Department gave all mission members a brief orientation 
session in Washington before the mission left for Germany 
with George Zook, the president of the National Education 
Association, as chair.29
28Memo from H. Speier to E. Anderson, 14 May 194 6; NA RG 
59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/5-1446.
29Tent Mission, 112-115. The State Department could not 
accommodate every prominent educator. Stephen Duggan, the 
director of the Institute of International Education at the 
time, for example, apparently had found out about plans for 
the mission and offered to go to Germany. Henry Leverich, 
Anderson's colleague in the Occupied Areas Division, 
diplomatically referred him to the War Department and out of 
the way (NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 862.42/7-146).
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Before the Department officially invited the educators 
to participate in a mission to Germany in July, it was able 
to obtain a directive from the State War Navy Coordinating 
Committee (SWNCC) which outlined the goals of American re­
education. While it did not mention youth specifically, the 
statement paved the way for later directives which would deal 
exclusively with the topic. SWNCC 269/5 stated that the re­
education of the German people was an integral part of a 
comprehensive American program. Eliminating Nazis from 
influential positions was the necessary precondition for 
starting any positive steps towards rehabilitating Germany. 
SWNCC 269/5 further explained that Americans needed to teach 
the Germans respect and tolerance. They would have to 
instill in the individuals a sense of their rights as well as 
their responsibilities and the desire for searching the truth 
in order to serve justice. The directive explicitly stated 
that Americans would rely on German manpower and resources to 
the widest possible extent. To achieve their goals the 
Americans would have to overcome the isolation which National 
Socialism and the war had caused. International cultural 
contacts would help to assimilate the Germans into the 
community of nations.30
30State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, Long Range 
Policy Statement for Germany, Policy Statement no. 269/5, 5 
June 1946; printed in United States, Department of State, 
Germany, 1947-1949: The Story in Documents, European and
Commonwealth Series 9 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1950) 541-42.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
216
Apart from the general directive the State Department
provided the mission with its inarching orders in July.
Clearly bearing Anderson's mark, the Department directed the
attention of the mission members to everything it believed
was wrong. It criticized Military Government for failing to
secure competent personnel and its educators for focusing
their efforts mainly on material reconstruction and
administrative questions. Concentrating entirely on formal
education had neglected to instill the Germans with positive
values and especially had not yet built up youth work along
democratic principles. The mission would therefore face a
threefold task:
(1) [S]tating a philosophic approach to the problem, 
pointing out the defects of our present program, and 
indicating the main lines of our future effort; (2) 
arousing US [sic] interest in and persuading qualified 
people to offer their services to the program; (3) 
influencing US officials in Germany to accept necessary 
changes in the present program, without the strain on 
relations between Washington and the theater which would 
occur if far-reaching proposals originated here without 
the benefits of the mission's recommendation.31
Zook and his colleagues spent August and September 1946
collecting information from a great variety of sources. Clay
received their final report at the end of September. The
mission members directed the first part of their paper
clearly more towards the public, politicians, and educators
in the United States than to the Military Governor. Their
310ffice Memorandum, US Government, 8 July 1946: German 
Educational Mission; NA RG 59 Central Files 1945-49, 
740.00119/7-846, quoted in Fiissl 111-112.
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report described the widespread destruction and the lack of 
nearly all materials of importance for a good educational 
system. According to the mission, the war not only had 
wrought havoc to educational facilities, but also to the 
educators and the population in general. Millions of refugee 
and expellee women and children, and the imprisonment of most 
able bodied men further exacerbated the situation. Largely 
agreeing with SWNCC 269/5 the mission members called for an 
all encompassing re-education effort. The Americans' major 
challenge would be to introduce democracy to a country with 
a rigid caste system and to a people whose majority did not 
display any interest in such a political system. Such an 
effort also would take care of the Germans' desperate 
material situation which could only be ameliorated by 
permitting the Germans to resume industrial production. The 
educators explained that Americans had taken on a special 
obligation towards their former enemies and the world when 
they agreed to become one of the occupying powers and assume 
complete control over Germany. Clay certainly concurred with 
the educators' statement that people who had to live below 
the recognized level of subsistence did not make good targets 
for any democratization effort. The mission members did not 
question any of the principles that underlay Clay's policies, 
especially denazification, which the Law for Liberation from 
National Socialism and Militarism had delegated to the 
Germans under American control and on which the Allies had
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agreed in Potsdam. On the contrary, they commended Military 
Government for the work it had done.
The mission nevertheless took up a number of issues 
which it thought needed improvement. The German school 
system was the most important part of the education package 
the Americans addressed. According to the mission members, 
however, the rigid caste system and political apathy in 
Germany needed to be addressed on many different levels. 
Reform of the school system would be necessary, but at the 
same time the mission found that the system did have its 
merits. They wanted to preserve Germany's "high standard of 
literacy and its excellence in trades and professions." 
Americans also should recognize that German educators had 
made significant strides towards democratizing the system 
during the Weimar Republic. Educators would have to retain 
the valuable sides of the system, but should continue to 
promote drastic reforms. The main goal should be a higher 
degree of equality which meant equal educational 
opportunities for everyone. The mission found Clay's policy 
to return most responsibilities to the Germans to be correct, 
but recommended that Americans should maintain their veto 
power and ultimate authority.32
nReport of the United States Education Mission to 
Germany [hereinafter Education Mission], the Department of 
State European Series 16 (Washington: Government Printing
Office, 1946): 1-32 (the quote is on 19).
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The report reveals the Americans' attempts to find a 
compromise between the American and the German educational 
systems. Based above all on John Dewey's educational 
philosphy, American educators understood their mission to be 
more than just the teaching of academic subjects. Dewey 
defined education as an important means of providing young 
people a basic academic training but also with the essentials 
of an egalitarian and democratic society. As a result, 
American children of all classes and races went through 
twelve years of comprehensive schooling under the same roof, 
with the notable exception of the South, where schools 
remained segregated until the 1960s. Colleges took care of 
the academic requirements for the more advanced students 
after high school. This philosphy differed sharply from that 
in Germany, where children, teachers, and parents had to 
choose between very different types of schools at an early 
stage of their childrens' education. While schooling was 
compulsory and resulted in an extremely high literacy rate, 
only a tiny elite was admitted to a variety of secondary 
schools which provided highly advanced and theoretical 
training. Only those students who made it through its 
rigorous curriculum and passed the comprehensive final exams 
after twelve years would be allowed to attend universities. 
The great majority of the students continued with a very 
basic eight year education which lead to an apprenticeship 
directly to the job market. Some of those who were deemed
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more gifted went to still another type of middle school from 
which they graduated after ten years with some basics in 
clerical training which enabled them to apply for 
apprenticeships in these fields. Dewey was highly critical 
of this system because more often than not it did not work 
according to abilities— as German educators claimed— but 
served to maintain class stratification. School fees and the 
selection process for the secondary schools made them 
fortresses of the middle class, while members of the working 
class had to be content with basic education. Nevertheless 
German educators could point out that this stratified system 
had worked very well in the past, providing universities with 
the intellectual elite they needed for research on one end of 
the educational stratum and industry with skilled and 
unskilled workers on the other.33
As far as the state of mind of young Germans was 
concerned, the mission found the situation to be far from 
hopeless. The report conceded that the Third Reich had 
demanded a special commitment from young people. The
33This paragraph provides only a very rough sketch of the 
two educational systems and philosophies. For more detail 
see Max Planck Institute for Human Development and Education 
(ed.), Between Elite and Mass Education: Education in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (Albany: State University of New 
York Press, 1983) 11-18, 26-35; Muller 138-175. I do not
agree with his interpretation of the Zook report as the 
recommendation to introduce the American school system in 
Germany. The report acknowledged the German system's merit, 
but also correctly insisted that its basic flaws, above all 
its function to maintain a rigid class system, needed to be 
changed.
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complete collapse and occupation of Germany had left them 
bewildered, confused and hopeless. But, the authors 
continued,
there is more residual health among the German youth, 
despite these difficulties, than outside or casual 
observers might suspect.... Despite difficulties of 
every kind, spiritual and physical, the youth of the 
nation exhibit a widespread eagerness to participate 
creatively in rebuilding their nation, in making contact 
with the outside world after years of isolation, and in 
reconstructing their own broken world of ideals and 
loyalties. There is, therefore, no reason to despair of 
the fruitfulness of the task of reorientation upon which 
we are embarked.34
Since most of the school children could not attend school for
more than twenty hours per week, the Americans should pay
special attention to extracurricular youth groups and
activities. Here the mission members again referred to
German tradition, which, according to them, had been healthy
and anti-authoritarian before Hitler incorporated all of the
youth groups in the Hitler Youth. That tradition could serve
as a basis for reviving youth work, but here as everywhere
else young people lacked almost all essentials: they did not
have food, transportation, clubhouses or equipment. The
report considered the lack of responsible leadership as
another severe handicap. In line with the State Department's
suggestions from July, the mission suggested that youth
should become more involved and responsible for their own
affairs. The report also found that adults dominated the
youth committees and tended to use them for controlling and
34Education Mission: 3.
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registering youth groups instead of supporting them. It 
would therefore be necessary to make yet another attempt to 
involve young Germans in managing their own affairs. MG 
should consider introducing youth councils which would be 
free of adult supervision prevalent in the youth committees. 
The mission pointed out that it regarded leadership training 
in Germany as essential and recommended bringing in American 
specialists on a short term basis for the purpose. The 
Army's assistance program could become a considerable help 
for American policy in Germany, provided that the Army would 
be able to supply it with sufficient and adequate personnel. 
The Germans also would have to be informed about the 
objectives of the program, and the Army and MG should 
maintain close liaison at the top level.35
The mission found another advantage in the presence of 
American troops in Germany. In April 1946 the first 
dependents of American soldiers had arrived there. This 
would not only provide American children and families 
stationed in Germany with excellent opportunities to serve as 
ambassadors for their country and the American way of living, 
but their schools could also serve as laboratories and 
examples for progressive German educators. Although the 
mission's optimism and idealism regarding German-American 
contacts on this level in the long run proved to be
35Education Mission: 33-36.
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disappointing, it led to a number of interesting experiments 
during the next years.36
The report finally admonished its readers to consider 
the re-education of the Germans as a goal that needed to have 
the highest priority. This would make it necessary in 
Germany to elevate the Education and Religious Affairs Branch 
to division status and at least to double its personnel. The 
mission criticized MG for not even filling all positions 
which the table of organization permitted. In the United 
States it would be necessary to pool all available resources. 
Washington would have to incorporate the services and 
contributions of private institutions and individuals into 
its efforts.
On their journey throughout the American zone, the 
mission members also had detected a desire by many Germans to 
come to the United States on an exchange basis. They highly 
recommended such a program. It would bring Germans out of 
their isolation and at the same time would provide them with 
the best hands-on experience in the democratic process. A 
permanent advisory committee would be able to assist the 
government in decisions regarding German reorientation and 
could help coordinate the private and the government sector. 
Zook and the mission members appealed to all Americans that
ztEducation Mission: 28; Frederiksen (119-128) provides 
detailed information about the first years of the American 
military communities in Germany.
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there could be "no turning back in our support of that 
program so vital to the enduring peace of the world."37
Anderson could be satisfied with these recommendations 
and the publicity this high calibre delegation received back 
home. Whereas the mission dealt with reorientation in the 
broadest terms, however, the four weeks in Germany had 
convinced him that extracurricular youth work would be the 
real testing ground for American efforts. According to his 
own analysis, the generation between twenty-five and forty- 
five years would not be able to participate in the re­
education process. Those who had survived the carnage of the 
previous six years were either in POW camps or politically 
discredited because of their participation in the Nazi state. 
One could therefore observe that old people who had not been 
tainted by the Nazis took over political responsibilities. 
Anderson observed that on the other side of the spectrum 
stood the young generation. According to him, the old people 
refused to entrust this generation with power and authority. 
He argued that older Germans thought that the Nazis had 
succeeded in indoctrinating the youth and had stripped it of 
all moral values, an attitude Anderson did not share at all. 
He predicted that the exclusion of young people from the
37Education Mission: 46-50; see also Henry Kellermann, 
Cultural Relations as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy: 
The Educational Exchange Program Between the United Sates and 
Germany 1945-1954, International and Cultural Information 
Series 114 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, Bureau of 
Educational and Cultural Affairs, 1978) 23-25.
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political process would hurt the American reorientation 
effort because the Germans prevented their own youth from 
finding and trying out new ideals. This constellation would 
promote a tendency towards a withdrawal towards extreme 
egoism and make young people susceptible to one sided 
indoctrination. Since the Germans obviously were incapable 
of finding a solution to the problem by themselves, Anderson 
concluded once more that it would be necessary to intensify 
all American reorientation efforts. Taking advantage of the 
only avenue SWNCC 269/5 left open for direct American 
involvement, Anderson suggested that a broad exchange program 
of persons and materials would be vital for achieving this 
goal. It would offer young people the orientation they 
needed.38
Anderson received strong and articulate support from 
Undersecretary of State, William Benton. In October 1946 
Benton advocated sending several thousand "carefully selected 
German students annually" to the United States. According to 
him, such an expenditure would be far more productive than 
spending the money on economic rehabilitation or the military 
occupation of Germany and would help eliminate the root of 
the German problem. If they decided to introduce such 
measures, Americans "would be approaching a major disease 
with the surgeon's knife instead of a scalpel." Benton also 
thought that sending experts to Germany on re-education
38Fussl 113-114; Tent, Mission 258-59.
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missions was an excellent idea. According to him, the 
Americans should not limit their efforts to schools, but 
should further encourage youth activities in Germany at all 
levels.39
Benton's statement immediately followed James Byrnes' 
famous Stuttgart speech in which the Secretary of State had 
announced to Germany and to the world that the United States 
was going to change its course. Frustrated by Soviet
obstruction at the Paris conference of foreign ministers and 
urged by Clay to counter the massive Soviet propaganda 
efforts with a constructive proposal of the United States, 
the Secretary of State went to Stuttgart in September 1946 to 
deliver a speech which Germans and foreign observers alike 
immediately recognized as a turning point of American policy. 
For the first time since the end of the war, a leading
politician of the former allies did not talk about the
Germans, but rather to them. Byrnes did not announce a 
softening of American policy in Germany. He also did not 
withdraw from any of the provisions President Truman had 
agreed to in Potsdam. The difference from previous 
announcements lay in the Secretary's statement that it was 
time for the Germans to start their way back into the
community of nations and that a united Germany would soon 
have to be able to make its own decisions. He commented that
39,lWilliam Benton reports to James Byrnes," Press 
Release, 12 Oct. 1946; NA RG 84 Munich Consulate General, 
Classified General Records, Box 2, 842 Student Exchange.
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the recent merger of the British and the American zones and 
the invitation to the other occupying powers to follow suit 
was the first step in a more constructive direction. Byrnes 
also made clear that the United States did not expect Europe 
to recover without the help of Germany's industry. He 
officially laid to rest the ghost of a permanent agrarian 
state which had arisen anew in Germany when Military 
Government published JCS 1067 just six months earlier, 
although it was outdated and had never been a serious option 
in American policy. Cloaked in a stern warning to the 
Germans that the Americans would not shirk their 
responsibilities as occupiers, he made clear to Germany, 
Europe, and the Soviets that the Americans would stay. In 
his conclusion Byrnes offered American help to the Germans on 
their way back into the community of "free and peaceloving 
nations of the world". German reactions were immediate and 
positive. The Germans in the western zones knew now that 
they would be able to start the physical and psychological 
reconstruction with American help and be protected from 
Soviet aggression.40
The continuity and strength of anti-Soviet feelings is 
certainly the most impressive evidence that Americans did not 
have to make any concessions to the Germans to win them over
40Address delivered in Stuttgart, 6 Sept. 1946 (the full 
text can be found in Department of State Information Bulletin 
15 (Sep. 1946): 496-501 and in Germany 3-8); see also Clay 
78-82; Davidson (145-156) describes the West German reactions 
to the speech.
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to their camp in the emerging Cold War. Of course some 
influential Americans argued this way. Following his trip 
with the education mission to Germany, the theologian 
Reinhold Niebuhr, for example, proposed in an article in Time 
that the United States would have to enlist the Germans in 
the impending struggle with the Soviet Union. Enlisting 
Germans against communism, however, was not the problem. 
Germans had invaded the Soviet Union in 1941. National 
Socialists were certainly among the most reliable opponents 
of communism. It was German aggressiveness, National 
Socialism, militarism, and racism that had inflicted two 
catastrophic wars in three decades. This is why the State 
Department was not happy with Niebuhr's proposal. Hilldring, 
by then Assistant Secretary of State, noted that Niebuhr had 
forgotten that the basis for the re-education program was not 
the fight against communism, but rather the attempt to 
replace National Socialism and militarism with democratic 
values. Since Soviet propaganda and actions in its zone of 
occupation only offered a different brand of totalitarianism, 
Hilldring found that developing an extensive re-education 
program which especially targeted youth in the west should be 
one of the State Department's top priorities.41
Clay's insistence that JCS 1067 was a solid basis for 
his actions and his refusal to let Military Government 
officials participate in the policy formulation process,
41Fussl 119.
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however, did not help the State Department in its attempts to 
assess the situation and needs in Germany and incorporate 
them in a new general directive. The cumbersome committee 
apparatus also prevented the Department from quickly 
formulating more specific guidelines for youth activities. 
In August 1946, however, the first obstacle fell. Apparently 
frustrated with four power negotiations, Clay finally 
signalled his willingness to accept a new directive for the 
American zone of occupation. As far as re-education was 
concerned, he thought that a broad statement would be 
sufficient. SWNCC 269/5 would serve well as the implementing 
directive for OMGUS headquarters. Apparently he wanted to 
give his officers in Germany as much leeway as possible.42
On the surface the Department of State accepted Clay's 
wishes, but between August 1946 and January 1947 the 
directive underwent constant revisions. In October, for 
example, apparently riding on Benson's support, the State 
Department succeeded in integrating the exchange of persons 
and materials between the American zone and the United States 
in the directive. Initially this exchange was to take place 
only between the United States and the American Zone. In 
1947, however, the Americans expanded the program, permitting 
Germans to travel to other European countries and experts 
from those countries to come to their zone of occupation.
42Clay to War Dept., 16 Sep. 46 and 25 Jan. 47; Clay 
Papers, doc. 157, 187.
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The ninth version of the directive, issued in January 1947,
exclusively dealt with the reorientation of German youth. It
became the basis of American policy until the official end of
the American High Commission in 1955.43
SWNCC 269/9 assessed the problems German youth were
facing in 1947. The authors of the directive seemed to base
their evaluation almost entirely on the findings of the OMGUS
intelligence section of the previous December. First, they
described the consequences of Hitler's policy and the war for
young people. In line with the field report and with
Anderson's thinking, they identified the main problem as the
youth's search for a new Fiihrer instead of a different
ideology. The directive confirmed the course of American
policy in the field, but it introduced a new dimension to the
efforts. According to the authors, Military Government had
completely neglected the large numbers of those who refused
to join any organizations. In general it drew a dire picture
of the present status of American efforts and German youth:
[t]o what an extent the spiritual and political 
reorientation of German youth has made headway is 
doubtful. The sometimes enthusiastic response to 
efforts made in that direction has always come only from 
a small minority. The great majority of German youth is 
described as distrustful, apathetic to political 
questions if not outright cynical, and altogether 
uncertain as to where to fix its wavering loyalty.
43SWNCC 269/8, 269/10, 269/11 reflect the development of 
the exchange program; they are in Germany 611-14; SWNCC 289/9 
is the main youth activities directive; it can be found in 
Germany 578-583.
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SWNCC 2 69/9 concluded by identifying nine objectives 
that Americans would need to target to help young people to 
get back on the right track:
a. To substitute Nazi and militarist thought by a new 
set of values compatible with democratic ideals and 
essential to social progress.
b. To protect German youth against undesirable 
political influences and to provide for the adjustment 
of Nazi youth in order to facilitate their political 
rehabilitation and their absorption by the community.
c. To provide German youth with new moral, social, and 
political incentives so as to invite their active 
participation in the reconstruction of their country and 
to overcome their indifference of hostility to community 
affairs, their intolerance and lack of initiative.
d. To foster youth groups as a means of control, as a 
means of facilitating reorientation, and as a means of 
self-expression.
e. To permit youth groups to operate in connection with 
adult civic groups, including political parties, in 
order to further civic education and to prevent 
clandestine or subversive activities by uncontrolled 
political groups.
f. To reduce the danger of mass loafing and delinquency 
by enhancing the social usefulness of youth through work 
projects and intensified vocational training.
g. To promote and to perpetuate community interest in 
youth and youth activities and to secure cooperation of 
youth with the community.
h. To rejuvenate existing political and civic bodies.
i. To overcome the isolation of German youth by 
resuming contacts between German youth and youth outside 
Germany.
Although the directive often simply legalized policies 
and objectives MG detachments had already pursued before 
April 1946, it also officially clarified the American 
position. Simply eliminating the old evils, for example, was
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no longer enough. Americans would have to replace them with 
other ideals. The directive for the first time ominously 
mentioned that not just Nazi influences would be unwelcome in 
the American zone. The fight against National Socialism 
slowly began to become more inclusive by applying the more 
general concept of totalitarianism, but Americans did not 
give up their original goal. The directive also took Clay's 
youth amnesty into account and made clear that the 
rehabilitation of former Hitler youth was not only possible, 
but highly desirable. The most important message of the 
directive seemed to be that Americans had to succeed in 
integrating and reconciling young Germans with the emerging 
political and social system. Contacts with the rest of the 
world would certainly further this progress considerably by 
exposing Germans to other democracies and widening their 
horizons in general.
The directive also provided detailed practical 
suggestions for its implementation. Military Government 
officials were to "advise" local authorities on what to do 
with the young people who were living in their communities. 
MG would have to make sure that youth organizations would be 
free of former Nazi activists. All youth activities would be 
based on experiencing the democratic process first-hand by 
voting and granting fundamental rights such as freedom of 
expression, tolerance, and cooperation to everyone. German 
administrators would have to cooperate to make hands-on
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experience in community affairs under their guidance 
available to young people, especially in the field of youth 
work. The Americans also emphasized youth leadership 
training. As far as the rehabilitation of Nazi youth was 
concerned, the directive made clear that the Germans would 
have to develop special programs for this group, but that 
their attempts at reintegration should not have any punitive 
character. Finally Military Government would be responsible 
for creating a wide variety of opportunities for German and 
non-German youth to become reacquainted with each other.44
1947 brought the final turnaround of Washington's policy 
in Germany. The first indication of a change came with 
former President Herbert Hoover's mission to Germany during 
the harsh winter of 1946/47 to assess the food situation. 
With the constant haggling over the enormous amounts American 
taxpayers had to come up with to feed the Germans in their 
zone of occupation, President Truman needed to investigate 
the matter. Hoover was the ideal man for the job. He had 
directed the American relief efforts for Belgium during World 
War I, he was familiar with the problems in Europe after 
World War II and his integrity was beyond reproach. Hoover 
had visited other countries in Europe earlier that year and 
had reported back to Washington that the situation there was 
serious, but that nobody in Western Europe would be starving. 
His report on Germany, however, sounded an alarming note.
“SWNCC 2 69/9; Germany 578-83.
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Hoover found widespread undernourishment which affected 
especially the young and the old. Hoover proposed that 10 
million tons of food be made available to American 
authorities in Germany immediately. The far reaching 
economical suggestions Hoover made so that Germans would be 
able to pay for their own food did much to change public 
opinion about reparations and deindustrialization in the 
United States. Still more important for the Germans, 
especially young people and children, was the fact that 
Hoover immediately set out to save Germans from starvation. 
His interest in the plight of children resulted in a special 
program which from April 1947 on provided additional calories 
for every child in the American zone. Germans gratefully 
named the program after its founder.45
In March 1947 George Kennan published his X-article in 
Foreign Affairs which brought wide attention and recognition 
of his containment theory. Just three months later, George 
Marshall, who had just replaced Byrnes as Secretary of State, 
delivered his address at Harvard University which outlined 
the American support program for Europe and became known as 
the Marshall Plan. Marshall recognized that Europe would not 
be able to recover without Germany, but the question 
remained, how the Germans could come back into the
45Davidson 158-161; Ruhl 184-86.
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international arena without becoming a menace to the
international community again.46
The Joint Chiefs of Staff directive that replaced JCS 
1067 to govern general American policy in Germany over two 
years after V-E day revealed the changes in attitude and
tried to provide the answer to the question. The new
guidelines differed considerably from JCS 1067 in various 
respects. Whereas before the Americans had held out the hope 
of Germany's reintegration in the community of nations in the 
distant future, in 1947 the time had come. Germans would 
join the international community as quickly as possible. JCS 
1067 had emphasized the negative aspects of American policy, 
such as de-industrialization, demilitarization and 
denazification. Not surprisingly the new directive, JCS 
1779, reflected the reconstructionist approach. Clay 
certainly was delighted to find that Washington finally 
agreed with his point of view that a functioning economy 
would serve as a pillar for a democratic and peaceful 
Germany. He may have been more surprised about Washington's 
decision to elevate the importance of re-education 
dramatically. The authors of the directive admonished the 
general that re-education of the Germans had to be "an
integral part of policies intended to help develop a 
democratic form of government." Clay should regard it as one
46Tent (Mission 282) provides an excellent summary of 
American policy in 1947.
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of his most urgent duties to coordinate these efforts with 
the other occupying powers. Military Government would 
encourage Germans further to develop their own initiatives 
and would support the development of international cultural 
relations in every respect, but Americans were far from 
abandoning all of their original objectives in Germany. Clay 
would have to "continue to effect the complete elimination of 
all National Socialist, militaristic and aggressively 
nationalistic influences, practices and teachings from the 
German educational system." Although the time had come for 
reintegrating the Germans into the international community, 
it could only happen if the old demons remained under 
control.47
In view of the increasing emphasis on extra-curricular 
activities it is hard to understand why the authors of the 
directive limited their instructions entirely to formal 
education. JCS 1779 admonished the American educators in 
Germany to "encourage and assist" the Germans in the 
development of educational methods, curricula, materials and 
even schools. Germany should end up with a "healthy, 
democratic educational system." It is not clear from the 
directive whether American policy planners considered formal 
education as the most important task of Military Government, 
or whether they were satisfied with the provisions in SWNCC
47The full text of JCS 1079 is in Germany 33-41; see also 
Tent, Mission 282-83.
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269 and simply filled the void the previous directive had 
left, just as Clay had suggested. At any rate the planners 
in Washington had finally succeeded in providing Military 
Government with new guidelines for the Germans. It remains 
to be seen what effect these guidelines and policy statements 
actually had in Germany. Military Government planning and 
actions in the American zone of occupation as well as the 
youth activities in a community will answer that question.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VI 
OMGUSt Reorientation. 1946-48
The fact that Washington needed almost two years to 
provide Military Government in Germany with specific 
guidelines concerning youth did not mean that Americans in 
the field remained idle. On the contrary, Washington's 
inactivity provided the men and women of Military Government 
youth operations in Germany with opportunities to develop 
their own ideas about re-educating young Germans in their 
zone of occupation. Undeterred by a lack of recognition 
within OMGUS and administrative chaos, the field officers 
successfully developed their own objectives. Their decisions 
needed time to be accepted by the higher echelons, but 
ultimately the youth officers determined American policy in 
their field. Private agencies as well as the tactical troops 
stationed in Germany provided additional vital support. 
Headquarters. Clay, and Re-education
In 1946 the men and women who were charged with the re­
education of German youth could not hope to achieve much 
without adequate recognition and organization. Their 
immediate superiors, John Taylor and R.T. Alexander, were 
completely absorbed in their struggle with German authorities 
about denazification, school reform and university matters 
and did not pay much attention to other issues from the 
beginning. Their long and hard struggle with recalcitrant
238
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German educators who simply did not seem to be willing to 
compromise on anything probably made it inevitable that they 
did not look beyond these three issues. They did not realize 
that the youth activities experts in their section were 
developing alternatives. The youth experts created an 
organizational structure based on German experiences with 
American innovations which many Germans and Americans found 
satisfactory. While their superiors were trying to achieve 
re-education by means of structural reform and tight 
controls, the youth activities branch developed a more 
flexible alternative which in the long run proved to be 
successful, but it had to wait almost two years until it 
found support within OMGUS for its concept of reorientation.
Various factors contributed to the delay. The lack of 
status of the Education and Religious Affairs Section within 
OMGUS reflected the low priority which reorientation in 
general enjoyed in the thoughts of General Clay and his 
immediate staff in Berlin. Despite the Zook Commission's 
recommendations in 1946 to elevate the Education and 
Religious Affairs Branch to Division status and to increase 
the number of people who were involved in re-education, Clay 
did not pay any more attention to John Taylor and his 
section. Throughout 1946 it had to suffer several cuts in 
spite of the fact that it never had reached its full 
strength. Clay was determined to save the American taxpayer 
as much money as possible by keeping the staff of his
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apparatus at the absolute minimum. For a while he even 
considered phasing out education and religious affairs 
completely.1
Sending Germans to the United States is a case in point. 
Although Clay had endorsed the Zook Commission's 
recommendation to send Germans to the United States in 1946, 
OMGUS needed two years to implement the program. OMGUS field 
officers had pushed for such a program long before SWNCC 
269/8 officially permitted it.2 Berlin, however, proved to 
be a bottleneck. Clay from the start made clear that the 
German economy would not be able to provide the funds 
required for such a program. Any appropriations for the 
exchange of persons would have to be charged to the future 
export proceeds from German industry. In view of the 
difficult position of the German economy in January 1947, 
Clay naturally was reluctant to charge an account which did 
not yet have a positive balance and might not have one in the 
foreseeable future. Having his hands full with securing the 
bare survival of the Germans under his care during the 
extremely cold winter of 1946/47, Clay also did not want to 
divert his energies and resources to anything that he 
regarded as not vital. Since nobody could predict how long 
the crisis would last, it was only logical for him to oppose 
any expansion of non-essential items. In case the German
‘Tent, Mission 259-60.
2For the details see chapter XII.
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economy would not come through, the American taxpayer would 
ultimately have to pay the bill. Clay was resolved to keep 
it as small as possible, but even if he had not faced the 
economic problems in his zone, he probably would not have 
approved a government sponsored program. In line with his 
Republican convictions he argued that Mthe German student 
sent to the United States at government expense would be less 
effective on his return than if his visit was financed with 
private funds. "3
In view of headquarters' reluctance to extend any aid to 
re-education efforts, it is not surprising that youth 
officers in the field had to fight for everything they 
needed. In July 1946, for example, Hans Thomsen, youth 
officer in Bavaria, complained to Munich headquarters that 
OMGBY had failed to assign him a vehicle on a permanent 
basis, although he needed to be in the field about 80% of the 
time and also had to attend youth meetings at nights and on 
weekends.4
Press criticism of the educators' in the United States 
for not sufficiently denazifying higher education, paired
3Memo from Clay to [Daniel] Noce [Washington, CAD], 31 
Jan. 1947; Clay Papers doc. 190; see also Tent 265-67. 
Whereas Tent thinks that Clay only paid lip service to the 
exchange program, I believe that he did not want to obstruct 
the program, but rather based his actions on his conviction 
that the government should not finance such endeavors.
4Memo from Hans Thomsen to Office of Military 
Government, Bavaria [hereinafter OMGBY] re. : Improper
transportation impedes youth activities work; NA RG 2 60 
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/22.
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with the Germans' insistence that the Americans were too 
strict in that field, certainly did not endear the section to 
Clay, who did not like criticism. To make matters worse, his 
chief educators did not seem to be able to make any progress 
towards school reform. Especially in Bavaria they 
encountered determined resistance throughout 1946 and 1947. 
Alois Hundhammer became minister for cultural and educational 
affairs in Bavaria in January 1947. The educators became 
involved in an increasingly bitter but ultimately hopeless 
battle with conservative politicians— above all the obstinate 
Hundhammer— which one historian adequately described as a 
Kulturkampf. The difficulties with authorities in Munich, 
however, overshadowed the successes American educators could 
claim even in Bavaria as well as in other areas under 
American control, most notably in Bremen and Hesse, where 
many reforms and projects were underway which progressive 
Germans either supported or initiated.5
5Tent, Mission 74-253; Kellermann 30-31. Tent dedicates 
considerably more space to the difficulties in Bavaria than 
to the successes the Americans had in Bremen, Berlin, and 
Hesse, although he mentions them. Winfried Muller argues 
that American ideas and efforts had a positive impact even in 
Bavaria, which was and remained the only state in the Federal 
Republic in which the Americans were unable to score any 
success in the field of educational reform. Muller finds 
that Americans in Bavaria were actively involved in the 
physical reconstruction of the schools and scored successes 
in revising schoolbooks and curricula. Like all other states 
Bavaria added social studies to its curricula, for example, 
although Bavaria indeed was the only state in which Americans 
were unable to initiate or support serious reform attempts. 
For a contemporary assessment of the situation in the 1940s 
see Henry Pilgert, The West German Educational System: With 
Special Reference to the Politics and Programs of the Office
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Alexander more than once came to feel that he did not 
enjoy the support of his own boss. Clay and his chief
educator at best often did not maintain good communications. 
When Alexander publicly announced, for example, that 
Hundhammer would be dismissed, Clay issued a statement from 
Berlin that he was considering the matter, but had not yet 
made a decision. Hundhammer stayed in office, which clearly 
undermined Alexander's authority and credibility. At worst 
the two men had completely different attitudes towards the 
task Americans had to fulfill in the educational sector. The 
chief educator, for example, made no bones about his 
disappointment over Clay's decision not to ask Congress for 
funds for the exchange program. He thought that Clay's 
decision would deliver a devastating blow to the American re­
education effort. Clay thwarted all his efforts to bring 
American university professors to Germany in 1947. Clay and
of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany ([Bad Godesberg]: 
Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, 1952).
Interestingly, Bremen, Hesse and West Berlin, which 
developed the most progressive school reform plans after the 
war, remained at the vanguard of the reform movement. The 
polarization between these three states on the one hand and 
Bavaria as the conservative bastion on the other remained a 
constant in West Germany's school reform plans for the next 
fifty years. During my own tenure as student representative 
for Middle Franconia at a Bavarian Gymnasium in the 1970s, I 
witnessed that Bavaria was the last state to reform the last 
two years of the secondary schools. The modifications were 
minimal compared to other states. Munich never permitted and 
even outlawed statewide high school student organizations. 
It also never made any serious attempts at integrating the 
different school tracks. Hesse and Berlin supported 
statewide student representation and tried to create an 
integrated Gesamtschule.
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Alexander also violently disagreed about the feasibility of 
creating a "Free University" in Berlin. The educator thought 
that the Germans were not yet ripe for such an undertaking. 
He was unable to agree with the Military Governor on the 
procedure of setting the university up when Clay made up his 
mind. This led to the virtual exclusion of Alexander from 
the project.6
Alexander's lack of administrative skills further 
aggravated the position of his section, since this type of 
reorientation had never been tried before, Americans did not 
have any precedents to build on. Programs needed time and 
creative administrators to develop, especially in view of the 
complicated and cumbersome administrative apparatus that was 
operating in Germany. The American visiting experts program 
illustrates the difficulties involved. Both Eugene Anderson 
and the Education and Religious Affairs Branch began to lobby 
for a program of bringing American experts into Germany to 
help with the re-education effort, but Clay dragged his feet. 
He preferred to incorporate experts as staff into OMGUS 
rather than having to deal with short term visits which would 
cause a range of logistical problems and from which the 
Germans in his opinion would not benefit. He found an 
unlikely ally in Hundhammer, who arrived at the same 
conclusion, even if for very different reasons. A pilot 
program in 1946 seemed to bear Clay out. Alexander did not
6Tent, Mission 267-72, 286-299.
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seem to be able to take care of the organizational side of 
the project. By 1947 OMGUS was able to overcome the Military 
Governor's reservations, but in that year only fifty experts 
in different fields of expertise ranging from agriculture to 
education made it to the American zone, with mixed results. 
The next year the number increased to 82. It was not until 
the last year of the occupation and after a thorough reform 
of the OMGUS administration that the number of exchange 
persons began to grow dramatically. In 1949 over 150 experts 
came to Germany. The High Commission continued the program.7
The bureaucratic tangle went beyond the boundaries of 
the Education and Religious Affairs Branch in Berlin. The 
exchange of persons and cultural materials initially became 
an administrator's nightmare. Clay's decision not to ask 
Congress for more appropriations for re-education in 1947 
came after Washington officials had led private organizations 
to believe that the government would bear a part of the 
burden. An appeal by the Institute of International 
Education and others to American institutions of higher 
learning had been surprisingly successful in the spring of 
1947, but Washington was only able to get SWNCC 269/8 and 
269/10 in place to officially authorize the exchanges of 
persons and material. OMGUS had not found a way to 
coordinate the different divisions involved in the program. 
Germans needed to be selected and screened for possible Nazi
7Tent, Mission 262-64.
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activities by intelligence, obtaining their travel documents 
required another division. Furthermore OMGUS could only 
provide support for them to the boundaries of the American 
zone. Since Clay's decision not to ask for re-education 
funds had excluded the government from financing the 
journeys, private sponsors had to step in. As a result few 
people, among them one student from Bavaria, made it to the 
United States in 1947.8
By 1947 it was clear that the Education and Religious 
Affairs Branch would only be able to carry out any meaningful 
reorientation program if it could improve its status as well 
as the organizational framework in which it operated. SWNCC 
269 and later JCS 1079 officially made reorienting Germans a 
top priority of Military Government, but as long as Clay 
could not be convinced of the necessity, nothing would 
change.
Help for the educators came from an unlikely quarter. 
In May 1947 the Bureau of the Budget in Washington sent a 
task force to Germany. The primary target of the group was 
an investigation of the organizational setup of the armed 
forces, but Washington also instructed them to examine the 
bureaucratic structure of OMGUS to find ways in which the 
American taxpayer might be able to save money. Usually such 
recommendations led to cuts in personnel and a tighter
8Tent, Mission 266-68, 302; see Kellermann (31-32) for 
the role the Dept, of State played in developing the program.
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organization. The task force did exactly that in other 
fields of OMGUS operations. In the case of the Educational 
and Religious Affairs Branch the task force also advocated 
greater efficiency, but actually resulted in strengthening 
the troubled branch. The men were impressed with the effort 
and degree of cooperation that existed between Americans and 
Germans in this field. With full support from their 
superiors in Washington the task force pointed out to Clay 
that his emphasis on economic and financial matters certainly 
was necessary, but that he needed to include 1 the stimulation 
of a democratic culture" in his program if he wanted to 
assure long term success. In view of the importance of the 
reorientation task, they informed Clay that he would need an 
adviser for education and cultural affairs. This adviser 
would have to bring the re-education activities which were 
scattered over various divisions under one umbrella. The 
task force argued that the education branch would be the 
right place for such a move, but that in view of the 
importance of its mission it would have to have division 
status to assure direct access to the Military Governor.9
The timing was fortunate. Clay, who had been promoted 
to Commander-in-Chief and Military Governor in March, needed 
to find a new head for the Education and Religious Affairs 
Branch. At the same time CAD signalled to him that 
Washington would appoint a cultural adviser on its own if
9Tent, Mission 282-286.
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Clay did not take the initiative soon. Reorganizing the 
branch and elevating its status might help him to bring in an 
outstanding educator in spite of the negative press the 
educators had received in the United States. For the first 
time Education and Religious Affairs did not suffer from any 
cuts while other divisions had to accept drastic reductions 
in the reorganization which followed the task force's 
recommendations.10
Exempting the Branch from budget and personnel cuts was 
the first step into a brighter future. Clay immediately set 
out to find a man who would be able to help him solve the 
administrative problems and would be able to recruit a 
competent successor for John Taylor. Herman Wells, then 
President of Indiana University, was one of the most 
competent educational administrators in the United States at 
the time. Wells had served the United States during and 
after World War Two on various important missions and was 
urgently needed at Indiana, but prodded by urgent messages 
from Clay and the War Department, the university decided to 
let him go for a brief time to resolve the most pressing 
problems in Berlin.11
10Tent, Mission 282-286.
nTent, Mission 299-300; Kellermann 32-33; Herman B. 
Wells, Being Lucky: Reminiscences and Reflections
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980)301-303; for the 
various stages of OMGUS reorganization in 1947/48 see Josef 
Henke and Klaus Oldenhage, "Office of Military Government for 
Germany (US)," OMGUS Handbuch: Die Amerikanische
Militarregierung in Deutschland 1945-1949, ed. Christoph
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Wells came to Germany in November 1947 and lost no time 
reorganizing the American re-education effort within the 
grander scheme of streamlining OMGUS. By March 1948 Wells 
was done. He succeeded in elevating Religious Affairs Branch 
to Division Status and made it the only part of Military 
Government which actually expanded. Formal education now was 
just one of several branches within the new Education and 
Cultural Relations Division. His first innovation was the 
establishment of a Cultural Exchange Branch which would be 
responsible for coordinating all efforts in this realm. 
Wells thought that the exchange program would have to be a 
cornerstone of American reorientation and democratization. 
Without it all American efforts would ultimately fail. At 
the same time he also gave Group Activities and its chief, 
Lawrence Norrie, equal standing with the other branches. 
Since Norrie came from the American YMCA in 1946, he had 
given special attention to youth work from the beginning. 
His promotion meant that youth activities would play a much 
greater role in official American policy in Germany in the 
future.12
Reorganizing the branch was just one of the tasks Wells 
had to tackle during his stay in Germany. Since he
Weisz, Quellen und Darstellungen zur Zeitgeschichte 
herausgegeben vom Institut fur Zeitgeschichte 3 5 (Miinchen 
[Munich] Oldenbourg, 1994) 57-76.
12Tent, Mission 302; Kellermann 33-34; see Weisz, ed. 
(69) for the personnel roster of the new division.
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considered the exchange programs essential, he paid special 
attention to developing an intricate network of committees on 
both sides of the Atlantic which could coordinate the 
different parties and interests involved in the effort. 
Wells was able to enlist the financial backing of various 
foundations in the endeavor. He demonstrated his continuing 
interest in the German exchange program by becoming the chair 
of the Commission of Occupied Areas in the United States 
which functioned as the supervising and advisory body for the 
entire exchange effort. By the end of his tenure in Germany 
Wells had taken care of the administrative weaknesses of the 
exchange apparatus. Among other accomplishments he had 
reduced the clearing and documentation process from nine 
months to ten days. He also was able to persuade Clay that 
the exchange was actually a good idea and that Germans would 
not encounter hostility on American campuses. As a result 
the number of exchangees increased from 81 persons in 1947 to 
354 in 1948. Two-thirds of the latter group were German 
students going to the United States. Americans had taken the 
first step towards reviving and strengthening the cultural 
ties between the two countries which they hoped would result 
in a stronger democratic orientation on parts of the German 
intellectual elite in the long run.13
When Alonzo Grace, former Commissioner of Education in 
Connecticut, assumed the post of Education and Cultural
13Tent, Mission 302-303; Kellermann 34.
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Relations Division Chief in Berlin in the fall of 1948 on 
Wells' recommendation, the stage was set officially for a new 
phase of American reorientation policy and with it, American 
youth work. A look at the youth section's work reveals that 
Wells simply had to re-organize and re-orient headquarters 
along the lines the youth activities branch had been 
following almost from its inception. The tremendous work of 
dedicated Americans and Germans in this field quickly 
overcame the negative phase of American policy and replaced 
it with a concept which became the model for all future 
efforts in American re-education long before policy makers in 
Berlin and Washington had sorted out their problems. Youth 
officers not only recognized early on the need for a 
constructive reorientation program, but also implemented it 
at a time when they had enough authority to introduce new 
programs against resistance of some German officials. Even 
more importantly, they relied on an approach of cooperation 
and encouragement. Youth activities were the only field in 
which Americans actually made use of the tactical troops' 
resources in manpower and material.
Establishing a Framework for Youth Activities
American education experts dedicated almost all of their 
efforts to the reopening of schools and the problems related 
to this issue during the first year of the occupation, 
although OMGUS headquarters soon realized the need to expand 
its activities beyond the schools. Following the philosophy
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that the Germans should be in charge of their own affairs 
under American supervision, the directive of October 1945 
permitted young people to form their own youth groups, 
provided they adhered to democratic principles and did not 
exclude members based on race, religion, or socio-economic 
status. Based on this policy Germans began to organize 
themselves. At the same time the youth committees which 
Military Government officials had installed began their 
activities at the county level. The committees were to 
operate on a volunteer basis and to consist mainly of German 
officials who in one way or another were interested in youth 
work.14
OMGUS Education and Religious Affairs youth officers 
from the start left no doubt that they intended to embark on 
a positive program at the earliest possible moment. Two of 
its representatives from Bavaria reported that the keynote of 
their zonewide monthly meeting in December 1945 was "the 
positive reconstruction of German cultural life." At the 
same conference their superiors informed them that 
cooperation between tactical troops and Military Government 
officials could do much to achieve that goal. They portrayed 
a sports program at Karlsruhe which the local tactical unit
14See pp. 127-129 above.
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and the field detachment sponsored together as a model for 
the entire American zone.15
Members of the Education and Religious Affairs Branch in 
Bavaria met in February 1946 to discuss the progress of their 
programs, but youth activities only appeared at the bottom of 
the agenda. At that time headquarters could do no more than 
inform its officers in the field that there was progress in 
formulating directives concerning youth activities and 
teacher education.16
Two months after the meeting OMGUS issued the first 
changes of the regulations that governed German youth 
activities. In line with Clay's general policy to permit the 
Germans activities on the state level, the new guidelines of 
April 1946 laid down the basis for the formation of statewide 
youth committees which would represent all youth of a state. 
These "Land Youth Committees" would be formed by the existing 
Kreis Youth Committees. They had to bring together the 
different youth groups and coordinate their efforts to 
provide the young people in a state with adequate leisure 
time activities. The state committees also would represent 
the youth organizations' and Kreis committees' interests to 
the states' youth authorities. The state ministries in
15OMGBY, Intelligence Division [hereinafter ID], After 
Action Report, Dec. 1945: 20; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Historical 
Reports, Box 50, 10/76-3/11.
l60MGBY, ID, weekly report no. 39, 31 Jan.-7 Feb. 1946: 
25; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Box 169, 10/85-3/6
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
254
charge of youth were advised to establish liaison with the
Land youth committees and to support them. Franz-Joseph
Strauss, one of the West Germany's most prominent post-war
politicians from Bavaria, started his career in this capacity
in the Munich ministry for Culture and Education in May 1946.
In addition to their representative duties the Land
committees had to process applications for statewide youth
organizations. Military Government would continue to
supervise and issue licenses.17
Headquarters did not only issue new directives, but also
made sure that the field officers knew what direction Berlin
wanted them to take. The OMGUS Information Bulletin
announced to its readers that Americans would provide
"Another Chance for German Youth: Through Carefully Planned
and Guided Leisure Time Activities Germany's Youngsters May
Soon Find 'The Road Back.'" The author dedicated a special
box on the first page of the article to impress his readers
with the importance of doing their jobs along positive lines:
[t]o deny the possibility of a decent, peaceful future, 
in which the abilities of all may be employed
constructively, is to smother the aspirations of youth
and to reap the consequences in lawless and possibly 
dangerous political behavior.
The article went on to describe the initiatives Military
Government officials had developed so far in the field. It
170ffice of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), 
Change 1 to Title 8, Education and Religious Affairs, 1 Apr. 
1946; NA RG 84 Munich Consulate General, Misc. Records 
840. IB; see also Fiissl 123-24.
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also informed its readers that international Christian youth 
organizations, among them the YMCA and the American Friends, 
were about to resume their activities in Germany as well. 
Most of the space and photos of the article dealt with the 
still informal youth program of the tactical troops in the 
American zone of occupation.18
Not only Military Government members were impressed with 
the GIs' success. Headquarters of the United States Forces, 
European Theater (USFET) in Germany had already taken steps 
to recognize and support the GIs' attempts to teach young 
Germans American games officially. General McNarney seized 
the opportunity which the soldiers' own initiative offered to 
keep them and German youth out of trouble by transforming 
their informal and voluntary activities into an extensive 
Army program. On 15 April 1946, just a few days after OMGUS 
had issued the changes in its regulations, headquarters USFET 
defined the role which both OMGUS and tactical troops should 
play in the American re-education effort. The disease and 
unrest formula still provided the basis for the military's 
efforts. McNarney stated that OMGUS programs and the 
tactical units' youth activities had proven their value 
during the past months by diminishing juvenile delinquency 
and should therefore be extended "by all practical means".
I8"Another Chance for German Youth: Through Carefully 
Planned and Guided Leisure Time Activities Germany's 
Youngsters May Soon Find "The Road Back," OMGUS Information 
Bulletin, No. 38, 22 Apr. 1946: 5-9.
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The directive established that close cooperation between 
Military Government officials and tactical commands was 
essential to ensure maximum efficiency. Since the Army had 
recreational facilities, equipment, and personnel at its 
disposal and the Germans were in dire need of them, it would 
concentrate its efforts in this area. As far as OMGUS was 
concerned, the directive established for the first time that 
qualified officers or civilians would dedicate their full 
time to the implementation of OMGUS youth directives at 
headquarters as well as on the Land levels. On the tactical 
level McNarney instructed the commands of all branches of the 
armed forces in Germany to assign "mature, qualified" 
officers full time to youth activities. They would be in 
charge of maintaining liaison with the appropriate Military 
Government authorities and Land Youth Committees and to help 
them correct any deficiencies and implement their programs. 
The directive instructed unit commanders to survey the 
recreational facilities the Army had requisitioned and make 
them available at least part time to German youth committees. 
Furthermore the units would stop requisitioning recreational 
equipment from the German economy. The Army could release 
items which it did not need from captured German stocks or 
which GIs did not use to German youth groups. Qualified Army 
personnel further should actively support young Germans if 
they were invited to do so. To educate GIs about the new 
policy, the directive set one hour per month aside for
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instructing them accordingly. The directive finally defined 
the different spheres of operation for OMGUS and tactical 
units. Military Government continued to be in charge of 
developing American policy and all aspects of appointing and 
supervising German officials and youth groups. Tactical 
units would dedicate their efforts to the actual field work: 
they would assess the needs of youth groups and share with 
them the facilities necessary to implement American policies. 
Only six months after the non-fraternization policy had died, 
the generals wanted to encourage GIs to participate in the 
youth program. The Army would expand its activities 
considerably: it would help German youth groups establish
youth centers, which would include reading rooms. The Army 
would also make suitable films available. Apart from 
competing in sports, young Germans should also have the 
opportunity to attend informal trade and handicraft classes. 
Tactical units could further assist them in reconstruction 
and rehabilitation projects of youth centers and youth 
hostels. The directive also encouraged soldiers to sponsor 
meetings in which young Germans would be able to learn about 
other democratic countries. To make sure that the tactical 
units complied with regulations, the directive established 
mandatory monthly reports.19
19Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European Theater, 15 Apr. 
1946, AG-353.8 GCT-AGO, subject: Army Assistance to German 
Youth Activities, US Zone; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/8.
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OMGUS officials had mixed feelings about the Army's 
capabilities to carry out such a program. A preliminary 
report in February 1947 by Alvin Fritz, chief of the OMGUS 
Youth Activities Section, stated that it was too early to 
judge the program's success, but that American GIs had done 
a remarkable job in "winning the trust and goodwill" of many 
young people and adults. Fritz thought that in spite of 
shortcomings within the program and a considerable lack of 
cooperation between OMGUS and Army field officers, "a very 
satisfactory contribution has been made in assisting the 
German youth."20
The main problem for OMGUS officials was that GYA 
remained outside of their jurisdiction. Throughout the 
existence of OMGUS, youth officers recognized the merit of 
the program, but constantly complained about lack of interest 
by the highest Army echelons, about unqualified officers in 
the field, but above all, about a lack of cooperation and 
support for their own objectives. According to Military 
Government officials, all the problems could be solved by 
giving them control over the program and additional personnel 
to do so.21
20OMGBY Evaluation of GYA, 27 Feb. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 42, 10/44-1/4.
2IMinutes of Conference on GYA objectives, 25 June 1947 
in Berlin; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., 
Box 140, 5/295-3/3; report of CAD Seminar for Bavaria, Sept. 
1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 
140, 5/295-3/1; E&CRD to General Clay, memo re.: Youth
Activities, 5 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
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Other decisions by OMGUS headquarters made clear that 
Americans did not regard young Germans as incorrigibles or 
fanatics. On the contrary, young Germans were the first ones 
whom the occupiers officially began to release from having to 
accept responsibility for Germany's Nazi past. The 
denazification law of March 1946 did not require prosecution 
of anybody under eighteen years of age. Nevertheless it 
still contained punitive clauses. Members of the Hitler 
youth who had been part of that organization for more than 
four years and had been automatically absorbed into the Nazi 
party after that could neither attend universities nor become 
teachers.22
Some German authorities began to take up the cause of 
their young people. In May the Hessian Minister of Cultural 
Affairs and Education, for example, inquired with the 
American Military Government in Wiesbaden whether it might 
not be justifiable to permit former Hitler Youth leaders who 
had proven themselves as members of the new youth groups to 
occupy leading positions within these groups. The minister
Education Br. , Box 152, 5/337-1/5; memo re.: Youth Activities 
by Louis Miniclier, OMGBY, 26 Apr. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/43-2/1.
22Fiissl (115) comments on the age limits of the law; for 
a detailed description of the effects the law on persons who 
wanted to study and were born after 1 Jan. 1919 see Proposal 
for the Readmission of Excluded German Youth to Educational 
Institutions from Vaughn DeLong, Chief of Education and 
Religious Affairs Branch, OMG Hesse, to Director, OMGUS 
IA&CD, 15 May 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community
Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/1.
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reported that a survey conducted by his office revealed that 
young Germans themselves did not regard leadership in the 
lower echelons of the Hitler Youth as a grave handicap to 
their work, provided that they were willing and able to 
cooperate in a free, responsible, and democratic manner, were 
good comrades, and were elected. The Minister thought that 
the young generation had been drawn to the Nazis without 
really knowing what they were doing and would definitely 
receive a big moral boost if the Americans granted them some 
leeway.23
The Minister found open ears and an able advocate for 
his ideas in American offices. Apparently based on similar 
communications as well as on his own convictions, Vaughn 
DeLong, chief of Hesse's Education and Religious Affairs 
Branch, had already worked out a detailed proposal which he 
directed to John Taylor. He strongly argued for the 
rehabilitation of German youth, which, according to him, the 
denazification law made impossible for a considerable number 
of young people. DeLong continued that especially the
intelligent and capable part of the youth suffered because 
they had believed in an idealistic cause and therefore joined 
the party after they had proven their leadership qualities in 
the Hitler Youth. Quoting evidence from the OMGUS
^Memorandum, Minister of Cultural and Educational 
Affairs for Greater Hesse to Military Government Education 
Branch, Wiesbaden, 8 May 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/1.
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Information Bulletin, he argued that the party often had 
registered these young people automatically and that they 
otherwise had been under enormous moral pressure to join. 
DeLong noted that the current negative policy deprived a 
large part of the younger generation of the possibility to 
become respectable members of German society and led to a 
huge degree of hopelessness among them. He found that German 
churches and worldly authorities alike were justified in 
their deep concern about this state of affairs. If not 
offered some way to enter society as respectable members, 
these young people in the long run would cause considerable 
trouble and would be lost for the democratic cause. DeLong 
therefore advocated that American authorities should think 
over their approach and give all youth born after 1918 who 
had not been involved in Nazi crimes a new chance by
displaying and granting "unqualified forgiveness". Young 
people should receive the chance to participate in the
reorientation process and should be allowed to assume
leadership positions once they had demonstrated that they 
were willing and able to operate within a democratic
framework.
DeLong thought that the unconditional amnesty he 
proposed was just the first step for rehabilitating young 
Germans. He provided a long list with specific suggestions 
he thought were essential for converting German youth into 
committed democrats. Instead of aiming at administrative
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
262
reforms, DeLong suggested that it would be essential to reach 
out for the minds of young Germans. This would necessitate 
a positive program of extra-curricular activities, courses in 
democracy at schools, changing teacher-student relations from 
an authoritarian style to one of cooperation, and the 
establishment of Parent Teacher Councils. To achieve this 
goal American experts would have to be brought in and young 
teachers and teacher trainees would need special orientation 
courses. The memorandum emphasized that all these measures 
should have a positive and constructive character and should 
replace the negative policies in place up to that date.24
It is not clear to what extent the paper from Hesse 
influenced General Clay's decision to grant youth the general 
pardon DeLong had requested, but on 2 July he could register 
with satisfaction the Deputy Governor's announcement to 
German politicians that OMGUS would grant a general amnesty 
to all people born after January 1919. Just as DeLong had 
advocated, only those who had participated in crimes would 
not be included.25
24Proposal for the Re-admission of Excluded German Youth 
to Educational Institutions from Vaughn DeLong, General Chief 
of E&RA Branch OMG Hesse to Director, OMGUS IA&CD, Public 
Health and Welfare Branch, Education Section, 7 May 1946; NA 
RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337- 
1/1 .
^Press Release, OMGUS, Public Relations Office, 2 July 
1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 
152, 5/337-1/1.
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Gathering Information
Certainly encouraged by the recent turns of events, 
officers in charge of youth activities travelled to their 
first zone-wide conference in Berlin in July 1946. They did 
not come unprepared. Apart from their own observations they 
could rely on a steady, but somewhat small and not always 
reliable, stream of information about German youth which the 
Intelligence and Information Control Divisions were 
gathering. These divisions were probing youth problems, 
young people's attitudes, and their reaction to Americans and 
their programs throughout the American zone since August 
1945, but the information was not always reliable. ICD in 
general made a conscious attempt to base its surveys on 
representative samples. Based on a survey of 134 young 
Germans, ICD researchers found in May 1946 that the children 
did not express much hostility towards Americans and thought 
that the economic situation was better in the British and the 
American zones than in the other two. According to the 
pollsters, all of the children were fully aware of the 
failure of Nazism, but more than a third still harbored Nazi 
ideas. Many others displayed an extreme nationalism or 
chauvinism which apparently came very close to National 
Socialist doctrine. OMGUS personnel could read in the 
Information Bulletin, in which ICD disseminated its findings, 
that German youth was "The Big Problem in Germany." The 
article also included a set of samples taken from the essays
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on which the division had based the survey. Only one out of 
the fourteen samples clearly expressed the hope that Germany 
would become a peaceful and democratic nation. Judging from 
this source, Military Government officials certainly had to 
act quickly and with full force to re-educate young 
Germans.26
The Intelligence Division's reports were not always 
reliable. Those which dealt with German youth conveyed 
contradictory information. One of ICD's "special
sociological investigators", for example, conveyed a report 
from Bavaria to headquarters which published it in February 
1946. He investigated the attitudes of young people in 
Miesbach, a little town in upper Bavaria. The picturesque 
setting, combined with the rather strange behavior of the 
inhabitants of the community, apparently appealed to the 
intelligence officer who based his report entirely on his own 
observations and arrived at surprising conclusions. 
According to him, young people in Miesbach did not display 
much concern about their future or the future of Germany. 
Regardless of their social status or background they showed 
a remarkable lack of interest in politics. Almost all of the 
youth in Miesbach did not seem to have liked joining the 
Hitler youth. Those who did were attracted by outdoor 
activities and sports or by the possibility of gaining
26"The Big Problem in Germany," OMGUS Information 
Bulletin, no. 40, 6 May 1946: 12-15.
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prestige. The investigator did not find any ideological 
indoctrination in Miesbach's youth. Almost all of them 
seemed to have confidence in their own future and had 
definite ideas about their careers. If one was to believe 
the report, promiscuity was widespread and often tolerated by 
adults. The town continued to have a rigid social cast 
structure in which each person had his or her assigned roles. 
The investigator stated that girls of civil servant families, 
for example, "generally do watercolors and play the piano, 
and develop romantic crushes on young officers," while the 
daughters of unskilled workers either married or became 
"maids, barmaids, and prostitutes." Their brothers roamed 
the streets and coffeehouses, went to the movies and listened 
to jazz. Their main goal in life was to move up to the ranks 
of skilled workers, but, the author noted, "they usually fail 
because of lack of steadiness." Although he did not bring it 
up in the narrative of his report, the intelligence officer 
concluded that young Germans in Miesbach demonstrated a 
"remarkable unanimity" in their opinions of Americans. 
According to him, these young people thought that Americans 
listened to jazz and mostly were "lazy, weak, likeable, 
superficial, and undisciplined.1,27
The report had several flaws. The author not only chose 
a region which researchers then and today would hardly have
^ICIS 3.0, 9 Feb. 1946: 6-9; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD,
Opinion Survey Branch, Box 157, 5/234-2/3.
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found to be representative for German or even Bavarian youth. 
Miesbach in almost all respects represented the exception to 
the rule. The town had not suffered extensive war damage and 
did not house any refugees. The author also assessed mores 
and habits of all social classes in a town with no industry 
to speak of and probably a very small number of middle class 
families. Disseminating fairly sensational information about 
sexual behavior of young people, which probably was more 
noteworthy for its rarity rather than serving as a rule, may 
well have attracted more readers, but it also helped to 
spread a somewhat problematical picture of young Germans. 
Since most of the Intelligence Division's members were German 
native speakers, the author of this report must not have 
taken his mission very seriously. Possibly his lack of a 
sense for realities— a hallmark of German academic thinking—  
survived emigration. Since headquarters printed and 
disseminated the report, distorted information reached an 
audience which did not speak German and had to rely on these 
reports.
Findings from other intelligence officers clearly 
contradicted the Miesbach report. The picture they painted 
seemed to be more realistic. Kurt H. Ehlers, apparently a 
naturalized American citizen who operated as intelligence 
team chief in Bavaria, for example, reported in September 
1946 that German youth were in dire need of American 
assistance if they wanted to face the future with some hope.
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In the long run young people would need better housing, jobs 
and vocational training. Before the Germans could reach this 
goal, however, Ehlers thought that Americans would have to do 
something to keep them off the streets and to occupy their 
minds constructively. He suggested co-educational club 
facilities which should contain libraries and educational 
movies; they should also encourage theatrical and literature 
groups under adequate leadership. Since ICD personnel were 
best acquainted with the local conditions, Ehlers proposed 
that they could expand their roles as mere observers and 
secure the cooperation of local groups. Ehlers also thought 
that OMGUS could employ ICD specialists profitably as 
discussion leaders in summer camps which he wanted to provide 
free of charge to young people.28
Eric Feiler, chief of the Intelligence Section of the 
Nuremberg Detachment, also did not concur with the Miesbach 
report. Feiler thought that the situation was rather 
desperate for young people, but they also were open to new 
ideas to fill the void the complete military defeat and moral 
collapse of the Nazis had left. He provided headquarters for 
Bavaria with detailed summaries of answers to questions he 
had received, apparently in preparation of another youth 
survey. Feiler called the two German administrators in 
Nuremberg who could be expected to know the situation best,
28Memo from Kurt H. Ehlers, US Civilian, Team Chief to 
Chief of Intelligence OMGBY, 16 Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
OMGBY Predecessor Intelligence, Box 111 10/87-3/14.
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Theodor Marx, who was in charge of the city's welfare and 
youth affairs, and Karl Maly, the director of the Nuremberg 
youth office. Feiler also tapped the leaders of the 
Nuremberg churches' youth activities as well as leading local 
politicians and the head of the school administration. He 
verified their information within his own detachment before 
conveying it to Munich. In April 1947 he sent his 
information to headquarters. Feiler noted that he should 
have more time for this kind of work. It would enable him 
and other field officers to obtain more reliable 
information.29 
Organizing Field Work
OMGUS youth activities officers apparently stepped up 
their efforts in gathering data from the field in preparation 
for their first zone wide conference in July 1946. OMGUS 
representatives from all states under American control 
convened in Berlin to discuss and coordinate their work. Two 
thirds of those present did not have any military rank, among 
them Richard Alexander, then acting chief of the Education 
and Religious Affairs Section in Berlin, and Hayes Beall, the 
OMGUS Youth Activities chief. This first meeting mainly 
served as a sounding board and an exchange of ideas.
29Memo from Eric Feiler, Team Chief, Intelligence 
Section, Nuremberg Detachment OMGBY, Information Control 
Division, to Chief of Intelligence, OMGBY, 25 Apr. 1946; NA 
RG 260 OMBGY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12.
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From the outset the delegates seemed to have assumed 
that the negative phase of the American occupation was over. 
They did not find it necessary to include issues such as 
denazification and demilitarization on their agenda and 
concentrated on what could be done to rehabilitate young 
Germans. All conference participants agreed that they were 
facing a challenging task and that they would not be able to 
reach their goals by issuing orders. In view of the recent 
youth amnesty they decided to define "youth" as broadly as 
the directive had done. This meant that young adults would 
also become targets of parts of their program.
One of the most important tasks of the conference was to 
assess the practical needs of young Germans. Malnourishment, 
as well as the lack of equipment and buildings for young 
people, surfaced as the most pressing problems, but to solve 
them the youth officers also had to fight within their own 
administration for more recognition. Conditions in Bavaria 
seemed to be worst. The members of the Bavarian delegation 
reported that OMGBY only recently had appointed a full time 
youth officer and therefore lagged behind the other states in 
the development of youth activities. For this reason 
Bavaria had not yet completed the creation of the youth 
committees through which OMGUS hoped to carry out its 
policies. Hans P. Thomsen reported that Bavarian authorities 
did not show the least interest in youth work, but that the 
formation of the Land Youth Committee in May had improved the
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situation. The Bavarian government in Munich supported it 
with money and office space. Thomsen urged youth officers to 
spend as much time as possible in the field to support the 
youth committees throughout the American zone against the 
German bureaucrats. The participants agreed that German 
government bodies would have to provide material support to 
the recently established committees, but should not be 
allowed to exercise any control over their work.
Since the committees were the backbone of the Military 
Government efforts, the officers spent much time discussing 
the possibilities for improving them. They found that one of 
the most serious problems was to find qualified youth workers 
to staff the committees which for the most part consisted of 
older people. American authorities in Hesse and Wurttemberg- 
Baden had already initiated youth leadership training 
programs to remedy the situation.
As far as practical youth work was concerned, the youth 
committees seemed to function adequately. They had helped to 
organize considerable numbers of youth organizations much 
along the traditional lines. Most of young Germans joined 
sport clubs, although the churches at that time maintained 
the largest membership numbers. OMGUS officers recognized 
the contributions which the tactical units had made so far 
in the field by providing young people with facilities and 
equipment. Many of the conference participants reported that 
the tactical troops were rendering excellent services, but
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also detected shortcomings which the Army would have to 
remedy. They were skeptical about the Army's ability to 
carry such a long term program through and to cooperate with 
OMGUS. In addition they noted that the Army had not yet 
revised its orientation practices to win more GIs over to 
working in the program. The occupation handbook continued to 
depict Germans and especially German youth as the 
incorrigible enemy and the soldiers still saw Your Job in 
Germany when they reported for duty in Germany. Nevertheless 
the conference participants welcomed the help the Army would 
be able to render.
An important goal of the Berlin conference was to
establish liaison with other divisions involved in youth 
work. ICD, for example, had two youth magazines in
circulation, but could not expand these activities due to the 
paper shortage. The film institute in Munich reported that 
only a limited number of educational films were available. 
Some of the films from the United States were not exactly 
useful for youth work, while others could not be shown 
because the available projectors could not handle them. So 
far the only alternative would be German educational films. 
A member of the welfare division briefed the officers on the 
situation of youth welfare before 193 3 and the practical
problems the German welfare authorities were facing at the
time. The most pressing of those were unemployment and 
homeless young people.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
272
Five months after Truman had initiated CRALOG, the 
conference members took up the issue again. Since qualified 
help was so hard to find within Germany, the field officers 
strongly recommended that OMGUS invite American voluntary 
agencies to participate in the task and to send American 
specialists to Germany.30
Although the Berlin conference basically had served only 
as an orientation session, it bore its fruits. The 
discussions of this conference apparently needed quite some 
time to get Clay's attention, but eventually the military 
governor responded to the criticism on the troops' 
indoctrination. In October he personally launched a public 
relations campaign on behalf of German youth among the 
tactical units. Under the headline "'Fanatical' Nazi Youth 
Secretly Laughed at Hitler, Clay Asserts," Stars and Stripes 
carried an interview with the Military Governor in October 
1946. Clay laid the previous description of German youth, 
which the Army and the Washington had tried to impress upon 
their soldiers in Germany, officially to rest. He maintained 
that young Germans had not liked the drill and militaristic 
aspects of the Hitler Youth, but rather had joined because it 
gave them the opportunity to engage in many exciting 
activities. Whereas the Army information materials had 
depicted young people as the ones most affected by Nazi
30Minutes of Conference of Regional Youth Activities 
Section Personnel Berlin 2-3 July 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 120 5/293-1/7.
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doctrine, and therefore the most dangerous after the war, 
Clay now stated that these young people knew from their own 
experiences that militarism led to disaster. According to 
him, the democratic leadership of Germany was quite old and 
tired and would have to be replenished with "some new blood." 
German youth were vigorous and they offered "the greatest 
hope for restoring Germany as a peaceful nation along 
democratic lines."31
To make sure that the soldiers received the new message 
the Army replaced its old warning signs about Germans and the 
dangers of fraternization with new admonitions posted 
everywhere in its military installations. Some of the older 
catchwords survived, but now they had a different meaning. 
Just as in 1945 posters reminded soldiers that they had an 
important mission and needed to do their jobs well if they 
wanted to justify the sacrifices of their fallen comrades in 
two wars and if they wanted to avoid a third war. This time, 
however, their job description had changed. GIs were 
admonished to "shun perverted fraternization." Another 
poster made clear what that meant. It told GIs to "associate 
with decent youth... not V.D pickups." The posters were 
designed to encourage soldiers to go out and permit young 
Germans show them that "not everything German is bad." Army 
personnel should try to become acquainted with the young 
people's language, their arts and crafts, and their sports.
3lStars and Stripes 24 Oct. 1946: 1.
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GIs now had two jobs to do: They had to carry out their 
duties well, but the Army also expected them to participate 
fully in a "positive program for the rehabilitation of 
Germany.1,32
The conference also had immediate results for youth 
officers in the field. Headquarters realized that providing 
them with background information about German youth work 
before, during, and after the Third Reich was as essential 
for tackling the problems of the present as giving them 
guidelines for their work in the communities. Consequently 
it published a brief brochure explaining youth activities in 
Germany. Apart from a history of youth activities in Germany 
before 1945, the booklet also summarized the American 
activities to date. Its authors emphasized the interest 
Americans had shown in German youth from the start and 
described the development of OMGUS and Army policies and 
programs. According to them, one of the main difficulties 
for the occupiers was to find and train capable German youth 
leaders and to provide German youth groups with all the 
materials they urgently needed for their work. The pamphlet 
molded the various ideas discussed during the previous 
conference into six long range objectives. The title of 
their publication already indicated that the section was not 
content with preventing youth from getting into trouble, but
32Posters issued by the US Army [1946]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Branch, Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
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.STEER CLEAR OF THE
BLACKMARKET
? SHUN PERVERTED
FRATERNIZATION
AMERICANS ARE
CITIZENS
7. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, 
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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8. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, 
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RELIGION IS 
INTERNATIONAL
GO TO CHURCH
1
ASSOCIATE 
WITH DECENT 
YOUTH.. .
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9. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, 
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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OBS
HIGHEST PERFORMANCE 
I- OF YOUR PRIMARY 
MILITARY ASSIGNMENT...t
FULL PARTICIPATION
f IN POSITIVE PROGRAM§ FOR THE REHABILITATION 
OF GERMANY I
11. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 2 60 OMGBY, E&CRD, 
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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MILITARY GOVERNMENT
CANNOT REHABILITATE GERMANY
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12. U.S. Army Poster, 1946 (Source: NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, 
Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9)
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rather aimed at "Giving Youth New Goals." The title also 
revealed that the youth section had no intention of doing the 
work for the Germans. Young people in the American zone 
would have to reach the goals by themselves. Americans would 
only offer advice and recommendations. Youth leadership 
training programs formed the top objective, followed by the 
expansion of activities as well as facilities and equipment. 
Americans would help to provide suitable youth literature as 
well as radio programs and films. International travel and 
exchanges would bring the "best influences" from the outside 
world back into Germany. Finally, youth should organize 
voluntary labor services for constructing or rehabilitating 
their own facilities, a topic the officers had discussed in 
Berlin as well.33
Apart from providing the field officers with practical 
and necessary ideas which were remarkably free of ideological 
content, the booklet also appeared just in time for the 
arrival of the Zook Commission and Eugene Anderson. The 
field officers and their section chief had done their 
homework. The mission's final report shows that the mission 
members were impressed with the work OMGUS was doing in this 
field. The educators from the United States wholeheartedly 
endorsed the youth section's objectives.
33Giving Youth New Goals: A Report of the Youth
Activities Section Education and Religious Affairs Branch, 
Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education 
Branch, Box 145 5/296-2/6.
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The mission's support prompted a favorable reaction from 
Clay, but did not lead to any significant changes. OMGUS 
headquarters commented on the report's recommendations in 
October 1946. As far as youth work was concerned, all 
parties involved agreed that much needed to be done. There 
also existed a consensus about the way the Americans should 
tackle the problem. OMGUS headquarters pointed out that its 
divisions already were carrying out many of the mission's 
recommendations. Clay officially also found strong words of 
support for the idea of letting Germans go to the United 
States as well as bringing American experts into Germany to 
help with the re-education efforts. Contrary to the spirit 
of the mission's recommendation, however, he argued that he 
did not see the need for an expansion of this sector of 
Military Government, but rather wanted to keep it at its 
present level. The Military Governor also did not follow the 
mission's demand for upgrading the Education section within 
his command structure. Education and Religious Affairs, and 
with it the youth section, had to wait until other needs were 
taken care of.34
Clay's response mentioned an additional re-education 
initiative OMGUS was just introducing in Germany. As early 
as July 1945 ICD had begun to open the American libraries in
MDraft, Comment on Report of U.S. Education Mission to 
Germany, OMGUS to Director, CAD, War Department, Washington: 
20-23, 37-38; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., 
Box 36 10/43-1/9.
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various cities for the use of the German public. The 
immediate goal was to counter German notions of the "American 
cultural retardation" by introducing Germans to American art, 
literature, and science. The Americans also regarded the 
libraries as an opportunity to fill the gaps in literature, 
but also in psychology, sociology, or even in the sciences 
which the Nazis had opened. By the end of 1945 ICD had 
established information centers in three cities. Eight more 
were to follow in the course of the following year. These 
centers formed the nucleus of the Amerika House program which 
in the course of the next years would expand into many larger 
cities in the western zones and in Berlin's American sector. 
It would eventually be able to reach out even to the smallest 
communities in the American zone in the form of reading 
rooms, film programs and mobile libraries, or book mobiles. 
While they did not target young people specifically, they 
also developed programs and offered books for them.35
In spite of Clay's apparent reluctance to assign re­
education a higher place in his administration and his
35Draft, Comment on Report of U.S. Education Mission to 
Germany, OMGUS to Director, CAD, War Department, Washington: 
34; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 
10/43-1/9; History, Information Control Division, Office of 
Military Government for Germany (U.S.), 8 May 1945-30 June 
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Branch, Box 
335 5/318-3/5; "US Information Centers," OMGUS Information 
Bulletin, no. 55, 19 Aug. 1946: 11-12; United States
Information Centers: General Information, 17 Aug. 1946; Facts 
About the United States Information Centers in Germany (For 
Visiting Delegation of Educators) [no date, October 1946?]; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Branch, Box 313, 
5/314-3/18.
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priorities, the youth section pressed ahead. Early in 
October 1946 the men and women in charge of youth activities 
met in Garmisch-Partenkirchen. This time they widened the 
scope of their considerations considerably. They invited the 
officer in charge of the Army's German youth activities 
program. Well before they knew anything about the new 
directive from Washington, the conference organizers decided 
to bring representatives from the British and the French 
Zones to Garmisch for an exchange of ideas and information on 
their respective policies and activities. Another first was 
the participation of German representatives in some sessions 
of the conference. With their objectives in place this time, 
the participants concentrated entirely on the practical 
problems they were facing.36
On the whole the picture looked encouraging. In the 
American zone the Land youth committees were in place and 
functioning. Throughout the zone Military Government had 
been able to help the Germans establish leadership schools 
which the state governments supported even in otherwise 
recalcitrant Bavaria. They also had successfully introduced 
a number of youth publications, but encountered major 
difficulties in maintaining them because of the paper 
shortage. The officers reported that youth groups in many
36OMGUS, IA&CD, Education and Religious Affairs Br., 
Summary of Military Government Conference on German Youth 
Activities 9-11 October 1946 in Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Hotel 
Wotumpka; cited hereinafter as Garmisch Conference; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/9.
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cities and counties began to see the merits of cooperation in 
the youth committees, but wanted to pursue their own goals 
without interference from officials or the local governments. 
They came together in their own organizations, the 
Jugendringe or Youth Rings which often tried to take over the 
functions of the youth committees, the Jugendausschiisse, in 
which adults still had a dominant voice. To further 
encourage these activities members of youth activities 
sections throughout the zone reported that they were making 
progress in organizing young people and setting up leadership 
training courses. The Bavarian delegation, for example, 
could report that it had opened four youth leadership 
training centers in Bavaria under the auspices of the State 
Youth Committee. OMGBY had secured the support of the 
Ministry for Food and Agriculture, an important asset in 
times of scarcity and food stamps.37
Other divisions had not been idle either. ICD 
representatives, for example, had made sure that radio 
stations devoted eight hours per week to youth programs and 
provided youth leaders with ample opportunity to be on the 
air.38
The youth officers at the conference also learned that 
ICD had launched a film program directed specifically at the 
younger generation which, according to its representatives,
37Garmisch Conference 1-4, 16-17.
38Garmisch Conference 16-17.
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showed much promise. Once again the idea for the program had 
come from the field. Shortly after the first conference on 
youth activities in July the youth activities officer of a 
detachment in Bavaria suggested to headguarters that German 
youth needed something more than classroom instruction in the 
field of education. He thought that young Germans would 
probably be quite receptive to US motion pictures and modern 
American music. As usual the mills of the OMGUS 
administration ground slowly, but four weeks after he had 
sent his memorandum the youth officer received an invitation 
to spend three days in Munich to discuss the details of his 
proposal and OMGUS policies. Military Government actually 
had an official policy regarding films for Germans in place 
since May 1946. Clay, who had to settle the dispute over who 
was in charge of the program, decided that ICD would be in 
charge of producing educational films and their contents. 
E&CRD would take over the responsibilities for distributing 
the films to individuals and institutions. By July they were 
ready to make movies available to youth activities.39
In spite of the encouraging news, obstacles remained. 
A number of participants complained about considerable lack 
of communication and support within OMGUS. Furthermore
39Memo from Paterson, Det. G 228, Ansbach to OMGBY, 
Munich, 16 Jul. 1946; Headquarters, OMBGY to Patterson, 15 
Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box
40, 10/43-3/22; directive from Military Governor, 22 May
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Field Operations Division [hereinafter 
FOD], Records of the Resident Liaison and Security Office at 
Nuernberg [hereinafter Det. B-211], Box 1419, 9/126-3/8.
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German bureaucrats were making life difficult by attempting 
to get youth activities under their control. Apart from 
their isolation within OMGUS, the youth officers felt that 
they needed to find a way to contact the American public. 
Without the support of Americans back home they would not be 
able to carry their objectives through. ICD added to the 
list that German youth publications so far had been 
disappointing in their re-educational value.40
The Army's program (GYA) received special attention 
throughout 1946. The Garmisch conference was just a part of 
a series of meetings between Military Government officers, 
Army representatives and German youth officials. In June 
1946 the three groups in charge of youth work in Bavaria had 
met to achieve a greater degree of cooperation. Military 
Government officials were eager to make sure that their 
agency would not be degraded to become a mere supplier for 
German youth groups. At the same time they insisted that 
they should have exclusive control over the distribution of 
all equipment which the Army could make available to German 
youth. Germans would receive all captured enemy materials 
with no strings attached. As far as youth centers were 
concerned, GYA officers pointed out that youth groups had a 
difficult time to hold on to their homes when pressured by 
German authorities once the Army released them to them. The
40Garmisch Conference 2, 21-22.
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only solution would be for the Army to retain control of the 
facilities and make them available to all youth groups.41
Apparently OMGUS representatives felt uneasy about their 
coalition with soldiers in re-educating German children. The 
numbers the Army provided during the Garmisch conference were 
impressive. The officer in charge of GYA reported that 
throughout the American zone more than 15,000 American 
personnel had contacted nearly 290,000 children since April. 
The ensuing discussion brought to light that, even though the 
directives provided for liaison and the exchange of 
information, contacts in the field needed to be closer. 
Military Government representatives also suggested the 
establishment of a training program for Army personnel 
participating in GYA. The very success and size of the 
program caused some apprehensions. Some officers felt that 
the Army was acting too independently and charged it with 
deviating from the official policy of leaving the actual 
activities in German hands. Another OMGUS representative 
argued that GYA claimed and received all the credit for 
actions his section had planned and initiated when they had 
merely asked the Army for help. A third critic pointed out 
that the Army's approach to children through sports and 
parties did nothing for the long range objectives the 
Americans were pursuing. All the GYA representative could do
410MGBY, Weekly Report no. 59, 20-27 Jun. 1946, "Youth 
Activities;" NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., 
Box 143, 5/296-1/17.
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was to reaffirm the Army's willingness to lend a hand to the 
agencies which were "primarily responsible" for youth 
activities. He explained that the Army was most experienced 
in the realm of sports and had the necessary equipment and 
facilities, so it was only natural that it mainly offered 
children these kinds of activities. The GYA officer added 
that suggestions for improvements would be most welcome.42
The conference revealed that it was hard to coordinate 
two organizations working in the same field. Between August 
and October 1946 OMGUS and Army representatives repeatedly 
met to discuss their respective roles in German youth work. 
The Army adhered to its traditional views that it should 
leave policy making to civilian authorities and therefore did 
not contest OMGUS prerogatives in this field. Both sides 
also agreed that the Army would have to change its 
objectives. Instead of simply trying to keep children and 
GIs out of trouble, GYA would have to participate in the 
American re-education effort. This meant that GYA would have 
to offer a more sophisticated program for young Germans. The 
key question was whether the Army would be allowed to take up 
a more active role in developing its own initiatives or 
should only provide assistance to German youth organizations 
who asked for it. The Army command favored the former 
solution, but OMGUS and Clay insisted that GYA should not try 
to compete with, or replace German youth organizations and
42Garmisch Conference 14-15, 22.
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should only supplement already existing German programs. 
Both sides finally agreed that the Army should be able to 
initiate its own programs, but should try to turn them over 
to the Germans as soon as they would be ready. Military 
Government officials suggested conducting forums and 
discussion groups with the youngsters to train them in 
democratic procedure.43
The resulting directive of October 1946 tried to satisfy 
all sides involved. Obviously based on the successes of the 
youth centers the Army had inherited from the Soviets in 
Berlin, the directive also permitted USFET to requisition 
buildings for youth groups in the vicinity of military 
communities. It authorized GYA to hire German employees in 
subordinate positions and American dependents who were 
permitted to come to the theater from April 1946 on. This 
meant that headquarters officially did not permit the Army to 
develop its own program, but provided it with all the tools 
and resources to do so if the Germans did not take advantage 
of the resources the units were required to offer.44
The directive came at an unfortunate time. The Army was 
in the middle of a complete reorganization of its troops in 
Germany. In June 1947 headquarters had to issue an extensive
43Minutes of Conference on Army Assistance to German 
Youth Activities Held at Headquarters, U.S. Forces, European 
Theater, 7-9 Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
44Jones 14-17.
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order to the commanders of the newly formed military posts 
which admonished them that the new administrative structure 
did not free American officers and enlisted men in any way 
from their obligations to assist young Germans. To make sure 
that units complied with their duties, headquarters 
introduced a system of weekly consolidated reports.45
In spite of the difficulties the Army made the best of 
the October directive. In January 1947 headquarters provided 
its posts with detailed procedures for obtaining films. At 
that time youth officers could choose from sixteen American 
feature films such as The Gold Rush, Madame Curie, Abe 
Lincoln in Illinois, or Young Tom Edison, which young people 
would be able to see for a moderate fee. They had four 
German films, five films from allied or neutral countries, 
and twenty-one American documentary films at their disposal. 
German documentaries and fairy tale films which ICD had 
approved completed the list.46
Another order from June clearly indicated that 
headquarters was doing everything it could to get American 
soldiers and civilians involved in the program. It reminded 
commanding generals that the November directive authorized
^Responsibility for German Youth Activities, AG 353.8 
GOT-AGO, HQ European Command, 5 June 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1428, 9/12-2/16.
^Headquarters US Forces, European Theater to Commanding 
Generals, 23 Jan. 1947, subject: Procedure for Obtaining
Motion Picture Films or the German Youth Activities Program 
from Information Control Units; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B- 
211, Box 1428, 9/122-2/16.
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soldiers to use up to four hours of their weekly training 
time for working with youth in manual arts. The authors of 
the directive made clear that they considered the program to 
be very important. Using the four hours for working with 
young Germans could be "of limitless value both to the troops 
themselves and to the occupation forces' efforts for the re­
education of Germany."47
The Army also recognized the need for good public 
relations. A EUCOM directive of May 1947 instructed GYA 
officers to do everything they could to keep the program in 
the public eye. They were encouraged to inform the German 
and American press not only in Germany, but also in the 
United States, and to provide the Army Pictorial Services 
with photos and motion pictures about their activities. AFN 
was instructed to cover GYA activities with live broadcasts 
if possible.48
Apparently headquarters did not need to worry about lack 
of enthusiasm. Early in 1948 GYA operated 295 youth centers 
in the American zone and in Berlin. Between September 1947 
and April 1948 attendance at GYA activities peaked at almost 
700,000 children in December and dropped below 360,000. 
Almost 420,000 German children attended over 27,000 meetings
47Headquarters, European Command to Commanding Generals, 
18 June 1947, subject: Use of Training Time for Group
Activities in Manual Arts Installations; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1428, 9/122-2/16.
48EUCOM Directive, 22 May 1947; NA RG 260, OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 141, 5/295-3/7.
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in April 1948. 389 officers and enlisted men supervised
their activities full time. They were assisted by 589 
military volunteers, 620 American and Allied civilian 
volunteers, and 1,056 German civilians employed by the 
Army.49
The number of participants only provided part of the 
picture. After the first year of GYA operations, ICD decided 
to explore the reaction of German adults to the program. 
According to its survey, a majority of all Germans in the 
American zone had actually heard of GYA. The pollsters found 
that over 80% of the Germans interviewed would permit their 
children to participate in GYA activities. Even of those who 
had heard about the program, however, only about 10% 
indicated that their children actually had attended any 
activities. Interestingly, those whose children had taken 
part in some GYA program had a much better opinion of the 
Army's efforts than those who had just heard about it. The 
authors of the report did not think that such a small 
percentage, which, according to them, still translated into 
hundreds of thousands of children, would actually hurt the 
program, as long as GYA successfully implemented its re­
education goals. In this realm the findings were promising. 
German adults seemed to understand clearly that the program 
was designed to introduce their children to democratic
49Monthly Report of the Deputy Commander in Chief, EUCOM, 
31 May 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., 
Box 37, 10/43-2/3.
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14. Army Assistance to German Youth Activities, 1947-48 
(Source: Monthly Report of the Deputy Commander-in-Chief, 
EUCOM, 31 May 1948. NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities 
Br., BOX 37, 10/43-2/3)
principles and thought that it did. At the same time, 
however, the survey revealed that the Germans appreciated GYA 
for its practical results: only the well educated of those 
whose children participated in the program let them go with
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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the specific purpose of learning more about democracy or the 
American way of life. Most of the others mainly sent their 
children because GYA kept them away from the streets and gave 
them something meaningful to do during their abundant free 
time.50
In April 1947 the Army polled its soldiers to find out 
about their participation and their opinions of GYA. At the 
same time ICD conducted a survey about the program with young 
Germans. The Army's findings were not surprising. Most of 
the GIs and officers surveyed had heard about the program and 
thought that GYA was a good idea for which it would be 
worthwhile to volunteer. A majority of the GIs found that 
GYA could teach them something about the Germans as well as 
the young Germans about democracy and the United States. As 
is the case with any volunteer effort, only a small 
percentage of soldiers and their officers sacrificed their 
time and energies as volunteers. Only about 6% of the 
enlisted GIs and 15% of officers had taken part in the 
program. Soldiers who spoke some German, who had done 
volunteer work in the US, and who had a rather favorable
50Office of the Director of Information Control, Opinion 
Survey Unit, Report Number 46, Army Aid to German Youth 
Activities Evaluated by German Adults, 19 Feb. 1947; NA RG 
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 142, 5/296- 
1/1.
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attitude of young male Germans, tended to render their 
services more willingly than others.51
The survey on young people is remarkable insofar as it 
shows that young Germans were much more cautious in their 
answers than their parents. The deep trauma of the war and 
their experiences with the Hitler Youth had made young people 
suspicious. A very large number of them preferred not to 
answer most of the questions. As far as participation in the 
Army's youth program was concerned, the survey confirmed the 
results of the adult survey. Only about 10% of children 
surveyed in Kassel, Munich, Heidelberg, and Frankfurt said 
that they had ever attended GYA activities. Their main 
motivation for participating in the program was the food 
which the Americans usually offered. Re-education or the 
desire to learn something about the United States did not 
seem to attract much attention in view of the very harsh 
realities young people in the American zone were facing at 
the time.52
In spite of the impressive numbers and the rather 
positive evaluation of GYA by adults not even one year after
5lHeadquarters, US Army, Troop Education and Information 
Group, Soldier's Opinion Concerning the Army's Assistance to 
the German Youth Program in the European Command, 15 June 
1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 
144, 5/296-2/1.
520ffice of the Director of Information Control, Opinion 
Survey Unit, Report Number 56, German Children Appraise the 
Youth Program, 26 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, 
Box 17, 10/110-1/13.
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its initiation, this highly visible part of the American re­
education efforts for youth attracted criticism. In May 1947 
the New York Times reported "U.S. Program for German Youth 
Reaches Only Small Percentage: 85% of 1,000 Polled in Cities 
Do Not Take Part - Candy and Food Are Found to Be Chief Lure 
For Those Who Do." The author of the article obviously had 
received a copy of the ICD report on German youth and 
faithfully— but without any further investigation or 
background knowledge— forwarded the information to his 
readers. As a result the public got a rather distorted 
picture of American youth activities in Germany. The Times 
correspondent was not aware of the fact that the report 
actually dealt with only a part of American re-education 
efforts, namely GYA. A short investigation with Norman 
Himes, OMGUS Education Officer, did not seem to clarify the 
issue. The Times merely reported that Himes thought it just 
natural in view of the dire situation in Germany that young 
Germans considered food to be extremely important and 
defended GYA as a rather new program which had made some 
progress.53
Vice Consul Robert Beghtol of the Munich Consulate 
General composed a report to the State Department along the 
same lines, criticizing the Army's efforts in no uncertain
53"U.S. Program for German Youth Reaches Only Small 
Percentage: 85% of 1,000 Polled in Cities Do Not Take Part - 
Candy and Food Are Found to Be Chief Lure For Those Who Do," 
The New York Times, 29 May 1947: 4; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 145, 5/296-2/7.
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terms. Robert Murphy, Clay's liaison with the State 
Department in Berlin, wrote to James Wilkinson, Beghtol's 
superior officer in Munich, that Clay regarded the report as 
"unfair." Just like the Times, Beghtol had completely 
ignored OMGUS re-education efforts and simply had focused on 
the Munich GYA activities and the German response. Clay 
thought that the Army was making a "praiseworthy contribution 
... for which all Americans should be grateful —  it has no 
other purpose than to help." Murphy also explained to 
Wilkinson that OMGUS did not appreciate sending this kind of 
internal information to Washington instead of headquarters in 
Berlin where constructive criticism would always be welcome. 
He thought that Beghtol's efforts to gather information on 
the youth program were laudable but limited in value because 
the Vice Consul relied only on the personal information he 
had been able to gather in the city and could not provide an 
accurate picture of the general situation in the American 
zone. Murphy advised Wilkinson to take this kind of 
observation to the local military authorities in the 
future.54
Clay's response did not stop with a reprimand of the 
vice consul. In August the general dispatched a personal 
message to the War Department in which he explained in detail
^American Consulate General, Munich, to Secretary of 
State, Washington, 2 June 1947, dispatch no. 653; Murphy to 
Wilkinson, 12 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 145, 5/296-2/7.
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OMGUS policies. Clay took special care to defend GYA against
the attacks in the press and by Beghtol. He thought it
unfortunate that the ICD report did not explain the purpose
of the Army program which, according to him, was a mere
auxiliary in the overall American effort of re-education.
Obviously hurt by the negative publicity Clay found it
surprising how many people think that the GYA program is 
our youth program for Germany. It is equally surprising 
how little credit the Army is getting for its 
willingness to be a good neighbor and to share its 
facilities with German youth.55
Clay's vehement defense of the youth activities under 
his command did not mean that he was blind to the pitfalls of 
the program or unwilling to listen to constructive criticism. 
In response to a critical memorandum to Berlin, the Internal 
Affairs Division suggested that Clay should render more 
public support to youth activities in general and should make 
sure that the commanding officers selected capable men as 
youth officers. The Division further recommended that 
"professionally trained" youth officers should be appointed 
to all OMGUS Land offices. Clay would have to remind his 
tactical commands that they were not competing with the 
Germans, but rather should assist them in their activities.56
55Clay to Dept, of War, 24 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/5.
56Memorandum from Internal Affairs and Communications 
Division to General Clay, 5 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 152, 5/337-1/5.
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While most of the points of discussion in 1946 dealt 
with matters of improving the program which OMGUS had already 
in place, participants in conferences also tried to confront 
more fundamental issues. Since the youth program was without 
question extremely important in the re-education of Germany 
because of its potential for producing social changes and 
instilling an understanding of democracy, Abe Vinik from OMG 
Hesse wondered at the Garmisch conference whether the youth 
activities section was pursuing the right course. According 
to him, the Americans so far had focused entirely on 
organizing youth, but had neglected their actual target, 
young people themselves. Clearly the officer had spotted a 
weak point in the project. Simply introducing new features 
to the organizational structure of youth activities in 
Germany might not be enough to change the minds of the 
younger generation. Vinik proposed that youth officers 
should not discuss these problems isolated from the other 
issues German society was facing and should bring in parties 
from all parts of Military Government as well as from German 
society to try to find an integral solution which Americans 
and Germans could implement. The conference participants 
agreed that more was indeed necessary, but Vinik must have 
been disappointed with the response. Apart from some 
practical proposals to remedy this deficiency, such as the 
initiation of discussion groups or bringing in experts to 
help with problems, the members of the conference did not
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respond in any way to his proposal. In October 1946 the time 
had not come for profound changes in a program which was 
barely one year old.57
Although OMGUS representatives always emphasized that 
Germans should be responsible for carrying out youth 
activities and had even invited some Germans to Garmisch, the 
minutes of the conference reveal that OMGUS personnel were 
not ready to turn the responsibility over to the Germans. 
They clearly felt these activities were a vital part of the 
American re-education effort in which the occupiers had to 
set the parameters of action. The conference was the first 
step, however, towards giving Germans a bigger voice in youth 
affairs and to open up a dialogue on a zone-wide basis which 
apparently was already taking place between Germans and 
Americans in several states. Nevertheless, OMGUS
representatives made clear that the Germans would have to 
develop their own initiatives within the framework they had 
established.
With the parameters in place, OMGUS officials tried hard 
during the next year and a half to initiate a dialogue with 
German officials. The annual report for 1947/48 noted that 
German-American conferences in September and November 1947 
were most successful. In the earlier of the two both sides 
agreed that the democratization of youth groups had made 
considerable progress, but that both, Germans and Americans
57Garmisch Conference 5-6.
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were neglecting the German mind over their attempts to reform 
the system. The Germans who attended the conferences 
appreciated the lack of ideological indoctrination and in 
general seemed to share the goals of their American 
counterparts. They certainly belonged to a group of
progressive educators who were eager to establish a dialogue 
and to promote new ideas.58
One problem Germans and Military Government shared was 
the Army's GYA program. Both sides agreed that GIs were 
interfering with their own arrangements by actively 
introducing programs the Germans had not asked for. They did 
not recognize at the time that this unwelcome intrusion in 
the traditional settings actually was opening new horizons in 
youth work. The problem with the approach of OMGUS officials 
to remain in the background was that it gave Germans the 
opportunity to simply continue their traditional concepts of 
youth work which largely neglected those who were unwilling 
to organize or forced them to join a youth group if they 
wanted to pursue their interests. GYA offered an alternative 
model of youth work open to everyone for young people as well 
as for progressive educators.59
58OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., German Youth 
Between Yesterday and Tomorrow: 1 April 1947-30 April 1948, 
3-4, hereinafter cited as German Youth 47-48; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, ID, BOX 189, 10/51-3/9.
S9German Youth 47-48 3-4.
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Some Americans recognized this shortcoming in MG 
policies. James R. Wilkinson, for example, American Consul 
General in Munich, informed Washington in November 1946 about 
the progress of American youth work in Bavaria. He pointed 
out that growing membership numbers in youth organizations 
indicated some progress, but he thought that neither OMGUS 
nor the Army had yet been able to overcome the inability of 
the Germans to understand— let alone adopt— the democratic 
principles inherent in American youth work, which was open to 
everyone, did not adhere to specific ideologies, and did not 
depend on a tightly knit, well organized and hierarchical 
structure of command. Wilkinson warned that Americans would 
not succeed in their reorientation efforts if they failed to 
add their own democratic concept of youth work to their 
agenda.60
Youth activities officers met again in January 1947. 
Apart from the usual consideration of issues concerning the 
field work in the American zone and cooperation with GYA, the 
major issue on the agenda was the development of new field 
directives which would comply with SWNCC 269/9. The 
conference clearly demonstrated that OMGUS youth officers had 
anticipated many of the policies and did not hesitate to 
adapt the directives from Washington to their own needs and 
prerogatives. Under the able guidance of Lawrence Norrie,
“Political Report, American Consulate General, Munich to 
Secretary of State, Washington, 5 Nov. 1946; NA RG 59 Central 
Files 1945-49, ‘862.489/11-546.
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the director of the Group Activities Branch, the discussions 
revealed that Washington was actually lagging about nine 
months behind the decision making process in Germany. 
Washington policy makers, for example, reiterated the disease 
and unrest formula as the only basis for action long after 
„ American officials in Germany had thrown it overboard and 
adopted a clear cut positive long range re-education policy 
regardless of the physical conditions in the American zone.61
In April 1947 OMGUS published its annual report on youth 
activities for the second year of the occupation. The 
authors maintained that April 1946 had brought a definite 
reorientation of American policy in Germany. According to 
them, youth officials had completed the eradication of Nazi 
and militaristic organizations and could begin to embark on 
a more constructive program during their second year of 
activities. This included the formation of the Land Youth 
Committees, a dramatic increase of the Kreis Youth 
Committees, and attempts to raise the number of young people 
who joined youth groups, but the report continued that these 
measures were just a beginning. Although life in Germany had 
somewhat returned to more normal levels and the shock of the 
defeat was wearing off, young people in the American zone 
still suffered from a lack of almost everything they needed 
for organizing and participating in youth activities. A
6lMinutes of Youth Activities Conference, Berlin, 6-7 
February 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education 
Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7.
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leadership program was in place and operating well, but the 
authors thought that it would take years to provide the young 
people in their zone with an adequate number of trained youth 
leaders. In spite of these shortcomings the Youth Activities 
Section could report that, apart from some isolated cases, 
young Germans had decided to stay away from any large scale 
subversive activities.62
Youth experts also had to deal with some setbacks. In 
spite of specific provisions by SWNCC 269/5 the authors noted 
that fewer than fifteen youth leaders, almost all of them 
older persons, had been able to go abroad. The situation was 
similar for foreign experts coming to Germany. Youth 
activities officers were clearly irritated by the fact that 
they had to be content with a very limited number of visitors 
while it seemed that American businessmen could come to the 
American zone almost at will to exploit the situation. The 
report concluded that the previous year had brought 
significant advances in the creation of a healthy exterior 
structure for youth activities, but that the process of a 
"democratic reorientation of German youth" had hardly begun. 
American objectives for the following year should therefore 
concentrate on "the re-awakening of certain moral and 
spiritual forces among German youth" and educating youth 
leaders who would clearly recognize the mistakes of the past
62Report on German Youth, Second Year of the Occupation, 
1 Apr. 1946-31 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 145 5/296-2/6.
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and would be willing to reconstruct youth work along 
democratic lines. To achieve these goals, changes in the 
young peoples' physical environment would certainly be 
desirable. German authorities would have to furnish 
sufficient funding for youth work and permit school reform in 
their states. The authors of the report concurred with 
Clay's basic tenet that ultimately only the improvement of 
the economic and political landscape in Germany as well as in 
the world could lead to a standard of living which would 
enable the people to set their interests beyond the immediate 
needs of bare survival.63
The material side, however, was just one part of German 
reconstruction. American youth officials were convinced that 
German youth would benefit tremendously from increasing 
contacts with the outside world and went to great lengths to 
overcome the spiritual isolation of Germany during the Third 
Reich. In January 1947 Berlin introduced a program which 
would help young Germans find a pen pal in the United States. 
Students of all ages could contact the US Office of Education 
on an individual basis, whereas the National Social Welfare 
Assembly would take care of group correspondence. During the 
next twelve months about 10,000 children made use of this 
official route, others approached youth organizations 
directly. The churches provided an additional avenue for
“Report on German Youth, Second Year of the Occupation, 
1 Apr. 1946-31 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 145, 5/296-2/6; German Youth 47-48 32-34.
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establishing contacts. GYA caught on to the idea a year 
after the Military Government initiative had started. When 
GYA officers investigated if their children would be able to 
participate, Lawrence Norrie informed them that he 
"appreciated the effort," but that he considered an 
additional program unfeasible since the volunteer agencies 
involved could barely handle the existing volume of letters 
they received. He therefore asked the Army not to rely on 
OMGUS channels, but rather use its own.64
In spite of some apparent organizational pitfalls, the 
American decision to permit contacts between young Germans 
and people abroad certainly helped to overcome the isolation 
of the previous years. Official and unofficial contacts with 
Americans satisfied a real need and desire and provided young 
Germans for the first time with the opportunity to learn 
first hand about their peers in other countries. Many took 
advantage of the opportunity.
The young generation's interest in opening up to the 
world also manifested itself in a dramatic rise in the number 
of people who participated in youth organizations. By March
“OMGUS Press Release, 23 Jan. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/13; German 
Youth 47-48 30; Commanding General, EUCOM, to Lawrence
Norrie, OMGUS, E&CRD, 18 Apr. 1948; Norrie to Commanding 
General, EUCOM, 3 May 1948; NA RG 260 E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/13. The correspondence of my 
father— 16 years old in 1947— with Lutheran reverends as well 
as with lay persons of congregations all over the United 
States documents well the possibilities church connections 
offered. All of his correspondence started as a thank you 
note for material help.
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1948 more than 1.2 million young people had joined youth 
organizations, an increase of one hundred per cent. Trade 
unions and sports groups enjoyed the most dramatic growth.65
Summer camps became one of the most important aspects of 
their activities. They were generally regarded as an 
excellent way of getting young people out of the destroyed 
cities into a healthy environment. Military Government, the 
Army, and American YMCA representatives developed an all 
encompassing program to make summer part not only 
recreational, but also re-educational events.66
The American YMCA had done pioneer work in this field 
already in 1946. The Army had provided the tent materials. 
Supplies from the United States made sure that the young 
people would be able to get additional calories. This 
established the pattern for the future, but American 
representatives had not been overly impressed with camp 
leadership in 1946. According to them, adults took complete 
control of the camps the German YMCA had organized. Young 
people expected to be taken care of and adults did not 
encourage them to take over any responsibilities. The 
Americans were not aware that not all camps operated in the 
same way. The Falcons' Republics, for example, reemerged in 
1946 as well. These large tent cities, organized by the 
socialist Falcons, functioned entirely as democratic
65German Youth 47-48 11-21.
66German Youth 47-48 21-24.
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institutions in which young people got hands on experiences 
with the procedures and learned to take over 
responsibilities.67 Compared to the church oriented groups, 
however, the Falcons only made a small minority of the 
overall summer camp population.68
The Americans were resolved to improve the situation in 
the following year. D.A. Davis, president of the World's 
Committee of YMCA, contacted Lawrence Norrie, whom he 
apparently knew well from his previous job with the American 
YMCA, to develop an all encompassing plan for making summer 
camps in 1947 not only a material, but also a re-educational 
success. During the following months Norrie called several 
conferences to coordinate the Army's material help with 
leadership training and practical guides for organizing 
summer camps. Norrie emphasized that American authorities 
needed to take special care of unorganized young people whom 
the organized groups tended to neglect.69
67It needs to be stressed here that the Falcons were 
close to the Social Democratic party and did not subscribe to 
any of the doctrines which came from Moscow. They based all 
their proceedings on Western democratic principles.
^Memorandum Edward T. Ladd, Youth and Sports Office 
OMGUS Bremen to Chief, Civil Government Division, 19 Aug. 
1946; Memorandum on Trip by Sgt. Tracy Strong to German Youth 
Camps, U.S. Zone, 30 July to 3 Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/25; for the 
Falcon Republics see Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4 Aug. 
1994.
69D.A. Davis, World's Committee of the YMCA, Geneva to 
Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, 10 Feb. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/25; summary of
Military Government conference on German Youth Activities
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As usual Military Government provided the necessary 
guidance to youth groups in the form of bringing an American 
expert, Elmar Ott from the American Camping Association, to 
Germany. During his six months stay Ott not only examined 
the situation, but also conducted leadership seminars and 
participated actively in camps throughout the American zone. 
Most of the camping equipment either came from former German 
Wehrmacht stocks which the Army released to the Land Youth 
Committees, or from Army surplus materials. The Army also 
provided much needed assistance in transporting young people 
to their destinations. The food for the camps came in part 
from Herbert Hoover's program as well as from the agencies 
organized in CRALOG. According to American sources, friendly 
German farmers did their share in securing the caloric 
supplies.70
In spite of some initial organizational problems, the 
camps were a great success. The undernourished participants 
gained weight dramatically, but Military Government's main 
objective of providing an additional avenue for reorientation 
did not seem to function very well. Ott reported that in the 
camps he visited food became the focal point for many of the 
young participants. According to OMGUS personnel, most of 
the organizers failed to transform the camps into communities
Camping Program, 18-19 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/14.
10German Youth 47-48 21-24, 31.
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in which the campers actively participated. Nevertheless, 
the officers spotted some young people who showed promise for 
becoming future leaders and lauded Elmar Ott for introducing 
Germans to the concept of making camping an educational as 
well as a recreational affair.71
The camping program revealed that many problems remained 
the same. In spite of Military Government's efforts to 
provide leadership training, it could not keep up with the 
increasing demand. The annual report for 1947/48 made it 
once more a point that it would certainly help the American 
reorientation effort to send German youth leaders to the 
United States where they would have the opportunity to 
observe and learn different approaches to youth work first 
hand. The youth activities section maintained that young 
Germans were barely starting to respond to American 
reorientation efforts. OMGUS youth officers thought that 
many older Germans did not help at all by trying to use youth 
organizations to disseminate their own political or 
ideological agendas. One of the most serious shortcomings 
was that many youth groups did not base their proceedings on 
democratic principles. They also had a tendency to exclude 
anybody from their activities who was not a member.72
In view of these rather discouraging observations 
leadership training in Germany and in the United States
71German Youth 47-48 21-24, 31.
72German Youth 47-48 32-34.
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became a vital issue. To secure the necessary funds and 
their long term objectives, Military Government— undoubtedly 
with the support of Herman Wells— successfully approached the 
Rockefeller Foundation for support. The foundation promised 
to provide the necessary finances for leadership schools in 
Germany. It was also prepared to send American experts to 
Germany and to sponsor the journeys of six German youth 
leaders to the United States where they would be able to 
study youth work for six months.73
In spite of this considerable support, the program had 
to overcome additional hardships in 1948. Currency reform 
initially wiped out many existing funds and put schools in 
jeopardy. Raymond Spahn, in charge of youth activities in 
Bavaria, for example, urgently requested money from his 
branch chief to assure the survival of a leadership school. 
Spahn argued that without support from this source, which he 
estimated to be about 3,500 Marks per month, the school would 
have to close. This would defeat "the primary function of 
this section as well as the occupation mission in Bavaria."74
OMGUS officials were beginning to reevaluate their 
general approach to youth activities as well. Whereas before 
1948 only the revival of youth groups on a democratic basis
73Minutes of the 15th Conference on MG Youth Activities, 
8-9 Apr. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education 
Br., BOX 136, 5/291-1/19.
74Memo from Raymond Spahn to Chief of Education Br., 1 
July 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 
37, 10/43-2/1.
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had received attention, youth officers recognized in 1948 
that a large segment of young Germans were not and would not 
be affected by the traditional German youth activities. 
Cooperative community planning for these youths would be 
necessary. As a first step to reaching out to these young 
people OMGUS planned to render special support to youth 
groups which would be open to all young people, not just 
particular interests.75
OMGUS received help from private organizations who also 
began to operate on an increasingly large scale in Germany 
from 1946 on. After Truman's initiation of CRALOG the 
American Friends were the first to arrive in Germany. 
Together with other American agencies they soon developed an 
extensive program for helping Germans survive. In June 1946 
the Council of American Remittances to Europe (CARE) signed 
an agreement with Clay, which permitted Americans to send 
food parcels directly to Germany. Initially CARE purchased 
three million surplus ration packages from the Army which 
American citizens could buy for friends or relatives in 
Germany. Due to its tremendous success, but also in response 
to the scarcity in Europe and especially in Germany, CARE 
expanded its operations in the course of 1947. In January it 
began to offer a variety of parcel types which not only 
consisted of food, but also of wool blankets with thread. 
The patterns for transforming these blankets into clothes
lsGerman Youth 47-48 32-34.
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were available upon request in Germany. From June on Germans 
could also receive fabric for making their garments. The 
great majority of CARE parcels went to the three western 
zones of Germany and to Berlin. The first parcels arrived in 
August, just in time for helping Germans through one of the 
most severe winters they ever had to face. By April 1947 
CARE had delivered nearly one million food parcels, two 
thirds of the total for Europe, to German families.76
CARE was not the only American relief operation in 
Germany. CRALOG reached an agreement with Military 
Government in June 1946 and began to make supplies available 
for feeding Germans. German children, 70% of whom the 
Americans found to be undernourished, were a special target 
group. The agreement stipulated that Germans were not 
allowed to donate anything to CRALOG or to the Red Cross to 
avoid any discrimination. During its first year of 
operations CRALOG delivered about eleven thousand tons of 
food as well as three and a half thousand tons of clothing to 
Germany. Most of the help came from various denominational
76Military Government of Germany, Monthly Report of the 
Military Governor [Hereinafter OMGUS, Monthly Report], no.
12, 1-30 Jun. 1946: 25-26; "CARE Program," OMGUS Information 
Bulletin, no. 56, 26 Aug. 1946: 16-17; "Cooperative for
American Remittances for Europe," OMGUS Information Bulletin, 
no. 89, 21 April 1947: 5-6, 10. The city of Bremen's and the 
German government's official celebration of the fiftieth 
anniversary of the arrival of the first CARE parcels at the 
port documents well the importance of this help not only for 
the physical well being of the German population, but also 
its psychological impact (This Week in Germany, 19 July 1996: 
8) .
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groups in the United States and went to the relief
organizations of the two major churches. The organizations
set about one fifth of the food aside to feed children at
schools.77
Although they dedicated much of their resources to
welfare efforts, many organizations actively promoted youth 
work. In June 1947, for example, John R. Mott, President of 
the World's Committee of the YMCA, visited the three western 
zones and opened the first YMCA sponsored center in
Frankfurt. The YWCA followed suit. American and Swedish 
representatives operated in Berlin, where they opened a youth 
center, and Stuttgart.78 The Friends also became active in
youth work in Frankfurt, but they followed a different
approach. They were the first group which recognized that 
traditional German youth activities would not reach a
substantial number of young people. In May 1946 Willis. D. 
Weatherford, the American Friends' Service Committee's 
commissioner for Europe therefore approached Clay directly 
with various proposals to remedy the situation. He suggested 
the opening of conference centers where German professionals 
who were involved in youth work would be able to come 
together and develop their own strategies "in a democratic 
manner" and the establishment of neighborhood centers which
^OMGUS, Monthly Report, no. 12, 1-30 Jun. 1946: 17.; no. 
26, 1-31 Aug. 1947: 37-38.
78OMGUS, Monthly Report, no. 24, 1-30 Jun. 1947: 31;
German Youth 31.
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would take care of young people much in the way Hull House 
did in Chicago. The idea for the establishment of these 
centers originated with Hertha Kraus, a German emigree, who 
had been one of the most influential German social workers 
during the Weimar Republic. Her philosophy and actions 
actually were very similar to those Jane Addams was pursuing 
in Chicago at the same time. After Hitler's rise to power 
she was forced to leave, took a teaching appointment in the 
United States, but did not lose interest in her home country. 
She actually proposed the idea of neighborhood centers in 
postwar Germany as early as 1943 to the AFSC.79
Since resources for constructing such a center were not 
available in Germany, the Friends had organized all of their 
materials elsewhere. Trucks loaded with everything necessary 
for the buildings were waiting in France for OMGUS approval, 
but the Quakers needed much patience in spite of the general 
consensus about the necessity of such a center in Frankfurt. 
They were facing the several dilemmas. In May 1946 Clay was 
still not inclined to permit American civilians to work in 
the American zone. Since he also insisted that all 
initiatives had to come from the Germans, the Friends had to 
find a way to comply with this policy. It was not until 
March of 1947 that Military Government headquarters approved 
the Friends' plan after the Lord Mayor and the city's youth
79Tent, "Simple Gifts" 66-75; see also German Youth 47-48
32.
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council had officially requested American help in this 
specific sector. During the following year the Friends added 
centers in Darmstadt and in Berlin.80
The three centers which the Friends ran actually were 
the first projects which consciously dealt with the issue of 
unorganized German youth. OMGUS officials only recognized 
the problem much later, while the Army never became involved 
with the theoretical implications of its activities, although 
the GYA centers often did exactly what the Quakers were doing 
with their enterprises: they provided a place where all young 
people would be able to get together and become actively 
involved with each other and with helping their surrounding 
community.
Religious groups such as the Friends not only provided 
the personnel to organize relief and places to stay to young 
Germans. They also tried to learn more about the situation 
in Germany and were among the first to send men and women to 
the American zone of occupation whose task was to help 
wherever they could. Jews, Catholics, and Protestants had 
already sent envoys to Germany in July 1946 to facilitate 
communications between Military Government and the different 
denominations as well as with the outside world.81 In 1947 
the World Council of Churches had three representatives in
80Tent, "Simple Gifts" 66-75; also German Youth 47-48 32.
8IOMGUS, Minutes of Conference of Regional Youth 
Activities Section Personnel, Berlin 2-3 July 1946: 7; NA RG 
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Box 120, 5/293-1/7.
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Germany to assist with youth work. Their assignments ranged 
from assisting in camping and training of youth leadership 
and supervising emerging Boys' Towns. One of the three, 
Chester P. Baird, went to Nuremberg to help the youth pastor 
in charge of Bavaria, Martin Helbich, to reestablish contacts 
between his Bavarian youth and Protestant youth groups in 
other countries.82
All of the objectives and policies which OMGUS and the 
Army developed in 1946 remained the basis for their 
activities throughout the American occupation and HICOG 
activities. OMGUS maintained a philosophy to induce young 
Germans to learn and internalize democratic behavior, while 
the Army's GYA program continued to provide practical 
assistance to the youth in the communities. By 1947 
Washington had caught up with the youth officers' practical 
approach. OMGUS received help in Germany from American youth 
and welfare organizations who provided young people with 
urgently necessary food and clothing, but the Friends also 
recognized that youth work needed to overcome the traditional 
organizational boundaries. They introduced a concept of 
youth work which opened the door for young people who did not 
intend to become organized in any way. Fruitful youth work 
within Germany, however, could only become a reality if the 
four occupying powers would be willing to coordinate their
i2German Youth 47-48 31-32.
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efforts. Events throughout Germany and especially in Berlin 
soon revealed that this cooperation would not be forthcoming.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
CHAPTER VII 
The other Zones. 1945-50; East vs.West
Re-educating German youth did not take place in a vacuum 
and was by no means an exclusively American undertaking. 
While youth activities went underway in all four zones of 
occupation, differences in the approaches of the three 
western powers and of the Soviet Union not only threatened to 
paralyze youth activities in Berlin, but also brought the 
profound political and ideological differences between the 
Soviets and the three western allies to light which 
ultimately led to the division of Germany.
Four Occupiers: Four Approaches
Lucius Clay soon had to learn that American ideas about 
postwar Germany in many respects differed sharply from those 
of the other occupying powers. The former allies were unable 
to agree even on minor issues. Not just the Soviets were 
giving Clay serious problems. Initially the French were most 
adamant about avoiding any political or administrative move 
that would strengthen the Germans in any way. Even while the 
Germans were still fighting, Charles de Gaulle had tried to 
expand French influence in Germany. French troops refused to 
leave Stuttgart to the Americans, for example, in an attempt 
to incorporate a major city in their zone of occupation and 
only withdrew when Eisenhower applied massive pressure. De 
Gaulle also insisted on the French exclusive right to redraw
321
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the western border of Germany, which included the annexation 
of the Rhineland.1
French, British, American, and Soviet occupiers brought 
very different philosophies and cultures into their zones of 
occupation. The British, for example, decided to retreat 
from direct controls over the Germans already early in 1946. 
They did not attempt to introduce a thorough re-education 
program but rather tried to gain the trust of the Germans and 
guide them through council and advice. The French, on the 
other hand, had a tendency to retain direct control over 
German authorities as long as possible. They were the last 
to permit elections in their zone of occupation and exploited 
it economically to the largest possible extent. Americans 
occupied a middle ground in administrative matters, but were 
the most adamant denazifiers. The Soviets struggled with 
formulating and pursuing a coherent occupation policy, but 
from the beginning overturned the political system in their 
zone and eventually replaced it with a Stalinist regime.2
‘Krieger 72-85, 104-109; Willis 7-31; see also Schwartz 
29-32.
2For British Policy see Michael Balfour, "In Retrospect: 
Britain's Policy of 'Re-education'," Nicholas Pronay and 
Keith Wilson, eds., The Political Re-Education of Germany and 
Her Allies lifter World War II (London & Sydney: Croom Helm, 
1985) 139-51; for the French outlook and policy see Krieger 
104-109, Willis 32-46; French initiatives in the cultural 
realm are also in Henry Pilgert, Community and Group Life in 
West Germany with Special Reference of the policies and 
Programs of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for 
Germany ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. High
Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, 
Historical Division, 1952) 76-77; see also Schwartz 29-32;
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When Clay realized that governing Germany as a political 
and economic unit was impossible, he opted for the next 
feasible solution, the unification of the Western zones. His 
motives were not the well being of Germany but rather the 
huge financial burden the American zone of occupation posed 
for taxpayers in the United States. Once again he found the 
French to be obstinate. They had nurtured the particularist 
movements in Germany's southwest while at the same time 
preparing the incorporation of the Saar region into France. 
Not surprisingly, the French needed eighteen months, 
considerable pressure from the United States, as well as 
economic incentives to join the bi-zone and did so with 
reservations.3
Although Paris recognized that Europe's economic 
recovery depended on that of West Germany, its military 
government officials in Germany found it difficult to give up 
their control over the new West German government in 1949. 
They insisted on reserving as many powers for direct 
intervention in German affairs as possible for the High 
Commissioners who were going to replace the Military 
Governors. In the end American and British overcame the 
French resistance. An International Authority of the Ruhr 
provided the French with the means to guarantee their access
for the results of Soviet policy see Naimark 9-68, 141-204, 
353-397.
3Krieger 282-289; Willis 17-31.
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to German coal and maintaining their influence in Europe's 
most powerful industrial area, while NATO bound the United 
States to Western Europe from 1949 on. It took the three 
Western Allies another six years, however, to find a way to 
integrate the Federal Republic in such a way into the Western 
camp that France's security needs could be satisfied. West 
Germany's autonomy coincided with the Republic's admission to 
NATO, a step which not just strengthened the Alliance but 
also provided adequate security against any future German 
aggression. American, French, British, and Canadian troops 
remained in Germany as allies.4 
Cooperation in the West
While Clay was fighting his battles over reparations, 
deindustrialization and decentralization with the French and 
the Soviets, OMGUS officers in charge of youth work did not 
seem to face the same difficulties. They took an interest in 
the activities of their allies early on. Whereas the first 
American meeting dedicated to youth activities in Berlin in 
1946 was an entirely American affair, a conference in 
Garmisch-Partenkirchen in October 1946 included participants 
from the British and the French military governments. At 
this conference the Americans were not just reporting about 
the progress in their own area of occupation, but also were
4Krieger 23-24; Schwartz 28-42, 57-83; Elmer Plischke, 
History of the Allied High Commission for Germany: Its
Establishment, Structure, and Procedures, ([Bad Godesberg]: 
Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of 
the Executive Secretary, Historical Division, 1951) 21-27.
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eager to hear the British and the French representatives 
describe the situation and policies in their zones. The 
officers found lots of common ground. Colonel R.T. Percival, 
the British representative, reported to the Americans that 
the British basically had pursued the same objectives as the 
Americans. Their approach from the start had aimed at 
reconstruction. They had permitted youth organizations and 
laid responsibility for youth activities in German hands soon 
after the war and were satisfied with the results. Just as 
in the American zone, Military Government officials remained 
in the background as far as possible.
Colonel Percival also pointed out some differences 
between the British and the American policies. First of all, 
the British mainly targeted a much smaller proportion of 
young Germans, namely just those between the ages of fourteen 
and eighteen years. British officials also had never made 
the past of young people an obstacle to their participation 
in youth activities after the war. Percival commented that 
the British were more reluctant to let the army participate 
in the youth program. He argued that, although they might 
share the same objectives, they would always be at odds, 
unless the army could be closely supervised by Military 
Government's youth experts. With these ground rules clearly 
established, the British army just then began to start a 
small scale program. While Clay's first thought on youth 
had included the feasibility of encouraging and readmitting
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the scout movement in his zone, Percival reported that a 
British general, who was an authority in this field, had 
advised his government to refrain from such an action, 
because the Germans were not yet ripe for this type of 
activity.
The problems in the British zone also were similar to 
those of their neighbors: Percival reported that many young
Germans had lost their families and homes and were just 
wandering. It was a challenging task to help them back into 
a normal life. The Colonel also talked about the shortage of 
material. Apparently the British army did not have anything 
to spare, so Military Government there had to rely 
exclusively on captured German material which did not go very 
far to satisfy the enormous need. There also was a serious 
shortage of literature, which the British had been trying 
"desperately hard" to eliminate.
As far as the future was concerned, British authorities 
in Germany energetically promoted an international exchange 
and were trying to convince their Foreign Office of the 
necessity to facilitate travelling. Percival thought that it 
would provide a real solution to many problems to permit 
Germans to travel abroad and to bring people from other 
countries to Germany, especially if they had been neutral.5
5Garmisch Conference 4-5.
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The British Field officers' efforts were successful. By 
January 1947 they had an official and extensive exchange 
program in place with their zone of occupation.6
Interestingly, an American pointed to an additional 
British program which he thought deserved the attention of 
the members of the conference. Abe Vinik, Youth Officer in 
Greater Hesse which bordered the British zone, informed the 
participants at the Garmisch conference that the British were 
trying to find ways to provide youth organizations with 
professional advice and support without having to resort to 
German youth offices, whom the British mistrusted. The 
occupiers had introduced full time Jugendpfleger. According 
to him, these youth secretaries, who were professional youth 
workers, dedicated their entire energy towards the promotion 
of youth activities. Vinik reported that some German youth 
leaders thought that the British initiative was worth copying 
in the American zone.7
On the whole American and British youth officers seemed 
to share the same objectives and problems. British military 
authorities had embarked on an official reconstructive 
program long before Washington had made up its mind, but they 
were even harder pressed for material assistance for youth 
activities than the Americans, who could draw to a certain 
extent on their army's vast resources.
6Pilgert, The West German Educational System 16-77.
7Garmisch Conference 6.
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In view of the economic exploitation and the way French 
troops and officers lived off their zone, one would expect 
that French re-education efforts did not go very far. 
Nevertheless, in what one historian called a "paradoxical 
occupation" the French military government made far reaching 
attempts to cure the Germans from the disease of exaggerated 
nationalism and militarism. Capable officers directed its 
re-education efforts and pursued a very far sighted and 
effective policy. German schools in the French zone were the 
first ones to reopen in Germany after the war. The French 
introduced more new school books per child than either the 
British or the Americans. While it did not pursue the far 
reaching goal of a complete school reform, the French 
military government made some significant changes which 
facilitated transferring between the different school tracks. 
At the university level, the French purged 30% of the 
faculties at the two universities under their control, but 
had them running again in 1945. To alleviate the desperate 
situation for many students, they reinstated the university 
in Mainz which had been closed in 1817, an interpreter's 
college in Germersheim and a school for administrators in 
Speyer.8
As far as French goals were concerned, Major Moreau, one 
of the two representatives of the French zone at the Garmisch 
conference, distinguished the French efforts from those of
8Willis 44-45.
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their neighbors. He explained to his colleagues that 
continental Europeans tended to assign great importance to 
ideologies, whereas Anglo-Americans seemed to regard 
democracy as a more practical undertaking, a "habit of life." 
Moreau pointed to some important differences between his zone 
and its two neighbors. Since the French area of occupation 
did not include any major or capital cities with their 
intellectual and political elites who could act on the 
occupiers' behalf, he argued that the French had to interfere 
with German lives, institutions, and youth work in a far more 
direct and visible way. Therefore French authorities had 
played a much more active role in German youth affairs than 
their neighbors. They also had reinstalled the German youth 
offices at the end of 1945, but had not given them much 
power. Just as their British and American counterparts, the 
French considered the available staffs too old, too set in 
their traditional behavior, and simply not dynamic enough to 
be up to the post-war challenges. The French also found that 
adequate replacements were very hard to find and introduced 
youth committees in the communities as important devices of 
the democratization process. These committees had similar 
tasks and consisted of the same groups of people as those in 
the other zones. The French agreed with their allies that 
the committees had to maintain their independence from 
government influence.
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Moreau further reported that his youth section had 
authorized the resurrection of traditional German youth 
groups just like the Americans and the British. In all 
three western zones the Catholic and Protestant churches 
claimed the largest following, but French authorities were 
the only ones who heavily promoted the Friends of Nature 
movement. According to Moreau, this youth group had a 
democratic structure with roots in Switzerland and a record 
of resistance to Hitler, at least in the French zone. Moreau 
was far more skeptical of the youth hostel movement which he 
considered to be undemocratic. The forty youth hostels open 
in the French zone therefore operated under the supervision 
of provisional committees with good results. Moreau 
continued that the French had permitted political formations, 
such as the Falken and the Free German Youth, which came from 
the Soviet zone, under the provision that they could not be 
part of any official party structure.9
All three occupying powers assigned leadership training 
high priorities, but the French military government developed 
a unique solution to the problem of finding and schooling 
youth leaders. Whereas British and American military 
government officials tried to establish independent
leadership schools, the French enlisted the help of
Volkshochschulen, a type of evening school, into their 
efforts. British and American authorities also were
9Garmisch Conference 10-11; see also Willis 45-46.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
331
supporting these institutions which had been a product of the 
Weimar Republic, but mainly used them for educating and 
reorienting adults. According to Moreau, the French tried to 
use these schools exclusively for learning about democracy 
and discouraged their traditional role of continuing 
education. They had found that 80% of the participants of 
evening school courses were under the age of thirty. Since 
these Germans obviously were interested in re-education, they 
seemed to be the natural pool for recruiting youth leaders 
and could remain in a familiar environment for their 
training. To achieve their goals, the French strongly 
encouraged these schools to cooperate closely on a zonewide 
basis. Moreau thought that this task was at least as 
important for future developments than the promotion of adult 
education.
The emphasis on cultural affairs with the official 
approval of Paris gave French youth officers a stronger 
position within military government than that of their 
colleagues who encountered difficulties with their 
governments and superiors when it came to international 
contacts. The French agreed with the others that 
international contacts would help the Germans to overcome 
their isolation and were already in the midst of an extensive 
exchange program. Since many organizations, such as the 
YMCA, the Boy Scouts, the Catholic Church, young workers, and 
political parties already had international contacts, French
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authorities simply encouraged contacts between the German and 
French branches. Moreau said that French students had gone 
to the university of Tubingen and discussed "fundamental 
problems, such as war guilt and Nazism" there. According to 
him, the results of this visit were better than expected and 
so plans were underway to expand the program. By 1948 the 
French had established a far-flung exchange operation between 
their zone of occupation and France which included 
partnerships between cities.10
Apparently the French did not have to worry as much 
about homeless and wandering youth as the British or the 
Americans. Moreau reported that French authorities did not 
face the same problems as their colleagues in the other 
zones. Since their zone of occupation was largely rural and 
much smaller, they had left all welfare activities to German 
authorities. While their zone was small and furthest away 
from the huge population movements which were taking place in 
the east of Germany, one may wonder if Moreau did not simply 
justify his military government's inactivity in this realm.11
The French exchange program expanded significantly 
during the next years. French authorities assigned lecturers 
to the universities and— according to American observers—  
French language teachers to practically all schools in their 
zone of occupation who not only taught courses, but also were
I0Willis 46.
nGarmisch Conference 10-11.
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instructed to cultivate informal contacts with the German 
faculties of the universities to which they were assigned, 
something Americans were not yet officially permitted to 
do.12
The French efforts to bring their civilization to the 
Germans also included institutions similar to the America 
houses. Four of these institutes offered Germans
information, cultural programs, lectures, free concerts, and 
language courses. Like the Americans, they arranged for 
exhibitions to reach those Germans in their zone who could 
not travel to their institutes. Personal contacts often led 
to official Franco-German societies and helped mitigate the 
economic exploitation and occasional transgressions of the 
occupational troops.13
All three delegations in Garmisch agreed that they 
should cooperate closely. Interestingly, even the French 
delegation agreed that the interzonal travel restrictions 
were one of the largest obstacles to a fruitful cooperation 
between German youth leaders, although their commanders were 
largely responsible for these restrictions. All youth 
officers decided to bring their desire to lift the
12Pilgert, The West German Educational System, 75-76; 
Pilgert, Community and Group Life 77-78.
13Willis 46.
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restrictions on interzonal travel to the attention of their 
commanding officers.14
During the next year and a half not much changed in the 
relations between the allied powers. The annual report for 
1947/48 only stated that the Allies held numerous formal and 
informal conferences during the preceding year, but they 
mainly served consulting purposes. The author of the 
American report also found it "interesting to note that 
American and British policies are more similar than either 
the French or the Russians."15
When the High Commissioners took over in 1949 they 
decided to improve relations at the grassroots and introduced 
an exchange program between the American Kreis Resident 
Officers who were in charge of HICOG's local detachments and 
their counterparts in the French and British zones. Coburg's 
Kreis Resident Officer Francis Lindaman, for example, 
reported favorably on his experiences in the French zone and 
lauded above all French administrative efficiency. He was 
also very impressed with the fact that Kreis Resident 
Officers were the ranking officers in their military 
districts regardless of the ranks of officers in charge of 
tactical units. The American found the practice to assign a 
French national as teacher in the faculty of every school was
14Garmisch Conference 16; for French resistance to 
interzonal travel see Willis 17.
lsGerman Youth, 47-48 5.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
335
their most effective reorientation device. Apart from that 
he found that French and American reorientation programs were 
remarkably similar. His counterpart cultivated contact with 
the German population and maintained an open door policy for 
every concerned citizen just as he was trying to do in 
Coburg. Lindaman finally pointed out to his superiors that 
people in general were very interested in the United States 
but that many misconceptions about America as well as the 
American zone existed.16
Anthony Sega, Kreis Resident Officer in Schwabach, a 
town in the vicinity of Nuremberg, was chosen to spend some 
time with a British Resident Officer in Oberhausen, an 
industrial town in the Ruhr area. Sega noted that the 
British did not have an explicit reorientation program and 
were rather skeptical about the American attempts to sell 
theirs, but this did not mean that the British were inactive. 
Sega noted that they had a very busy social schedule and 
tried to encourage democracy through informal contacts. 
According to the American, the British paid much attention to 
youth. They worked hard to counteract any Communist 
influence they might detect by organizing youth rallies and
I60ffice of the United States High Commissioner for 
Germany, Office of the Land Commissioner for Bavaria, 
Resident Office Coburg to Kenneth L. van Buskirk, Chief, FOD, 
Office of Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Munich, Germany, 28 
Jun. 1950; Guy A. Lee, ed., Documents on Field Organization 
of the Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany 1949- 
1951 ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the High Commissioner for 
Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, Historical 
Division, 1951) doc. 16.
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providing funds for youth groups who did not like communism. 
Sega reported that the only but very successful special 
reorientation program in which the British were investing 
much money and effort was Die Briicke (The Bridge) , an 
institution similar to the Amerika Hauser in the U.S. zone. 
Sega and his wife had a most cordial reception and found the 
British trying to make their stay as comfortable as possible. 
Obviously getting along in the field was easier than at the 
conference table. Just like his colleague from Coburg, the 
American found that German residents of the British zone were 
well disposed towards the Americans and very curious about 
the United States, but also about the conditions in the 
American zone, an indicator of how difficult travel was still 
five years after the war's end.17 
A Different Concept in the East
The opening of Soviet and former East German archives 
after the collapse of the Soviet empire reveal a surprising 
picture of Soviet planning and policy making for post war 
Germany. While the Soviets from the start regarded the 
occupation of Germany as a struggle between communism and 
capitalism, they did not have a blueprint for the future of 
their zone of occupation, but remained open to maintaining 
the unity of Germany as long as they perceived a chance that
I7Anthony S. Sega, Office of the High Commissioner for 
Germany, Office of the Land Commissioner for Bavaria, 
Resident Officer Schwabach to Kenneth van Buskirk, Chief, 
FOD, Office of Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Munich, 
Germany, 24 Aug. 1950; Lee, ed. doc. 17.
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they would be able to expand their influence further west. 
According to one historian, they began to rebuild the Soviet 
zone based on the only model they knew and accepted: the 
Soviet Union.18
Interestingly, the Soviets neither had sufficiently 
trained military government personnel at their disposition 
nor were they able to eliminate rivalries and competing 
interests between different agencies such as the secret 
police, the tactical commands, military government units, 
party representatives, and the returning German communists. 
Graft, violence especially against women, and corruption 
remained a feature of the Soviet occupation throughout its 
existence which officially ended with the creation of the 
German Democratic Republic in 1949. The Soviets never seemed 
to formulate specific policies, but rather relied on 
communist and Stalinist ideology to provide the guidelines 
for the occupation. Not surprisingly, the results varied 
widely. It could happen that Soviet officers kept former 
Nazis in important administrative positions much to the 
annoyance of the German communists who wanted to see them 
removed. Although the Soviets increasingly delegated 
political power to the German communists, they always 
maintained the ultimate authority and made very clear even to 
their German allies that they knew best which way to go in 
establishing a new socialist state in Germany. Many of the
l8Naimark 465-468.
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occupiers displayed an arrogance and assumed an air of 
superiority which even long term members of the communist 
party often found intolerable. Walther Ulbricht and his 
comrades ultimately were only able to wrest control of the 
Soviet Zone's affairs from the occupiers by catering directly 
to Soviet demands and making the fulfillment of Soviet 
policies their highest priority— a behavior that secured 
their power, but cost them and their ideology almost all 
public support.19
Promoting Russian and Soviet culture in Germany took on 
special significance for the occupiers in the east. First, 
it was a way to prove wrong Nazi propaganda which had 
incessantly denigrated Russian and Soviet culture. At the 
same time making culture available to the masses was an 
important part of communist doctrine. In contrast to the 
Western zones the Soviets were not content with simply making 
Russian and Soviet films, literature, and music available to 
Germans for their information. To assure that cultural 
activities would serve their political agenda, the Soviets 
tried to control every aspect of cultural and intellectual 
activity. They promoted and supported authors such as 
Gerhard Hauptmann or Heinrich Mann who had written books that 
had exposed flaws and injustices in the capitalist order, but 
they also introduced censorship and increasingly oppressed 
deviating ideas or criticism by German intellectuals. The
19Naimark 9-140.
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very narrow minded dogmatism of Soviet and German party 
members who did not tolerate any apolitical activity or 
deviation from stalinist doctrine completely alienated even 
those German intellectuals who were favorably inclined 
towards reform. Many opted to vote with their feet and took 
residence in the west.20
Interestingly, the idea of a cultural exchange program 
also circulated in the Soviet zone of occupation. German 
communists as well as some Soviet officers regarded it as a 
good chance to show those who had not been to the Soviet 
Union the achievements of the socialist state first hand. 
While the occupiers in the West integrated such a program as 
an essential part of their re-education efforts, Moscow 
remained very cool to the concept. Sending delegations from 
the Soviet zone to the Soviet Union was a major undertaking 
reserved for very few select people. The beginning campaign 
in the Soviet Union against those who maintained contact with 
the outside world further stifled any attempts to establish 
closer personal ties between German and Soviet citizens. The 
arrogance and insensitivity the few Soviet educators 
displayed who could be convinced to travel to the Soviet zone 
even towards serious German communists showed that an 
exchange program did not automatically lead to better 
relations. Once a delegation from Germany made it to Moscow, 
the hosts took their re-education mission very seriously and
20Naimark 398-440, 459-464.
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did not leave the slightest details to chance, but their 
efforts were hampered y the fact that the Soviet leadership 
relegated the German visitors to the role of passive 
observers whose sole task was to admire the achievements of 
the Soviet Union.21
Not surprisingly, cooperation between the Soviets and 
the western allies was not forthcoming. While OMGUS reports 
stated that all four allies met regularly, it seems that 
Soviet delegations did not venture beyond the limits of the 
Berlin Kommandantura or the Allied Control Council. No 
Soviet youth officers, for example, participated in the 
Garmisch conference in October 1946. The minutes do not 
reveal the reason for their absence. It is possible that the 
Soviets declined to participate in such rather informal 
meetings without the basis of any formal agreements by the 
Allied Control Council, but American youth officers may not 
even have invited them. Events in Berlin and in the Soviet 
zone of occupation had made sufficiently clear by October 
1946 that Soviet authorities followed a completely different 
approach to youth work which they were not willing to 
compromise.
German communists in exile began preparing for post war 
youth work quite early. Those who had gone to England 
decided to create a youth organization in 1939 which they 
called the Free German Youth. The organization's main goal
2INaimark 406-408, 450.
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was to unify all exiled young Germans under the banner of 
antifascist activity, but the communists soon had to realize 
that they did not strike a responsive cord. Free German 
Youth did bring together a number of youth activists who 
worked in English factories and donated their wages to the 
English war chest or to the Soviet Union. Many of them 
joined the British army when they finally were permitted to 
do so in 1943. Those who survived formed the nucleus of 
communist youth leaders who, claiming a right to leadership 
based on their war time activities, expected to be employed 
in key positions in Germany immediately after the war. The 
British, however, were slow to permit them to return to 
Germany. Most of the communist emigres from Great Britain 
finally made it to Berlin, where they joined their comrades 
who had arrived from Moscow.22
Walter Ulbricht and Wilhelm Pieck, German communists who 
had survived the purges in Moscow, became the key figures in 
planning and determining the political course of the Soviet 
zone of occupation after the war. Whereas youth work and 
even schools were just a minor aspect in American planning 
and did not acquire a prominent position until 1948, the 
communists assigned youth work a high priority already in the 
planning stages. According to them, Hitler's Germany had 
completely annihilated Germany's scientific achievements, had 
destroyed the country's educational system and pushed the
“Fussl 207-212.
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Germans' socio-cultural values to the lowest imaginable 
standards. It would therefore be urgently necessary to start 
a program of reconstruction at the earliest possible moment. 
The communists targeted youth, because young people were the 
ones who would be most capable of learning from the past and 
would be the group which most likely would be able to take 
over leadership positions in a new Germany, soon. The young 
generation therefore needed to receive a special place within 
the re-education agenda. Since Hitler's policies had led to 
a complete social levelling, the communists thought that for 
the first time they would be able to reach the formerly 
hostile bourgeois classes with their message, since basically 
every German had to start her or his life at the same 
abyss.23
The planners in Moscow concentrated on two aspects of 
re-education. Not surprisingly they advocated a complete 
school reform which would eliminate the class differences in 
Germany. Especially the secondary schools which taught 
ancient languages and thought to a traditionally bourgeois 
elite would have to go. The communists in Moscow thought 
that they would be able to win the bourgeois middle classes 
over to their plans because they assumed that Hitler's policy 
and the devastation of the war had eliminated much of the 
class differences which had previously existed.24
“Fussl 205-206.
24Fvissl 198-204.
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As usual planning a complete school reform was one 
thing, implementing the plan quite another. As far as 
schools and universities were concerned, the Soviets and 
their German helpers initially had to come up with solutions 
for the same immediate problems the Americans, British, and 
French were facing in their zones of occupation. Many of the 
school buildings lay in ruins and the number of children who 
needed schooling had swollen dramatically due to the influx 
of refugees and expellees from the east. There were no 
heating materials or light bulbs, no textbooks, paper, or 
writing utensils or other teaching materials. Just as in the 
western zones, a vast majority of elementary school teachers- 
-up to 90%— had belonged to the Nazi party.25
To remedy the dramatic shortage of teachers and to take 
the first step in the direction of their democratization 
ideal, the Soviets introduced short courses with the aim of 
transforming farmers and workers into school teachers. 
Initially the three weeks courses, conducted under the most 
primitive circumstances, provided just the most rudimentary 
education for these future teachers. Parents and responsible 
administrators complained that they did not know their 
materials and often also demonstrated serious deficiencies in 
spelling and grammar. Consequently and in line with their 
general denazification policy, the Soviets soon allowed 
nominal Nazis to return to the schools, but made sure that
^Naimark 454-455.
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they would not replace the new teachers and could not rise to 
supervisory positions.26
While the situation in the western zones improved 
perceptibly from 1947 on, schooling conditions in the Soviet 
zone remained beyond any acceptable levels throughout the 
occupation and beyond. Just as the Americans, Soviet 
educators and their German helpers made almost no progress in 
their attempts at school reform during the first four years 
after the war. Even after the foundation of the German 
Democratic Republic they never achieved the complete 
transformation of the traditional German school system.
Much to the communists' dismay, teachers also refused to 
accept the role of political vanguard the party expected them 
to play. Even many of the new teachers either remained 
apolitical or showed a distressing tendency to join the ranks 
of the conservative party. At the university level the 
situation was even more alarming. Communists in the Soviet 
zone had to deal with recalcitrant young men and women, a 
good part of whom remained staunch nationalists while others 
began to embrace western ideas of democracy. Although the 
communists finally managed to make political reliability and 
indoctrination key parts of their admission policies to 
higher education, it seems that they never were able to 
transform a great number of those who went through the
26Naimark 455-57.
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process into convinced followers of the new socialist 
regime.27
The German communists made extracurricular youth 
activities another pillar of re-education. To reach this 
goal they would introduce an all encompassing youth 
organization. According to Wilhelm Pieck and others, the 
atomization of youth work, which even had divided the 
socialist forces before 1933, had been one of the major 
factors in preventing young Germans from forming a national 
antifascist front which could have effectively resisted 
Hitler's rise to power. The exiles argued that neither the 
communists nor the social democrats nor the bourgeois youth 
groups had been able to satisfy the young Germans' wishes for 
a unified youth which included both sexes, and the solution 
of the "national question." Hitler's creation of a national
^Naimark 440-452, 456-459. I have not been able to find 
a study on the long term impact of communist indoctrination 
attempts. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, I participated in 
regular illegal conferences between West German and East 
German school teachers in East Berlin with a church 
affiliated organization. According to many of the East 
German teachers, most students and teachers regarded the 
official indoctrination as an unwelcome nuisance. SED as 
well as army recruiters usually were pressed hard to fill 
their quotas and did not attract the more successful 
students. People my age who were active in the Lutheran 
church but were permitted to study nevertheless, simply 
complied with the required Marxist-Leninist rhetoric in their 
application papers and the courses in ideology which formed 
part of the curricula even at medical schools. Friends who 
studied to become teachers or relatives with closer 
affiliations to the party, police, or army, however, avoided 
contacts with the West such as letter writing because it 
could hurt their chances for promotions or even could lead to 
losing their jobs.
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organization and his emphasis on the young generation had 
superficially satisfied the young people's desires. The 
communists from the start thought that German youth would 
have to come to terms with its share of the blame for the 
catastrophe, because they had followed Hitler blindly and 
quite willingly. Since all young people were equally guilty, 
all would have to undergo the same treatment. The logical 
step for postwar Germany therefore would be the creation of 
the national front which had eluded the youth organizations 
before 1933. This thinking was in line with the communist 
strategy of creating antifascist people's fronts. It also 
had the advantage that young Germans would have a sense of 
continuity, since the nationwide structure would rely on many 
components of the Hitler Youth. The communist planners 
decided that recreating a separate youth organization of 
their party would not be necessary. They would concentrate 
on occupying the key positions of the new, all encompassing 
movement. It would also have the advantage that relatively 
few people would be able to control a large apparatus. They 
would be in a position to suppress attempts to create 
independent youth organizations in the name of unity. Of 
course such a strategy would make it initially necessary to 
scale back communist agitation.28
Even such a limited program required additional help. 
Nazi prosecution had depleted all ranks of the communists and
28Fussl 203-04, 218-19.
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of course had made recruiting of young people impossible for 
twelve years. Soviet attempts to fill the gaps from the 
millions of prisoners of war resulted in the creation of the 
National Committee for a Free Germany (Nationalkommittee 
Freies Deutschland or NKFD), but had meager results. The 
great majority of the prisoners regarded those who joined the 
committee as traitors. Nevertheless the German exiles were 
able to win some converts which could help with the 
implementation of the youth programs. Fritz Rucker, for 
example, had been a member of the circle around the legendary 
Paul Oestreich, himself a communist, and his Alliance of 
Determined School Reformers. The Nazis had stripped Rucker 
of his job at a Berlin secondary school and sent him to the 
eastern front, where he became prisoner in 1942. Rucker soon 
began to realize the merits of Marxist doctrine and the 
shortcomings of his own bourgeois reform attempts. He set 
out to develop new curricula for the schools under Soviet 
rule in 1944 along Marxist lines and under Ulbricht's and 
Pieck's supervision. After some more examining on the part 
of the German communists and the Soviets, Rucker returned to 
Berlin in August 1945, where he joined Ulbricht and his small 
group of activists and would later play a prominent role in 
reforming East Germany's educational system. Heinz KeBler 
deserted to the Soviet army already in 1941 and was one of 
the first Germans to join the NKFD. Thoroughly
indoctrinated, he became the leading communist figure in
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Berlin's youth work from 1945 on. Apart from these two, 
about eighty youth activists arrived in Germany immediately 
after the German capitulation and took up their positions 
following an intricate plan. One of the most influential 
figures in the creation of the new movement was not a member 
of the returning exiles, but rather a communist who had 
survived Nazi imprisonment for eight years. Erich Honecker 
was young, intelligent, and had the necessary flexibility to 
deal with the problems the communists were soon facing on 
their way to an East German unified youth. All of the 
converts, the returning exiles, and the liberated communists 
who reached influential positions acted only on behalf of the 
small and tightly knight group around Ulbricht and ultimately 
did nothing without the explicit approval of their Soviet 
comrades.29
On 4 June 1945 an early morning conference between 
Ulbricht, who was accompanied by two other Germans, and 
Stalin and Molotov took place. During this meeting the 
Soviet dictator approved of the German comrades' plans to 
initiate youth committees in the Soviet zone which would 
prepare the creation of an all encompassing German youth 
organization. Interestingly Stalin told his German friends 
in the same meeting that he expected Germany to become 
permanently divided, in spite of the present unity of the 
victorious allies.
29Fussl 190-95.
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Even before they had Moscow's approval for their plans 
those returning from exile had to prepare the ground for 
action in the Soviet zone of occupation and in Berlin. 
Ironically some of the first groups they had to deal with 
belonged to their own camp. Communists who had remained in 
Germany and had participated in underground work and sabotage 
had created their own anti-fascist youth groups immediately 
after the end of hostilities. Since independent communist 
groups did not fit into the postwar concept, Ulbricht and his 
spearhead detachment needed to bring them into line with 
Moscow. Not even two weeks after the German surrender 
Ulbricht reported to his Soviet liaison that he had 
eliminated the problem and dissolved the groups.30
While Americans were still in the process of creating an 
administrative structure for military government and did not 
have more than the purely negative instructions of JCS 1067 
to govern their zone, the German communists who were the only 
ones who had developed a concept for youth work in the Soviet 
zone quickly set out to implement their plan in the areas 
under their influence and in Berlin, which remained under 
exclusive Soviet control until August. They created youth 
committees in all of Berlin's sectors and requisitioned 
houses in which young people would be able to meet. Although 
they invited all young Germans, they made clear from the 
start that only communists had earned the right to occupy
30Fussl 214-16.
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leadership positions. At the same time the Berlin magistrate 
set up a committee within the office for the people's 
education which was going to supervise and coordinate the 
activities of the different districts. Its mandate was to 
re-educate the youth which was "contaminated by fascism" on 
a voluntary basis. Heinz KeBler became its chairman. At the 
end of July Marshal Zhukov, the commander of the Soviet Zone, 
expanded this system of youth committees with close ties to 
the local governments into all communities of the Soviet 
Zone.31
Young Germans in Berlin soon made clear that they had 
their own ideas about youth work. They expressed their 
discontent with the communist leadership practically from the 
start. When the chairmen of the district youth committees 
met just six weeks after the German surrender to constitute 
the new youth committee for all of Berlin, they agreed with 
KeBler's demands that youth should not again become a tool 
for waging war, that they should cultivate friendship with 
the Soviet Union, and that all young people should come 
together to solve their problems. The overwhelming majority 
of those present, however, vehemently rejected KeBler's 
thesis that all young people were responsible for the rise of 
Hitler and the Second World War. Even fellow communists 
complained to Ulbricht that KeBler maintained an unacceptable 
attitude.
31Fussl 218-219.
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The communists did not fare better two days later at the 
first mass meeting the organized for young people. In an 
internal appraisal the communist leadership concluded that 
the majority of the 1,500 persons present neither liked the 
extremely long and obviously very boring admonitions of the 
speakers, nor had they much positive to say about the content 
of their presentations. Young people thought that the only 
interesting part of the whole affair had been the opportunity 
to get a free ride to the center of the city. Fifty per cent 
of those surveyed stated that they would not attend similar 
events in the future.32
The work in the districts during the following year 
revealed the same conflicts. Whereas the young people wanted 
to come together and have a good time, the communists 
accepted parties and dances only reluctantly as necessary 
evils. Since many of the youth committees' chairs were not 
trained youth workers, they did not recognize the young 
people's needs and desires and therefore were unable to 
address them. They made the situation worse with constant 
attempts to use the centers and meetings for indoctrinating 
and convincing the youth about their share of the war guilt. 
It is not surprising that such a course of action very soon 
led to an alienation of most boys and girls and to dwindling 
attendance records.
32Fussl 218-220.
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The behavior of the Soviet troops did not make the 
German communists' tasks easier. Rape, violence, and 
arbitrary arrests of young people remained everyday 
occurrences throughout the Soviet zone, although incidents 
became fewer in the course of the occupation. A group of 
Berlin youth, for example, agreed to help with the harvest in 
a region west of the Oder river which had just become the 
border between the Soviet zone and the area the Soviets had 
annexed from Germany and set under Polish administration. 
They found themselves east of the Oder, in the midst of 
expulsions and hard feelings on all sides. Working under 
Polish authority, they suffered from maltreatment and got 
almost no food. The female members of the expedition only 
barely escaped repeated attempts by Soviet soldiers to rape 
them. After about three weeks the young people were able to 
make it back to Berlin without any support.33
Undeterred by such setbacks, the communists proceeded 
with their plans. In September 1945 they founded a central 
youth committee for the Soviet zone under Honecker's 
leadership. This youth committee became part of the 
education administration. Honecker defined its main tasks: 
The committee would take care of all young people up to age 
twenty one. It would become a presence in all aspects of the 
young people's lives, their jobs, schools, sports, and in 
cultural affairs. Honecker's main goal was the ideological
33Fussl 220-225; Naimark 69-140, 382-85.
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re-education of German youth which, according to one of his 
closest co-workers, "had succumbed to a very reactionary 
militaristic policy."
During the next months Honecker and his aides had to 
work hard to overcome resistance and to maintain an 
appearance of unity. The communists scored an important 
victory when they were able to convince the Social Democrats 
that it would be better to cooperate in a united front than 
to found a separate organization. In December the communists 
felt sufficiently strong to launch the drive for a Free 
German Youth in the Soviet Zone, but the meeting in a Berlin 
school, in which young Germans themselves were supposed to 
demonstrate and express their desire for a united youth front 
went all but smoothly. An American observer noted that in 
spite of the "definite communistic background and complexion" 
of the meeting he was surprised to see very pronounced 
opposition to the proposal emerging from the floor. Above 
all delegates from various Berlin districts either completely 
opposed the foundation of a unified front or wanted to create 
independent organizations within the front. The opposition 
notwithstanding the communists made sure that their motion to 
unite all youths in the Soviet zone carried the day.
The churches were the last considerable stumbling blocks 
towards creating a united front, but Church leaders of the 
two denominations soon had to realize that they did not have 
much choice. Honecker's constant pressure, which he paired
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with promises of openness and compromise, brought them in 
line. They also hoped that their conditional cooperation 
would enable them to influence the course of the movement. 
With the last obstacles removed, Pieck dutifully noted at the 
end of the year that he approved the creation of the front 
but that Moscow would have to decide the matter. The green 
light from the Soviet Union came in February. While church 
leaders were still admonishing the communists to guarantee 
diversity within the front in February 1946, the distribution 
of the offices within the Free German youth revealed their 
true intentions. When the organization officially started 
operations in March, communists occupied all key positions in 
the new organizations, relegating most minor offices to the 
Social Democrats. Only one member of the Christian 
Democratic Party received an administrative post. All 
committees would continue to receive government founding. 
This organization scheme foreshadowed the forced fusion 
between the communists and the Social Democrats in the Soviet 
zone the following month. From that moment on until the 
reunification of Germany in 1989 the Free German Youth in 
fact remained the German Democratic Republic's only and all 
encompassing youth organization. Just as its founders had 
envisioned, its organization and its practices in many ways 
continued the work the National Socialists had done during 
the previous twelve years.34
F^iissl 226-232, 238-41.
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Conflict in Berlin
Events in the capital soon revealed the major 
differences between the allies in approaching youth work and 
provided young Germans with the opportunity to voice and 
enact their own preferences. The frictions did not become 
immediately apparent. Americans, French, British, and the 
Soviets agreed that National Socialism had done serious harm 
to young Germans and needed to be eliminated from their 
minds. Americans certainly could have no objections to the 
professed goals of the communists to return German youth to 
decent behavior and a good work ethic. The American 
education officer in Berlin, Captain Paul F. Shafer, also 
could observe that the Soviets were serious about re­
education. While Shafer was alone and still had to wait for 
directives, an administrative setup, and an increase in his 
office's personnel, he could observe that the Soviets were 
already busily implementing their policies with an adequate 
staff. The four allies apparently also agreed that they 
should leave youth work in the hands of the Germans, although 
the Germans in the Soviet zone clearly had no inclination to 
do anything without Moscow's approval. The political 
orientation of the youth committees and of the centers the 
Americans inherited from the Soviets in their sector were 
bound to lead to conflicts in view of the American policy not 
to permit any political organizations in their zones. Since 
the Americans were slow to organize in Berlin as everywhere
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else and did not assign their education staff the high 
priority the Soviets obviously found necessary, it was not 
until 1946 that they became active.
The mere presence of the three Western Allies in Berlin, 
however, encouraged the young Germans who were living in 
their sectors to take the initiative themselves. Young 
people from different organizations in the districts of 
Wilmersdorf, Zehlendorf and Steglitz openly contested the 
communist claims to exclusive leadership of the committees 
late in 1945. Heinrich Schiller, for example, twenty-one 
years old in 1946, was one of the most active opponents the 
communists encountered. The National Socialists had 
prosecuted him because of his partly Jewish heritage, but he 
survived and returned to Berlin in 1945. Schiller became a 
full time city employee for cultural affairs in August and 
was able to interest a considerable number of secondary 
school students in youth work. Since almost all of them 
opposed communism, the organizers of the Steglitz youth 
committee faced an uphill battle in the predominantly middle- 
class district. Schiller also soon recognized the value of 
living in the American sector of Berlin and established close 
contact with the occupiers, above all with David Cozart, who 
became the city's American youth officer in January 1946. 
Not surprisingly, Steglitz was the first district in which 
the Americans dismissed the communist chairs of the youth 
committee.
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Apparently encouraged by his successes in Steglitz, 
Schiller organized a conference in May 1946 in which 
representatives of the city's western districts stated that 
a large majority of the Berlin youth criticized the youth 
committees' orientation into just one direction. The 
representatives demanded that the Berlin youth should 
determine the composition of their committees through free 
elections and that the Free German Youth should not be the 
only organization representing them. The initiative had 
immediate results. To counterbalance the communist monopoly 
and to support the democratization efforts, Military 
Government decreed at the end of the month that OMGUS 
representatives would have the last word in the determining 
who would represent young people in the American sector. This 
step clearly reveals that the positive side of the American 
program earlier or later would have to come in conflict with 
the communists. Not being content with simply eliminating 
National Socialism, Americans in the field supported 
democratic procedures against any form of dictatorship. The 
American initiative quickly spread to the French and the 
British sectors, where the youth committees reorganized 
themselves along democratic lines. The last communist in 
West Berlin lost his office in June 1948. Interestingly a 
large number of the young people who carried the fight 
against the communists in West Berlin in 1945 and 1946 in 
later years came to occupy prominent positions in the Federal
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Republic's social and political life. Schiller went to the 
United States to study social work at the University of 
Minnesota. He was probably the first German after the war to 
receive a degree from an American institution. He returned 
to Berlin and became involved in the training of social 
workers there. In 1953 he accepted a position as assistant 
professor of Nuremberg's new school of social work and became 
its director in the sixties. Schiller still is one of the 
most prominent teachers of social work in the Federal 
Republic.35
The following one and a half years saw a deadlock in the 
Allied Commandantura between the Americans who were 
determined to deny the Free German Youth a monopoly, and the 
Soviets, who did not want to permit any other youth 
organizations. While this deadlock could not stop practical 
youth work, German initiatives for creating a central youth 
office failed to gain the recognition of the Allies. The 
situation seemed to be hopeless, but in October 1947 the 
British were able to find an acceptable compromise which led
35Fussl 244-47. He also provides short biographies of a 
number of those involved in West Berlin's anti-communist 
youth activities (295-97). Many of them became prominent 
politicians in Bonn and Berlin. Others went on and occupied 
leading positions in journalism or in the business world. 
Ralf Dahrendorf, then sixteen years old and member of the 
Social Democrats, started his distinguished career resisting 
the communist advance in youth work. See also Heinrich 
Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995; for details on 
the school of social work see chapter XIII below.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
359
to the official recognition of various youth groups for 
Berlin only.
The allied compromise could not overcome the deep 
polarization in Berlin. The Free German Youth had lost its 
bid for taking over control of all young people in Berlin and 
had to limit its activities more and more to the eastern 
sector of the city. The only other youth group which tried 
to operate on a city wide basis, the Falken, soon had to 
withdraw from the east due to persecution.
Youth work suffered considerably from the lack of 
consensus between 1946 and 1947, but it did not stop. Since 
it was impossible to reach a consensus about permitting 
German youth organizations, Clay decided to take the only 
route open to him. He expanded GYA, which was a purely 
American venture, into Berlin six weeks after its official 
inauguration in the American zone in April 1946— against the 
advice of Shafer who predicted difficulties with the Soviets. 
Once the army found a suitable youth officer for this unique 
assignment, it went to work. For over one year GYA remained 
the only active youth organization in West Berlin. At the 
inauguration event in August 1946 12,000 young Berliners 
showed that Clay had correctly assessed the need for such an 
organization. During the next months GYA expanded its 
activities. Although GYA had to deal with some internal 
problems due to the constant fluctuation of personnel and 
attacks from the Soviets on the "militaristic character" of
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the program, the army took its mission seriously. It 
dramatically increased the number and the quality of youth 
centers in its sector. A more sophisticated reorientation 
program replaced the initial emphasis on sports. Young 
Germans became involved in discussion groups or drew up 
constitutions for their own youth organizations with the help 
of American soldiers. Of course GYA continued to support 
German youth organizations with material and transport 
facilities. 1947 saw the start of a summer camp program 
within Berlin with the aim to improve the health of the 
city's young population. The army also initiated a program 
that enabled young Berliners to spend their summer vacations 
in the western zones or even in Switzerland. The 
participants of all the camps not only enjoyed a change of 
scenery, but also received health care and much needed 
additional calories.36
GYA was not the only successful American endeavor in 
Berlin. Just as in the American zone, military government 
youth officers in Berlin regarded the training of youth 
workers as essential for reaching their re-orientation goals. 
1948 saw not only the creation of the Free University in West 
Berlin, but also the opening of the renown Wannseeheim, a 
joint German-American venture in which Germans had the 
opportunity to learn the ins and outs of effective youth 
work. As long as it was still possible to cross the zonal
36Fussl 255-56.
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borders, the center also attracted a considerable number of 
people from the Soviet sector and zone.37
The direct confrontation between the two competing 
systems in Berlin led to a remarkable phenomenon. American 
surveys conducted during the late 1940s and early 1950s 
showed that the process of transforming the minds of German 
youth was indeed a slow one. The pollsters found that many 
young people had not yet internalized democratic ideas or 
shed all of the Nazi indoctrination. While this did not come 
as a surprise in a country which was just then slowly 
beginning to recuperate from the war, it is interesting to 
note that Berlin youth consistently fared much better in the 
surveys than their counterparts in the western zones. Their 
anticommunist attitude does not explain this phenomenon, 
since one does not have to be a democrat to reject socialism. 
According to Fiissl, Berlin's special position was responsible 
for this difference in young people's attitudes. The open 
fight against the communists in Berlin made a much closer and 
more intense contact between Americans and the other western 
allies and young Germans in the city inevitable. It not only 
led to an immense increase in the significance of youth work, 
but also resulted in a socialization process which took place 
outside of the institutional boundaries of the school. This 
socialization process provided a much stronger impetus and 
therefore accelerated the process of democratization in young
37Fiissl 248-270.
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people who participated in it. It should be added that the 
American model also was the most visible and the most 
attractive alternative. It fought communism, emphasized 
individual rights, and was able to produce seemingly 
boundless riches and opportunities.38
Youth work in the four zones as well as in Berlin in 
many ways anticipated the political and economic division of 
Germany. On the one hand American, French, and British 
military government youth officials in the field agreed on 
most of the basic assumptions and on the principles that 
underlay the course they were steering in re-educating young 
Germans early on, although their policies differed 
considerably. In all three zones the Germans were mainly 
responsible for re-establishing their youth activities. The 
British apparently were much more willing to delegate 
authority than the French, who insisted on control, and the 
Americans, who went to great lengths to sell their programs. 
All three western allies had introduced youth committees, 
which were surprisingly similar in their organization, to 
open up youth work to a democratic decision making process. 
International contacts as well as introducing a new 
generation of youth workers became their main goals, but only 
the Americans were trying to involve their tactical troops in 
the re-orientation effort. On the other hand Soviet 
authorities had other objectives and a very different idea
38Fussl 268-270.
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about the meaning of bringing democracy to youth work in 
Germany. They were the only ones who came to Germany armed 
with a master plan. German communists under Soviet 
supervision set out to make drastic changes in formal 
education and to bring youth work under communist control. 
The Soviets assigned youth work and education a high priority 
from the start of the occupation on, whereas the leading 
officers of the western allies, especially in OMGUS, seemed 
to recognize the importance of youth work, but did not follow 
through with the necessary administrative adjustments until 
1948. The unique situation in Berlin led to a special 
relationship between the younger generation in the western 
sectors and the western allies. A closer look at the field 
in the American zone will have to show to what an extent 
Americans there would be able to play a role in defining the 
direction which youth activities and youth work in the 
western parts of Germany would take in the future.
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CHAPTER VIII 
Nuremberg, 1946-48; Emergency Management
While Americans and their former allies were discussing 
politics and beginning to implement their programs for German 
re-education, life for young people went on. For the first 
three years after the war they were facing difficult times. 
German authorities and private organizations did their best 
to help young people, but few new patterns in organizing them 
emerged. Youth groups developed a surprising interest in 
cultural activities. Giving children, adolescents, and young 
adults something meaningful to do during their spare time 
became one of the main objectives for youth organizations. 
Summer camps and week-end trips acquired a central place in 
youth activities. They were a way to escape the drab city 
and to offer some physical and mental relief from the 
struggle to survive.
Life in Nuremberg
Just as in any other city the time between 1945 and 1948 
was for most people in Nuremberg a daily fight for survival 
and young people were no exception. Many had lost either 
their homes or their families or both. Often their fathers 
or brothers were prisoners of war so that it was up to them 
to provide their share for the support of the family. Heiko 
Kistner, for example, had to look for a job and work as long
364
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as his father remained in captivity.1 Many who did not have 
a home lived in train stations or in the woods and travelled 
all over Germany. Not surprisingly the criminal delinquency 
rate in Nuremberg rose dramatically after the war.2 The 
effects of the occupation were causing considerable concern. 
In April 1947, for example, German police reported that the 
conditions of the occupation had a negative influence on many 
young people in the city. According to the police, clubs for 
African-American soldiers were hotbeds of moral decline for 
Nuremberg's youth: "It was generally observed that young
people of all ages not only are involved in intense bartering 
with colored soldiers, but also have immoral dealings with 
them." The authors of the report noted that the desire to 
get to know and to become acquainted with the foreigners soon 
replaced the initial reservations which had existed on both 
sides. Children were the first to overcome the barriers, 
but, the police noted, some of these contacts made it 
necessary for responsible German circles to intervene. Boys 
and girls left their families to move in with American units 
or their American boyfriends. Soon profiteering replaced 
curiosity. According to the police, not only teenage girls 
but also a considerable number of their mothers became 
involved intimately with American soldiers, spreading disease
‘Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
2The three special editions of the Niirnberger 
Nachrichten, Trummerjahre, Wiederaufbau, and Erinnerungen 
provide a vivid picture of life in the city after the war.
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among GIs and their own families. The authors stated that 
many children, often with the encouragement of their parents, 
were spending most of their time loitering around American 
facilities hoping to obtain goods or food. The police found 
that these contacts with Americans often led to black market 
activities, kept children away from school, work, or their 
apprenticeships. Since black market activities and American 
friends could be quite profitable, some young people even 
refused to work. In looking for the causes the authors 
showed a clear grasp of reality. They noted that the reasons 
behind this moral decline often were not •'moral weaknesses," 
but rather "naked, merciless want. People have lost their 
homes, they lack clothing and food. They trade their moral 
decline for an economically better supply through contact 
with the occupation forces."3
The numbers indicated that the problem had not reached 
major proportions. At the time about 300,000 people were 
living in Nuremberg. German and American courts had to deal 
with 276 cases which were in some way connected with the 
occupation between August 1946 and February 1947. Thirty 
young people were arrested for illegally crossing zonal 
borders, twenty one because they owned American property. 
Becoming arrested for the latter offense was not at all 
difficult. Military Police apprehended Heiko Kistner, for
Memorandum from the City of Nuremberg to the German 
Council of Cities, 2 Apr. 1947: 16-19; Niirnberg 1945-49, II, 
doc. 217.
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example, for owning American occupation dollars. Kistner had 
sold his bicycle to a man for the highly valued currency. A 
few days later he was arrested for illegal possession of 
foreign currency. The bicycle buyer had stolen the dollars 
and Military Police were trying to recover the fortune. The 
Americans confiscated what was left of the treasure and 
brought Kistner to a Military Court in the Military 
Government building. Apparently not much happened to him and 
the "crime" never affected his career in any way.4
Roughly half of all offenders had committed crimes 
against the public order, which included loitering and 
prostitution, but could also be simply not having their 
identification papers with them.5 In a twelve months period 
between 1946 and 1947 courts tried a total of 685 juveniles, 
two thirds of them boys. This meant that cases involving 
illegal contacts or deals with Americans seemed to occupy 
most of the judges' time. The numbers declined steadily
during the following years. An official publication of the 
city in 1950 pointed out that the vast majority of the city's
4Memorandum from the City of Nuremberg to the German 
Council of Cities, 2 Apr. 1947: 16-19; Niirnberg 1945-1949,
II, doc. 217; Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
Memorandum from the City of Nuremberg to the German 
Council of Cities, 2 Apr. 1947: 16-19; Niirnberg 1945-1949,
II, doc. 217; for Nuremberg's population statistics see 
Statistische Nachrichten no. 2, Feb. 1948: 5; Niirnberg 1945- 
1949, II, doc. 216e.
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young people in one way or another tried to find their way 
back into a normal life.6
Living normally at that time more often than not meant 
that Germans had to spend much of their time "organizing" 
food and other necessities. Many went to the countryside 
where they tried to exchange food from the farmers for 
amenities such as china. Others had to bring their cameras 
and other luxury items to the black market where they would 
barter them for butter, potatoes, or for American rations.7 
Even Nazi literature found its buyers. Gerhard Springer 
recalled that his father made a good deal with an American to 
whom he sold Alfred Rosenberg's Mythus des Zwanzigsten 
Jahrhunderts, the main opus of Hitler's chief philosopher. 
An improvement of the situation made it unnecessary for him 
to part with a special edition of Hitler's Mein Kampf which 
already then was a much sought after collector's item among 
Americans.8 The most pressing problems for the citizens and 
the city administration were the constant lack of food and
6Die Deutschen Stadte und ihre Jugend 11, 15-16.
7Heiko Kistner recalled that almost everybody in one way 
or another became involved in illegal dealings (Heiko 
Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994); see chapter IX for 
some of the activities in which Germans and Americans 
directly interacted.
8Eckart 193-202; Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 
1 Aug. 1995.
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the deplorable living conditions which Army requisitions 
continued to aggravate.9
Many people blamed the occupiers for the crisis. Even 
Nuremberg's Lord Mayor Ziegler, a Social Democrat whom the 
Nazis had prosecuted, stated in 1947 that one constantly 
heard that Hitler was to blame for the current crisis, but 
that the war had been over for over two years and the 
situation had gotten worse. Fritz Linnert, a liberal town 
councilor, showed a rare portion of courage and insight in 
his reply. According to him, Hitler indeed was to blame for 
the misery, but many people did not want to confront that 
truth. Germans had lived well throughout the war only 
because they had plundered and robbed other peoples. Those 
who claimed that the situation had been better indeed were 
right, but Linnert argued that they failed to realize that 
they had lived at everybody else's expense.10
Linnert certainly did not endear himself to the public 
or to the majority of his colleagues in the city council with 
his remarks. A sixteen-year-old boy, who described the 
situation in a school essay in rather drastic terms, probably 
came closer to the sentiment of many people during the 
difficult times:
[t]he first [concern] is naturally the extremely
miserable grub, because one cannot talk about food here,
9Nurnberg 1945-1949, II, docs. 138, 156, 161-176; Eckart 
181-193.
10Eckart 209-211.
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and the ragged clothing. With the exception of the 
black market one cannot buy anything. And now the Ami 
[American] wants to make us believe that there is a food 
crisis all over the world. All these are nursery tales. 
When the German cities were suffering from the 
continuous terror bombings, we had our food and now in 
peacetime we don't have anything. Just because the Ami 
wants it this way. One does not get an education in the 
shop because all is in ruins. An incredible mass bunk 
instead of an apprenticeship. One lives in half a house 
with a broken chimney, with a little wind from the west 
the oven smokes like a factory chimney. The only thing 
the Ami has done was to beat up our cities and to brag 
in a great way, but most of these cowards never heard a 
bullet whistle. When one sees them in their clubs, they 
are completely drunk and have their feet on the table. 
And that kind of people want to bring us culture and 
ease the misery?11
Another German youngster wrote to the Land Youth 
Committee to vent his anger. According to him, young people 
in the American zone were especially critical towards the 
occupiers and would be negatively influenced by the wanton 
acts of Americans. He thought that the Americans in no way 
were living up to their alleged promises of coming as 
"liberators and not as oppressors." The author of the letter 
was apparently very incensed about requisitioning policies 
which did not differentiate between former Nazis and those 
who had not supported the system. He argued that soldiers in 
the Soviet zone had to live in barracks and showed a 
remarkable sympathy for the plight of the Germans, whereas in 
the American zone apparently every sergeant could requisition
uBrief student essay by a boy, sixteen years old, father 
at home; essay no. 8 accompanying a presentation regarding 
the state of mind of the Nuremberg youth by A. Staudt; NCA E 
10/33 no. 6; for a general account of the mood in the city 
see Eckart 203-05, 212-13.
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a whole house. Interestingly, he compared American "un­
christian" behavior during a "period similar to peace" 
unfavorably with that of German troops during the war. It 
provided him with a reason to declare the occupiers morally 
bankrupt. He thought that the American actions had forfeited 
their right to judge the Germans and accused them of pursuing 
a course of mass impoverishment and an "obvious extermination 
policy." The author concluded that this type of behavior 
certainly did not endear young Germans to democratic 
principles and even less to the Americans. Land Youth 
officials informed the Americans that apparently the young 
man had just lost his home to requisitions, but forwarded the 
letter to American authorities "for their information about 
realities".12
German and American authorities also had to fight with 
the opposite extreme. Detachment B-211 reported that the 
German welfare organizations had considerable difficulties 
with "underage girls" who were staying with American soldiers 
and with young boys who preferred working for the occupiers 
to attending school.13
Even those who did not fall into either extreme often 
displayed a deep skepticism about their present situation.
12Herman Schild, Niirnberg an den LandesjugendausschuB, 
Munchen, 14 Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10.
13OMGBY, Det. B-211, Daily Report for Monday, 14 Jan. 
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, District III, Reports, Box 1055, 
13/27-1/7.
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A young girl, for example, wrote to her aunt in the United 
States that
perhaps twelve years of National Socialism have spoiled 
us so much that we are not yet ready to become 
democrats. We lack every understanding for it. Our 
father often wants to convert us, especially Konrad, 
Martha and me, but we still want action to prove that 
the new system is better than the old one. The parties 
are continuously fighting now and none of them has any 
power.... Why should we blame our uncle Richard for 
being a member of the SS? They were not the worst kind 
of soldiers...and he is still in prison just because he 
had an important position.14
Changing these attitudes and helping young people return to
a normal life in the middle of want and hunger was a daunting
task.
Opinions on Youth Activities
In view of the fight for mere survival it is surprising 
that many of those in charge of young people on the local 
level found time to develop their own ideas for youth 
activities. Initially the Germans did not have the privilege 
of assembling their experts on youth work, youth welfare, and 
education to develop plans beyond their communities, so they 
had to limit their concepts to the local boundaries. In 
spite of the considerable burden which scarcity,
reconstruction, and denazification caused, many people in 
Nuremberg still managed to find time for reflecting on the 
city youth's situation. A poll taken by ICD director Feiler 
in April 1946 revealed a remarkable degree of agreement
14Letter L.H., Nuremberg to M.H. , USA, 19 Jan. 1947; NA 
RG 260 OMGBY, ID Predecessor, Box 111, 10/87-3/14.
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between the different institutions responsible for youth 
work, but also staked out some major differences.
As the head of the city's welfare organizations, Theodor 
Marx became one of the most important men for shaping 
Nuremberg's youth activities after the war. He had very 
clear ideas about young people and what authorities should do 
to help them. According to him, young people in 1946 found 
themselves in a vacuum. They were disappointed by the Third 
Reich and shocked by the outcome of the war. At the same 
time they had developed a very critical attitude towards 
everything and therefore did not show much inclination to 
follow the ideas which had existed before 1933. Marx felt 
that it would be best to leave young people a free hand in 
the process of finding themselves. Consequently the city 
administration should not try to exercise any influences 
which went beyond making sure that young people did not break 
the law with their activities. Nevertheless, Marx saw 
encouraging signs within a year after the war. According to 
him, the majority of the young people was not looking for 
material satisfaction, but rather was trying to satisfy an 
"inner yearning".
Marx, of course, had his opinion of the role which 
local, state, and eventually the national government would 
have to play in youth activities. According to him, 
legislation from the Weimar Republic gave sufficient guidance 
in this matter, but the Bavarian state government in Munich
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remained a real obstacle. Marx thought that the Munich 
authorities had never shown any inclination to accept any 
responsibility for youth activities or for the welfare of the 
young people in general and did not seem to be willing to 
change its course.15
Marx argued that the youth committees should be guided 
and supported by qualified experts. Apparently he did not 
see any contradiction between this proposal and the statement 
he had made earlier during the same conversation. Marx did 
not want to see politically active youth groups in the 
immediate future, because he did not think that they were 
ready for this kind of activity yet. For the same reason 
Marx opted against the creation of a unified anti-fascist 
youth movement. In his opinion it would not be wise to 
create a purely negative movement with no constructive goals 
in place to fight a demon which definitely belonged to the 
past.
When asked about the main goal for the future of young 
Germans, Marx clearly demonstrated his strong patriotism and 
a deeply rooted idealism. According to him, young Germans
15Memo from Eric Feiler, Team Chief, Nuremberg 
Detachment, OMGBY, ICD, Intelligence Section, to Chief of 
Intelligence, ICD, OMGBY, Political Affairs Section, 25 Apr. 
1946: results of a survey conducted on youth activities; NA 
RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12. Marx had no 
problems telling officials in Munich in no uncertain language 
what he thought about the Bavarian government's efforts to 
help young people in the state. See his account of a meeting 
with responsible officials in Munich in the minutes of a 
welfare committee meeting, 2. Dec. 1946, Enclosure 6; NCA 
C7/IX no. 1232.
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should develop a sense of responsibility for the long term 
reconstruction of Germany. They would have to educate and 
prepare themselves for this task. Marx hoped that ultimately 
all young Germans would come together as one big community to 
master this great task they were sharing.16
The ICD survey revealed that a majority of the 
responsible youth leaders in Nuremberg did not favor 
politically active youth groups in 1946. Of the eleven
persons Feiler polled, six, among them the chairmen of the 
Communist Party and of the Free German Youth, agreed with 
Marx that young people were not yet ready. Of the other five 
only the chairman of the Democratic Party's youth group gave 
his unqualified approval.
As far as an antifascist front was concerned, only the 
communists and the leaders of the Free German Youth supported 
the idea, but emphasized at the same time that of course the 
members of all youth groups should have a right to 
participate in the movement in any way they wished. It seems 
that all the other people who were surveyed had already 
recognized the nature of the antifascist movement in the 
Soviet zone. While the Social Democrat argued along Marx's 
lines, others were less diplomatic. Not surprisingly the 
Lutheran Youth Pastor for Bavaria, Martin Helbich, and the
l6Memo from Eric Feiler, Team Chief, Nuremberg 
Detachment, OMGBY, ICD, Intelligence Section, to Chief of 
Intelligence, ICD, OMGBY, Political Affairs Section, 25 Apr. 
1946: results of a survey conducted on youth activities; NA 
RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12.
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chairman of the just recently founded youth chapter of the 
Conservative party in Nuremberg had almost identical 
arguments. They thought that such an idea reminded them 
strongly of the youth organization of the previous twelve 
years. His Catholic colleague did not think that it would 
foster any democratic understanding in young people. The 
member of the Liberal Party made his point even clearer. He 
suggested that such a movement should be directed against any 
kind of dictatorship. Interestingly, the leader of the
Socialist youth organization, Hans Schubert, in many ways 
voiced the most optimistic opinion about young Germans' 
capabilities for recognizing any dangers to the democracy and 
addressing it in a truly democratic spirit. He argued that 
youth would have to form their own opinion and should have 
the opportunity to join any group they wanted. According to 
him, anti-fascist groups did not permit this kind of
political freedom.
Schubert's goals for the future also came closest to the 
re-education ideas of the Americans. Apart from eliminating 
National Socialist doctrine from schools and homes, the 
Socialist Education Movement wanted to eradicate 
materialistic thinking and create an independent individual 
which would not be another subject to anyone. He explained 
that the people within this movement cultivated respect for 
other persons and ideas and tried to implant the will to work
for the community and to accept responsibilities.
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Interestingly, many of those people whom Feiler polled 
also emphasized the desire to integrate Germany in the 
international or European community, with the exception of 
Rev. Helbich and the chairman of the Communist Party, the men 
surveyed also included democratic ideals in their main 
objectives, but did not become any more specific. In 
contrast to the Catholic chaplain in charge of youth affairs, 
Helbich defined the main goals of his Church's youth work 
exclusively along Christian principles. The communists not 
only refused to endorse democratic principles but also 
concentrated so much on eliminating the past that they had no 
future-oriented program to offer which might have 
supplemented their anti-fascist stance.17 
The Authorities: Emergency Management
Young people had plenty of time to pursue their legal, 
semilegal, or illegal activities, although all schools in 
Nuremberg had reopened by the spring of 1946. In April 1947 
the city reported that the lack of schooling, which had 
already started during the war, would result in disastrous 
consequences for the young people as well as for the future 
of Germany if authorities would not be able to remedy the 
situation anytime soon. According to school authorities, 
many children under ten years were almost complete
17Memo from Eric Feiler, Team Chief, Nuremberg 
Detachment, OMGBY, ICD, Intelligence Section, to Chief of 
Intelligence, ICD, OMGBY, Political Affairs Section, 25 Apr. 
1946. Results of a survey conducted on youth activities; NA 
RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12.
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illiterates. The education of apprentices and all other 
students at the different branches of secondary education 
revealed the "gravest deficiencies." School officials 
thought that these deficiencies would significantly hamper 
the reconstruction of Germany for a long time to come. The 
city fathers further stated that the lack of schooling and 
supervision also affected the moral fiber of children and 
adolescents negatively. According to them, the percentage of 
girls who were infected with veneral disease had reached 
proportions which earlier would have been unthinkable. In 
addition to that the lack of food also threatened the health 
of the generation which was facing "the especially hard 
duties of reconstruction".18 The local MG detachment
reported in July 1947 that during the previous twelve months 
elementary schools had been open just two and a half hours a 
day, while secondary schools provided their students with 
four hours of daily instruction. The report identified the 
lack of teachers, rooms, and school materials as the causes 
of the misery.19 By September 1947 the situation had 
improved somewhat. The head of the Nuremberg school 
administration, Raab, reported to the city council that the 
number of students had only slightly increased, but that now
18Memorandum by the City of Nuremberg to the German 
Council of Cities, 2 Apr. 1947: 29-30; Niirnberg 1945-1949, 
II, doc. 217.
19OMGBY, Det. B 211, Annual Historical Report 1 July 1946 
- 30 June 1947; Niirnberg 1945-1949, II, doc. 118.
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many more teachers were available, as well as rooms.
Although conditions were still far from ideal, Raab announced
that the schools had been able to increase instruction from
twelve to sixteen hours per week.20
The lack of heating materials during the winter months,
however, forced the city to close schools for extended time
periods between 1946 and 1948. The local MG detachment
estimated that the schools had lost about twenty per cent of
their school days due to the lack of fuel during the harsh
winter of 1946/47.21
Even when the schools were open, many children could not
attend classes because they had no shoes or clothing or
because they were sick. One teacher reported to the city
administration in March 1947 that
90% of the girls do not have any shoes anymore, 75% 
[have] no warm underwear, 50% of the families no heating 
materials, 6% of the families no potatoes. There is a 
lack of thread and wool everywhere. The situation is 
particularly bad with stockings. 10 girls do not have 
coats anymore, there are five cases of scabies in the 
school. 20 children got frost bite, 1 child got a 
bladder disease, 1 a kidney infection. Better food 
remains to be of utmost importance.22
20Minutes of the City Council session on 24 Sep. 47, 
Point 7/8, present situation of the elementary schools; 
Niirnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 13lc.
2I0MGBY, Det. B 211, Annual Historical Report, 1 July 
1946-30 June 1947; Niirnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 118.
22Niirnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 194; see also the 
reproduction of a letter of excuse a Nuremberg mother wrote 
for her son in April 1946 in Tziimmerjahre: 32.
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To alleviate the desperate situation a little, Mayor Levie 
wrote to the Bavarian government in Munich requesting to have 
several thousand pairs of shoes which were stored in 
Nuremberg made available to the population.23
In view of these facts, the city administration found it 
necessary to develop special programs for young people. 
Under the forceful leadership of Theodor Marx the Nuremberg 
welfare authorities tried their best to revive youth 
activities in the city. In September 1946 the Social 
Democrats made a motion in the city council to allocate 
special funds for youth work. During the coming months the 
city slated 88,000 Marks for youth work which did not include 
welfare activities.24 A few months later Marx announced that 
the city would make one high rise bunker available to youth 
groups as a youth center, but that the younger generation 
would have to help with its decoration and furnishings. This 
new youth center would replace one that had not survived the 
bombing raids. The bunker was conveniently located near the 
center of the city, but a full year passed before the 
administration actually was able to turn the center over to
“Meeting of the Senior Committee, 17 Oct. 1947; Niirnberg 
1945-49, II, doc. 137m; monthly report of Nuremberg City 
Council for 20 Sept. to 19 Oct. 1947: 32; Niirnberg 1945-1949, 
II, doc. 161n; "Die Not muB gebrochen werden! Notprogramm 
1946/47 beschlossen," [The Misery Must Be Brought to an Endl 
Emergency Program for 1946/47 Passed] NN, 7 Dec. 1946: 7.
“Welfare Committee Meetings, 26 Sep. 1946, 2 Dec. 1946; 
NCA C7/IX no. 1232; OMGBY, Det. B-211, Cumulative Quarterly 
Report 1 Jan. 1947-31 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, 
Reports Control Br., Box 207, 10/81-3/7.
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young Germans. By then the bunker harbored a youth hostel, 
several club rooms, a youth restaurant, a library, and a 
reading room, but just before its inauguration Nuremberg's 
new youth house almost fell victim to the Army's program to 
destroy all defense installations within its zone. It took 
the combined effort of the Youth Committee, the city 
administration and above all, of the local GYA officer who 
had proposed the project, to save the building.25
Apart from establishing a new youth center, Marx also 
tried to provide for those who might not be able to reach the 
bunker during the winter of 1947/48. If lack of fuel would 
force the city to close the schools again during the cold 
season, there would be at least one stove in each building to 
provide some heat for the students. Secondary school 
students would receive emergency classes in selected schools. 
Marx further stated that the city carried all these measures
“OMGBY, Det. B-211, Annual Report for 1947, Chapter 4; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 44, 10/47- 
1/3; "Stadtjugendhaus Landgrabenbunker," [City Youth House 
Landgrabenbunker] NN, 7 Dec. 1946: 7; resolution from
Nuremberg KJR to MG, re. destruction of bunker at 
GugelstraBe, 26 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 130, 5/294-2/15; James C. Barnett,
Director, MG Det. 211, to Commanding General, European 
Command, Office of the Chief Engineer U.S. Army, 23 Jan. 
1948; Niirnberg 1945-1949, II, doc. 157; letter from Major 
Mark Selsor, Nuremberg GYA Officer, to Governor Murray van 
Wagoner, OMGBY, 28 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMBGY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/17; James E. King jr., Staff 
Secretary, OMGUS, E&CRD, to Dr. Steuerwald, KJR Nuremberg, no 
date [Feb. 1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education 
Br., BOX 130, 5/294-2/15.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
382
out in addition to the activities of the private welfare 
institutions.26
Marx also was concerned with the problem of homeless 
young people. In December 1946 he suggested to the city 
welfare committee that it would be necessary to initiate a 
project which would provide these persons not only with a 
place to stay, but also with opportunities to learn and to 
develop roots which would prevent them from resuming their 
restless lives on the streets.27
In view of the limited resources of the city, winning 
the support of American authorities for such a project would 
be the best way to get it underway. In September Marx
immediately responded to an article in the Neue Zeitung, the 
official German language newspaper sponsored by OMGUS. The 
paper had reported that American authorities in Frankfurt 
were supporting a German initiative for constructing a youth 
village by supplying it with barracks and tents. Marx 
inquired with the local detachment about the possibility of 
getting the same support for his community. Colonel 
Callicott dutifully forwarded the letter to OMGBY, but no 
answer is recorded. Marx, however, had found another
American partner who showed more concern. In December he
26Dr. Marx to the German Association of Private and 
Public Welfare, Frankfurt/Main, 19 Nov. 1947; Niirnberg 1945- 
1949, II, doc. 180.
^Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 2 Dec. 1946; 
NCA C7/IX no. 1232.
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told the welfare committee that the American youth officer in 
Nuremberg, Major Mark Selsor, had demonstrated much interest 
in such a project and promised his support. Selsor had just 
taken over his duties as GYA officer for the Nuremberg 
Military Post in summer.28
During the next year the city fathers considered various 
sites for their youth village. American troops had occupied 
a former German Luftwaffe landing field in a little village 
in the vicinity of Nuremberg. Marx found out that the 
Americans would soon evacuate the barracks and included the 
property on the city's wish list to the Bavarian property 
control office. Apparently Marx was successful. In November 
1947 the city council's welfare committee decided to set up 
a youth village at the former air force base. The city 
fathers also planned to attach dormitories for students and 
for apprentices to the property, but apparently they had 
acted too quickly. Although eighty boys were living in the 
barracks in May 1948, the Munich Property Control Office 
could not make up its mind and was threatening to dispossess 
them of the property.29
28Marx to Det. B-211, 18 Sep. 1946; Col. Callicott to 
OMGBY, 23 Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/24; minutes of a welfare
committee meeting, 2 Dec. 1946; NCA C7/IX no. 1232; for 
Selsor's appointment see Det. B-211, Monthly Historical 
Intelligence Report, Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Reports 
Control Br., Box 207, 10/81-3/7.
29Minutes of welfare committee meetings, 2 Oct. 1947, 27 
Nov. 1947; NCA C7/IX no. 1233; Headquarters, Nuremberg 
Military Post, German Youth Activities Section, GYA Staff
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In view of these developments the city council began to 
look for alternatives. It scouted a second property closer to 
Nuremberg. The former Nazi party rally area had much space 
and some accommodations to offer. After an inspection of the 
site the committee found the barracks from which the 
architects had guided the construction of Hitler's rally 
grounds a suitable place for another village.30
Since Nuremberg only had limited funds at its disposal, 
the city was looking for a private sponsor for the project. 
This kind of help did not immediately materialize. 
Nevertheless the city obtained the right to use the 
buildings, for which it did not have to pay, for social 
purposes such as youth work by the end of 1947.31
For the time being a new and unique private organization 
received permission to temporarily use the facilities until 
it would be able to construct its own youth village for 
homeless young people nearby which it called "Peace Village". 
The idea for this organization actually did not have its 
roots in Nuremberg, but rather goes back to one of the first 
attempts to launch a project designed to foster cooperation 
between Germany and other nations. The organizers of an
Report for Week Covering 1-7 May 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
30Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 3 July 1947; 
NCA C7/IX no. 1233.
31Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 2 Oct. 1947, 
Enclosure 14; NCA C7/IX no. 123 3.
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international youth camp in Munich founded an organization 
with an international board of directors which would address 
the problem of homeless young people by providing them with 
the opportunity to build their own boys towns. The venture 
not only tried to get young people off the streets and into 
a regular life, but also set out to bring young Germans back 
into the international community by looking for sponsors from 
abroad and organizing youth camps with participants coming 
from all over the world to help with the work of 
reconstruction. These ideas received a warm welcome. 
Members of the Nuremberg youth council supported the project 
as did city officials like Marx, as well as the local GYA 
officer. The young people who came to live in the barracks 
would soon begin building their own homes on the former Nazi 
rally grounds. 1948 would be the official start for the 
project.32
In spite of these efforts the relief, welfare, and youth 
activities of the city administration were by no means 
sufficient to satisfy even the most urgent needs. 
Nuremberg's authorities were overtaxed with the tremendous 
tasks they were facing during the first three years after the 
war, especially since they did not operate in a vacuum, but 
increasingly had to deal with state and even the bizonal
3211 Jugendsiedlung "Friedensdorf" bei Nurnberg: Ein Modell 
sozialer Selbsthilfe," Jugendnachrichten des Bayerischen 
Jugendringes 2, June 1948, no. 3/4: 6-7; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, 
Analysis Br., Box 189, 10/51-3/9; Karl Schmidbauer, personal 
interview, 5 July 1995.
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administrations. The whole apparatus was cumbersome and more 
often than not did not function. Nuremberg's connections to 
the surrounding region suffered from a considerable lack of 
enthusiasm on the side of the farming communities to support 
the city. Hitler's much propagated "folk community" simply 
did not exist. Each German seemed to fend just for himself 
or possibly for the tightly knit group to which he or she 
belonged. Many farmers, for example, did not meet their 
quotas, but were able to provide goods for the black market 
or to city people who had something attractive to offer. 
Even without these obstacles the situation would have been 
extremely precarious. Germany needed time to recover from 
the complete collapse of the Third Reich, and not much could 
be done without outside help. As a result, Nurembergers 
became increasingly disillusioned with their administrators 
and representatives. An ICD survey in 1948 revealed that a 
majority of the city's inhabitants suspected their city 
administrators of acting selfishly and not caring about the 
public good. The survey revealed more about the
Nurembergers' state of mind than about their local 
government. Apparently they were not aware or overly
concerned with the obvious discrepancy between their own 
behavior and the expectations of their local government.33
It comes as no surprise that the occupiers also came 
under attack during the bitter months of 1946 and 1947, but
33Eckart 191-2 02.
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it is interesting to note that those who negotiated with the 
local detachment on a day to day basis differentiated between 
the men with whom they were dealing and those in charge of 
politics. The city fathers recognized that the Americans who 
were in charge of them at the local level did much to support 
them. In general relations between detachment B-211 and the 
city administration remained quite friendly. Local 
politicians and administrators usually limited their attacks 
on American policy to the men in charge in Washington.34 
A Youth Committee in the Making
As far as coordinating youth activities was concerned, 
we have already seen that city officials and MG in Nuremberg 
had developed the same concept at about the same time in 
1945. Nuremberg was one of the first cities to have a 
functioning youth committee. Just as Americans had observed 
in general, the committee in Nuremberg initially did not have 
much input from young people. It consisted of five members 
of the city administration and the leaders of the nine youth 
groups which had registered with local authorities and 
applied for licenses.35
One of the committee's first actions was to take stock. 
In February 1946 the Niirnberger Nachrichten reported that 
"Free Youth Work Revives." Announcing to young Nurembergers
^Eckart 205.
35Det. B-211, Monthly Historical Report, July 1946; NA RG 
260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
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that they would soon be able to resume their youth 
activities, it informed its readers that all organizations, 
clubs and persons interested in youth activities should turn 
to the youth office for further information.36
In April 1946 the Youth Committee established its own 
constitution. The authors of the document clearly wanted to 
establish a legal and organizational continuity with the time 
before 1933. They referred to the responsibilities in the 
field of youth activities which the Youth Act of 1926 had 
established for the communities. The authors thought that 
the best way to respond to the demands would be to 
reestablish the traditional youth groups from before 1933, 
since many of their former leaders were still available and 
could serve as important guides in the future. The 
constitution made clear that the committee under no 
circumstances aimed at recreating the unified youth movement 
of the Third Reich, but rather wanted to coordinate the 
activities of all youth groups and help them to develop their 
own initiatives with the greatest possible respect for their 
ideological, religious and organizational structures. The 
committee also included specific goals, such as reopening 
youth hostels, the creation of youth centers, and the 
organization of retreats in its constitution. It would serve 
as a visible pressure group and try to direct the interest of 
the administration and of politicians towards the problems of
36NN, 6 Feb. 1946: 5.
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all young people. An additional task would be to make sure 
that youth groups complied with Military Government 
regulations before they received their licenses. Only those 
youth groups would be licensed who made sure that they would 
eliminate all National Socialist or militaristic thought and 
would try to educate their members towards becoming free, 
independent, and peace loving citizens. Any person who had 
been connected to the National Socialists would be excluded 
from leadership positions in the new organizations.37
Although the Nurembergers created a body based on 
democratic principles, Military Government officials pointed 
to a significant flaw in the committee's organization. 
Colonel James C. Barnett, second in command who later became 
commanding officer of the Nuremberg Detachment, advised the 
local authorities that their constitution only represented 
organized young people. He insisted that it would be 
necessary to develop some kind of representation which would 
assure that the voice of all those young people who did not 
opt for becoming members in an organization would be heard. 
Barnett introduced an entirely new concept of youth work to 
Nuremberg which also signalled a new departure in MG 
policies. Although a number of people had recognized that 
unorganized young people so far had not received sufficient
3711 Jugendring Nvirnberg," [before April 1946]; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/12; monthly intelligence 
report, Det. B-211, July 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Reports 
Control Br., Box 207, 10/81-3/7.
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attention by German and American authorities, nobody had 
officially taken steps to remedy the situation. Barnett was 
the first American representative who raised the problem in 
his community and forced Nurembergers to come up with their 
own solution to the problem.
By June 1947 they were ready. The committee adopted the 
new constitution "after lively discussion". Depending on the 
number of its members, each organization would have one or 
more representatives in the general assembly. One person 
from each school would be elected to represent all 
unorganized young people. To assure proper communication 
with the city administration, delegates from various branches 
involved in youth activities also had a seat in the assembly. 
Adults would not occupy more than seven seats, a number which 
just matched that of representatives of the largest Nuremberg 
youth organization, the Trade Union Youth. At that time 
about fifty per cent of all young Nurembergers had joined a 
youth organization. It was quite fitting that the chair of 
the youth committee invited Colonel Barnett to the Nuremberg 
Army youth center to participate in first session of the 
youth committee under its new constitution. Americans 
regarded the Nuremberg constitution as a model which other 
German communities should emulate. The fact that Germans 
came up with this constitution in the city of the Nazi party 
rallies and the Nuremberg Laws may have enhanced its 
significance for the occupiers. They may well have regarded
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it as the first indicator of the success of their 
democratization policies.38
The youth committee was not just a coordinating body 
with no real power. On the contrary: Americans made sure 
that the Youth Committees had something to offer their 
members. The American Army released its own surplus 
clothing, camping materials, and other equipment as well as 
that of the former Wehrmacht to the Land Youth Committees 
which they in turn distributed among the local bodies. When 
the program began on a large scale in 1947, MG in Bavaria 
released 1,000 tons of camping materials and promised to take 
care of the transport of the children and the necessary 
gasoline or field kitchens. MG could not keep all of its 
promises, but after initial problems and some confusion on 
both sides, the program got underway. Together with the 
materials the Youth Committee issued guidelines for camping 
in which it stressed the importance of exercising democratic
38Report on youth committee meeting, 29 Apr. 1947; 
Invitation from Andreas Staudt to Col. Barnett, 30 May 1947; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1427, 9/122-3/1. A 
visiting expert who examined Land and Kreis Youth Committees 
in the American zone during the summer of 1948, for example, 
quoted the statutes and activities of the Nuremberg Committee 
verbatim as an example for others to emulate (David F. 
Demarch, "Report of Survey on Land and Kreis Youth Committees 
and Youth Rings, Sept. 1948: 78-85; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 138, 5/295-2/7).
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procedures in the camps. By the end of the summer 75,000 
Bavarian children had participated in the program.39
Since the city administration also was interested in the 
committee, it supported the committee's activities with a 
substantial amount of money and with a 75% discount for 
public transport to the camps if it was available. More 
importantly, the local food office issued special allocations 
for the hiking and camping activities of all licensed groups. 
The fact that the Land Youth Committee hired a full time
employee for Nuremberg who dedicated all his time to
administering the use of the equipment and helping young
people to organize these activities, shows how important it 
was for them to leave the city. In view of the dire
schooling situation, the city of Nuremberg had even decided 
to take advantage of the refreshing camp atmosphere and 
continued some classes in the field to catch up with its 
work. Well over 4,500 young people had participated in 
summer camps which lasted between ten and fourteen days at 
the beginning of August, with about six weeks left in the
39Minutes of Youth Activities Conference, Stuttgart, 18- 
19 March 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education 
Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/14; minutes of 7th Youth Activities
Conference, 15-16 May 1947, NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7; Jugendring, Miinchen an die 
Jugendabteilung der Militarregierung in Bayern: Bericht tiber 
die Zeltlageraktion 1947, 18 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2; see also list 
of equipment released to LYC [1947]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, 
Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/2; report about
negotiations between Bavarian Youth Reverend Helbich and MG, 
8 Nov. 1946; LCA Kreisdekan Niirnberg 318, Jugendarbeit.
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season. When the summer was over, more than 10,000 young 
people had spent some time in summer camps which lasted on 
average ten days and included a substantial increase in 
calories.40
The program was such a success in 1947 that Americans 
and Germans considerably expanded their plans for the next 
year. In February 1948 MG youth officials noted that in 
Bavaria alone 200,000 young people had applied for camping 
materials. The Bavarian Youth Committee had already 
scheduled a conference for camp counselors and leadership 
training for camp supervisors.41
Summer camps remained very popular well into the next 
decade, providing many young Germans with an opportunity to 
spend their vacations away from the city, but the returning
40Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; 
Bayerischer Jugendring, Miinchen an die Jugendabteilung der 
Militarregierung in Bayern: Bericht iiber die Zeltlageraktion 
1947, 18 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities 
Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2; Berichte des BJR an OMGBY fur
Zeitraum bis 15.8. 47: 4; 15.9.47: 4; 15.10.47: 8; NA RG 260 
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 146, 5/296-2/9; 
list of summer camps in Bavaria, 13 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2.
41Letter from Lawrence Norrie, Chief Group Activities Br. 
to Col. Cunningham, E&CRD, Economic Br., 19 Mar. 1948; NA RG 
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br. , Box 129, 5/294- 
1/17; minutes of 13th MG Youth Activities Conference, 12-13 
Feb. 1948; NA RG 260, OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., 
Box 120, 5/293-1/7; many of the interviewees, especially
those of the trade unions and two directors of youth centers, 
remembered these camps very fondly; for trade unions and 
their summer camps see also Birgitt Grieb, ed., Mit 
Hordentopf und Rucksack: Zur Geschichte der Gewerk-
schaftsjugend in Nurnberg und Coburg nach 1945, Oberursel: 
P.V. Werkdruck, [1987], 42-46.
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prosperity brought an end to the programs. During the 1950s 
more and more young people and their families were able to 
afford their own holidays farther away from home or chose 
more comfortable accommodations for their vacations. 
Nevertheless, the program had served its purpose. Young 
people received calories and could recuperate from the still 
rather devastated city for a while. Many of them also for 
the first time acquired hands-on experiences with democratic 
procedures. And all of them, no matter to which youth group 
they belonged, literally could feel American support.42
These benefits notwithstanding, not all Germans were 
easily convinced about the value of a Youth Committee and its 
activities. Although it was well known that all youth 
organizations would have to register through the committees, 
Bavaria's Lutheran Youth Minister Helbich announced to his 
brothers in the congregations in February 1946 that he 
considered denominational youth groups to be exempt from 
these provisions. He instructed those who wanted to register 
their groups with Military Government not to do so. Helbich 
thought that church representatives should be present in the 
newly created youth committees, but that they should limit 
their participation to giving "supportive advice." The 
minister informed his youth leaders that the committees 
certainly could do some good, especially if they supported
42Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Willy 
ProlB, personal interviews, 4 Aug. 1994, 4 Aug. 1995; Willy 
Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
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youth activities by trying to reopen youth hostels, getting 
price reductions for youth groups, or obtaining equipment, 
but he apparently did not want to jeopardize the independence 
of his own flock or give up any part of his control over it. 
During the next months Helbich had to admonish several of his 
pastors not to apply for licenses, since these precedents 
would undermine his own course.43
In November 1946 Helbich was still negotiating with 
OMGBY about the necessity of licensing Lutheran youth groups, 
but by then it was clear that he would not have much choice 
in the matter, although MG did not seem to force the issue. 
Helbich conceded that obtaining a license would be very 
beneficial for the work of the youth groups, since the 
Americans had taken care to invest the youth committees with 
a monopoly over the distribution of all the commodities 
urgently needed for youth work. Youth hostels also were 
exclusively reserved for licensed groups. In view of these 
realities, the church authorities decided not to hold out any 
longer, especially after both Military Government and the
43|,Stand der Jugendarbeit des Landesjugendpfarrers," 12 
Feb. 1946; LCA Landeskirchenrat VI; 1178a 1946-1964, Akten 
des Landesjugendpfarrers Bd. IV; exchange of letters between 
Reverend Dollinger and Helbich, April-May 1946; LCA Personen 
CLXV Dollinger 14. Protestant youth groups were
conspicuously absent from a list of youth organizations who 
had applied for licenses with Det. B-211. Of the eleven 
applicants MG did not grant a license to only one sports 
group because one of its sponsors was not employable under 
denazification laws (MG, Det. B-211 to Lord Mayor of 
Nuremberg, 25 Oct. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211 Box 
1439, 9/126-1/19).
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Land Youth Committee assured Helbich that they would not 
attempt to exercise any influence on Lutheran youth 
activities. In view of these incentives the church leaders 
announced to their congregations that they should apply for 
licenses. The memorandum also noted sourly that some 
reverends who had applied for licenses on their own 
initiative had not made negotiations any easier. The 
decision came just in time to participate in the final 
elaborations for the new constitution of the Nuremberg Youth 
Committee. The Lutherans joined an organization which had 
evolved away from adult influences towards a truly 
representative body of all young Nurembergers. During the 
following decades it would have to weather a number of 
storms, but remained to be a democratic institution which 
fought for the interests of all young people.44
By 1947 the city administration, youth groups, and 
Military Government had created an organizational structure 
for the representation of the city's youth which would 
continue to serve young Nurembergers for the next fifty 
years, although it underwent significant changes.45
“Report about negotiations between Bavarian Youth 
Minister Helbich and MG, 8 Nov. 1946; LCA Kreisdekan Niirnberg 
318 Jugendarbeit.
45Ulrike Fuchs (Kreisjugendring: "... gemeinsam fiir die 
Interessen der Jugend? Eine kritische Bilanz tiber 30 Jahre 
Jugendpf lege (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: Kreis jugendring Niirnberg- 
Stadt, 1980) 14-79) provides an interesting discussion of the 
development of the Nuremberg Youth Committee. Military 
Government records as well as those of the Nuremberg city 
archives and of the Lutheran church, however, reveal that her
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Reviving Youth Activities
The Nuremberg Kreis Youth Committee became one of the 
pillars of the city's youth activities from the start. The 
committee organized the first "Nuremberg Youth Day" in 
September 1946. About three thousand young people had the 
opportunity to relax and enjoy games at twelve different 
locations throughout the city. American observers noted that 
youth organizations had prepared games, songs, plays, and 
dances for their peers. According to the report, the Youth 
Committee, MG, and tactical troops had cooperated closely to 
make the event a success.46
At about the same time young people in Nuremberg could 
read on posters all over the city about another innovation. 
The committee opened an office whose sole task consisted of 
listening to the needs and complaints of the younger 
generation. The office was only open two hours a week, but 
it was the first attempt by the youth committee to reach out 
to young people. It also provided an opportunity for those
account and conclusions are not entirely reliable, especially 
for the early stages of the committee's existence. She does 
not recognize, for example, the very active role Americans 
played in the foundation of the committee and the formulation 
of its constitution.
^OMGBY, Weekly Report, Youth Activities, 4 Sep. 1946; NA 
RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 5/296- 
1/17; monatlicher Bericht des Bayerischen Landes- 
jugendausschusses fur den Zeitraum bis 15.10.46; NA RG 260 
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 5/296-1/20; 
see also Fuchs 24.
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who were not organized to look for help or voice their 
concerns.47
One of the most pressing problems in youth work remained 
the lack of trained youth leaders. Americans, German church 
leaders, and those in charge of more mundane organizations 
agreed that much needed to be done in this field. The 
Bavarian Youth Committee and on the local level the Kreis 
Committees soon became actively involved in this task.48 In 
the fall of 1946 forty-two people in Nuremberg responded to 
a campaign to create an amateur theater group. They were 
just in time for the opening of a new fifty-six room youth
47Monthly Report, Land Youth Committee to OMGBY, 14 Sep. 
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 
10/43-1/10.
Translation of the Poster:
Attention Young People!
War and the collapse has brought much harm and misery to our 
youth. Nuremberg's Youth Organizations are taking care of 
the fates and worries of all young people and are providing 
advice and help to all boys and girls!
Everybody may come to our new
COUNSELLING OFFICE 
which is open every Tuesday and Thursday from 5-7 p.m. in the 
orphanage at 34 Reutersbrunn Street.
Boys and girls come and see us!
The Kreis Youth Committee of the city of Nuremberg
48Youth leadership training was one of the main concerns 
of one of the first German-American conferences on youth, 12- 
14 Sep. 1947 (for the minutes see NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 120, 5/293-1/7). Although the 
German Lutherans in general were reluctant to cooperate with 
other groups, they shared their concerns. See, for example, 
the presentation of German youth pastor Manfred Muller at a 
conference called by the Youth and Reconstruction Department 
of the World Council of Churches in Prisingen, Switzerland, 
27-3 0 Oct. 1947 which Lawrence Norrie also attended (NA RG 
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 150, 5/297- 
1/13).
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■PDooucio>rMiw«wi«nMi J .
Jugend
giD GCItT!
Durch Krieg und Zusammenbruch ist viel Unheil  und 
N o t  uber unsere Ju g e n d  gekommen. Die Jugend- ~  
Organisationen Nurnbergs nehmen sich der Geschicke 
und Note allerJugendlichen an und stehen jedem Jungen 
und Made! mit Rat und Hilfe beil
Wende sich jeder mit seinen Anliegen an die neu errichtete
-
B E R A T U  N G S S T E  LLE
die [eden Donnerstag von 17 bis 19 Uhr im Waisenhaus 
Nurnberg, ReutersbrunnenstraBe 34/1, geoffnet ist. \
Jungens und Utaflete fommt |u  un$! 
DER K R E I S - J U G E N D ' A U S S C H U S S
N U R N B E R G - S T A D T  i . a „  a . s t a u d t
100 Nraati
15. Poster, Nuremberg Youth Committee, 1946 (Source: NA RG 
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10)
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leadership training center, Burg Feuerstein, located in a 
small town about thirty miles north of Nuremberg. The site 
actually belonged to the Catholic Church, but Military 
Government turned it over to the Bavarian Youth Committee 
specifically for training youth leaders. Feuerstein was just 
one of many leadership schools. In December five young 
Nurembergers went to Seeshaupt, a small town near Munich, to 
attend a leadership training course there.49
After the reorganization of the committee, the young 
people in charge announced in May 1947 their intention to 
create a youth parliament which would consist of 
representatives of various administrative offices, organized 
youth groups, and unorganized young people. Since a similar 
institution in Munich previously had led to utter chaos and 
quite turbulent scenes, the young people themselves decided 
to limit their agenda entirely to questions which concerned
49OMGBY, weekly report, "Youth Activities, 1 4 Sept. 1946; 
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 
5/296-1/17. "... und auf der Jugendburg Feuerstein, " [. . . and 
in Feuerstein Youth Castle], NN, 26 Oct. 1946: 6. Actually 
Feuerstein was a Catholic institution which the Archbishop of 
Bamberg had officially handed over to young people in his 
diocese in September 1946 (Weekly Report, 27 July 1946, Group 
Activities Br.; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Act. Br. , Box 
36, 10/43-1/10) . Judging from a common MG procedure, the
Catholic Church probably would not have been able to reclaim 
the property if it had not opened the facilities to all 
youth.
List of participants of a youth leader training camp, 2- 
7 Dec. 1946 in Seeshaupt; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/3. Three of the five
Nuremberg residents were university students, one was a 
secondary school student and one a medical assistant.
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young people. City council members reacted to this 
development with "satisfaction" and, undoubtedly, relief.50
Hans Eckstein represented the trade unions in this body. 
According to him, it functioned well and managed to discuss 
a wide variety of topics. Although this youth parliament did 
not attempt to run the city, it had a highly political 
agenda. Practical youth activities were rarely discussed. 
The young people rather focused on their legal status, their 
working conditions, and their training. According to 
Eckstein, adult council members of the different parties took 
the ideas of the young people up and included them in their 
own agendas.51
Apart from the material support it received from Munich, 
the committee could count on very dedicated volunteers in the 
youth groups. The trade unions became one of the strongest 
pillars of the new structure. Denazification, the insecurity 
of factory owners and managers about their future, and Allied 
Control Council Directives actually had given the unions a 
strong position in the shops of which they immediately took 
advantage. They not only revived their organizations and 
initiated workers' councils, but also focused on bringing 
young people into their unions. During the first three years 
after the war, they were able to organize the great majority 
of young workers and apprentices in big and medium sized
S0Minutes of a meeting of the city welfare committee, 5 
May 1947, Enclosure 9; NCA C 7/IX no. 1233; Fussl 126-12 9.
51Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
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factories. In September 1945 the trade union leaders 
appointed a youth secretary, Loni Burger, who immediately set 
out to revive youth activities. In the course of the next 
years trade union representatives were able to provide 
apprentices with remedial courses which they could take 
during working hours to make up for time and schooling they 
had lost during the war. They also began to cooperate 
closely with the Nuremberg vocational schools which 
apprentices were required to attend. This cooperation 
provided union leaders with the opportunity to reach out to 
all apprentices and keep them informed about their rights.52
Surprisingly, cultural activities became the focal point 
of the unions' youth work. Burger and his colleagues 
recognized that political issues were important, but that 
young workers also needed to catch up with activities such as 
reading books which had been burnt during the Third Reich or 
becoming aware of culture in other realms during their free 
time. Trade union youth groups were among the first to 
develop programs for others. In November 1946 young people 
were invited to the first variety show with music, theater 
sketches, folk dances and poems, but also were invited to 
participate in an essay writing contest in which young people 
should develop their own ideas about democracy and their 
expectations from the trade union movement. Of course Loni
52Grieb, ed. 8-19; see also Karl Schmidbauer, personal 
interview, 5 July 1995.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
403
Burger did not pass up the occasion to inform the youngsters 
about the trade unions. It is noteworthy that Nuremberg's 
GYA officer Major Mark Selsor, not a member of the Military 
Government detachment, represented the Americans.53
Theater and public performances attracted many young 
people, but most of them preferred sports. In 1947 only 
twenty-nine of the 765 youth groups in Nuremberg were sports 
clubs, but over one third of all organized young people 
belonged to them. Willy Gensmantel, for example, began where 
he had left in 1933. He had been a member of a local 
workers' sports club and immediately upon his return from the 
United States began to organize a youth section of the local 
sports club in Fiirth, where he was living.54
Most of the Nuremberg youth organizations who applied 
for licenses had existed before 1933. The first ten groups
53,lJugend spielt fur Jugend," [Youth Plays for Youth] NN,
20 Nov. 1946: 5.
^Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995. 
OMGBY, Det. B-211, Quarterly Historical Report, 20 Oct. 1947; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det B-211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6. The 
number of 765 is astounding even for a city like Nuremberg. 
The reason for this number is that MG counted every single 
group within the youth organization of which it was part. 
Although the vast majority of young Germans belonged to the 
two major denominations, for example, the Nuremberg 
detachment listed 465 religious groups with about 10,000 
members. With an average of about twenty persons, one 
suspects that this number not only included youth clubs, Boy 
Scouts and YMCA but also the churches' individual Sunday 
school classes. Either the churches registered every 
conceivable group with German thoroughness or the groups 
hoped to obtain more material support from the Kreis Youth 
Committee by registering individually. See also weekly 
report of Field Team, 17 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, 
Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/43-2/2.
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were the Catholic Youth, the Choir and Orchestra Community of 
Nuremberg, Boy Scouts and various sports clubs, one of which 
did not obtain a license because one of its sponsors had been 
a member of the Nazi party. The trade unions, the Socialist 
Youth, and the Free German Youth had registered their 
activities with the city administration already in March 
1946. The only new member of this group was the Free German 
Youth which obtained its license from German and American 
authorities without any problems.55 The churches simply 
revived their activities on a large scale. Workers not only 
revivied their trade unions but also made cultural activities 
and sports programs a central part of their activities for 
young people. They made sure that young members immediately 
became involved in these activities and took care of 
organizing their peers to the largest possible degree. 
Interestingly, the communists took the lead in this postwar 
organizing drive. Karl Schmidbauer recalled that the local 
trade union youth committee initially consisted of seven 
members of the Free German Youth, which in Nuremberg was the 
equivalent of the Communist Party's youth organization, and 
only three Social Democrats.56 Traditional sports clubs, the
55Memorandum from Eric Feiler, Det. B-211 ICD, to Chief 
of Intelligence, OMGBY, 25 Apr. 1946: results of a survey of 
17 Apr. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Director, Box 17 10/110- 
1/12; OMGBY, Det B-211, Monthly Historical Report Oct. 46. 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
56Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Willy 
Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; Karl 
Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 July 1995; see also
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Nuremberg YMCA, as well as the Socialist Falken, could look 
back on a long tradition and relied on members from before 
1933 who were willing to lend a hand in reconstruction.57 
Apart from the Free German Youth, Nuremberg only witnessed 
the creation of one more newcomer, a German-American Youth 
club which became active in 1947. The great majority of the 
youth organizations relied on their traditional and well 
known ways.58
American policy directives did not permit youth groups 
to become politically active. On first sight Germans in 
Nuremberg complied with this request. Americans kept a close 
eye on those who had a political background, such as the 
Falcons. Willy ProlB, for example, remembered that his group 
repeatedly ran into problems with Military Government 
representatives, because of its close affiliation with the 
Social Democratic Party.59
Surprisingly, the Free German Youth did not suffer from 
the same type of scrutiny. Especially trade union members 
and those of the more moderate left recalled that FDJ members 
in Nuremberg seemed to have established a close relationship
Schmidbauer's recollections in Grieb, ed. 8-11.
57For the Falken see Willy Prolfi, personal interview, 4 
Aug. 1994 Gerhard Knochlein recalled the revival of the local 
YMCA (personal interview, 24 July 1994).
58For the German-American Youth Club see chapter X, 
below.
59Willy ProlS, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994.
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with Major Selsor and the GYA who did not seem to mind their 
Communist background. News of the Free German Youth's 
attempts at taking over youth work in Berlin and the Soviet 
Zone under Communist leadership also did not seem to affect 
their standing with the Americans in Nuremberg. Looking 
back, trade unionists and a former member of the Falcons 
recalled that Free German Youth members seemed to enjoy a 
somewhat preferential treatment.60
A closer look, however, reveals that all political 
parties had either youth committees or actually ran their own 
youth groups. American authorities in Nuremberg were aware 
of the situation but did not report any of them as officially 
registered by Military Government. Eric Feiler's survey of 
April 1946 reveals that he obviously knew the men in charge 
of youth activities in all parties and was well informed 
about their work. Interestingly, only one of the party men 
in charge of youth thought that young people should actually 
become involved in political affairs. Even Hans Schubert, 
chairman of the most visible politically oriented youth
“See, for example, Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 
July 1995; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 
1995; Willy ProlS, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994; Karl 
Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 July 1995. All four men 
volunteered this information without being asked about it. 
Eckstein thought that Americans probably targeted especially 
the Communists for re-education and therefore gave them a 
preferred treatment, while ProlS suspected that the better 
position of the Free German Youth was probably due to the 
good personal relationship between one of its leaders and 
Major Selsor. None of them was very happy that communists 
seemed to get more from the Americans than those groups who 
were truly democratic.
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group, the Falcons, thought that political activities were 
not a good idea for young people, although all of the leading 
members were clearly and openly affiliated with the Social 
Democrats. It seems that the Falcons and possibly the other 
groups concentrated more on practicing democracy and teaching 
their members more about the political process than becoming 
involved in party politics. The Americans apparently were 
aware of this pattern and supported it. The Falcons 
maintained cordial relations with the local detachment 
throughout the occupation.61
We have seen above that summer camps became an important 
means of providing young people from Nuremberg and in cities 
throughout the American zone with valuable recreation and 
additional calories. All youth groups became involved in 
hiking and organizing summer camps from 1946 on. In 
Nuremberg the Socialist youth group set up the first of its 
"Falcon Republics" next to the Feuerstein youth leader 
center. Other groups did the same. Trade unions were among 
the first groups to use youth hostels, Lutheran groups had
61Memorandum from Eric Feiler, Det. B-211 ICD, to Chief 
of Intelligence, OMGBY, 25 Apr. 1946: results of a survey of 
17 Apr. 1946; NA RG 260, OMGBY, ID, Director, Box 17, 10/110- 
1/12. The Falcons repeatedly invited Lieutenant Callicott, 
who apparently was in charge of youth activities in 1946/47, 
to their meetings and activities. See, for example, their 
invitation to their first state wide conference in Nuremberg 
of 18 Mar. 1947; NA RG 2 60 OMGBY, FOD, Box 1415, Det. B-211, 
9/127-1/16.
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their camps near a castle not far from the city. The YMCA 
did its share of camping as well.62
Camping only offered a partial solution to the recovery 
needs of young people. Permanent constructions could be used 
year round not only for camping but also for retreats and 
leadership training. Burger, who also was a leading member 
of the youth hostel organization in Nuremberg, was able to 
have some of the buildings which had belonged to the 
organization before 1933 released. Hans Eckstein became the 
man in charge of organizing everything necessary for getting 
the buildings ready for operation again. He spent half a 
year travelling throughout Bavaria soliciting donations. 
Eckstein was able to bring the necessary items together. His 
work earned trade union groups the right to be among the 
first ones to use the reopened facilities.63
These efforts notwithstanding, space for youth 
activities and for leadership training remained at a premium. 
Youth organizations, the city administration as well as the 
churches all were looking for suitable places to provide 
young people with the necessary accommodations. In 1947 a
62Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994; Marianne 
Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug 1995; Hans Eckstein, 
personal interview, 6 July 1995; OMGUS, Internal Affairs and 
Communications Div. , Education and Religious Affairs Br., 
Memorandum on Trip by Sgt. Tracy Strong to German Youth 
Camps, U.S. Zone, 30 July-3 August 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/25.
63Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 5 Aug. 1995; Grieb, 
ed. 19.
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GYA youth group stumbled across an old castle in the vicinity 
of Nuremberg which was almost ideally located and offered 
enough space for establishing a youth hostel and training 
facilities for the city. After an initial cleaning by 
American women, young trade unionists, as well as members of 
the Peace Village, volunteered their time to reconstruct the 
old buildings, install plumbing, heating and other amenities 
needed for year round operation of youth castle Hoheneck. 
The Land Youth Committee initially leased the property, but 
Nuremberg later took it over for its youth groups, as well as 
youth leadership training. The city also used Hoheneck as 
training site for its own employees.64
As usual the churches preferred to have their own 
facilities. Due to Military Government regulations the 
Catholic Church shared Feuerstein Castle with other youth 
organizations, but some groups, such as the Lutherans, wanted 
their own places. In December 1947 Carl Schweitzer, one of 
the leading men of the largest Protestant welfare 
organization in Germany, the Hilfswerk der Evangelischen 
Kirchen in Deutschland, approached various OMGUS officials in 
Berlin and Bavaria about a project of rehabilitating yet 
another castle in the vicinity of Nuremberg, named 
Hohenstein. Schweitzer apparently was aware of American
wJune Selsor, Is the German Youth a Lost Cause? 
(Manuscript, typewritten, 1950, in possession of the author) 
16-18; Grieb, ed. 43-45; Erinnerungen aus der Stadtverwaltung 
50, Illustration 66.
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support of leadership training and proposed that OMGUS 
sponsor the construction of a Christian leadership camp at 
the site. Lawrence Norrie forwarded the proposal to the WCC 
in Geneva, but did not find any support there. Clearly 
unhappy that the youth section and not religious affairs had 
approached him, Robert Tobias of the WCC declined to sponsor 
the project. He suggested to make the center a joint venture 
with other youth organizations, especially since Schweitzer 
seemed to have acted on his own behalf rather than in any 
official capacity for the EKD. OMGBY officials endorsed 
Schweitzer's plan after a visit of the castle in February 
1948, but apparently wanted other youth groups to become 
involved just as Tobias had suggested. They explained to 
Schweitzer that they would not sponsor the project or 
requisition materials for it and referred him to the Land 
Youth Committee for further consultations which also proved 
to be disappointing for Schweitzer. Apparently the two 
concepts were too far apart for compromise. For the time 
being, nothing came of his proposal.65 
The Nuremberg Youth Show
In spite of all difficulties, Marx and other members of 
the city administration were determined to make the best of
65Carl L. Schweitzer, Hilfswerk der EKD, to Dr. Norrie, 
OMGUS, 14 Dec. 1947; Carl Schweitzer to Dr. Spahn, OMGBY, 15 
Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 
39, 10/43-3/19; Norrie to Robert Tobias, WCC, Geneva, 24 Dec. 
1947; Tobias to Norrie, 7 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 126, 5/293-3/15.
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the situation and to demonstrate to the public the importance 
of youth work as well as its successes to date. In September 
1947 the city administration informed Major Selsor, whom it 
apparently regarded as the man in charge of all American 
youth activities in the city, that Nuremberg was planning to 
organize a youth show for the coming year and asked for 
support. Selsor forwarded the request to OMGUS headquarters 
in Munich. The people in charge of youth activities there 
thought that it was a good idea, provided that such an 
exhibition was "proposed and desired by German youth and 
responsibility is definitely assumed by them, through their 
schools and organizations and through the Stadt- and Land 
Kreis Committees". Military Government did not think that 
the occupiers should participate in such a venture "with 
displays in order not to confuse the issues," but exempted 
extracurricular contacts between young Americans and youth 
groups from that rule. Detachment F-211 also endorsed all 
assistance the Nuremberg Military Post would be able to 
provide.66
During the following months the project made progress. 
With American endorsement assured, planning went ahead. In 
December Marx informed the American authorities in Munich 
that the city would put the youth house, which was still
“otto Barthel, Nuremberg city administration to Mark 
Selsor, GYA, 11 Sept. 1947; Selsor to Religious Affairs Div., 
OMGBY, 8 Oct. 1947; OMGBY to Selsor, 18 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/43-2/2.
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under construction in a bunker, at the exhibition's disposal. 
Contrary to Military Government wishes he told OMGBY 
headquarters that the city council also had decided to 
"charge the Municipal Administrative Board of Nuremberg with 
the preparation and the execution of the exhibition." 
Neither currency reform which the Western Allies carried out 
in June, nor the resulting Berlin crisis could stop the 
project. In August 1948 the youth show opened its doors to 
the public. In their introductory remarks Marx and Andreas 
Staudt, the two leading men in charge of youth affair in 
Nuremberg, discussed the dire situation in which young people 
found themselves in 1948. According to them, nobody knew if 
the currency reform would kill or heal the economy. Apart 
from that officials did not refer to the present political 
situation but rather attempted to show educators, youth 
leaders, and the general public what young people as well as 
the city authorities had been able to create in spite of the 
immense misery in the city. They also tried to show what 
would be necessary to create a solid future for the 
generation which would have to shoulder Germany's 
reconstruction.67
67"Youth Show 1948 in Nuernberg," memorandum from Theodor 
Marx, representing the Nuremberg City Council, 15 Dec. 1947; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box 42, 10/44- 
1/5; official program of the Nuremberg Youth Show, Aug. 1948: 
1-6; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Branch, Box 
121, 5/293-1/9; see also "Youth Exhibition Nuernberg 1948," 
Jugendnachrichten des Bayerischen Jugendringes, August 1948: 
3 .
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The Nuremberg show demonstrated that Nuremberg indeed 
had made some progress towards the democratization and 
elimination of old habits which American authorities regarded 
as essential for the spiritual recuperation of Germany. Otto 
Barthel, one of Nuremberg's school superintendents, pointed 
out that for the first time in the city's history many 
different organizations had cooperated to make the show 
possible. The group charged with its organization had been 
able to enlist the help of many departments within the city 
administration, the regional government, and the Kreis Youth 
Committee. Almost all of Nuremberg's youth groups, including 
the Free German Youth, contributed with theater plays, 
musical performances, or folk dance evenings. Distinguished 
speakers informed the public about youth related topics 
ranging from welfare and guardianship of homeless young 
people to their health and, of course, the school system. 
Films completed the effort.68
The public could have a first hand look at the 
achievements in twenty-seven rooms of one of the city's 
rehabilitated school houses. Six rooms dealt with practical 
elementary school work, explaining the importance of new 
forms of teaching for the formation of young children. 
Adequate nutrition was extremely important, so the Hoover 
plan which helped to provide Nuremberg's children with
680fficial program of the Nuremberg Youth Show, Aug. 
1948: 20-24; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Branch, Box 121, 5/293-1/9.
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urgently necessary additional calories had its own room in 
the exhibition, in which many children's drawings expressed 
their gratitude. The health department, youth office, youth 
radio, as well as the youth organizations occupied additional 
rooms. To help young people in their job search, the city's 
vocational schools and industry occupied a quarter of the 
available space. Following Munich's instructions neither the 
local MG detachment nor GYA participated in the show.69
The city's initiative found a positive echo. Under the 
headline "Youth Show 1948 - Symbol of Hope" one of the local 
newspapers provided its readers with detailed information 
about the exhibition. An American observer also found that 
the effort was a "good one" and recommended that American 
representatives visit the show which was just a ten minute 
walk away from the Palace of Justice. In 1948 it not only 
housed the IMT personnel but also the OMGUS Community 
Education Branch which had just moved from Berlin to 
Nuremberg.70
American officials also could be satisfied with the 
outlook of Nuremberg's school administrators. They proposed 
to incorporate modern concepts of teaching into the
690fficial program of the Nuremberg Youth Show, Aug. 
1948: 12-20; NA RG 260, OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education
Branch, Box 121, 5/293-1/9.
70Report on the Opening Meeting of the Nuernberg 
Jugendschau 1948, [August 1948] (Lawrence Norrie received the 
program together with the report); NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Branch, Box 121, 5/293-1/9.
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exhibition. History teachers would no longer dwell upon 
political and militaristic subjects, but focus on the history 
of civilization. Civics or Social Sciences for the first 
time found attention as a "very up to date" subject. 
Geography would serve as a vehicle to become acquainted with 
other peoples and to demonstrate the interdependence of the 
world's community. Teachers would also discuss "universal 
reconciliation" in geography classes.71
The show also demonstrated that Nuremberg still had a 
long way to go. In typically German fashion the authorities 
planned the enterprise and occupied most of the exhibition's 
space. The organizing committee consisted entirely of 
administrators. Marx and his colleagues never asked young 
people for their ideas for an exhibition which was dedicated 
to them. Youth organizations were relegated to organizing 
the entertainment section of the show. Clearly adults had 
made the exhibition for adults to inform them about 
activities and possibilities in the realm of youth work.72
71"Youth Show 1948 in Nuernberg," memorandum from Theodor 
Marx, representing the Nuremberg City Council, 15 Dec. 1947; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 42, 10/44- 
1/5. Interestingly, the proposal for geography did not talk 
about "nations" but preferred "peoples." This wording may be 
an indicator for a turn away from the power politics approach 
which had promoted chauvinism and an extreme nationalism 
towards the neutral concepts based on ethnology and 
anthropology.
^Willy Gensmantel described Marx as a very energetic man 
who undoubtedly invested much of his energy in youth 
activities but who also in some ways remained in the 
traditional ways of thinking. According to Gensmantel, Marx 
expected young people to accept and respect his authority
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In the immediate postwar period, however, young people 
were not yet ready to tackle these issues. They had more 
pressing practical problems. The food situation remained 
desperate. Many facilities, gymnasiums, and sport fields 
were either destroyed or requisitioned. Youth groups also 
did not have equipment, shoes, or clothing for sports. There 
were no tents or food for camps. Travelling even to the 
immediate vicinity of the city remained difficult. Only the 
occupiers seemed to have everything. And they helped out.
without any questions (Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 
10 Aug. 1995).
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CHAPTER IX
American Assistance at the Grass Roots, 1946-1955
Although the American presence in Nuremberg caused some 
problems and hard feelings towards the new rulers, it also 
opened many opportunities for the German population. The 
occupiers did much to alleviate the dire situation. In 
addition to that the Americans modified but continued their 
reorientation efforts. Many Germans used the increasing 
opportunities to become acquainted with American history, 
politics, and culture. Most of the programs were designed 
for the entire population, but all of them included special 
features for the young people. The younger generation 
benefitted disproportionally from American jobs, food 
programs, and support for its activities. These contacts not 
only provided additional calories, but also quite favorable 
impressions.
Working for the Occupiers
Large-scale black market activities or prostitution were 
not the only ways to become involved with Americans. In 
spite of negative feelings which a considerable number of 
Nurembergers seemed to harbor towards the occupiers, many 
others, among them a large number of young people, did not 
mind either officially earning their living by working for 
the armed forces, or doing their share of dealing with the 
occupiers on a much more innocent, if not always legal,
417
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basis. Getting a job with the occupiers was enormously 
attractive because it meant that food would almost be sure to 
be on the table. According to a woman, at the time twenty 
years old, nobody was concerned with furthering his career 
after the war, but everybody had to fight for survival. Her 
husband took up a job as a janitor with the Army in 1946 
which he kept for the next three years.1
Heiko Kistner, nineteen years old in 1946, also had to 
look for employment immediately after his return to 
Nuremberg, because his father was still in an allied prison 
camp. Since he had worked for the Americans before, he 
decided to look for a job with them again. Kistner slowly 
worked his way up from dishwasher to waiter in an American 
club. When he applied for a job, he observed that Americans 
handled everything in a much more casual manner than German 
authorities. Papers of the past of a candidate did not seem 
to interest the soldiers in charge of hiring. They employed 
people based on their impressions and on the Germans' ability 
to communicate in English. Kistner never obtained official 
release papers from the Army or from a prisoner of war camp, 
for example, but the Americans never asked for them. He soon 
found a job in the Army's special services' entertainment 
section. Between 1946 and 1948 Kistner travelled with German 
floorshows as master of ceremonies to units stationed across 
northern Bavaria to entertain them. He was not only
•Mrs. H., personal interview, 1988; NCA C104 no. 2.
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responsible for arranging the shows, but also for the welfare 
of the troupe. According to him, the artists were 
international, but rarely American. Since he only worked at 
night, he was able to support his family and finish his 
secondary school education at the same time. Kistner's 
employment with American troops ended with the currency 
reform of 1948.2
Kistner also learned an unexpected lesson from the 
Americans after American Military Police had arrested him for 
illegal possession of foreign currency and brought him to the 
American court. When the judge entered the court, he stood 
at attention until the judge asked him why he did not stand 
at ease. This remark made him aware of the deep roots the 
training of the Hitler Youth and in the military had in him. 
At that moment he decided to eliminate the Third Reich's 
remaining influences on him.
Kistner recalled that he never got into close relations 
with American soldiers. He did have some friends with whom 
he went on sightseeing tours around Nuremberg, but in general 
he saw enough Americans doing his job. He maintained his 
distance from the Americans, because, according to him, a 
psychological barrier prevented him from seeking too much 
contact with them. After all they were the occupiers and the 
Germans were the occupied. Apart from that, working and
2Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
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going to school at the same time did not leave him much room 
for other activities.3
Johannes Wahner also began to work for the Americans in 
1946 at age seventeen. He obtained a job with the Army 
through the local Labor Office. During the next years he did 
a variety of jobs which ranged from packing and crating the 
possessions of soldiers who returned home, to handiwork. 
Since he was living in one of the largest and poorest refugee 
camps, he constantly was searching for something they might 
be able to use. He remembered that occasionally he had 
"organized" things before, but when he started to have a 
regular income he did not have to steal anymore. According 
to him, most of the time the Americans were very willing to 
help him out anyway. When he asked, for example, if he could 
take home some wood from crates which the Americans were 
discarding so he could heat his accommodations, he promptly 
received a paper that he could do so. Instead of just the 
one crate, however, the soldiers loaded one of their GMC 
trucks with wood and took Wahner and his treasure home. He 
retained his job with the Army until the 1950s, when he 
joined the German border police forces.4
His job did not only provide Wahner with work and 
opportunities to organize valuable commodities for his family 
and the refugee camp, but also enabled him to experience
3Heiko Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994.
“Johannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
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American culture firsthand. According to him, American 
parties, to which German employees and their friends or 
families also were admitted, were very popular. For a 
nominal fee one could indulge in unheard of quantities of 
food, but also could mingle with Americans, listen to 
American music, and dance. Some personal relationships 
started in these events. Wahner remembered how he met a very 
attractive African-American lady on one of these occasions. 
They began to see each other more often. The affair became 
so serious that Wahner decided to introduce the lady to his 
parents and began contemplating emigration to the United 
States, obviously without being fully aware of the situation 
he would have to deal with overseas.
While all of his friends envied him for going out with 
a very attractive American lady, his parents displayed much 
less enthusiasm for the affair. Although his father, a 
carpenter, also had shortly worked for the Army, he did not 
share his son's attitude towards the occupiers. Wahner 
remembered that his father was quite embarrassed by pictures 
of nudes in a bar which he helped to furnish for GIs. He 
became suspicious about American morality in general, but the 
deciding factor for him was the color the girlfriend's skin. 
Going out with a black woman was too much for Wahner's 
parents who, according to him, were unable to overcome their 
deeply rooted racial prejudices. Left with the choice of 
losing his family or ending the relationship, he opted for
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the latter. Fifty years later Wahner still regretted the way 
this encounter had ended.5
Germans who were able to play an instrument also had a 
good chance of finding employment and food with the 
occupiers. Hanns Bader and H. Wisura, seventeen and nineteen 
years old in 1946, began earning a living playing jazz and 
swing music for the occupiers. Since sheet music was not 
available and the Nazis had outlawed jazz as "degenerate," 
listening to the latest songs on the American Forces Network 
became vital for the musicians' success. Wisura successfully 
played the piano as a soloist, whereas Bader was one of 
thousands of young men who joined one of the many jazz and 
swing bands in the Nuremberg area and throughout the American 
zone. Playing this new music was more than simply earning a 
living. Bader began to collect swing and jazz records and 
made the music a lifelong hobby.6
Bader was not alone in this passion. Ironically, the 
Germans got to know the light and easygoing music of Glenn 
Miller and Benny Goodman as well as jazz and George 
Gershwin's compositions at a difficult time and when the 
American audience actually had passed on to something new.
5Johann Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995.
SH. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995; Hanns 
Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; see also "Joe in der 
Baby-Band: Musiker spielte urn Zigaretten und Kaffee," [Joe in 
the Baby-Band: Musician Played for Cigarettes and Coffee] 
Triimmerjahre: 38; "Begeisterung uber Glenn Millers Sound,"
[Enthusiasm About Glenn Miller's Sound] Wiederaufbau: 30.
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Nevertheless this new style of music became an immediate and 
long lasting success in the American zone of occupation. AFN 
helped to disseminate the new music and seems to have 
attracted more German than American listeners. Serious Jazz 
fans soon opened their own club which featured live 
entertainment and long jam sessions of German and American 
musicians, many of whom were GIs.7
Even those who would not tune in to the American radio 
station got their share of the new music. The "Ten of the 
Week," which brought almost exclusively American songs from 
1946 on, became one of the most popular programs for young 
people on the German radio station in Munich. In spite of 
the paper shortage the station received about 1200 letters
7Hanns Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; Heiko 
Kistner, personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994. Just like Bader, 
Kistner became a serious collector of Jazz records. See also 
"Joe in der Baby-Band: Musiker spielte urn Zigaretten und 
Kaffee," [Joe in the Baby-Band: Musician Played for
Cigarettes and Coffee] Triimmerjahre: 38; "Begeisterung iiber 
Glenn Millers Sound," [Enthusiasm About Glenn Miller's Sound] 
Wiederaufbauz 30. One of my father's (born in 1931) most 
prized possessions are two sets of sheet music printed for 
the United States Army with Gershwin and other American 
contemporaries. Like so many others of his age group, he 
thoroughly enjoys Glenn Miller and Big Band Music. Winfried 
Bliimel reported that friends who worked in the Bavarian Radio 
Studios in Munich had told him that AFN received more fan 
mail from Germans than from Americans (Winfried Bliimel, 
personal interview, 28 July 1994). See also Werner Maar, Die 
Jugendarbeit der U.S.-Army nach dem Kriege in Niirnberg 
(Nuremberg: Pentalog, 1995), 55-56. Maar, apparently himself 
one of the former members of the German-American Youth Club 
in Nuremberg, provides an insightful, entertaining, and 
provocative account of the times. See also Egon Fein, 
Niirnberg in den SOern: Die Stadt in stiirmischen Aufbaujahren 
der Nachkriegszeit. Geschichte, Geschichten, Anekdoten und 
400 Bilder (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: Verlag Niirnberger Presse, 
1995) 234-35.
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each month, many of them requesting particular songs. An 
OMGUS survey found in December 1947 that about 70% of all 
young people listened to the radio. Under 10% of those 
between ten and seventeen years of age listened to the news, 
but 57% listened to music which was not considered to be 
serious. An additional 37% declared that they listened to 
school and youth programs which undoubtedly also included 
broadcasts such as "Ten of the Week." 78% of those between 
eighteen and twenty-five listened to the non-serious section 
of the German radio music scene as well. Since the 
broadcasting landscape in Germany did not have much variety 
to offer, it is reasonable to assume that a good sized part 
of the light music listeners tuned in to AFN or programs such 
as the "Ten of the Week" which proved to be popular all over 
Europe. The OMGUS Radio Control Branch reported that the 
program had fans in Great Britain, Switzerland, Norway and 
Holland. According to one lady in Nuremberg, the new music 
simply went "into your legs."8
AFN was probably the most popular radio station in the 
American zone and West Berlin for young people. It did not 
just provide the latest music but also represented an 
entirely new way of using the radio. Winfried Bliimel,
8Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1994; Radio 
Control Branch, OMBGY to ICD, Monthly After-Action Report, 1- 
30 Nov. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Historical Reports, Box 
56, 10/66-1/2; the survey is in OMGUS, ICD Opinion Surveys, 
Report No. 99, 5 Mar. 1948: 12, 16; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID
Director, Box 17, 10/110-1/13.
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fourteen years old in 1946, for example, became fascinated 
with the way American disc jockeys were able to communicate. 
According to him, the Germans still made radio news an affair 
of state, while the Americans provided news and information 
in a much more relaxed, but no less credible manner. Bliimel 
felt that AFN often was able to reach its listeners in ways 
unthinkable in German programs. He recalled that one night 
he was listening to AFN in bed when he suddenly heard a 
serious voice asking "are you smoking in bed?" and alerting 
its listeners to the dangers of doing so. Since Bliimel had 
a lit cigarette in his hand exactly at that time, the message 
got immediately through. AFN remained his and many others' 
favorite radio station well into the sixties, when German and 
other European broadcasters began to introduce programs which 
emulated the American example.9
Wisura's job as musician was not his only source of 
income from the occupiers. It also enabled him to initiate 
his own business. Like many other people, he became involved 
in illegal activities with the occupiers in order to survive. 
Alcoholic beverages seemed to be an especially attractive 
field of trade. Kistner was able to obtain the gasoline he
Vinfried Bliimel, personal interview, 28 July 1994; H. 
Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994; "Radio liefert 
Lebensgefiihl," [Radio Provides a Feeling for Life] 
Wiederaufbau: 26; Gerd Walther, "Morgens anti-Vietnam, abends 
AFN: Die Geschichte des amerikanischen Soldatensenders,"
Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kultur im GroBraum Niirnberg, Fiirth, 
Erlangen, Schwabach, eds., Facing America, Ein Mosaik: Texte, 
Fakten, Meinungen (Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: Plarrer Verlag, 
1992) 130-131; see also Maar 23.
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needed to return to Nuremberg through his trade with 
schnapps. Wisura had to adapt to different tastes to become 
successful. Americans did not like the high percentage 
schnapps distilled from fruit he obtained, so he diluted his 
raw material with water, colored it with sugar caramel and 
sold it as cognac in appropriately labelled bottles. 
Apparently his product was popular. Wisura recalled that one 
of his best costumers was a member of a Military Police unit. 
His neighbors soon got used to the regular appearance of an 
MP in full uniform mounted on his heavy motorcycle who came 
to refuel at Wisura's house.10
In 1951 Wisura exchanged the work at the piano with a 
job in the photo laboratory of an American air base. He 
recalled that the sergeant in charge of the facility did not 
ask for any papers, but rather wanted to see if Wisura would 
be able to do the job. Soon, the he did not just develop 
films, but also took photos for the Air Force. After hours 
he was often invited to American parties and remembered well 
that the sergeant had no problem entrusting him with his new 
American car to bring intoxicated guests home.11
Wisura stayed on the air base until Washington returned 
it to the new German Luftwaffe in the late 1950s. Although
10H. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994. Maar (24) 
and Kistner (personal interview, 9 Aug. 1994) stated that 
this kind of activities was by no means exceptional in 
Nuremberg.
nH. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994.
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the Germans wanted him to continue his work, he was highly 
disillusioned with their behavior and with the new atmosphere 
on the base. While the American sergeant had run the entire 
photo laboratory in a rather informal but very efficient 
manner, the Germans needed an officer for the task who 
introduced a very authoritarian and inflexible work 
environment. Even worse, Wisura witnessed that the German 
air men developed an attitude towards their American partners 
which he found objectionable. He recalled that the Americans 
cordially received the first Germans who arrived at the base 
to prepare the takeover. They were invited to the clubs and 
even to the homes of their allies, and the German soldiers, 
outcasts just a few years earlier, were grateful. As soon as 
the new German Luftwaffe was in control of the base, however, 
the remaining Americans had to bear the brunt of a reemerging 
self-confidence and arrogance which Wisura could not accept. 
According to him, the German air men at the base were aloof 
and did not even allow American officers in their clubs. 
Wisura remembered that the U.S. Air Force officers who were 
treated in such a way began to wonder if American policy 
makers had not made a serious mistake in permitting 
rearmament. Wisura preferred to leave such an environment 
and looked for work elsewhere.12
During the 1940s Hans Eckstein also at times had a 
commodity available which he could convert into American
l2H. Wisura, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1994.
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cigarettes. The prosecutor in one of the war crimes trials 
in Nuremberg ordered him to appear repeatedly at his office 
to provide him with information about the situation in the 
factories during the Third Reich. To get to the 
International Military Tribunal (IMT) building at the other 
end of the city, the company provided Eckstein with a car. 
When he was returning to the factory for the first time, he 
gave GIs a ride who were stationed near his workplace. To 
his surprise the soldiers gave him packs of cigarettes, the 
unofficial currency in the American zone, for his service. 
From that moment on Eckstein never failed to take an American 
soldier along, sometimes repeating his trips between the IMT 
and the factory several times before going back to work.13
Not only men found employment with the American forces. 
Two sisters who had just returned to the city also applied 
for a job with the Americans in 1945. Both started to work 
in a Red Cross club for African-American soldiers. They 
quickly overcame their initial apprehensions when they found 
out that the different culture and different behavior of 
African-Americans did not in any way interfere with their 
jobs. Working for the occupiers not only meant that they got 
additional calories and became acquainted with exotic drinks 
such as Coca Cola, but, according to them, it also saved the 
life of their mother who could not eat the German bread due 
to a serious health problem. The white bread from the club
13Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
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which the sisters were saving for her every day helped her 
survive. Both continued to work for the Americans in 
different capacities when the club closed in 1947.14
Friedrich Voigt's wife also helped support the family by 
working for the American forces. According to him, she found 
a job in the kitchen of a club next to the train station. 
The work there enabled her to bring hamburgers and real 
coffee home, which not only served as a welcome commodity, 
but also as a precious exchange object. Voigt recalled that 
on occasion the women were allowed to bring their families 
along and that there were special parties for the children.
A job with the Americans could lead to more extensive 
contacts. While working at the club, Voigt's wife also got 
to know a GI whose parents had emigrated from Denmark to the 
United States. The Voigt family was able to provide a room 
for his girl-friend who had followed him from Alsace- 
Lorraine. Johnny showed his appreciation by providing them 
with many amenities. They got corned beef and one time could 
have a party with a fifty liter barrel of "real" beer which 
a Nuremberg brewery made only for the occupiers. The contact 
continued even after Johnny moved into a requisitioned 
apartment. Voigt helped him repair the house's heating 
system and in return Johnny kept him equipped with shoes as 
well as blankets and thread which the Germans could transform
I4Liselotte Arnold, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995. 
Helga Stadtlander, personal interview, 15 Aug. 1995.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
431
into Bavarian costumes and coats. Voigt was impressed with 
the quality of the products. He kept some of the thread for 
almost fifty years.15
Working for the occupiers was by no means an isolated 
phenomenon. During the first three years after the war the 
Army was one of the largest employers in the Nuremberg 
region. In the period from October to December 1947, for 
example, over 28,000 Germans worked for the American forces 
stationed in and around the city.16
These numbers did not include jobs Germans were doing 
for American soldiers on a private basis. Many Nurembergers 
began to do the laundry for American soldiers. The GIs 
usually paid in cigarettes or food. Hans Wahner remembered 
that many refugees were able to obtain additional calories in 
this way, but that the business was not always easy. 
Occasionally GIs did not come up with their end of the 
bargain. It is interesting to note that— according to 
Wahner— African-American troops had a reputation for never 
cheating the Germans. This might account in part for the
l5Friedrich Voigt, personal interview, 26 July 1994.
I6Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post, Quarterly 
Operations, Fourth Quarter 1947, Section V - Logistical 
Support; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 
118.
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increased activities German authorities noticed around 
African-American clubs.17 
American Help
Marx and the city council did their utmost to carry the 
city and its citizens through desperate times, but both the 
administration and many Germans had to rely on the occupiers 
for their survival. Whenever the situation became serious, 
Nuremberg officials had no other way but to appeal to 
Americans for help. During 1946 and 1947 Nuremberg's mayor 
Levie repeatedly asked for assistance with the city's wood 
cutting program. In clear reference to the Army's disease 
and unrest formula, Levie informed the commander of the local 
infantry regiment that "15-20 big trucks with motor fuel" for 
the transport of wood would be enough to avoid the outbreak 
of epidemics.18
As we have seen, the Army usually complied with these 
requests, but American trucks did not just transport wood. 
Whenever the Nuremberg city administration was unable to 
provide the necessary transport facilities, a call at the 
local detachment was enough to send American trucks out to 
secure supplies from the region. In November 1946, for 
example, a shortage of tires had left 50 of the city's 90
17Johannes Wahner, personal interview, 18 Aug. 1995; see 
also "Nescafe als Lohn fur Englischunterricht," [Nescafe was 
salary for English lessons] Triimmerjahre: 6.
18Mayor Levie to Colonel Williams, Commander, 26th Inf., 
Nuremberg-Fiirth enclave, 12 Sept. 1946; Niirnberg 1945-1949, 
II, doc. 165c; see also docs. 165a, b, d.
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trucks immobilized. During the next weeks the Army took 
over. Every day about a hundred trucks, "including drivers 
and gasoline," went to the surrounding villages to pick up 
the food the city needed. When shipments were not yet ready, 
the truck drivers did not hesitate to help with packing and 
loading the precious commodities. Mayor Levie publicly 
thanked the American authorities and tactical units for their 
support.19
Young people found that American vehicles could 
alleviate the public transport crisis in a more informal way. 
Heinz Fiegl lived in a little town just out of Nuremberg 
after the war. Since public transport to the village was not 
yet reopened, he had to find other means of transportation. 
Luckily for him an American transport unit was stationed 
nearby so that many trucks commuted between the city and 
their base. Fiegl remembered that he never had a problem 
getting a ride back home, especially since this was a Black 
unit and African-Americans tended to be more cooperative in 
this respect than white GIs.20
Detachment B-211 also had to deal with requests which 
were harder to fulfill. In December 1947 the director of the
19"Bobby Milton holt Gemiise ab: Die Amerikaner helfen der 
Bevolkerung, [Bobby Milton Picks up Vegetables: The Americans 
Help the Population] NN, 20 Nov. 1946: 5; "Die Not muB
gebrochen werden! Notprogramm 1946/47 beschlossen," [The 
Misery Must Be Brought to an End! Emergency Program for 
1946/47 Passed] NN, 7 Dec. 1946: 7.
20Heinz Fiegl, personal interview, 6 July 1995.
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city food office described the situation of provisions to the 
local Military Government detachment. The severe drought 
during the previous summer had made an already very poor 
situation even worse. According to the director, the city 
did not even have enough potatoes to satisfy the need of 
December. People had not seen vegetables for months. 
Basically all available foodstuffs were cut to the bare bone. 
If American flour or grain would not arrive soon, there would 
be serious problems by the end of January, he warned. Beyond 
that, only massive American supplies would be able to prevent 
the impending catastrophe.21
It is not clear how American officials reacted to this 
specific plea, but their help was forthcoming. As usual 
young people were the first to benefit from it. During the 
summer of 1946 the city had initiated an emergency feeding 
program for children who were getting dangerously close to 
starvation. The city's program only reached about 15% of the 
school children but, according to Marx, 90% of them showed 
signs of mainourishment. In July the first help arrived.
Marx informed the city council about a feeding program for 
children with American supplies.22 This private relief help 
enabled the city to expand its program by October 1946 but it 
was scheduled to last just two months. Although it provided
21City councilman Glatthaar to MG Nuremberg, 18 Dec. 
1947; Nurnberg 1945-1949, II, doc. 162c.
^"Kinderspeisung," in minutes of welfare committee 
meetings, 18, 25 July 1946; NCA C7/IX no. 1232.
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660,000 meals, the program was not large enough for improving 
the situation significantly. Nevertheless it halted the 
downward spiral. Of the 30,000 children who benefitted from 
the program less than 10% lost weight and about 20% 
maintained their weight, but the 70% who gained weight only 
showed a maximum increase of a little more than a pound. To 
make such a program work it would be necessary to carry it 
out for a much longer time.23
By April 1947 much more substantial help was on the way. 
Marx later reported gratefully how the American government 
came to the rescue with former President Herbert Hoover's 
plan. In April the city dispatched sixty trucks to the port 
of Bremen to pick up the first shipment of food for the 
children. From April through September 1947 all school 
children between six and eighteen years of age participated 
in the program. In spite of cuts during the following school 
year, 85% of all children— about 47,000— still were able to 
get additional calories at school. In 1947/48 the Hoover 
plan provided Nuremberg's children with more than twelve 
million meals.24
^MG Detachment B-211, Intelligence Report, 18 Apr. 1947; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
24|,Die Schulspeisung in Niirnberg," [The School Feeding 
Program in Nuremberg] Councilman Dr. Marx to MG Ansbach, Mr. 
Thomson, 1 June 1948: 1-2; Niirnberg 1945-49, II, doc. 182b; 
for details on the transport see MG Detachment B-211, 
Intelligence Report, 18 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. 
B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
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Currency reform ended the worst crisis, but the American 
plan remained in place until 1950. By then the number of 
recipients had dropped to 30,000 and the city administration 
was able to continue the feeding program with its own 
resources. During the next two years the number of needy 
children declined dramatically. In 1951 only 13,500 students 
received additional meals at school, by 1952 the number 
dropped to 4,000. During the next eight years the city only 
provided a nutritious breakfast and subsidized milk sales at 
schools.25
Many ordinary Nurembergers found ways to express their 
opinions about the American food program. The newspaper 
printed a little girl's description of the first days of the 
"Hoover Feeding" in her school in 1947. According to her, 
all children in her class were very excited about the 
additional meal they were about to get. The girl and her 
fellow students enjoyed the variety and taste of the food, 
above all the chocolate they received. When the paper 
printed a letter to the editor from a lady who complained 
about the taste and the presentation of the food in her 
neighborhood school, it got an immediate and overwhelmingly 
positive reaction. One mother wrote: "I think that I speak
in the interest of many mothers when I say that it is about 
time not to criticize in an ugly manner all the time. In
^Barthel 73.
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this case the American state really tries to help our 
youth.1,26
Aid from private organizations also received much 
attention in the local news. The Niirnberger Nachrichten 
reported in detail about the first shipment of food the AFSC 
sent from New York in March 1946. In April the press 
informed its readers about the formation of CRALOG under the 
headline "American Gifts for the US-Zone." Throughout the 
next years the newspaper updated its readers on the quantity 
of CARE parcels and other relief shipments. When CARE 
terminated the program fourteen years later, Germans had 
received nearly ten million CARE packages.27
In Nuremberg CARE parcels reached their recipients in 
many different ways. The families of workers of a an 
American owned factory, for example, were probably very 
pleased when each of the workers found a CARE parcel at his 
work place shortly before Christmas 1947 which the owner and 
of the plant and workers of his American factories had sent. 
In August 1948 Congressman Louis Warbington arrived at
26"Es schmeckt feini" [It Tastes Great!] NN, 3 May 1947: 
5; "Klagen iiber Kinderspeisung," [Complaints About Child 
Feeding Program] NN, 17 May 1947: 3; "Alle helfen mit,"
[Everybody Pitches in] NN, 4 Jun. 1947: 3; all of the
interviewees who were students at that time expressed their 
gratitude for the additional calories of the Hoover program.
^"Quaker-Sendung fur die US Zone unterwegs," [Friends' 
Shipment on its Way to US Zone] NN, 30 Mar. 1946: 1;
"Amerikas Liebesgaben fiir US Zone," [America's Gifts for US
Zone] NN, 13 April 1946: 1; caption and photo, The Week in
Germany, 19 July 1996: 8.
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Nuremberg with 1,000 CARE parcels for the suffering 
population. He had collected 50,000 Dollars from his 
constituents in Ohio. This was enough to provide eight of 
the hardest hit cities in the American zone with 1,000 
parcels, all of which included the addresses of the donors. 
It is safe to assume that a considerable increase in mail to 
Ohio took place during the following months. Undoubtedly 
some longer lasting exchanges of letters especially among 
young people were the result, opening an avenue for widening 
horizons on both sides of the Atlantic.28
In spite of all American efforts the demand always 
seemed to exceed relief shipments from the United States. 
Throughout 1946 and 1947 the headquarters of the most 
important Lutheran Church's relief organization in Bavaria, 
the Innere Mission, was swamped with requests from Lutheran 
kindergartens throughout the state who asked to be included 
in the feeding program it was administering for the 
Americans. The Nuremberg office could only answer that not 
enough was available for everyone and that especially the 
rural areas would have to rely on their own resources.29
Tactical units as well as individuals also did their 
share in offering relief to the needy. In 1946 the Bavarian
28"CARE Paket auf dem Gabentisch,11 [CARE Parcel Under the 
Christmas Tree] NN, 24 Dec. 1947: 5; “'Neighbors in Action:' 
1000 Carepakete fur Niirnberg," [1,000 CARE Parcels for 
Nuremberg] NN, 28 August 1948: 5.
29LCA Diakonisches Werk 1742, Schulspeisung.
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Ministry of the Interior informed the state's youth office 
that American families living in Bavaria were planning to 
present German families with Christmas presents. Local 
authorities were advised to name deserving orphanages, 
refugee camps or kindergartens close to the American bases. 
Nuremberg responded with a long list which the city sent 
express mail to Munich with names and addresses of 
kindergartens, refugee camps, the city's school for the blind 
and hospitals.30
Nuremberg's children were not disappointed. In December 
the Ntirnberger Nachrichten reported on its special page for 
young people that GIs were "Diligent Workers for Santa 
Claus." In Nuremberg and Fiirth alone, Americans invited 
about 10,000 children for the first time to Christmas 
parties. The soldiers were busy making presents for older 
and younger people, but were also gathering candy and money 
which they would invest in the much desired CARE parcels for 
German families. American parties and gifts for needy 
children became a standard feature of Nuremberg's Christmas 
preparations during the next decades, although their 
importance diminished with the returning prosperity after 
currency reform.31
30Bavarian State Ministry of the Interior to Land Youth 
Office, 25 Oct. 1946; City of Nuremberg to Bavarian Ministry 
of the Interior, 8 Nov. 1946; NCA C25 no. 479.
31»FleiBige Heifer des Weihnachtsmannes: Amerikanische 
Soldaten sorgen fur strahlende Kinderaugen," [Diligent 
Helpers of Santa Klaus: American Soldiers make Childrens'
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Tactical troops did not limit their efforts to Christmas 
parties. A GYA youth club sponsored by a unit stationed in 
the city had an idea of providing support for undernourished 
children of an orphanage and the soldiers put the plan to 
action. In March 1947 the unit set aside a building for the 
care of ten orphans who not only received "donated food," but 
also went through a special exercise program. Army doctors 
supervised the program which the soldiers expanded from ten 
to twenty children and reported "excellent results." As 
usual, Military Government's policy makers needed some time 
to catch up with the actions in the field, but by September 
1947 headquarters signalled that it was not opposed to 
welfare activities as long as the troops cooperated with 
German authorities and provided "qualified personnel for 
liaison." GYA personnel in Roth, a town in the vicinity of 
Nuremberg, had no problems with the directive. They not only 
established a visiting program for young patients at the 
local hospital, but also donated much needed additional 
calories. Interestingly, the page on which the paper 
reported about the GYA activity also displayed an ad that 
admonished German farmers to produce more milk in view of the 
fact that Americans were making sacrifices to help the 
Germans.32 Even the children of the American families in
Eyes Shine] NN, 7 Dec. 1946; see also Maar 30-31.
32USFET, GYA Report for March 1947, 30 Apr. 1947; NA RG 
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box 43, 10/44-1/9;
Memo, D. Sims, OMGUS Internal Affairs, 15 Sept. 1947; NA RG
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Nuremberg pitched in. They enlisted the help of the German 
Red Cross to organize an Easter party for young Nurembergers 
in 1947.33 
Escaping the Citv
American support became not just important for obtaining 
food, but also was crucial for assuring the success of German 
summer camps. The Nuremberg Military Post cooperated closely 
with Detachment B-211 in this venture and enjoyed full 
support from headquarters. Directives in 1947 and 1948 
instructed military post commanders in the American zone and 
Berlin to render all possible help to German youth groups 
with personnel, transportation and supplies. Units could 
sponsor their own camps if they did not find German 
organizers.34
With Army support the Nuremberg Youth Committee became 
the city's largest sponsor of youth camps. In 1947 the 
Nuremberg GYA officer received 100 tons of camping material
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box 42, 10/44-1/4; 
'•GYA betreut kranke Kinder in Roth," [GYA Takes Care of Sick 
Children in Roth] NN, 3 Mar. 1948: 3.
33Signal Corps Photo, 28 Mar. 1947; NA RG 111 Still Photo 
Collection, U.S. Army Signal Corps [hereinafter SC] 1941- 
1954, Box 131, 28 30 15. All Signal Corps Photos not only 
provide visual evidence but also have detailed information 
about the captured events on the reverse side.
^[EUCOM] Summer Camp Bulletin No. I [early 1947]; NA RG 
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2; 
Directive from EUCOM to: All Theater Commanders, 13 Apr. 
1948, subject: Army Assistance to German Youth Activities, 
Summer Camping Programs; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 128, 5/294-1/16.
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which he turned over to the youth committee. All equipment 
initially came from captured enemy stocks or from Army 
surplus. The equipment was incomplete, arrived late, and 
sometimes was in a sorry state, but the Army provided the 
materials at no cost. since the German corporation which 
handled the released materials had come under harsh criticism 
for overcharging youth organizations for the equipment they 
needed and refused to sell any more material to youth 
organizations in 1948, EUCOM drafted an extensive list of 
Army materials it wanted to distribute among German groups 
before they would be released to the German economy. Over
60,000 tents, 18,000 cooking stoves and more than 600,000 
sleeping bags were slated for the 1948 summer program in the 
American zone and Berlin. Headquarters also "encouraged” 
post commanders "to authorize the loan of unit expendable or 
non-expendable supplies for assistance to summer camping 
programs." As a result the big American troop tents as well 
as smaller versions became an indispensable part of every 
German youth camp and were deeply appreciated. Germans 
cleaned their drinking water with American tablets, acquired 
field kitchens and the necessary fuel for them, and they 
received food from American stocks, but even this source 
could not satisfy all German wishes. The local Military 
Government detachment had to deny a Lutheran reverend's
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request for an entire field kitchen he wanted for his rather 
small Christian boy scout group.35
Occasionally it took the experience of those who had 
been exposed to American culture before to use American 
utensils correctly. One reverend reported that it would take 
time for young people to learn to construct their camp with 
the American equipment. Young people who camped with Willy 
Gensmantel did not have these problems, since his internment 
in the United States had introduced him to everything they 
saw for the first time. He not only helped them with the 
construction of their tents, but also made sure that they 
properly used previously unknown products. Food was one of 
the essentials for the summer camps, but the Army also made 
sure that boys and girls took care of hygiene by providing 
them with soap, toothpaste, tooth brushes, and other items. 
Since all of them had English labels, some mishaps were 
inevitable. In one camp a boy used tanning lotion as shaving
35[EUCOM] Summer Camp Bulletin No. I [early 1947]; NA RG 
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2; 
Selsor to OMGBY, 4 Aug. 1947; OMGBY to Selsor, 12 Aug. 1947; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 37, 10/43- 
2/2; EUCOM, memorandum, subject: Army Surplus Purchased by 
Germans, 26 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/17; Directive from EUCOM to: 
All Theater Commanders, 13 Apr. 1948, subject: Army
Assistance to German Youth Activities, Summer Camping 
Programs; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., 
Box 128, 5/294-1/16; Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4 Aug. 
1994; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; 
Karl Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 Aug. 1995; Hans 
Wiesner to Dollinger, C[hristliche] P[fadfinder], Sommerlager 
Bischhofsgriin, 23.-27.5.47; Pastor Dollinger to MG, 
Nuremberg, 27 July 1946; MG, Property Control, Nuremberg, to 
Dollinger, 6 Aug. 1946; LCA Personen CLXV Dollinger 10, 16.
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creme, much to the delight of his comrades. Children in a 
trade union camp thought that American toothpaste was mint 
candy and ate it instead of brushing their teeth. It took 
Gensmantel some time to set the matter straight.36
Americans also tried to alleviate the lack of facilities 
for youth organizations. The local youth committee, Falcons, 
Trade Union Youth, and many other groups used facilities 
requisitioned by the Army for youth or sports activities 
without any charges. When Willy Gensmantel needed a 
gymnasium for his sports club in neighboring Furth, he found 
an understanding sergeant in charge of youth activities who 
secured the necessary facilities from the local unit.37
Mark Selsor, the officer in charge of the American 
Army's GYA program in Nuremberg, actively took part in 
decorating the bunker the city had handed over to youth and 
successfully intervened with his superiors on behalf of the 
Nuremberg youth groups when the Army was going to destroy the
36Hans Wiesner to Dollinger, C[ristliche] P[fadfinder], 
Bischhofsgriin, Pfingstlager, 23.-27.5.47; LCA Personen CLXV 
Dollinger 16; OMGBY, Det. B-211, Quarterly Historical Report, 
20 Oct. 1947, Chapter VIII: 8; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B- 
211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6; "Die Besten Witze sind die
unfreiwilligen: Die verkannte Fettcreme, [The Best Jokes are 
Involuntary: Tanning Creme was not Recognized] The Young
World: A Two Language Information Sheet of the Armed Forces 
Assistance Program to German Youth Activities for Nurnberg 
Military Post [hereinafter cited as YW], vol. 4, no. 10, Oct. 
1950: 6; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
37Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
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bunker just shortly before its official inauguration in 
1948.38
Youth groups desperately needed equipment for their 
activities and once more the Army provided help. Skis, 
backpacks and some sports equipment came from captured enemy 
stocks, balls and uniforms from American surplus, but in 
spite of pooling all these resources the Nuremberg Post never 
had enough equipment to satisfy the enormous demand.39
Army trucks remained the only reliable and available 
means of transport to and from summer camps as well as for 
weekend trips and picnics for young people throughout the 
postwar years. The Germans were impressed with the 
willingness of many GIs to sacrifice their spare time and 
drive them wherever they needed to go, even if the trip 
lasted longer than a day and led to other zones of 
occupation. Many of them not only drove the trucks, but also 
shared their rations or even brought extra food along for the 
j ourney.40
38See above, chapter VIII; for Selsor and GYA see below, 
chapter X.
39,,Eine Bitte der NN," [NN Asks for a Favor] NN, 9 Nov. 
1946: 4. The lack of equipment was a constant complaint of 
local GYA centers to Major Selsor which he reinforced and 
sent to headquarters. See, for example, Nuremberg Military 
Post, GYA Quarterly Report for First Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 
Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124.
40Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995; 
Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 6 July 1995; Willy ProlB, 
personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994.
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Since many African-American GIs belonged to transport 
units, they did a considerable part of the driving. Apart 
from their apparently friendlier disposition towards the 
Germans, they may have had deeper motives than simply good 
will for their volunteer jobs. Karl Schmidbauer recalled 
that his youth group always had one specific driver whose all 
black unit was fittingly stationed in the former SS quarters 
near the Nazi party rally grounds. This GI took them 
wherever they wanted to go as long as a blond and blue-eyed 
German girl sat next to him while he was driving. If the 
Germans were unable to come up with a girl, he refused to 
drive. Schmidbauer thought that this behavior was noteworthy 
because the soldier never made any advances to the girls who 
accompanied him in this way. For the German this behavior 
was not more than an amusing episode, but the soldier may 
well have undertaken his first successful attempt at 
desegregating his own world, apart from getting the 
satisfaction of being able to demand the presence of good 
looking female company.41
Initially only those youth groups whose members had 
personal contacts to a local unit received the transport they 
needed, but Major Selsor made sure that organizations who 
were not able to arrange for their own transportation with 
individual units also came to enjoy the benefits of American 
trucks. Selsor used an average of more than two thousand
4,Karl Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 Aug. 1995.
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gallons of gasoline per month for these additional 
services.42
Re-education Continues
While local detachments and units usually tried their 
best to help the Germans with their material plight, they 
often were hard pressed to satisfy the desire of some Germans 
to find out more about the United States and to learn from 
the occupiers. A young German secondary school teacher in 
Nuremberg, for example, inquired with the local American 
authorities in October 1946, if it would not be possible to 
carry the American re-education work beyond the highest 
echelons:
[i]n our endeavor to guide our youth according to the 
principles of democracy we regret very much that all 
discussions so far have concerned only the deans of the 
different high schools, while the teachers, especially 
the younger ones, had no chance to exchange opinions and 
receive first-hand information about American high 
school education. I take the opportunity to assure the 
MG officer in reference, that the teachers of Nurnberg's 
high schools should appreciate with gratitude any 
forthcoming meeting with American colleagues and 
experts. We all certainly should be grateful to learn 
about American conception of high school training and we 
are convinced that we should profit greatly by such 
discussions as they are already established in other 
towns.43
42Helga Stadtlander, personal interivew, 15 Aug. 1995; 
see also GYA Quarterly Report for the Third Quarter of 1948; 
NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125.
43From Lewis Maussner, teacher at the high school 
WolkernstraBe-Nurnberg to MG Niirnberg, Officer for Education, 
24 Oct. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1415, 
9/127-1/15.
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In his reply Klise could only inform the teacher that his 
proposal "contains merit," but that the staff of his 
detachment had been reduced so much that the only education 
officers on duty were in Bavarian headquarters in Munich.44
The more progressive teachers in Nuremberg had to wait 
another year until they were able to satisfy their curiosity 
and to engage in discussions with Americans at the 
grassroots. In October 1947 OMGUS opened an Education 
Service Center in the city to accommodate the needs of the 
teachers. The centers actually document that Americans from 
the start pursued their goals on different levels in this 
field. While in Bavaria the Kulturkampf between the German 
ministries and the American authorities was still raging, 
some OMGUS educators obviously had come to the conclusion 
that in the long term persuasion and discussion with 
progressive teachers might do more for their goals than a 
rather hopeless fight with an entrenched Bavarian Minister of 
Cultural Affairs. They also realized that teacher behavior 
in the classrooms might be just as important for the 
democratization process as administrative reform.45
To support their new grassroots approach of persuasion 
instead of directives the Americans needed to provide German 
educators with the means to obtain access to the latest
^C. Klise, Director Det. B-211 to Lewis Maussner, 8 Nov. 
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1415, 9/127-1/15.
45Muller 134-138.
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literature and publications in their profession. Initially 
Americans had opened textbooks centers in 1946 to help with 
the production of school books without militaristic and 
chauvinistic contents or Nazi ideology throughout the 
American zone. The centers had American directors and 
several German employees to assist teachers who visited the 
centers. Nuremberg was one of the first eight cities in 
which OMGUS opened centers in 1947. All of them were well 
equipped with literature, but the German teachers who could 
not read English initially found the choices rather 
limited.46
With their mission largely accomplished by 1948, the 
centers expanded their activities during the following years 
both under OMGUS and its successor, the Office of the High 
Commissioner for Germany (HICOG). They still supported the 
writing and publication of democratically oriented textbooks 
as well as curriculum revision, but the emphasis shifted to 
personal education and help with practical problems that 
would aid teachers in the classrooms. The centers had 
special translation programs to introduce German teachers to
“^Pilgert, Information Services 40-43. Pilgert does not 
seem to have had reliable information on the opening dates of 
the centers. According to him, the Nuremberg center did not 
open until December 1948, for example. The official 
invitations for the opening ceremonies, however, establish 
the date as 31 October 1947 (NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Branch, Box 41, 10/44-1/2). Since the center
initially shared a building with the local Amerika Haus, 
Pilgert may have mistaken the move to a different location 
for the official opening date. See also Maar 59-60.
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the latest pedagogical trends, they promoted the publication 
of periodicals, organized parent-teacher organizations, and 
hosted their meetings. They also tried to interest teachers 
in the use of modern teaching aids, for example audio-visual 
equipment. Most importantly, the centers initiated or 
supported research in education, especially in the field of 
student evaluation which Germans had virtually ignored up to 
then. It was not until 1951 that Americans decided to 
consolidate the program, but they still left six of the 
fifteen centers open. HICOG also supported new German 
institutions, such as the Munich Test Institute which 
instructed Bavarian teachers in the administration and 
development of student testing or the Institute for 
International Educational Research in Wiesbaden, with funds, 
visiting experts from the United States, and exchange 
programs for German researchers and educators.47
Just as all other institutions, the Nuremberg center 
soon became involved in more than just writing textbooks or 
developing curricula which Bavarian ministries did not 
accept. Nuremberg traditionally had been a center for the 
more progressive currents among German educators. Together 
with the Americans they developed curricula for individual 
subjects as well as for a reformed school system but much to 
their disappointment they were unable to penetrate the 
defense of the Munich authorities and had to be content with
47Pilgert, Information Services 41-51.
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some token concessions in 1950. In 1955 the Bavarian 
ministry at least expanded elementary school education from 
eight to nine years.48
Since the center had a dormitory that could accommodate 
up to seventy persons, it was able to organize rather large 
week-end or week-long workshops. In 1948 the center hosted 
a pedagogical conference in which educators discussed the 
possibilities of the use of audio-visual equipment at school. 
With American help they did not have to theorize long. At 
the end of the year OMGUS made one thousand radio receivers 
available to German schools in the American zone, of which 
Nuremberg received thirty-five. OMGUS was aware that this 
new medium would need some explaining and so it combined the 
official delivery of the equipment with lectures by German 
experts on the use of radio in the classroom. A second 
conference in 1949 resulted in the foundation of the German 
Association for Education which began to publish its own 
monthly magazine. Since many members of the organization
48Barthel 66-68. Interestingly, Barthel does not mention 
the American institute at all in his book, although there are 
indications that the school office relied on American help. 
Barthel describes the contribution of Nuremberg teachers to 
the development of school books at length. Much of this 
undertaking undoubtedly took place in the textbook center 
since it was the only place which was able to command any 
resources, such as paper.
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also were in charge of educational radio programs, Nuremberg 
became the center of research in this field.49
The center did not limit its activities to specialized 
workshops. One of its main functions was to promote 
progressive ideas among German teachers. Young teachers from 
Nuremberg and the surrounding region, for example, started 
their own organization of “determined educators." The center 
was their logical choice for meetings. When the local Kreis 
Youth Committee did not have a place to meet, it was welcome 
to use the extensive facilities as well.50
The center apparently also organized presentations for 
teachers by American educators. In May 1948 Freemont Wirth, 
who had been a professor at a teacher's college in Nashville, 
Tennessee before he joined OMGUS headquarters in Berlin, 
visited Nuremberg to introduce vocational school teachers to 
the concept of social studies. According to Nuremberg's 
school superintendent Raab, the teachers would have to pay 
special attention to this new subject if they wanted to help 
their students in becoming independent citizens instead of 
the subjects they had been before. As usual the American did 
not waste any time with theoretical discourse, but rather 
limited his informal presentation to explaining to the
49Pilgert, Information Services 41-43, 51, 53; "Amerika- 
nische Radios fur deutsche Schulen," [American Radios for 
German Schools] NN, 20 Nov. 1948: 3.
S0Karl Ritter, personal interview, 26 July 1995; Willy 
Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
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Germans how schools in the United States incorporated social 
studies in their curricula and gave some practical advice on 
how to do something similar in Nuremberg.51
The efforts of progressive educators such as the 
chancellor of the Erlangen university, Eduard Brenner, to 
reintegrate German educators into the international teachers' 
organization met with success in 1949. In March the 
organization extended an invitation to Bavarian educators, 
represented by Otto Barthel in Nuremberg, and invited them 
cordially to participate in its upcoming conference in 
Switzerland.52
While the first attempt by OMGUS to officially promote 
re-education through German-American cooperation in the 
educational field needed some time to become a reality, it 
had a successful predecessor long before American educators 
in Berlin discovered this avenue. In the fall of 1946 Frank 
J. Klier, Press Officer for Detachment B-211, decided to 
introduce the German public to the United States on his own 
initiative. He offered a course at the Nuremberg evening 
school under the title "Discussion about America." Klier 
obviously was the right person for the job. He had taught at 
the university level before joining Military Government and 
spoke excellent German. Klier's course actually served three
51"Schule furs Leben," [Schooling for Mastering Your 
Life] NN, 8 May 1948: 5.
52"Zusammenarbeit aufrichtig gewunscht," [Cooperation 
Earnestly Desired] NN, 16 Apr. 1949: 3.
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purposes at the same time. First he was able to still the 
Germans' hunger for information from the outside world. In 
his lectures he also introduced democratic procedures in 
theory and practice by talking about several aspects of the 
American political process. The third goal of his mission 
was more subtle. Klier conducted the classes in a manner to 
which his students had not been exposed previously. Instead 
of just lecturing, he permitted them to chose their own 
topics, and to discuss them in depth. His audience 
apparently appreciated his informal teaching style which, 
according to the local press, tore down any barrier which 
might have existed between the American and his audience. 
The newspaper praised above all Klier's openness, his 
willingness to be critical about his own country when he was 
answering guestions, and his ability to acknowledge when he 
did not know something which apparently stood in stark 
contrast to the attitude and behavior of many German 
professors.53
Klier continued his work at the evening school in 1947. 
In six two-hour discussion groups in which about fifty people 
participated, the Germans dealt with a wide range of topics. 
Klier encouraged them to choose their own agenda. According 
to him, the topic which aroused most interest was emigration 
to the United States. The question whether Germany could
53"AG 1:'Diskussion viber Amerika'," [Workshop 1:
"Discussion about America"] NN, 3 Oct. 1946: 7. «.
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become an American style democracy also ranked high on the 
Germans' interest scale, whereas the Germans relegated issues 
of educational reform, comparisons between conditions of 
specific groups in Germany and the United States, or finding 
means of parliamentary self-help against maladministration, 
to the bottom of the agenda. Klier estimated that about 60% 
of those attending were under thirty-five years old. He was 
impressed with the quality of the presentations he had 
assigned to the twenty-four to thirty-five year old group 
"despite limited means of research." Those over thirty-five 
usually were outstanding in the discussion of any topic. 
Klier noted that during the discussions the Germans did not 
display bitterness and also did not resort to heckling or 
baiting although "lively exchanges of opinion were frequent." 
Klier informed his superiors that his courses found due 
attention in the local and regional German newspapers, but 
that his duties did not permit him to continue his courses at 
the evening school during the current trimester. He expected 
to resume them in the fall of 1947.54
Some members of Detachment B-211 did not feel that the 
higher echelons attached any importance to their re-education 
efforts. In his annual report for 1947/48 the officer in
^Report on Re-educational Work from Frank J. Klier, 
Press Control Officer, Detachment B-211 to James A. Clark, 
Chief ICD, OMGBY, 20 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det B- 
211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/13; see also "Mr. Klier stellt
richtig," [Mr. Klier Clarifies] NN, 19 July 1947: 3. The
paper reported that Klier's approach found a very receptive 
and grateful German audience.
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charge noted that he and eight German workers had to take 
care of a district with half a million people living in it. 
According to him, only the understanding commander of the 
Nuremberg Military Post allowed him to maintain even that 
small number of personnel. He wrote to Munich that the 
complete lack of cooperation from headquarters did not leave 
much room for going beyond the routine administrative tasks. 
Even when his busy schedule permitted him occasionally to 
include re-education in his agenda, he had a very hard time 
getting the materials he needed, especially films, for his 
activities in Nuremberg. The author concluded that Military 
Government had become "Penny-wise, but pound-foolish.1,55 
Bringing America to Germany
In spite of this complaint of an overworked OMGUS field 
officer, the situation was not as bleak as he painted it. 
The ICD's information center program, for example, did not 
seem to have these problems. As was the case with other 
projects, OMGUS field officials developed the program. They 
collected Army surplus materials for their centers and held 
regular meetings to develop a consistent policy, to 
coordinate the efforts of the different centers and reading 
rooms, and to use their resources throughout the zone to the 
largest possible extent. Tensions between the Soviet Union 
and the United States became apparent during the Berlin
55OMGBY, Det. B-211, Annual Historical Report, 1 July 
1947 to 30 June 1948: 4-5; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, 
Box 1426, 9/124-1/2.
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crisis in 1948 and seemed to make German reorientation 
towards Western ideals even more urgent than before. By then 
Information Control had established a sound system of "overt 
education" in the American zone and in Berlin and was ready 
for expansion.56
The program reached Nuremberg long before the Cold War 
made its appearance. In November 1946 the city got its own 
American library which was located in the basement of the 
building which housed Detachment B-211.57 Under the headline 
"Books - Messengers of Peace," Germans learned in their 
newspaper that the American Congress had appropriated an 
annual budget of $ 15,000 for the Nuremberg Information 
Center which offered over two thousand books in three "nicely 
furnished, well heated rooms." The article informed its 
readers that patrons would be able to check out almost all of 
the books without any charges. The center's goal was to 
inform Germans about the United States and the world and to 
fill the gaps which Hitler's book burnings and the war had
56"The United States Information Centers: General
Information," 17 Aug. 1946; OMGUS, Director of Information 
Control, 3 Oct 1946, subject: agenda for USIC meeting in
Stuttgart; Subscription orders to various American newspapers 
by the Frankfurt USIC, 7 Aug. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, 
Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 313, 5/314-3/10; 
Maritta Hein-Kremer, Die amerikanische Kultur-offensive: 
Grtindung und Entwicklung der Information Centers in 
Westdeutschland und West-Berlin (1945-1955) (Cologne: Bohlau, 
1996) provides the first and long overdue scholarly study on 
the subject. Her book, however, was not yet available in the 
United States when this dissertation was approved.
57For the roots of the program see above, pp. 280-82.
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opened in German libraries. In his opening speech Col. 
McMahon, Chief of ICD, OMGBY, emphasized that he hoped that 
especially young Germans would be able to become acquainted 
with American literature, the United States in general, and 
the world. Interestingly, the American dignitaries who 
participated in the opening presented their speeches in 
German while mayor Levie responded in English. The press 
noted that the only drawback which would hopefully soon be 
remedied was that most of the books were in English.58
Three months later the press revisited the Information 
Center. By then the reading rooms were stocked with three 
thousand volumes and had much to offer to those who were 
acquainted with some "basic understanding of the English 
language." Apart from American authors the users also could 
find a selection of German writers whom the Nazis had banned. 
1,200 people had taken advantage of the borrowing privileges 
during the first three months, but, according to the paper, 
many more frequented the "cozy reading rooms." The choice of 
books clearly indicated the Germans' desire to overcome the 
isolation of the previous twelve years. The vast majority of 
the users wanted to learn as much as possible about other 
countries and parts of the earth, but many tried to catch up 
with the latest technological trends and advances as well.
58"Biicher - Boten des Friedens: Eine amerikanische 
Bibliothek eroffnet [Books - Messengers of Peace: An American 
Library Opens] NN, 16 Nov. 1946: 7; see also Pilgert, 
Information Services 76.
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American magazines and newspapers also became the focus of 
much attention. The paper further reported that interested 
Germans could participate in "free and open discussions" 
about American literature with an American. The journalists 
learned from the reading room personnel that plans for a move 
and an expansion were already underway.59
In line with ICD policy and in step with many other 
cities, the Information Center grew considerably during the 
next months. Not even a year after its inauguration it 
needed a new location. In October 1947 the library moved to 
a very representative villa close to the center of the city 
and to the major hub of the city authority's public transit 
system. The Americans initially used 12 rooms of the 
building and also expanded their activities. The center 
sponsored discussion evenings and exhibitions from November 
1947 on. The number of volumes grew to over 4,600 and 
monthly attendance rates went from about 1,000 at the old 
location to well over 8,000 in December 1947. The German 
patrons also had given the library its official German 
designation: Amerika Haus. As with all other American
enterprises, the stage was set for a new take off in 1948.60
59"Blick in eine andere Welt: Starkes Interesse fiir das 
US Information Center," [View Into Another World: Much
Interest for the US Information Center] NN, 22 Feb. 1947: 5.
^ilgert, Information Services 76; Report "Amerika Haus 
Nurnberg," [June 1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, Information 
Centers Branch, Box 335, 5/319-3/3; "Die Umerziehung beginnt 
in der Bibliothek: Das Amerikahaus sollte die Deutschen auf 
dem Weg zur Wahrheit iiber die Welt fiihren - Gutbesuchte
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In January 1948 Patricia van Delden, the head of the 
Exhibitions and Information Centers Branch of ICD, travelled 
throughout Bavaria to evaluate the program in the state and 
to make suggestions for its further development. For the 
Nuremberg region she noted that the Amerika Haus in the city 
as well as the reading rooms in Ansbach, Bamberg, and Coburg, 
were functioning very well with German personnel under the 
local Military Government officers' supervision. Neighboring 
Erlangen had a facility which cooperated closely with the 
university. According to her, American employees, many of 
whom were about to arrive, would strengthen the program if 
Military Government would be willing to free German 
authorities from the task of having to provide rooms and 
supplies. For more efficient operation and greater 
attractiveness, van Delden recommended that all centers be 
equipped uniformly and should have attractive light fixtures, 
curtains and furniture. Three trailer trucks would be 
necessary to provide them with the necessary supplies, but 
also to function as mobile libraries and information centers 
that could reach out to villages and small communities which 
otherwise would not have any access to American information.
Van Delden's report also reflected the growing tensions 
between the United States and the Soviet Union. She 
recommended that two more centers be opened in the immediate
Sparchkurse," [Re-education Begins in the Library: Amerika 
Haus was Designed to Guide Germans on Their Way to the Truth 
- Well Frequented Language Courses] Wiederaufbau: 15.
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future. One of them, which would be located in Hof, was 
particularly important, "because it is close to the Russian 
line of demarcation." Reorientation would have to counter an 
additional totalitarian threat to democracy, this time in the 
form of Stalinist socialism.61
The report found a warm reception. In February 1948 
headquarters not only authorized the two additional centers 
van Delden had asked for, but also complied with her 
suggestions for revising the general policy statements. The 
Information Centers and Exhibitions Branch lost no time and 
developed operating procedures along the revised policy 
directives to ensure close cooperation and the best use of 
the resources available in Germany, including American guest 
speakers.62
61Interoffice Memorandum from Patricia van Delden, OMGUS, 
ICD, Chief, Exhibitions & Information Centers Branch, to 
Colonel Textor, Director, OMGUS, ICD, 30 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 
OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., 313, 
5/314-3/10.
“Memorandum from OMGUS, Office of the Military Governor, 
to OMGUS Land Directors, subject: U.S. Information Centers, 
U.S. Zone, Feb. 1948 (Draft Revision); Memorandum from Cecil 
Headrick, IC Br., OMGUS, to Captain Chester S. Wright, Chief, 
Exhibitions and Information Centers Br., OMGBY, subject: 
distribution of films, 4 Feb. 1948; Memorandum from Patricia 
van Delden, Chief, Exhibition and Information Centers Br., 
OMGUS, to Chiefs of Exhibition and Information Centers 
Branches in the Land Detachments, the American zone of 
occupation, subject: Exhibit Instructions to Information
Centers, 2 Feb. 1948; Memorandum from Patricia van Delden, 
Chief, Exhibition and Information Centers Br., OMGUS, to 
Chiefs of ICD in the Land detachments; subject: procurement 
of German books with reorientation funds, 9 Feb. 1948. These 
are just a few examples of a considerable number of new 
policy directives and guidelines for the field operations 
which van Delden and her staff developed between February and
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In Nuremberg the arrival of an energetic American, 
Amelia Horn, as director of the Amerika Haus marked the 
beginning of a new era. During the next months the new 
director considerably expanded the activities of the facility 
and reached out to the surrounding region. By 1949 Horn had 
established ten reading rooms in the bigger communities of 
Middle Franconia. The list of employees grew from eleven 
Germans in January 1948 to forty-two in December 1949. Most 
of them served as librarians.63
In spite of a persisting uncertainty of the future of 
the Amerika Haus program and a lack of a specific budget 
which currency reform aggravated even further, Horn managed 
to renovate the new facilities and to bring the program to 
life. She was able to enlist the help of the local Military 
Government detachments for her projects and also enjoyed the 
support of the Nuremberg Military Post's commanding general. 
Generally the detachments found suitable locations for 
reading rooms, often in their own buildings. GYA as well as
June 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and 
Exhibits Br., Box 313, 5/314-3/10.
63Roster of indigenous employees of the Amerika Haus 
Nuremberg, 12 Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information 
Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 313, 5/318-3/18; USIC
Nuremberg, List of Active Personnel, [Dec. 1949]; NA RG 260 
OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 326, 
5/316-2/47.
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Military Government officials conducted at least some of 
their activities in these rooms.64
Support from other American agencies in the field was 
urgently necessary in view of much confusion and a 
considerable lack of communication between the field agencies 
and headquarters. In 1948 the Amerika Haus had vastly 
improved the quantity of its reading materials. Its patrons 
were equally impressed with the facilities and the available 
material. Horn found that German patrons did not show any 
interest in a considerable number of magazines which OMGUS 
provided, but that many Nurembergers searched in vain for 
scientific literature and magazines. They seemed to be 
available in the Munich Amerika Haus but not in Nuremberg, 
although the city traditionally had been Bavaria's leading 
industrial center and now looked to the Information Center to 
catch up on recent technological information.65
“Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October 
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits 
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11. Horn never hesitated to turn to 
higher authorities to have bills paid or to get some 
uncooperative local Army official in line. See, for example, 
Amelia Horn, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, OMGBY, FOD to OMGBY, 
Munich, ICD, Exhibitions and Information Control Branch, 27 
July 1948, subject: payment of bills for Amerika Haus and 
Reading Rooms; Amelia Horn, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, OMGBY, 
FOD to OMGBY, Munich, ICD, Exhibitions and Information 
Control Branch, 1 Oct. 1948, subject: repair work for Amerika 
Haus; NA RG 260 OMGUS ICD, Exhibitions and Information 
Control Br., Box 313, 5/318-3/18.
“Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October 
1948]; Amerika Haus Niirnberg, OMGBY, FOD, Area Niirnberg, to 
C.S. Wright, Chief, Exhibitions and Information Centers Br., 
ICD, OMGBY, subject: monthly report for period ending 11 Feb. 
1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits
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Obtaining reading materials was just a minor problem of 
the operation. Horn thought that the whole Amerika Haus 
program should be much better organized. She explained to 
her superiors that the lack of funds and a firm budget 
prevented her from reaching out to the public and expanding 
the program in a way she desired because she simply could not 
pay the bills. Apart from that, nobody seemed to be sure 
about responsibilities. In spite of Patricia van Delden's 
efforts to provide the Information Center directors with 
guidelines, her field officers felt that a clear cut policy 
which defined and assigned responsibilities within OMGUS was 
necessary. Horn thought that more centralization and 
logistical support would certainly improve the program 
because the local directors would not have to waste time on 
the procurement of supplies and the classification of books. 
In addition to that, she made clear to her superiors that she 
would need more personnel for the very extensive operations 
she felt were necessary to make the program a success.66
The OMGUS film program was a special case in point. In 
February 1948 OMGUS headquarters issued a directive which 
outlined in detail a new 16 mm re-education and reorientation 
film program. The directive determined exactly how many film 
projectors would be available for each city and county and
Br., BOX 314, 5/314-3/11.
Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October 
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits 
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11.
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provided a list of all available films. Horn did not seem to 
be aware of the instructions, although the Amerika Haus 
obviously had received the projector it was supposed to get 
and had employed a projectionist by June 1948. The director 
related to headquarters that Nuremberg had been fortunate in 
obtaining documentary films for her program, but had had to 
rely entirely on the resources and connections of local 
personnel. According to her, supply or distribution centers 
had not shown any support in this field. Horn stated that 
she "would be very much interested in knowing who started the 
film program, how they expected it to function and what 
happened to it, like "Topsy" it seemed to grow, I heard a lot 
about it and nothing happened. She would not have had to go 
far to find out about the directive. The local detachment 
had received and faithfully filed it apparently without 
distributing the paper within the American community. 
Neither Ms. Horn nor the local GYA officer ever received a 
copy of the directive from James Barnett, the Nuremberg 
detachment' s director.67
Horn would have been able to gather further information 
from the local newspaper as well. In March 1948 the 
Niirnberger Nachrichten reported that Military Government
67Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October 
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits 
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11; OMGUS, Office of the Military
Governor, Berlin to Land Military governments in the American 
Zone, 2 Feb. 1948, subject: distribution and use of re­
education and reorientation 16 mm films and projectors; NA RG 
260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1419, 9/126-3/8.
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would make about eleven film projectors with about one 
hundred films about culture available. Above all schools, 
churches, and the villages around Nuremberg would benefit 
from the program.68
The start was difficult. In April 1948 Nuremberg 
Military Government officials had one projector at their 
disposal. By December twenty projectors were available and 
the same number of Germans were trained as full time 
projectionists. It also took OMGUS officials until the end 
of the year to allocate the necessary budget for the 
program.69
Obtaining an adequate supply of films proved to be 
another obstacle. ICD alerted its information centers to an 
"immediate source", the Signal Corps Training Film Libraries 
throughout the American zone. Their films would certainly 
complement the documentaries available to OMGUS so far. In 
this way, Germans got to know "A Small Town in USA," 
"Washington," or "A Suburban Family." By the end of 1948 
OMGUS was taking steps to reorganize film distribution and 
overhaul the available material. From June 1949 field
“"Hundert Kulturfilme kommen," [One Hundred Cultural 
Films About to Arrive] NN, 3 Mar. 1948: 3.
69Memo James Barnett to OMGBY, 18 Mar. 1948; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, FOD, Box 1419, 9/126-3/8; MG Det. B-211, Monthly
Report covering May 1948; MG Det. B-211, Annual Report of 7 
Aug. 1948 for Period Covering July 1947 to June 30 1948; NA 
RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2; OMGUS, E&CRD, Semi 
Annual Report for Period Ending 31 Dec. 1948; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, ID, Box 54, 10/130-2/5.
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detachments could order film packages for specific audiences 
which included newsreels, documentaries, and entertainment 
films.70
In Nuremberg James Barnett made young people his 
priority. His detachment began to show forty five-minute 
programs to children. Barnett also negotiated with the 
Nuremberg school superintendent about bringing a projector 
and movies to each school every two weeks. Adults had to be 
content with whatever time would be available, but as soon as 
Barnett had enough projectors and material, he developed a 
program for adults which included discussions of the movies 
the audience had seen. Headquarters agreed with this 
emphasis, as long as the showings had a definite 
reorientation mission and were accompanied by discussions or 
presentations of the local Liaison and Security Officer.71
During the next years the film program became one of the 
most important pillars of American reorientation policy. 
Each projectionist toured the countryside, introducing the
70ICD, Information Centers Br. to Directors of 
Information Centers, 19 Feb. 1948, subject: Army films
available to Information Centers; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ICD, 
Information Centers Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/20; OMGBY,
Reorientation Staff Unit, minutes of meetings, 30 Nov. 1948, 
7 June 1949; OMGBY Reorientation Committee, minutes of 
meeting, 16 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, CAD, Democratization 
Br., BOX 112, 13/150-2/13.
7lMG Det. B-211, From James Barnett, Director, 
Supplemental Intelligence Report, 24 Aug. 1948; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Br., Box 312, 5/314-2/12;
OMGBY, minutes of Reorientation Staff Unit, 7 June 1949; NA 
RG 260 OMGBY, CAD, Democratization Br., Box 112, 13/150-2/13.
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local population to American films. A HICOG study revealed 
that in some regions the American films were the first moving 
pictures the people had ever seen. Usually turnout was very 
high. Entire village populations attended shows in local 
restaurants, gymnasiums or even in the open air. USIC 
produced a considerable number of movies on the functioning 
of the democratic process, but documentaries about the United 
States proved to be the most popular feature of the program. 
HICOG spent almost one million dollars for these activities 
in 1950 and 1952. In that year it also decided to replace 
the old and not very reliable projectors with new ones which 
were smaller, easier to use, and had a better sound 
quality.72
HICOG was not content with bringing American films to 
Germany and synchronizing them. It continued the production 
of the weekly newsreels and also produced many films in 
Germany which addressed specific reorientation issues, 
especially the practical application of democratic principles 
in many different situations ranging from the democratic 
procedures in local government to elections in trade unions 
or youth organizations. Young people learned about the 
American student exchange program for Germany. To teach them 
more about youth work in the United States, OMGUS produced
^Pilgert, Information Service 61-76; memo from HICOG to 
Dept, of State, 11 Dec. 1950; memo from HICOG to Dept, of 
State, 19 Sept. 1951; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 
511.62A5/12-1150, 511.62A5/9-1951; Franz Schmalz, personal
interview, 5 July 1994.
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films about the function of youth centers, progressive 
schools, or community initiatives for more playgrounds.73
Attendance numbers in the Nuremberg area were 
impressive. An average of more than one hundred people came 
to each show. In 1948 about 26,000 persons saw American 
reorientation movies every month throughout the region. 
Three years later the HICOG Kreis Resident Officer for 
Nuremberg reported that the film program for his area had 
just registered its 500,000th visitor.74
The popularity of the program also made it an attractive 
feature for private sponsors. The German Shell Corporation, 
for example, decided to make its name better known to the 
rural areas of Northern Bavaria through its own film car. 
The local GYA newspaper reported that the car would "stop at 
every youth center and school" to show educational films.75
In Nuremberg many youth groups took advantage of the 
program. After taking a course in handling the portable 
equipment, youth representatives were able to check a 
projector and films out of the Amerika Haus and show it to
^ISD Motion Picture Branch Monthly Report - November 
1950; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A5/1-251.
74Det. B-211, Annual Report of 7 Aug. 1948 for Period 
Covering 1 July 1947 to 30 June 1948; NA RG 260, OMGBY, FOD, 
Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2; Det. B-211, Reorientation 
Report (consolidated), 1-15 Oct. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, 
Headquarters, Box 333, 16/53-1/21; Office of the Land
Commissioner for Bavaria [hereinafter OLCB], E&CRD, monthly 
report for March 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, FOD, Director, Box 2.
75Caption and photo, YW, vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June 1950: 8.
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their youth groups. Horst Klaus, a trade union youth leader, 
decided to take up the reorientation offer from the Americans 
and make it part of his work in one of Nuremberg's factories. 
He had developed a taste for American movies previously when 
the GIs stationed close to his home allowed children to 
attend their unit's shows. Thanks to his efforts management 
agreed to grant apprentices part of their work time for 
educational purposes. Klaus obtained the necessary equipment 
for showing movies from the Information Center. To comply 
with the education mission he would first show a documentary 
about the work of trade unions in the United States or about 
the function of the democratic process. A second movie 
invariably would deal with the culture or different regions 
of the United States and other parts of the world. According 
to Klaus, the program was very popular with the apprentices 
and served him well in his work for the trade unions.76
In line with traditional Military Government policy to 
leave as much as possible to the Germans, HICOG officials 
decided to turn the films and most of the projectors over to 
the Germans from 1951 on. HICOG field officials carried 
their task out, but also let headquarters know that they did
76OLCB, District III Report: HILITES for January 1951; NA 
RG 466 OLCB, FOD, Director, Box 2; Horst Klaus, personal 
interview, 11 Aug. 1994.
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not understand why HICOG was cutting such a successful 
program.77
The film program led to another interesting 
reorientation feature for young people in the American zone. 
In 1950 the Nuremberg Resident Officer began to develop 
quizzes which followed the films. Young Germans reacted 
enthusiastically to this new and fun way to expand their 
horizons. GYA groups and the German-American Youth Club 
organized their own quiz bowls and HICOG introduced a zone- 
wide competition. By 1953 these contests had become a 
standard feature in many of Nuremberg's youth groups' 
activities.78
In 1948, however, these successes seemed to be far away. 
The information centers program still needed to secure 
support from higher echelons. Horn was not the only one to
^OLCB, Public Affairs Division [hereinafter PAD], 
monthly reports, June 1951, Sept. 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, PAD, 
Box 1.
78Harald Lund, Kreis Resident Officer for District III, 
to Kenneth E. van Buskirk, Chief, FOD, OLCB, 20 Sept. 1950; 
NA RG 466 OLCB, FOD, District Land Office Activity Reports, 
1950-52; District III Hilites for January 1951; NA RG 466 
OLCB, "EEI" Reports, 1950-51. The local newspaper reflected 
the success of the idea: see, for example, "Quiz-Abend beim 
KJR: 13 Verfassungen in der Bundesrepublik," [Quiz Bowl at 
the Kreis Youth Ring: 13 Constitutions in the Federal 
Republic] NN, 3 Mar. 1951: 13; "Die besten 'Quizer' sind
ermittelt: Frankische Endausscheidungen der HICOG-Quiz-
veranstaltungen - Antwort in 15 Sekunden," [The Best 
"Quizzers" Were Found: Finals of HICOG Quiz Bowls in
Franconia - Answer in 15 Seconds] NN, 14 Dec. 1951: 9;
"Betriebsjugend lost Ratsel: Sechs GroBfirmen treten in
Wettstreit," [Youth in Factories Solves Riddles: Six Major 
Firms to Compete] NN, 18 Mar. 1953: 9.
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At the Army Youth Center #2, Nurnberg, Germany, a quiz was 
held between German members of the German-American Youth Club 
of Nurnberg [sic] and Dependents of the Nurnberg-Furth [sic] 
Military Post. The Quiz was sponsored by the youth club as 
part of their cultural program. The final score of the quiz 
was: the U.S. dependents; 3 50; the German youth: 395._____
17. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 299412, Dec. 1947.
criticize procedures within Military Government. Amerika 
Haus directors throughout Bavaria had similar grievances. 
Local Liaison and Security Officers were equally frustrated 
by the lack of coordination between headquarters and the 
field. Coburg and the surrounding region were immediate 
neighbors of the Soviet zone of occupation. In view of the 
mounting tensions with the Soviets and Patricia van Delden's 
awareness of the importance of this region in American 
reorientation efforts, the frustration of the local field 
officer is surprising. In October 1948 he reported about the 
condition of the Coburg Amerika Haus program and its attached
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
reading rooms. Coburg had just recently been upgraded to the 
status of Amerika Haus. The detachment's most pressing 
problem was the lack of personnel. In the town three 
employees were running the facility at the time. The officer 
noted that he would have no problems finding qualified 
personnel "if and when the proposed allocation of employees 
for this Amerika Haus is authorized." Until that moment it 
would be "necessary to beg, borrow or steal assistance from 
every possible source." The situation was even worse for the 
reading room in Kronach which was equally close to the 
border. The two employees there actually were paid by
Special Branch. Since the branch was being phased out, they 
would be terminated by the end of the month. While the 
detachment had supplies and space available for a number of 
additional reading rooms, it had no employees at its 
disposition to run them in October 1948. Apparently the 
problems in Coburg were resolved. In 1950 the town still had 
its own Amerika Haus, but plans were underway to consolidate 
American activities. Coburg became a branch of the larger 
institution in Hof.79
In spite of all obstacles, Horn transformed the 
Nuremberg Amerika Haus into a vibrant cultural center which 
tried to offer something for everybody and enjoyed
79Lawson R. Beard, OMGBY, FOD, Area Coburg to OMGBY, 
Office of the Land Director, Munich, 12 Oct. 1948; NA RG 260 
OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibition Br., Box 313, 
5/318-3/18; Pilgert, Information Services 38, 76.
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considerable success. By September 1948 the twenty-five 
employees of the Information Center were busy. They had 
issued over 7,000 readers cards to people who took advantage 
of the open shelf system— a new feature in Germany— and had 
a home to enjoy the literature. 4,000 of the almost 18,000 
available volumes were checked out during that month. 7,200 
people came to the library during September to study books or 
to read magazines. The center offered 124 English courses in 
which more than 2,500 people participated. The demand for 
these courses was so great that teachers had to limit 
participation. Twenty-one discussion evenings attracted 
1,800 participants. Concerts and recorded music hours found 
880 listeners. Lack of suitable films and their low quality 
did not seem to bother German audiences. The center's film 
hour was an extremely popular feature and performances 
usually enjoyed capacity audiences. In September 1948 
twenty-four performances for adults netted 2,400 people. An 
additional 1,200 visitors came to see an exhibition at the 
center. Over 20,000 Nurembergers had found their way to the 
Amerika Haus during that month.80
During the next months the Center was able to increase 
these numbers considerably. In February 1949 almost 30,000 
people used the facilities. Half of them came to read or
80Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October 
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits 
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11; "Reges Leben im Amerika Haus,"
[Lively Activities in Amerika Haus] NN, 21 Feb. 1948: 5.
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borrow books, the other half took advantage of the English 
courses, listened to American and German lecturers on topics 
ranging from American authors to Psycho-Analysis. The film 
program introduced Germans to Ireland, the British Empire, 
Mexico, and life in the United States. Woody Woodpecker and 
Mickey Mouse entertained the children. The Amerika Haus also 
increasingly developed into a center of the city's cultural 
life. Various classical music groups performed works by 
modern American and German composers, but also included the 
traditional works by Bach, Handel, Mozart, Ravel, Brahms, and 
Chopin in their programs. Even in this realm, however, the 
staff did not forget its reorientation mission. Discussions 
about the music always followed the performances.81
Reading rooms were in no position to make similar 
programs available to their patrons, but almost all of them 
offered more than just library services from the start. 
English courses and story times for children were the most 
popular choices. One year after the reading rooms had opened 
their doors they had consolidated their activities. Ansbach, 
Middle Franconia's capital about thirty miles west of 
Nuremberg, for example, had about 33,000 inhabitants at the 
time. In August 1949 two employees were in charge of the
81 Amerika Haus Nurnberg, OMGBY, OD, Area Nurnberg to Mr. 
C.S. Wright jr., Chief, Exhibitions and Information Centers 
Br., Information Services Division [hereinafter ISD], OMGBY, 
Munich, subject: monthly report for period ending 11 Feb. 
1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits 
Br., BOX 314, 5/314-3/11.
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local reading room which was centrally located. 1220 
registered borrowers could choose from 628 German titles and 
5,100 English books. The library had 390 books in German and 
3,406 books in English available for young people. Summer 
traditionally was the slowest time of the year, but 
nevertheless 2,160 people visited the reading room. Although 
Ansbach was largely an administrative center, technical 
magazines were among the three most popular items, but the 
people who came were not just interested in American 
literature. A considerable number of users wanted to find 
out more about the American Constitution. American office 
management was another popular topic. Significantly, over 
half of the patrons at the time were juveniles who took 
advantage of the library's large youth section. The reading 
room also offered a special children's hour which introduced 
the youngest patrons to translated American stories and 
poems.82
82Report of USIC, OMGBY, Amerika Haus Nuremberg, [October 
1948]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Information Centers and Exhibits 
Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/11; library data report, U.S. Reading 
Room Ansbach, attached to US Information Center Nuernberg, 
month of August-September 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, 
Information Centers and Exhibitions Br., Box 326, 5/316-2/47. 
The folder contains reports from all other reading rooms 
serviced by the Nuremberg Amerika Haus. The Ansbach reading 
room is representative of the rest of the region. All 
reading rooms which were not within easy reach of the Amerika 
Haus in Nuremberg served between 5 and 10% of the population 
living in these communities. The percentage of young readers 
was usually about 50% of the total. The fact that many of 
the reading rooms also hosted GYA activities may play a role 
in the high proportion of young patrons. It also could 
reflect a greater degree of curiosity and a more pronounced 
desire to get to know more of the world.
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Its success obvious success notwithstanding, the Amerika 
Haus program had to endure considerable cuts and uncertainty 
about its future when the War Department finally handed over 
military government responsibilities to the Department of 
State at the end of 1949. By then the Cold War, which turned 
hot in Korea in 1950, clearly influenced the agenda. Harry 
Truman and Dean Acheson announced that the United States 
needed to expand its own world wide information services 
program to counter Soviet propaganda. To provide HICOG with 
the necessary guidance, the State Department's German desk 
sent daily cables, weekly information letters and a special 
series of notes on Soviet activities to Berlin, but a 
Republican Congress which was eager to save money only 
reacted slowly to the demands for more funding of the 
Democratic administration. Even within the State Department 
the expansion of the program did not enjoy unanimous support. 
Considerable cuts in allocations and a drastic consolidation 
program by HICOG were inevitable.83
In spite of these cuts, the U.S. Information Agency 
maintained an impressive presence in Germany. In 1953 forty- 
seven Amerika Hauser with fifty-four American and 961 German 
employees spent three million dollars to maintain their own 
operations which included twenty book mobiles and 115 German- 
American libraries. Nuremberg employed two Americans and
83Pilgert, Information Services 1-6, 37-38.
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forty-two Germans in 1956. Throughout the 1950s the 
Nuremberg Amerika Haus retained a large children's section.®4
Americans continued to reach out to the countryside. 
Franz Schmalz, a member of the USIC staff since 1948, 
recalled the consolidation phase vividly. Initially he had 
been a member of the reading room staff in Ebermannstadt, a 
small town in Upper Franconia. When the room closed Schmalz 
decided to remain with USIA and moved to Bamberg. In 1950 he 
became director of the Amerika Haus in Hof. He remembered 
that book mobiles became one of the most important vehicles 
to keep the population of his district, which bordered the 
Soviet zone, informed. According to him, the American book 
mobile not only provided the population with reading 
materials, but also brought exhibitions and information 
materials to the most remote areas.85
Schmalz observed firsthand that during the 1950s young 
and old people were "hungry for information" about the United 
States and the world. Most patrons and visitors wanted to 
fill the void which the twelve year long isolation under
®4Office of the United States High Commissioner for 
Germany, Information Centers Division, The America Houses: A 
Study of the U.S. Information Center Program in Germany (Bad 
Godesberg: Office of the United States High Commissioner for 
Germany, [1954]) 1; William F. Sheldon, "Facing America -
Facing Germany: Amerikahaus und Deutsch-Amerikanisches
Institut seit 1946," Facing America. Ein Mosaik: Texte, 
Fakten, Meinungen, ed. Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Kultur im 
GroBraum Nurnberg, Fiirth, Erlangen, Schwabach (Nurnberg 
[Nuremberg]: Plarrer Verlag, 1992) 122.
®5Franz Schmalz, personal interview, 5 July 1994.
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Hitler had left. Many members of the older generation came 
to the American institutions to request books which the Nazis 
had burnt and therefore were not available in German 
libraries anymore. School classes visited the center in Hof, 
and in Bamberg many secondary school students became regular 
patrons, but, according to Schmalz, USIA did not particularly 
emphasize youth work.86 
American Aid to Churches
Lutheran church leaders displayed a considerable reserve 
towards OMGUS and HICOG programs as well as the Army's GYA, 
even though members of the churches appreciated American help 
as long as it came from the right sources. As early as 1946 
Bavarian Youth Reverend Helbich could report that Nuremberg 
had re-established contacts with the World Council of 
Churches (WCC) and with churches in Switzerland. Helbich 
welcomed these contacts because in this way the Germans would 
be able to clarify "many misunderstandings."87
Nuremberg saw the first prominent international 
Christian youth leader in June 1947, when John R. Mott, 
President of the Young Men's Christian Association, visited
86Franz Schmalz, personal interview, 5 July 1994.
87Stand der Jugendarbeit des Landesjugendpfarrers, 12 
Feb. 1946; LCA Landeskirchenrat, Akten des Landesjugend­
pfarrers VI; 1178a 1946-1964, Bd. IV.
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the city to confer with YMCA leaders, as well as with church 
representatives and American authorities.88
The WCC maintained close contact with the occupation 
authorities and kept them abreast of its intentions and 
actions. In March 1947 OMGUS representatives encouraged the 
WCC to participate in the reorientation effort. Robert 
Tobias of the WCC in Geneva informed OMGUS in July 1947 that 
the council was "in the process of selecting suitable 
candidates."89 Four weeks later he provided OMGUS with a 
detailed plan of the mission of six WCC representatives whom 
the WCC would assign to "strategic centers." One of them was 
slated to go to Nuremberg where he would be "attached to 
Protestant Youth Council of Bavaria in area leadership for 
conferences, camps, over-all planning, field work."90 In 
September 1947 Reverend Chester Baird, born in China, 
recently ordained and just twenty-five years old, arrived at 
Nuremberg to coordinate and revive the international contacts 
between the Lutheran youths of Germany and abroad. The 
reverend stayed until 1949, but actually does not seem to 
have done more than listen and observe. He made it a point
88Cable from JCS to OMGUS, 29 Apr. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-l/[2].
89Letter from Robert Tobias, WCC, Geneva, to Arnold Olsen 
and Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, 1 July 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 150, 5/297-1/13.
Proposed Plan for Christian Youth Leadership Exchanges 
by Robert Tobias - World Council of Churches, 30 July 1947; 
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 150, 
5/297-1/13.
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not to participate in Nuremberg's social life in order to be 
able to concentrate on his mission in Germany. According to 
him, churches in Germany and overseas were achieving the goal 
of reconciliation fast, because "there were no boundaries 
between Christians the world over." Baird thought that the 
real problem for Germany were those young people whom the 
churches were unable to reach.91
In spite of the Nuremberg Lutheran youth leaders' 
criticism of the materialistic attitudes which American 
programs for children in Nuremberg allegedly promoted by 
distributing food, candy and Coca Cola, those involved in 
youth work found that love in fact became a matter of the 
stomach as the German proverb says. The reverend who 
organized one of the first youth camps of the Lutheran church 
in Bavaria in June 1946 gratefully reported about the food he 
obtained from the Americans. This time it was not the Army 
but rather Lutherans, Mennonites, and Baptists, who, the
9lApplication [for residence in Germany], Carl Chester 
Baird; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 
150, 5/297-1/13; "US Church Worker Lives Quietly in Nurnberg: 
'No Borderlines between Christians ...'," YW, vol. 2, no. 17, 
1 Jun. 1948: 2. With the exception of an article by Pastor 
Helbich in which he bid good-bye to Baird in 1949, I was 
unable to find any materials on or from Baird in the Lutheran 
Church Archives in spite of the fact that he spent two years 
in Nuremberg. Interestingly, MG approached Baird in January 
1948 and asked him to provide MG with reports of his 
activities and a list of capable youth leaders. Baird 
probably took great care not to compromise his position. I 
found no answer to the request. (Letter from Richard T. 
Alexander, OMGUS, to Carl C. Baird, Nuremberg, 28 Jan. 1948; 
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 126, 
5/293-3/15)
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reverend observed, had already started to collect food for 
hungry Germans while the war was still raging in Europe. 
Without the help of canned beans, dried milk and vegetable 
preserves, the author noted, the children in his summer camp 
would have gone hungry. American visitors recorded the same 
gratefulness for American food supplements in church 
organized summer camps throughout the American zone.92
American generosity in this field, however, did not 
reach all Germans. American churches had not only collected 
food in the United States, but in 1947 also sent 50,000 
Dollars to Switzerland to procure food for summer camps in 
Bavaria. Military Government officials initially assumed 
that all youth groups were included in the program, but the 
churches did not show any signs of Christian charity. They 
were not willing to share their resources, which left 
Military Government and German authorities scrambling for 
alternatives just weeks before the program was to start. The 
action certainly did not endear the Lutheran clergy to
^Pentecost 1946, Camp in Georgensgemiind; LCA Personen 
CLXV Dollinger 16; see also Dr. Arnold Dannemann, report on 
summercamps for German boys, [Fall 1947]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 135, 5/295-1/14; "Bericht 
iiber die Lager ar be it des CVJM Ev. Jungmannerwerkes in der 
amerikanischen, britischen und franzosischen Zone," Summer 
1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 
151, 5/297-1/25. This report contains a considerable number 
of thank you letters, some of which came from boys who lived 
in Nuremberg.
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Military Government, German administrators, and youth workers 
who were not affiliated with the churches.93
The practical assistance many American institutions 
rendered to Nuremberg's population and especially the city's 
youth during the postwar period did much to tear down 
barriers between the victors and the vanquished. 
Nurembergers had countless opportunities to get in contact 
with Americans, to become acquainted with their culture, and 
last, but not least, to survive with their support. 
Americans continued their efforts to re-educate young Germans 
by means of a more democratic school system, but they adapted 
their strategy to the situation in Bavaria. Amerika Hauser, 
Education Centers, and the OMGUS film program worked towards 
the end of instilling democratic ideas and ideals in young 
and old Germans alike, but almost always took special care to 
reach out to Germany's youth. CRALOG, CARE, and the Hoover 
program became household names in Nuremberg.
While Lutheran church leaders maintained their reserve 
about American authorities in Germany, they established a 
separate track of communications with the United States 
through the World Council of Churches which also was designed 
to alleviate the physical needs of Germany, but also to 
reintegrate the Lutheran church and its members into the
93Bayerischer Jugendring, Munchen an die Jugendabteilung 
der Militarregierung in Bayern, Bericht iiber die Zeltlager- 
aktion 1947, 18 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group
Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/2.
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international community. The tactical troops' willingness to 
help out wherever it was necessary left a long lasting 
favorable impression on many young and older Germans who 
certainly appreciated the effort. A close look at GYA 
activities in Nuremberg will show that the Army not only 
assisted German youth organizations, but went beyond the 
traditional boundaries of German youth work in the American 
zone, providing German administrators as well as young people 
with alternatives to the traditional German ways.
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CHAPTER X
The GYA; Army Assistance to German Youth Activities in
WiirAnihera. 1946-1952
The Army's program in Nuremberg developed from small 
beginnings into a full fledged operation with a wide variety 
of programs designed especially for those who did not want to 
join a youth organization. Besides a warm place to stay and 
the famous candies and cookies, the Army centers of the 
Nuremberg Military Post offered a wide range of activities. 
Many of them were educational, others offered hands-on 
experiences in democratic procedure, respect, or individual 
initiative. The open door approach offered an attractive 
alternative to the strictly regimented life the younger 
generation had come to know in the Hitler Youth and which the 
Free German Youth continued in the Soviet zone. An 
impressive number of young Germans in the region took 
advantage of the many GYA programs. Many German youth 
leaders, however, resented this encroachment on their 
traditional turf. Nevertheless GYA served as a model for 
progressive German educators and youth workers.
Laving the Foundation
Just like everywhere else in the American zone of 
occupation, American soldiers and their units in and around 
Nuremberg began to start making contacts with young people 
early on. The Army directive of April 1946 made youth work
485
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an official responsibility of the local commanders. GYA 
activities in the region initially consisted almost entirely 
of sports. Some officers in Fiirth had established boxing 
teams, other Americans introduced young Nurembergers to 
American sports such as baseball, football, or basketball, 
since equipment for German sports was not yet available. 
Weekly stage shows in the Fiirth opera house provided youth 
with the only GYA-sponsored cultural activities. In 
Nuremberg 1st Lt. William Schroeder, the officer in charge of 
the city's extensive sports facilities which the Army had 
requisitioned for GIs, was the first man to become active for 
GYA. He soon was well known among D.P. children who lived in 
a camp close to the sports facilities, but also to young 
Germans, many of whom inhabited a nearby refugee camp.1
Mark Selsor received his appointment as head of the 
Nuremberg Military Post's German Youth Activities program in 
August 1946. He remained with the assignment until May 1950 
and became one of the most important and respected figures in 
the city's and the region's youth work. The Nuremberg Post 
area for which he was responsible included the city of
l0MGBY, Det. B-211, Monthly Historical Report, July, 
Aug., Sept. 1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 
9/124-1/2; Hanns Bader, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; 
Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995; "Good Luck, 
Lt. Schroeder!" YW vol. 1, no. 2, 1 Feb. 1947: 2.
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Nuremberg, the entire region of Upper and Middle Franconia as 
well as parts of the Upper Palatinate.2
Selsor was well equipped for the job. He had spent time 
in Germany during the twenties and spoke German well. A 
difficult childhood had helped him to develop a deep 
understanding for the problems young people faced during hard 
times. As a professional soldier, Selsor was able to combine 
these gifts and a high degree of idealism with a profound 
understanding and respect for the organization he was 
serving. From the outset, he and his family not only tried 
to give something to young Germans, but actually made an 
attempt to share some of their misery with them. The Selsors 
decided to skip one meal a week and donate the proceeds to 
needy people. Soon, many families of the military community 
did the same. This combination of inside knowledge, skills, 
and dedication enabled Selsor to secure support of his 
superiors and to mobilize the enormous facilities the Army 
had to offer in spite of constant difficulties in the 
personnel sector. Capable officers and enlisted men were 
transferred and could not be replaced, and qualified
2A11 of the interviewees who were directly involved in 
leadership positions in Nuremberg youth groups remembered 
Selsor well and expressed their respect and gratitude for the 
American youth officer, although they did not always see eye 
to eye with him about youth activities in the city. See also 
Maar 106.
Selsor retired as a Colonel and to date has not lost his 
willingness to lend a helping hand. In spite of serious 
difficulties with his health, he and his family were 
extremely helpful and provided me with very valuable 
information and documents.
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indigenous personnel was equally hard to locate. The Major's 
dedication, qualities, and tact also earned him the respect 
of the German youth leaders, with whom he remained in close 
contact, and the admiration of many of the young people who 
experienced first hand Selsor's and his wife June's work in 
Nuremberg. Originally assigned to work at the IMT, the major 
immediately volunteered for the job as youth officer for the 
entire Post when it became available. From the start Selsor 
cultivated good relations between German authorities and his 
office. Even more important, he successfully reached out to 
the German youth organizations in Nuremberg, but also offered 
alternatives to those who did not find their way into youth 
groups.3
One of Selsor's main objectives was to support German 
youth groups as much as he could. MG was only able to assist 
German groups with the help of the tactical command. All 
material and assistance the Army which provided in the 
Nuremberg region went through the GYA office.
3OMGBY, Det. B-211, Monthly Historical Report, Aug. 
1946; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2; 
"Ein Portrat: Niirnbergs Jugendoffizier," [A Portrait:
Nuremberg's Youth Officer] NN, 11 Jan. 1947: 6; for Selsor's 
permanent struggle with adversity see especially his almost 
complete monthly narrative reports for 1948 (NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9, Box 47,
10/19-3/16, Box 34, 10/43-1/4); June Selsor (10) reports
about the meal skipping initiative. Mrs. Selsor's manuscript 
provides a unique and very thoughtful perspective of her 
family's four years in Germany, as well as her and her 
husband's work for GYA.
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The Major and his co-workers were not content with the 
rather limited approach of the program for which he had taken 
responsibility. GYA made it into Nuremberg's newspaper for 
the first time in September 1946. Nurembergers found an 
interview with Lieutenant William Schroeder on the sports 
page in which Schroeder announced that he was planning to 
introduce a city-wide youth sports club open to everyone. 
Young Germans would be able to become acquainted with 
American sports but would also have the chance to revive the 
traditional German disciplines under American supervision. 
The officer told the press that the Americans would provide 
all the equipment necessary for these activities. Although 
the interview appeared on the sports page, Schroeder went far 
beyond the realm of physical education. Probably with the 
blessing of Major Selsor, he provided the Niirnberger 
Nachrichten with a complete outline of the program which the 
GYA intended to establish for the city's youth. During the 
winter young people would not only be able to use local 
gymnasiums for playing ping-pong or chess, but the Americans 
would also try to provide them with "spiritual values." 
Schroeder counted on the generosity of the local troops to 
donate food and candies so that the events would have a 
nutritional value for those who would attend. The first 
lieutenant explained that the Army would make club rooms 
available which were not used to capacity by local units. 
Trucks would provide safe transportation home for those who
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came during the long winter nights. Obviously impressed by 
this news, the interviewer noted that the city administration 
should be grateful for the initiative and should support it 
above all through the schools.4
Schroeder did not deliver empty promises, although he 
left Nuremberg just four months after his interview.5 The 
Nuremberg Military Post initiated an all encompassing program 
throughout the region. While GYA's first attempt to bring 
young Germans to the requisitioned Nuremberg opera house did 
not meet with an enthusiastic response, Schroeder did not 
give up. An amateur theater performance of Erich Kastner's 
"Emil und die Detektive" broke the ice. According to the 
local paper, the function attracted many young Nurembergers 
and was a tremendous success for everybody involved.6
Nevertheless GYA did not take off with a resounding 
success. ICD collected contradictory information about the 
program. While a study of March 1947 concluded that about 
50% of all Germans in the American zone knew GYA and about 
10% of the zone's youth participated in it, a second survey—  
conducted just two months later— reversed the positive
4"Wir Amerikaner helfen Niirnbergs Jugend: Der Stadion- 
Sportoffizier entwickelt in einem Gesprach mit den 'N.N.' 
seine groSziigigen Plane," [We Americans Help Nuremberg's 
Youth: The Stadium Sports Officer Develops His Generous Plans 
in an Interview with "N.N."] NN, 21 Sept. 1946: 6.
s"Good Luck Lt. Schroeder!" YW, vol. 1, no. 2, 1 Feb. 
1947: 2.
6"Emil und die Detektive," [Emil and the Detectives] NN, 
12 Oct. 1946: 7.
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findings. The new study stated that very few people knew the 
program and an even lower percentage were actually involved. 
Questionnaires of the Nuremberg ICD unit, which were 
apparently part of the latter survey, supported the more 
negative findings. According to them, adults usually thought 
that the Americans either wanted to educate young people for 
democratic ideals or simply wanted to keep them out of 
trouble. Almost all of the parents indicated that they would 
not object to their children attending American youth 
activities. Boys and girls were curious and signalled their 
willingness to participate, but in general did not have any 
opinion about the purpose of such a program.7 
Going to the Movies or Having them Delivered
The survey was conducted only two months after Selsor 
had introduced the GYA youth film hour which soon would 
become one of the most successful American programs in the 
city and assured that GYA became widely known. The 35 mm 
film program came just in time to provide young people with 
a warm place to go to during the cold winter months. For a
7Adolf Kiifner, Bericht iiber die Freizeitgestaltung der 
Jugend, 28 Jan. 1947. Kiifner, a German ICD employee, seems 
to have based his report on a rather small sample of sixteen 
adults and sixteen children. The sample included one member 
of the upper class, one member of the upper middle class, and 
one member of the lower middle class. The rest of the people 
he polled were members of the working class. In spite of its 
obvious limitations, it probably is a good indicator for 
German sentiment in Nuremberg at the time. The two surveys 
are Information Control Weekly Review no. 15 (15 Mar. 1S47) 
and no. 23 (10 May 1947); NA RG 260 OMGUS, ICD, Opinion
Surveys Br., Box 158, 5/234-2/5 and 5/234-2/6a.
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mere thirty Pfennigs young Germans could attend functions in 
the opera house from December 1946 on. Under the guidance of 
Ignaz Wiihr, a qualified and dedicated German volunteer who 
owned one of Nuremberg's movie theaters, the film program 
became one of the major attractions for young people in the 
city. By March 1947 already 24,000 children and adolescents 
had visited the American movie hour. Selsor made sure to 
establish close contact with city officials. The schools 
took care of ticketing and the collection of the fees, and 
German as well as American officials were at hand to explain 
the significance of certain movies to the young audience. 
Not even four months after its inauguration Selsor could 
celebrate the fiftieth function and announced that over sixty 
thousand children had visited this GYA program to date. It 
continued to be part of the Nuremberg youth activities for 
many years. A little over twelve months after the first show 
Selsor informed the press that 120,000 tickets had been sold 
for the one hundred functions the program had given so far. 
In January 1947 sixteen American, two Swiss, one British, one 
French, and one Soviet, as well as three German feature films 
stood at the program's disposal. Charlie Chaplin's “Gold 
Rush” was one of the favorites, but "Young Tom Edison,” 
"Union Pacific," or "Madame Curie" also filled the theater. 
Twenty-one documentaries dealt with topics which covered
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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American technical and governmental achievements as well as 
life, history, and culture of the United Sates.*
GYA field work leaped ahead of the policy makers as well 
as Military Government activities. In March 1947 EUCOM 
decided to integrate film programs into GYA. To counteract 
the tendency to provide the GYA visitors just with 
inexpensive entertainment officers were instructed to use 
"suitable motion pictures [... ] to the fullest as a means for 
illustrating democratic life." Entertainment films needed 
Military Government approval and had to be combined with 
documentaries. Selsor was sorry about the limited number of 
films and the rather poor physical condition of the available 
copies, but he thought that they were better than nothing. 
Success proved him right. The program expanded further in
1948. During the second quarter of the year over 316,000 
young people in Nuremberg, Hof, and Bamberg took part in the 
film hour.9
*"GYA Movies," YW, vol. 1, no. 1, 2 Jan. 1947: 3; list 
of films available for German audiences, 23 Jan. 1947; NA RG 
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 147, 5/296- 
3/5. The GYA film program became a regular feature in the 
Niirnberger Nachrichten. See, for example, "Jugendfilmstunden 
im Opernhaus," [Youth Film Hours in the Opera House] NN, 30. 
Nov. 1946: 7; "Jubel um Tom Edison," [Cheers For Tom Edison] 
NN, 25 Jan. 47: 7. "Jugendfilmstunde - sehr beliebt," [Youth 
Film Hour - Very Popular] NN, 15 Mar. 1947: 5; "Jugendfilm- 
stunde hat Jubilaum," [Youth Film Hour Has Anniversary] NN, 
5 July 1947: 3; "100. Jugendfilmstunde," [100th Youth Film 
Hour] NN, 28 Jan. 1948: 5.
9From EUCOM to Field Forces, directive re.: motion
pictures, 11 Mar. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 141, 5/295-3/7; Nuremberg Military Post, 
GYA Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit
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GYA  
J U G E i X D F I L  M S X U lY D E
tm  A jn e riltJ u U a c fc e a  Ih c a te r  la  :V & rm b « *v  ( U a te r  d m  U p e ra h a u *  ) 
Vam t U a n g t i i  J c d c n  .H Illw a A ,  m O  CThf
iYlittivoch, 9. Ju ii R ichter von C o lo rado  (Farbfilm) 
Mittwoch, 16. Juii Unter s d n e a rs e r F la g g e  
ftlittwoch, 23. Ju ii M it  Buciise un d  Lasso 
Mitt-woch, 30 . Ju ii Liebesbriefe aus E n g la n d
Vorr«riuui jawoili ib Freiug aa <ler K i m  dca Victoria- Filacbaatan. Ludwiftinia 1 
and ia iier Theater- S u m  eiaa balba Scuada .or deal Segiaa der F3m- Vonteiluac
18. GYA Youth Film Hour Advertisement, 1952 (Source: YW, vol. 
6, no. 7, July 1952: 6)
Currency reform in 1948 suddenly wiped out all cash 
reserves and for a time saddled GYA with considerable debts, 
almost eliminating the program, but Wiihr, the heart and soul 
of the film hour who had been mainly responsible for 
organizing the films, managed to overcome that crisis as 
well. In December 1950 he could look back to 400 
performances, 400 different films and over 300,000 guests. 
To celebrate the occasion, Wiihr provided an audience of 
teachers and 1,200 students with the synchronized version of 
"Lassie Come Home" in color. To accommodate some people who 
criticized the choice of the films GYA had announced in the 
summer of 1950 that it was planning to introduce a screening 
committee consisting of educators, both churches, and GYA
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125, [1].
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which would be responsible for selecting the movies. Until 
such a committee could be organized the film hour would 
continue in its traditional manner.10
One year later the film hour moved to a new Army theater 
next to the opera house which the city had constructed with
considerable HICOG help to regain full use of its own
facilities. By then participation had increased to 43 0,000. 
Almost every show was sold out. Wtihr tried his best to 
organize valuable films. In January 1950 "The Jungle Book” 
made its debut before a packed audience. For the 500th show 
he was able to obtain the Swiss film "The Search" which had 
been shot partly in Nuremberg and nearby Ansbach. The film
ran for the first time in Germany and received a very
positive review in the papers. One of the last shows once 
more demonstrated the popularity of the film hour. In spite 
of competition from Hollywood, quality films still attracted 
large audiences. 2,000 young people tried to get one of the
10"Niirnbergs Jugendf ilmstunde feierte Geburtstag: 4 00
Vorstellungen, 400 Filme und 307 000 Gaste: Trotz Kritik: 
Die besten Filme fur die Jugend!" [Nuremberg's Youth Film 
Hour Celebrated its Birthday: 400 shows, 400 films and
307,000 guests: In spite of Criticism: The Best Films for 
Youths!] YW, vol. 4, no. 12, Dec. 1950: 3. Interestingly, 
this article did not have its English counterpart in the 
paper. Often the authors modified articles under the same 
headline specifically for the German or American audience. 
"Council Named for Youth Films," YW vol. 4, no. 8, Aug. 1950: 
2 .
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920 tickets available when "All Quiet on the Western Front" 
stood on the program.11
The days of the film hour were numbered, however. In 
March of 1952 the GYA officer and the director of the city's 
youth office reached an agreement that the Army would cease 
its operations as soon as the new city youth home, which also 
housed a small movie theater, would be opened in fall. Some 
city fathers continued to attack the quality of the program. 
The city council's art committee initiated an investigation 
about the "educational value" of the youth film hour, 
especially about the selection procedure for the films. 
Apparently the investigation touched a raw nerve with Otto 
Barthel, by then the city's school superintendent. He 
reported that in view of some questionable choices, the city 
had attempted to establish a screening committee in 1950. 
According to Barthel, Wiihr had not cooperated in the venture 
which had resulted in a considerable controversy in the 
press. Apparently upset by Wiihr's independence, Barthel had 
refused to continue the promotion of the program in the 
city's schools. Not everyone shared Barthel's negative 
assessment. Andreas Staudt reported that most of the movies
""Jugendfilmstunde geht weiter," [Youth Film Hour 
Continues] YW, vol. 4, no. 1, 1 Jan. 1950: 4; "Nurnberg Youth 
Movie Hour lights 4th Candle: 400 Performances, 400 Films, 
and 307,000 Youth," YW, vol. 4, no. 12, Dec. 1950: 3,4;
"Youth Movie Hour In Its Sixth Year: Performances Now at New
Post Theater," YW, vol. 5, no. 6, Oct./Nov. 1951: 3; "2000 
wollten ins Kino: "Im Westen nichts Neues,"" [2,000 Wanted to 
Go to the Movies: "All Quiet on the Western Front"] YW, vol. 
7, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 1953: 6.
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were very valuable, although some of them seemed to be too 
difficult for the young audience. He thought that the city 
should not revive the controversy since the administration 
would take the film hour under its wings when the new city 
youth house would be finished.12
35 mm films were not the only movies for young people. 
In 1948 GYA also became involved in the 16 mm film program 
which ICD had initiated. Like Amelia Horn, the director of 
the Nuremberg Amerika Haus, Selsor had to find out by himself 
what policy OMGUS officially pursued. Directives from 
headquarters informed him about the five hundred projectors 
OMGUS was making available throughout the American zone and 
Berlin. Apparently unaware of James Barnett's efforts along 
the same lines, Selsor reported in July that the initiative 
was well accepted in spite of the lack of suitable films and 
that he would try to include schools and other German 
institutions in the program.13
Selsor and his successors were able to establish a 
successful venture by using the versatility of the smaller
12Nuremberg Post Journal, 31 Mar. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit 
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122; minutes of a 
metting of the committee for school and cultural affairs, 4
July 1952; NCA C7/IX no. 1307.
13Directive from OMGUS to Field Detachments, subject: 
distribution and use of re-education and reorientation 16 mm 
films and projectors; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community 
Education Br., Box 118, 5/292-2/1; Headquarters, Nuremberg
Military Post, German Youth Activities Section, GYA Staff
Report, 20 July 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9.
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format to their advantage. The Nuremberg GYA center no. 1 
had its own full time staff and film library which included 
educational, cultural, and entertainment movies. Three film 
projectors and one for slides were available to show the 
material. Movies came mainly from HICOG and the Army, but 
GYA also acquired German documentaries as well as 
entertainment movies. The German Shell corporation supplied 
some technical films. All youth groups and schools could 
either borrow them for a nominal fee or arrange for a 
complete performance which included a projectionist, the 
equipment, and the movies.14 In 1950 GYA Nuremberg obtained 
a four wheel drive Dodge Army pick up truck which was 
converted into a film car, enabling a German driver and 
projectionist to reach out even to the most remote villages 
in the region. Just when everything was in place the program 
had to take a first setback. In November 1950 GYA announced 
that it was not permitted to show 16 mm feature films 
anymore. Apparently commercial theaters were afraid of the 
competition.15
Although young Germans had a number of choices to see 
American movies, GYA remained very busy in this field. 
Practically all youth groups took advantage of the program.
l4,lFilm Library Starts Work Again After Inventory," YW, 
vol. 4, no. 9, Sep. 1950: 4.
15Photo and caption, YW, vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June 1950: 4. 
"Film Library Changes Hours: Feature Films No Longer
Available," YW vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 1.
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The trade unions were among the most frequent users, followed 
by sports clubs, the YMCA, the protestant youth groups, and 
the Falcons. Youth groups in factories arranged for 
showings. GYA provided displaced persons from Czechos­
lovakia, Russia, and Poland, who lived in camp Valka on the 
former Nazi Party rally grounds, with shows as well as German 
expellees from the Sudetenland and Silesia who occupied other 
camps in and around Nuremberg. In this way the Army 
introduced several thousand young people each month to 
American culture, to the United States, but also to the 
principles of democracy. A certainly not unwelcome side 
effect of the very popular shows was that it filled the 
coffers of youth organizations with the new currency which 
was otherwise hard to obtain. Between 1948 and 1950 German 
youth groups in the region earned about 10,000 Marks, a 
substantial sum at the time.16
The trade union youth used the offer to feature a weekly 
show in their centers which attracted capacity crowds until 
the middle of the next decade. The increasing prosperity of 
young people, who by then were able to buy tickets to see 
commercial movies which GYA was not permitted to show 
anymore, brought about the end of the program, but Americans
I6|,Film Attendance Booming Again: May Report: 8,910
Participants," YW vol. 4, no. 7, July 1950: 4; "Summer Film 
Slump: Only 5,879 Spectators," YW vol. 4, no. 8, Aug. 1950: 
6; "10,000 DM brachte die GYA Filmbticherei deutschen
Jugendgruppen in die Kassen," [GYA Film Library Netted 10,000 
DM for Coffers of German Youth Groups] YW, vol. 4, no. 12, 
Dec. 1950: 3.
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made sure that the Germans could continue the work. The 
trade unions, for example, received a projector when the Army 
phased the program out and continued to use it for their own 
educational endeavors.17 
Youth Centers
Movie theaters were not the only place that offered 
young people a place they could visit. Soon after he assumed 
his post, Selsor began to search for a suitable youth center 
in Nuremberg. As a first measure, American soldiers had 
decided to share their club facilities with young Germans 
during the cold winter months. The soldiers would not only 
provide the facilities, but also initiate discussion groups 
and organize sports events.18 In Nuremberg young people 
could use the requisitioned track and field installations and 
the swimming pool. During the wintertime the Americans 
provided them with opportunities for ice skating. GYA 
estimated that about 45,000 children throughout the Post area 
had participated in these activities during the first six
17Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug. 1995. 
Trade Unionists agreed that the beginning of prosperity was 
the end of many of their activities. Hans Eckstein, personal 
interview, 6 July 1995; also Grieb, ed. 41 (Horst Klaus); for 
the termination of the film program see Grieb, ed. 71 (Erwin 
Schonleben). It should be noted here that GYA and the USIS 
did not coordinate their film programs officially. Since 
cooperation between GYA and MG was good in Nuremberg, 
Americans there probably managed to avoid duplication in 
effort and material.
“Newspaper clipping, "In Bayern," [In Bavaria] 
Siiddeutsche Zeitung, 1 Sept. 1946: n.p.; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/10.
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months of 1947. The numbers increased substantially during 
the next year. In May 1949 it passed the 100,000 attendance 
mark for one month. At the end of the year over 140,000 
young people in one way or another received GYA support. It 
was only natural that GYA supervisors and volunteers who took 
care of the installations began to instruct the children who 
came to their facilities. As a result American football and 
basketball matches between teams from different Posts became 
a feature. GYA also organized its own soccer league within 
the Post area as soon as it was able to obtain the proper 
equipment.19
Selsor soon began to look for a center which young 
people would have all to themselves. In early 1947 the major 
found a requisitioned restaurant in the suburb of Erlenstegen 
and made it the first GYA center in Nuremberg. The 
restaurant not only had a kitchen and rooms but also was 
surrounded by a park for outdoor activities. The fact that 
many German dignitaries attended the inauguration of the new 
center shows the importance German authorities attached to 
GYA which was growing rapidly. Just six weeks after the
190MGBY, Det. B-211, Annual Historical Report, 1 July 
1946-30 June 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 
1425, 9/124-1/6; Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly
Reports for First, Second, and Third Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 
Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124, 125; the
Young World reported in detail about activities throughout 
the post; see, for example, "Participation Booming," YW vol. 
4, no. 2, 1 Feb. 1950: 2; see also Willy Gensmantel, personal 
interview, 10 Aug. 1995, and "Education," OMGUS Information 
Bulletin no. 80, 7 Feb. 1947: 17.
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official inauguration of the first youth center GYA moved to 
a larger home with a park in a requisitioned huge villa not 
far from the Nuremberg party rally grounds. Selsor's close 
connections with the city helped him in remodelling the place 
quickly. While the Army provided the building materials and 
furniture, Mayor Levie was able to mobilize Nuremberg 
craftsmen to finish the job quickly. The new center not only 
had more rooms availabe to everyone, but also offered a 
kitchen where the young visitors often got ice cream, 
doughnuts, or candy and could learn about American recipes.20
The center soon became the focal point for many 
activities. The youth committee, trade union groups and many 
other youth organizations took advantage of the facilities, 
but the center from the start also offered its own programs 
for those who did not want to join a German club. The 
center's largely German staff had much to offer to young 
Germans: A music teacher and a singing instructor, a manual 
arts instructor and a sports teacher, as well as a librarian 
and her assistant occupied full time positions. All these 
professionals also were in charge of helping units in the 
region with setting up specific programs. Interestingly, MG 
officials noted that the IMT, which continued to prosecute
20,lReport Vacant Buildings," YW, vol. 1, no. 1, Jan. 
1947: 3; "Ein Haus fiir die Jugend," [A House for Our Youth] 
NN, 16 Apr. 1947: 5; "GYA zieht urn," [GYA Moves] NN, 14 May 
1947: 5; Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995; for 
the German help see correspondence between Selsor, Mayor 
Levie, and the local crafts association of April and May 
1947; NCA 085/I Handakt Levie.
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German war criminals throughout the forties and maintained 
many of the international staff from the first trial, 
provided a considerable number of enthusiastic international 
volunteers who were willing to support the Army with its re­
orientation efforts.21
The center's employees were always busy. Young Germans 
came to sing in an English choir, a children's choir and a 
choir for young adults. The repertoire ranged from 
traditional folk songs to classical music. Since EUCOM 
permitted Americans to teach German youths handicrafts in 
June 1947, the new facility also offered workshops ranging 
from woodwork to photography. Sewing and needlework ranked 
high on the girls' agenda. Materials for their activities 
came either from Army scrap or directly from the United 
States where GYA was able to mobilize considerable support.22
2ILore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995; Arno 
Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994; Helga 
Stadtlander, personal interview, 15 Aug. 1995; Nuremberg 
Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for First Quarter 1948; 
NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124. 
OMGBY, Semi-monthly report, 25 June 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 143, 5/296-1/18; see also 
Maar (107-110) for contacts between IMT interpreters and GYA 
youth groups.
^Selsor managed to have various reports on GYA 
activities with appeals for support published in English and 
German newspapers in the United States as a result of which 
GYA received books, cloth, clothing, and shoes. See, for 
example, "Friends, Helpers, and Visitors: Many thanks to all 
the friends from the United States listed below, who have 
assisted GYA Nurnberg with their gifts," YW vol. 4, no. 4, 1 
Apr. 1950: 4.
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Boys and girls had the chance to take dancing lessons which 
they could put to good use in the graduation balls their 
schools frequently held in center no. 1 as well.
.Since WUIr is a member of a GYA erxftshop he is so very industrious;"
.Seic mein Willy in der GYA-Basteistundc ist, ist er mSchtic fleiSif!"
19. GYA Cartoon (Source: YW, vol. 2, no. 10, 1 Oct. 1948: 4)
Early in 1948 Selsor was able to inaugurate the Junge Btihne 
in the villa's basement which featured a full fledged stage. 
A serious lay theater group, the Frankische Volks- und 
Jugendspielbiihne, became the main beneficiary of the 
installation and attracted large audiences. Throughout the 
Nuremberg Post area playing theater became a successful 
venture in the larger cities. Meetings and mutual visits of 
different acting clubs within the region and in the American 
zone formed part of their activities. The room in Nuremberg
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also served as the center's movie theater which usually 
attracted capacity crowds.23
Members of German Youth Activities from the Darmstadt 
Junggesellen Leben Club who presented a show for the 
Nuremberg members of the activities. Heidelberg, Germany, 
12 July 1947.
20. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 286778, 18 Aug. 1947
Selsor continued to look for possibilities to improve 
the center for the benefit of young Germans. Shortly before 
he left Nuremberg in 1950, the major was able to inaugurate 
the center's own youth hostel which offered twenty beds for 
young travellers. In August of the same year participants of 
an international youth camp rehabilitated the park of the
“Headquarters Nuremberg Military Post, Consolidated 
Report, Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities 
Br., Box 45, 10/47-1/6; "Vom Schwimmbad zum Theater,"
[Swimming Pool Becomes Theater] NN, 23 Mar. 1948: 3; caption 
on photo, 18 Aug. 1947; NA RG 111 SC 1945-1954, Box 133, 
286778.
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youth center and constructed outdoor sport facilities with 
the help of heavy Army equipment.24
Apart from the help GYA rendered to support German 
summer camp activities, it also sponsored those who were 
unable to join those camps or did not belong to an 
organization in its own camps. In 1947 9,000 children
attended GYA camps in the Nuremberg Military Post district. 
Currency reform in June 1948 severely hampered the 
organization of summer camps by wiping out the entire German 
currency funds of the Nuremberg GYA, but still 5,000 children 
participated in the summer program. In 1949 the numbers rose 
to 9,000 again. In 1950 GYA sponsored or co-sponsored ten 
tent camps throughout the Post area, but the returning 
prosperity put an end to the program. In 1952, its last year 
of operations, only a few hundred young people spent their 
time in one consolidated summer camp for the entire region. 
The unit in charge of the camp made sure that the needy also 
would have a chance to attend by assuming the costs for those 
who were unable to pay the fees.25
24"International Youth Camp in Nbg. Dutzenteich Center," 
YW, vol. 4, no. 8, Aug. 1950: 1.
^Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for 
Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg 
Military Post, Box 125; Report from Headquarters, Nuremberg 
Military Post, Youth Activities Section, to Commanding 
Officer, Nuremberg Military Post, subject: GYA staff report 
for week covering 26 June-2 July 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 43, 10/44-1/9; Report from 
Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post, Youth Activities 
Section to Commanding General, Headquarters EUCOM, ATTN: 
Director of GYA, subject: monthly narrative GYA report for
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From the start GYA provided young Germans with 
educational opportunities. One of the more popular choices 
for older boys and girls were the English courses many 
centers offered. During the first half year of its 
operations in Nuremberg, seven teachers taught nine English 
courses at center no. 1. GYA could count on a number of 
international volunteers who were employed by the 
International Military Tribunal at the time. Hans Lamm, a 
Jewish emigree who had returned to Germany as interpreter at 
the IMT, became one of the most popular teachers. As a 
member of the occupation forces he was living in rather 
luxurious accommodations in Nuremberg's undestroyed suburbs 
and invited his students there. Lamm was an excellent 
teacher who used progressive methods. He not only introduced 
his students to American literature, but also made them 
speak, something unheard of in German classrooms at the time. 
To overcome the language barrier and to induce his students 
to speak freely, Lamm rewarded those who were able to give 
presentations in English with much coveted contents of CARE
Aug. 1949; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, 
Box 125; "Tent Cities in Bavaria," YW, vol. 4, no. 7, July 
1950: 4; "Site for Summer Camp Wanted: Only One Camp Planned 
for NMP," YW, vol. 4. no. 1, Jan. 1952: 1; "GYA," Nuremberg 
Post Journal, 25 July 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg 
Military Post, Box 122.
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parcels. Needless to say that Lamm always had a group of 
highly motivated students.26
A request was made by GYA, that books be sent to the German 
Children in GYA clubs throughout the zone. German papers, 
printed in the United States, let the request be known, and 
many books are now being donated by American and German 
citizens.
German children at the GYA center in Nurnberg [sicl] start 
looking through the books even before they are unpacked.
21. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 310899, 25 Oct. 1948
Books and reading materials became an important issue 
for Selsor and his staff. Initially GYA just supported the 
idea of a book drive of the local newspaper by supplying the 
necessary transport. Apparently a simple appeal was not very 
successful for filling the gaps on the shelves which the war
26OMGBY, Annual Historical Report, 30 June 1946-1 July 
1947, chapter IV, Youth Activities; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, 
Det. B-211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6; Gerhard Knochlein, personal 
interview, 24 July 1995; Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 
11 Aug. 1994; Maar 113.
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and National Socialism had opened. Selsor found an 
additional incentive for youngsters to donate the books they 
did not need to the Army center. In December 1947 GYA 
announced in Nuremberg that there would be cake and ice cream 
as well as a free library card for every donor of a book. 
Those bringing more than one book would receive a special 
prize, a free pass to the GYA's film hour at the opera house. 
The results of the ensuing book party exceeded the greatest 
expectations, in spite of bad weather. The major and his 
wife made sure that all children received their promised 
rewards. By the end of the day the center had acquired 
almost 2,500 German books for its patrons. The Nuremberg 
public library helped cataloging them. Similar book drives 
in the towns and cities throughout the Nuremberg Post made 
sure that all GYA centers held an impressive number of 
suitable reading materials for their visitors. Many young 
people undoubtedly found their way to the center through 
their stomachs, but Selsor made sure that they got something 
more than food before they left. In March 1948 the center 
handed out its 1000th library card to a young Nuremberger.27
27,1 Eine Bitte der NN," [A Request by NN] NN, 9 Nov. 1946: 
4; Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995; "German 
Youth Activities Idea Exchange," 22 Dec. 1947; NA RG 260 
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/295-3/5; 
Narrative GYA Report for Nov. 1947, Nuremberg Post; NA RG 260 
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 144, 5/296-2/1; 
Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for First 
Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military 
Post, Box 124.
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German children wait for books at the GYA children's library, 
Nurnberg [sic!]. The library, which has now been open three 
years, stocks more than three thousand books.
22. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 335833, 25 Nov. 1949
During the following years the library continued to 
expand. By June 1948 the Nuremberg Youth Center's holdings 
of youth books surpassed those of the city library. City 
officials also conceded that GYA in Nuremberg actually had 
more young patrons than they did. Selsor and other dedicated 
GYA workers were able to mobilize donors in the United States 
and bought many books in Switzerland. In this way the 
library in Nuremberg grew by about fifty books a week in
1949. Interestingly, young people shared their parents' 
interest in technical and scientific literature, but it was 
impossible to satisfy the demand in these fields. 
Nevertheless, three years after the inauguration of GYA
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Selsor could proudly report that six libraries throughout the 
Post had 22,000 volumes available to young readers. GYA 
center no. 1 in Nuremberg offered 6,000 books to its patrons 
and cooperated closely with the city's library. At the end 
of 1951 the Nuremberg Post GYA libraries had 15,600 German 
and about 9,000 English books on their shelves. In many 
towns, such as Ansbach, Americans ran the only library 
specifically designed for young people.28
To reach out even further to young people who did not 
have the chance to visit one of the GYA libraries, Selsor 
decided to furnish the Post's own book mobile, an idea which 
the Air Force had pioneered late in 1946. As was the case 
with GYA, EUCOM transformed an initiative in the field into 
official policy.29 Headquarters furnished a 2 1/2 ton truck
28,lDrei Jahre GYA in Nurnberg: Major Selsor und Lt.
Hirsch berichten iiber das vielseitige Jugendprogramm," [Three 
Years GYA in Nuremberg: Major Selsor and Lt. Hirsch Inform 
About the Many-Sided Youth Program] NN, 16 Mar. 1949: 5; 
caption on photo, 25 Oct. 1948; NA RG 111 SC 1941-1954, Box 
155, 310899; caption on photo, 25 Nov. 1949; NA RG 111 SC
1941-1954, Box 178, 335833; "GYA Library Has Nearly 4,000
Users," YW, vol. 2, 1 Jun. 1948: 2; "Old Nurnberger in USA 
Sent Books to GYA," YW, vol. 2, 1 Jul. 1948: 1; "1000th GYA 
Reader to Get Fancy Cake: 2,000 Volumes Augmented Libraries 
in 1951," YW, vol. 6, Jan. 1952: 5.
Once again, GYA and the local Amerika Haus did not 
officially cooperate. It seems, however, that the Amerika 
Haus staff referred children and teenagers to the GYA center 
for many youth programs, although the Amerika Haus also had 
a room dedicated to children.
29The GYA book mobiles served exclusively the needs of 
young people and schools. As we have seen in the previous 
chapter, U.S. Information Centers copied the idea. When GYA 
ceased its operations, the Amerika Hauser were able to pick 
up the slack.
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German youth eagerly read books obtained from the bookmobile 
during its visit to a German High School in Schweinfurt, 
Germany. The Wurzburg [sic!] Post bookmobile placed in 
operation in June 1948 travels through the post area giving 
children an opportunity to read American fiction and 
magazines. Also in demand are more serious books on science, 
psychology and geography. School authorities, teachers, and 
parents, as well as the students have expressed appreciation 
for this book service.
23. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 313582, 7 Oct. 1948
for each Military Post and instructed the local commanders to 
convert them into mobile libraries complete with their own 
German drivers and librarians. The program was supposed to 
be in place by July 1947. In Nuremberg a refurbished truck 
was ready for action in August. Apparently it was easier to 
get the truck than the books necessary to operate it. By 
November it had only about two hundred mostly American books 
on its shelves,— not enough to satisfy the demand of readers 
between the age of ten and twenty years in small towns
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throughout the region. Nevertheless Selsor reported in 
December that the book mobile finally had started operating. 
Four months later it had to cease operations temporarily once 
more because there were not enough books available to run it, 
but in the course of 1948 the Post GYA was able to solve the 
problems. The mobile library became so busy that Nuremberg 
headquarters furnished a second truck for this mission during 
that year. The situation in other Posts was much the same.30
Selsor tried to make sure that parents were informed 
about their children's activities. They received invitations 
to get to know the center. GYA representatives took the 
opportunity to explain to parents that their program was not 
intended to transform German children into little Americans, 
but rather to help them become responsible and articulate 
citizens. To assist parents and educators with the task, the 
Major invited German parents and teachers to discuss the 
education of their children at home and at school and use the 
center's facilities for their meetings. Apparently teachers
30EUCOM, Directive re.: Bookmobiles, 20 June 1947; NA RG 
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 141, 5/295- 
3/7; "Eine fahrbare Bibliothek," [A Mobile Library] NN, 26 
Oct. 1946: 6; Headquarters, Nuremberg Military Post, German 
Youth Activities Office, Weekly Report of the Army Assistance 
to the GYA Program, 28 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Det. 
B—211, Box 1427, 9/122-3/1; "Bibliothek auf Radern," [Library 
on Wheels] NN, 1 Nov. 1947: 3; Nuremberg Military Post,
Narrative GYA Report for Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 144, 5/296-2/1; Nuremberg
Military Post, GYA Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; 
NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125, 
[1]; report [n.d.] Nuremberg Military Post; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/18.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
514
and parents responded to the offer. In March 1949 the 
Nuremberg newspaper reported that the city's school 
administration officially endorsed the program. According to 
the paper, Otto Barthel, who had succeeded Raab as 
Nuremberg's school superintendent, thought that this type of 
cooperation between parents, teachers and the GYA could help 
all parties to solve some of the problems they were facing in 
this field.31
Although GYA Youth Center no. 1 in Nuremberg remained 
the best equipped facility in the Post area, Selsor made sure 
to spread his efforts throughout the region. To communicate 
better with his co-workers, the major introduced an 
information bulletin in English immediately after his 
appointment in 1946, in which he informed them about the 
latest developments. In January 1947 the bulletin became a 
newsletter, followed four weeks later by a German version for 
GYA participants as well as for the employees. By May 1948, 
just two years after GYA's inauguration, The Young World made 
the transition from a mimeographed newsletter to a full 
fledged printed bilingual newsletter with a circulation of 
two thousand copies. It changed its format several times,
31Caption on photo, 12 July 1947, NA RG 111 SC 1941-1954, 
Box 133, 286777; "Elternabend beim GYA," [Parents Meet at 
GYA] NN, 26 Mar. 1949: 6; see also Lore Falter, personal
interview, 29 June 1995; "German Parents to Visit Army Youth 
Center Nr. 1," "Eltern trafen sich im Jugendhaus Dutzenteich: 
Deutsche Kinder sollen keine "Amis" werden!" [Parents met in 
the Youth Center Dutzenteich: No Intentions to Transform 
German Children into "Little Amis"!] YW, vol. 3, no. 4, 1 
Apr. 1949: 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
Mrs. Augustus J. Regier, wife of Col. Augustus J. Regier of 
the Nuremberg Military Post, is shown after she pours the 
first cup of coffee at he first official German Youth Mothers 
and GYA Officials meeting. Approximately 200 mothers of 
German youths, members of the Nurnberg GYA Club attended.
24. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 286777, 12 July 1947
but it always faithfully recorded American youth activities. 
As should be expected, the emphasis lay on successes and 
achievements of the Nuremberg Posts's program. Even budget 
cuts and the Army's policy to turn the program over to the 
Germans after 1951 could not stop its publication. Captain 
Lorraine Schultz, at the time the Post GYA officer, 
approached the problem in typical American fashion. In July 
1952 she found a local sponsor for the paper. Nuremberg's 
largest supplier of photographic equipment assumed the cost 
of producing the paper and had it printed in his business's 
print shop. In return, he had one page of The Young World
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for promoting photography in general and advertising his 
products. The newsletter continued until the end of the 
program in 1954.32
Selsor's efforts to promote GYA within the Nuremberg 
Post area in 1947 were not in vain. During that year many 
units throughout the Post started their own programs under 
his and his staff's guidance. By 1948 forty-five centers 
were operating in the region for which the Nuremberg 
headquarters was responsible. Throughout the region an 
average of more than 60,000 young persons per month 
participated in GYA events which an average of 450,000 people 
attended. Three officers, three enlisted men, one American 
civilian and eighty-eight Germans worked full time for the 
recreation and re-education of young Germans.33
32MG, Det B-211, Annual Historical Report, 20 July 1947; 
NA RG 260, OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1425, 9/124-1/6; see 
also Maar 47-49; most issues of the Young World are in NCA 
AvPer 202.2 (apparently the newsletter found wide attention 
within Military Government: the first issue is in NA RG 260 
OMGBY, ID, Box 52, 10/60-1/46, the first German issue in NA 
RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Act. Br. , Box 48, 10/43-2/14);
Nurnberg Post Journal, 11 Jan. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records, 
Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122; "USAREUR GYA Thanks Mr. 
Porst," YW, vol. 7, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 1953: 5.
33Monthly Report of the Deputy Commander in Chief, EUCOM, 
31 May 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., 
Box 37, 10/43-2/3; Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Quarterly
Report for First Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit Records, 
Nuremberg Military Post, Box 124; Nuremberg Military Post, 
GYA Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit 
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125, [1]; for a zone
wide perspective see "GYA Civic Centers," OMGUS Information 
Bulletin, no. 109, 8 Sep. 1947: 7-8, 14, and "Army Youth
Program," OMGUS Information Bulletin, no. 80, 17 Feb. 1947: 
21-23.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
517
German Children of the 385th Station Hospital GYA Club in 
Nurnberg [sic!], Germany, work their private plots of ground 
in th§ GYA garden. Each boy or girl may grow whatever he 
pleases in his own plot. There are approximately 150 small 
gardens in the Nurnberg [sic!] area that are cared for by the 
German children of the Nurnberg [sic!] GYA clubs.____
25. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 301250, 21 May 1948
Not all GYA efforts met with success. When the Kreis 
Youth Committee in neighboring Fvirth asked the Army to 
derequisition a house so that it would be able to transform 
it into a youth center, the Army refused to oblige because it 
had made plans for constructing a bowling alley there. 
German youth groups in Fiirth would have to wait a while 
longer for their own facilities in spite of Selsor's
21-23.
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intervention on behalf of the project. In the meantime they 
continued to rely on various GYA centers in the city.34
Wives of officers and enlisted men act as hostesses at the 
grand opening of the Erlangen Youth Center, which is operated 
by the Erlangen Air Force.
26. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 283024, 2 Apr. 1947
In spite of obstacles, many units in the Post area 
emulated the example which the GYA center in Nuremberg set 
for them. Erlangen, for example, opened its own youth 
facility in March 1947. It featured a library of over 5,000 
volumes, a sports clinic, and, from May 1948 on, its own 35 
mm film hour. Together with most units in the area the local 
GYA offered summer camps for needy children and had a 
publication to disseminate its news. Like many others, the
^Letter Dr. Kaltenhauser, Fiirth KYC to LYC and OMGBY 
headquarters, 21 Jan. 1947; NA RG 2 60 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 41, 10/44-1/3.
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managers of the Erlangen center found that a garden project 
appealed to its patrons. Erlangen also developed its own 
initiatives. The local GYA chapter introduced youth day 
rooms which permitted working mothers who did not have a 
husband to leave their children under supervised care. "Many 
and urgent requests" caused the local Post to expand this 
part of its program in 1948. By June GYA Erlangen was 
providing day care facilities for 160 children.35
In the course of 1947 the Army conducted extensive 
inspections in Upper Franconia which revealed an interesting 
picture. Major Townsend, the inspecting officer, found much 
praise for the majority of the youth centers he visited. 
None of them operated under similar conditions or could even 
rely on the same resources. In general the centers 
functioned to Townsend's satisfaction, although he thought 
that there was much room for improvement and that GYA 
officers and enlisted men should pay more attention to the 
re-educational parts of their mission. On only two occasions 
the major recommended to remove personnel or to close down a
35"GYA Activities," Nuremberg Military Post, Erlangen 
Subpost, Historical Report April-June 1948; NA RG 338 Unit 
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 119, [1]. Erlangen was 
a quite typical local operation. All of the posts had their 
own libraries by 1948, many offered summer camps and had 
garden projects for which Selsor was able to obtain seeds and 
other planting materials (Nuremberg Military Post, GYA 
Quarterly Report for Second Quarter 1948; NA RG 338 Unit 
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 125) . Day Care Centers 
also were not unique to Erlangen (see "Day Care Centers," 
OMGUS Information Bulletin, no. 113, 6 Oct. 1947: 2-4).
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This acrobatic act is staged at the opening night of the 
Erlangen youth center. More than 2,000 youths belong and it 
is operated by the Erlangen Air Force._______________
27. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 283025, 2 Apr. 1947
center. In his reports Townsend took unit commanders and 
other officers to task for being indifferent to the Army 
program, for not providing the necessary personnel and 
support, and for the high rate of turnover which often left 
a good program in limbo and young Germans bewildered. 
According to him, German authorities did not always render 
the desired cooperation. When American troops withdrew from 
Kronach, for example, local authorities initially kept the 
GYA center and the youth hostel in the town's old fortress 
open, but soon after the units were gone the city fathers 
dismissed the German manager allegedly because of lack of 
funds and closed the facilities at the castle, although the
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young people of the town urgently needed a center and a youth 
hostel and had demonstrated their support for the GYA 
institution.
Townsend also detected a lot of creativity and 
innovative programs. In Coburg, which was practically 
surrounded by the Soviet zone from three sides, the major 
found a well managed youth center under GYA auspices which 
the local youth had constructed themselves. They also 
handled the administration of the facilities in a democratic 
fashion. The local GYA officer had managed to steer the 
center free of political controversy, a task which was 
certainly not easy in the vicinity of the very different 
political outlook and content of the programs the FDJ offered 
just a few miles away. Apart from the already familiar 
features, the young people who participated in the center's 
activities had initiated a program for taking care of single 
mothers and their babies, most of whom had been fathered by 
American soldiers.36
1948 saw the inauguration of a very successful zone wide 
GYA program which the Army designed to foster young peoples' 
sense of fair play and sportsmanship, apart from providing 
them with a meaningful occupation during their spare time. 
In December Nurembergers witnessed the first soap box derby
36Clifford Townsend, Headquarters EUCOM, to Commanding 
General, OMGUS, subject: reports of inspections of GYA
installations, 8 Sept. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 144, 5/296-2/1.
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in their city. To everybody's surprise the local population 
demonstrated a tremendous interest in the races. Over 40,000 
people assembled on the ruins around the old fortress to see 
more than one hundred young boys and seven girls race down 
the steep hill on cobblestone streets. All of them had 
constructed their cars at GYA centers. Encouraged by the 
success, Selsor promised additional derbies for the coming 
year. The next time police had to terminate the event early 
because it was unable to control the crowds. From the start 
GYA enlisted the support of private sponsors such as the 
German Shell Corporation, General Motors, or local factories. 
Successful racers could win new motorcycles and bicycles, 
cameras, plane trips from Nuremberg to Munich, vouchers for 
clothes, and rain coats made by GYA sewing classes from scrap 
materials the Army had donated. The Adam Opel Car Factory, 
a subsidiary of General Motors, provided the racers free of 
charge with axles and wheels from 1949 on. Many GIs, but 
also local HICOG Resident Officers, acted as sponsors or lent 
a helping hand during construction. German teachers in Furth 
showed their interest by offering their help and expertise to 
soap box enthusiasts in their schools. In 1950 more than a 
thousand racers participated in preliminary races throughout 
the Post area. The winners came to Nuremberg to race in the 
regional qualifiers which 15,000 spectators attended. The 
champion of the zone-wide finals could look forward to 
becoming the owner of a motorcycle and a two week journey to
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the United States with all expenses paid by Opel and General 
Motors for the parents as well.37
The soapbox derbies enjoyed much attention of the local 
press from the first race on. With corporate sponsors well 
established, GYA retreated from center stage in 1950, but 
German enthusiasm for this new sport did not wane. In 1952
12,000 spectators witnessed the races in Nuremberg. Of 
course the Army still was willing to lend a helping hand. 
Young Germans continued to build their soap boxes in GYA 
centers. Army Engineers built a ramp for the event at the 
former party rally grounds to make sure that operations went 
smoothly and safely.38
37James 34-35; "GYA Sponsored First Nurnberg Soap Box 
Derby: Big Hit With 40 000 Spectators," YW, vol 2, no. 23, 1 
Dec. 1948: 1, 3, 4; "Over 1,100 Soap Boxes Ready to Run in 
NMP," YW, vol. 4, no. 5, 4 May 1950: 5; "Further Lehrer
beraten junge Seif enkistlbauer, " [Fiirth Teachers Advise Young 
Soap Box Builders], YW, vol. 4, no. 5, 4 May 1950: 6; "15,000 
see Grafenwohr Win 1950 NMP Box Derby," "Gen Handy Honors 
Winner of US Zone Soap Box Derby," YW vol. 4, no. 7, July 
1950: 1; "GYA Rennfahrer auf der Strecke," [GYA Racers En 
Route] YW, vol. 4, no. 11, 1 Nov. 1950: 6; see also "Was ein 
richtiger Rennfahrer werden will...: 40 000 Niirnberger
wohnten dem Burgbergrennen bei. 'Nervenzersetzende Rivalitat' 
in Seifenkisten," [Who Wants to Become a Real Race Car 
Driver...: 40,000 Nurembergers Attended Race at the Fortress 
Hill. "Nerve Wrecking Rivalry" in Soap Boxes] NN, 22 Nov. 
1948: 4; "Kinderjubel um das 'Seifenkistl'-Rennen,"
[Children's Cheers for Soap Box Derby] NN, 30 May 1949: 5.
38For German coverage of the events see, for example, 
"Was ein richtiger Rennfahrer werden will...: 40 000
Niirnberger wohnten dem Burgbergrennen bei. "Nervenzersetzende 
Rivalitat" in Seifenkisten," [Who Wants to Become a Real Race 
Car Driver...: 40,000 Nurembergers Attended Race at the
Fortress Hill; "Nerve Wrecking Rivalry" in Soap Boxes] NN, 22 
Nov. 1948: 4; "Kinderjubel um das "Seifenkistl"-Rennen,"
[Children's Cheers for Soap Box Derby] NN, 30 May 1949: 5; 
for the construction of the ramp in 1952 see photo and
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A soap box derby, sponsored by German Youth Activities, with 
the help of various German industries, was held for German 
children in Nurnberg on 29 May. Young dare devil wins the 
third race in his midget car.______________________________
28. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 323455, 29 May 1949
The following year a Nuremberg apprentice won the West 
German championship. He received a cheque for 5,000 marks to 
help pay his education, the trip to the United States, and an 
invitation to participate in the American championships. 
Extensive newspaper coverage accompanied him on his journey 
to the New World and reported in detail about his experiences 
at the championships in Akron, Ohio. Even the Department of
caption, YW, vol. 7, no. 4, June/July 1953: 6.
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State's official shortwave radio broadcast "Voice of America" 
featured the guest from Germany.39
Other GYA programs also received much publicity. From 
1949 on, for example, the Army organized zone wide handicraft 
contests for boys and girls. Projects ranged from needlework 
and sewing to building boats and even model roller coasters. 
GYA furnished the materials and facilities for the young 
people. In 1950 over 3,500 boys and girls participated in 
the new program within the Nuremberg Post. The following 
year, judges had to evaluate the work of over 40,000 zone 
wide contestants. The Nuremberg region always did well in 
the contests, a fact the local press duly acknowledged. 
Exhibitions of the young people's work throughout the Post 
area provided additional opportunities to generate public 
support.40
39"Ein Niirnberger Bundessieger," [Nuremberger the Federal 
Republic's Champion] NN, 20 Jul. 1953: 6; "Im Geleitzug durch 
die StraBen," [Grand Reception in the Streets] NN, 22 Jul. 
1953: 5; "Heinz Martin schied aus," [Heinz Martin eliminated] 
NN, 11 Aug. 1953: 5; "Die Rader waren schuld," [Wheels to 
Blame] NN, 20 Aug. 1953: 5; "Wie ein Staatsmann empfangen," 
[Reception of a Statesman] NN, 24 Aug. 1953: 7; the newspaper 
continued its extensive and enthusiastic coverage of soapbox 
derbies throughout the fifties.
40James 35-36; "Handfertigkeitswettbewerb mit iiber 3,500 
Teilnehmern. Madchen: Nahen, Stricken und Schneidern
iiberwiegt. Amerikaner und Deutsche in den Schiedsgerichten 
[Handicraft Contest with over 3,500 Participants. Girls: 
Sewing, Knitting and Tailoring Most Popular. American and 
German Referees] YW vol. 4, no. 4, 1 Apr. 1950: 5; "Miinchen 
erster Sieger, Nurnberg zweiter im groBen GYA-Handfertig- 
keitswettbewerb," [Munich First, Nuremberg Second in Zonewide 
Handicraft Contest] YW vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June 1950: 3; "9
Preise im Handfertigkeitswettbewerb nach Franken: Insgesamt 
beteiligten sich iiber 40,000 Jugendliche," [9 Prizes in
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Examining the items of the GYA handicraft exhibition at the 
GYA center are: Dorothea Erhardt, German handicraft teacher; 
1st Lt. L.A. Schultz, Assistant Post GYA Officer, and Mrs. 
Harold Carroll.
29. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 344451, 3 May 1950
In 1949 Major Selsor and the Nuremberg GYA initiated a 
zonewide program designed to revive West Germany's cultural 
life. From 1950 on Nuremberg hosted the Meistersinger
contest for aspiring young singers of classical music.
Handicraft Contest for Franconia: Overall Attendance over 
40,000] YW, vol. 5, no. 6, Jun. 1951: 3; "Craft Contest
Highlights April Program," YW, vol. 6, no. 4, Apr. 1952: 3; 
"All Youth Invited to Join In 1954 GYA Handicraft Contest," 
YW vol. 7, no. 6, Nov./Dec. 1954: 5; for coverage in the
German press see, for example, "45 Meisterbastler erhalten 
Preise: Feierstunde im Armee-Theater," [45 Master Tinkerers 
Receive Prizes: Celebration at the Army-Theater] NN, 25 Apr. 
1952: 10; "Verdienter Lohn fur gute Arbeit: Die 81 ersten
Gewinner im GYA-Handfertigkeitswettbewerb wurden 
ausgezeichnet," [Deserved Premium for Work Well Done: 81
First Prize Winners in GYA Handicraft Contest Received 
Prizes] NN, 25 Apr. 1952: 9.
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Selsor from the start tried to interest Germans in the 
project. He was able to assemble a committee of German 
musicians, music critics and other dedicated men and women 
close to the music scene in the city who worked out the 
regulations. The highest American and German dignitaries, 
among them High Commissioner John McCloy and the Federal 
Republic's first President, Theodor Heuss, acted as honorary 
chairpersons. Local firms and factories provided many 
attractive prizes which made the contest a resounding success 
from the start. Preliminaries took place throughout West 
Germany. The finalists met in Nuremberg and competed in the 
opera before a carefully selected jury and a packed house. 
The winners received considerable cash prizes, but more 
important for their further development was the publicity and 
scholarships in the United States which obviously helped to 
launch them successfully. Hermann Prey, one of Germany's 
most accomplished postwar singers, started his career in this 
way.41
41James 36. Both, the Young World and the local 
newspapers extensively reported about the Meistersinger 
contest throughout its existence. See, for example, "Mrs. 
and Mr. McCloy Ehrenprotektoren im Sangerwettbewerb,1 [Mrs. 
and Mr. McCloy Honorary Chairpersons of Singing Competition], 
YW vol. 4, no. 3, March 1950: 1; "Meistersinger Working Comm. 
Sets Dates for 1951 Contest: Seven Equal Prizes for the
Winners - Age Limit from 18 to 25," YW, vol. 4, no. 9, Sept. 
1950: 1; "President Heuss and High Com McCloy, John Handy as 
Meistersinger Co-Chairmen," YW vol. 6, no. 3, Mar. 1952: 1; 
"1952 GYA Meistersinger Proclaimed," YW, vol. 6, no. 6, July 
1952: 1.
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Reorientation
Although GYA focused on recreational and educational 
activities, Selsor and his successors never lost sight of the 
re-orientation aspect of their work. In November 1947 the 
Nuremberg Military Post reported that steps had been taken to 
organize German advisory councils for the three largest 
centers in the Post area. The idea was a success. In 
Erlangen, for example, 450 parents discussed the next year of 
the program in 1950 and elected their representatives for the 
advisory council.42
Selsor and his superiors also tried to make sure that 
American and German employees received adequate training for 
their rather difficult mission. MG criticism prompted the 
Army to initiate training programs for American GYA 
officials. To improve the program further, headquarters 
hired an American civilian youth specialist as its official 
adviser. In September 1948 GYA also began to establish 
training schools for its German employees. In addition to 
that, MG and GYA representatives met at regular intervals to 
discuss their problems. To be able to assess the situation 
better on the state level, they invited representatives from 
the Bavarian Youth Committee to their conferences from 1950 
on. On the local level Selsor initiated round table 
conferences for all American and German employees within the
42Nuremberg Post, Narrative GYA Report for Nov. 1947; NA 
RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 144, 5/296- 
2/1.
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GYA 3UGENDSANGERWETTSTREIT
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30. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 454852, 20 Jun. 1953
Post area. The turnout was not always satisfactory, but 
Selsor also maintained personal contact by means of frequent 
inspections of the centers throughout the Post. German 
employees and volunteers of the Nuremberg GYA also had the
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opportunity to attend courses in youth leadership schools
such as Ruit near Stuttgart.43
Selsor's efforts were not always recognized by high
ranking members of the OMGUS youth section which had
relocated to Nuremberg from Berlin when the blockade began.
In July 1949 Selsor prepared two training conferences for
German GYA employees of the Nuremberg Military Post. He
invited Norrie to participate in a panel discussion. Selsor
explained that
conversations with both Americans and Germans have shown 
that there must be a meeting of the minds of German 
youth, German parents, German youth officials, and those 
Americans who are endeavoring to build up a program 
towards the reorientation of German youth, the 
preparation of German youth for participation in future 
democratic Germany.
Apparently Norrie was not impressed with Selsor's efforts and
did not participate. A brief handwritten note on the
invitation stated: "Not important. Only suggesting a
discussion between GYA, MG, and Germans."44
43Headquarters, EUCOM, memorandum, 25 Sept. 1948; NA RG 
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 36, 10/43-1/8; 
"HICOG and GYA Personnel Will Meet in Nurnberg," YW vol. 4, 
no.6, 2 June 1950: 1; "GYA Personnel to Receive Special
Training: Parliamentary Procedure First on Schedule," YW, 
vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 1; "I Visit a Youth Leader
Training Course," YW, vol. 3, no. 4, 1 Apr. 1949: 7; for one 
of Selsor's many complaints about lack of participation in 
training conferences see Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Office 
to Commanding General, Headquarters EUCOM, Attn.: Director of 
GYA, 16 Aug. 1949, subject: monthly narrative GYA report for 
July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., 
BOX 154, 5/293-2/7.
^Invitation from Maj. Selsor, Post GYA Officer to 
Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, 5 Jan. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/295-3/3.
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Dr. Weldon Shofstall, left, Dean of Stephen's College, 
Columbia, Missouri, at present German Youth Activities 
civilian adviser for the European Command, conducts a 
discussion on "discussion procedure" with a group of German 
youth leaders at the Berghaus Sudelfeld , Germany, a former 
SS officers' recreation area. This meeting is held to bring 
about better understanding among youth leaders throughout the 
first military district. Twelve of the group present are 
chosen to participate in a discussion. The rest of the group 
acts as the audience. Members of the audience are given 
rating sheets, on which to write their criticisms and 
opinions and answers of the discussion group. Carl Stordel, 
who is acting as his interpreter, is with the GYA in Bamberg. 
He teaches English to the girls of the GYA girl's club.
31. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 292388, 14 Feb. 1948
While all support activities lay well within the 
reorientation framework of MG, GYA carried its mission 
further. Whereas OMGUS always made it a point to remain in 
the background, the Army reached directly out to young 
people. The American sponsors of GYA activities did much to 
help them gain a new perspective on their place and 
responsibilities in society and in the world. Activities
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
532
within the centers offered many opportunities to practice 
democratic procedures. GYA encouraged youth groups to write 
their own constitutions and to elect representatives. At the 
start the undertaking was not easy. Many young people had 
never participated in elections or taken over 
responsibilities for a group. In 1950 GYA center no. l 
invited all youth groups and individuals connected with its 
activities to form a youth council whose task it would be to 
develop operating procedures, to support those groups who 
needed help, and to participate in the scheduling and 
planning of all events within the center. Selsor's 
successor, Major Robert A. Norman, was satisfied with the 
first meeting, but also pointed out that the young people had 
wasted considerable time because they were not acquainted 
with democratic procedure. The council would provide them 
with the opportunity to practice.45
GYA officers in other communities carried the idea of 
democratizing young people a step further. In February 1950 
Charles Emerick, the High Commission's Resident Officer in 
Fiirth, discussed the possibility of having a "mayor for a 
day" program with local authorities and the GYA
45"Jugendbeirat im Haus am Dutzenteich," [Youth Advisory 
Council in Dutzenteich Youth Center] YW vol. 4, no. 6, 2 June 
1950: 5; "Dutzenteich Youth Center Accepted House
Constitution," YW vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 4. Many other 
youth centers had similar institutions. See, for example, 
"Bayreuth: Musterbeispiel eines Jugendrates," [Bayreuth: Fine 
Example of Youth Council] YW, vol. 5, no. 6, Jun. 1951: 3; 
see also Selsor 5-6.
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representatives in Zirndorf, a small town in the vicinity of 
Fiirth. According to him, the response was immediate and 
positive. Without any further help from Mr. Emerick GYA 
officers and local officials cooperated closely in making his 
proposal a reality. In March 1950 students of the local 
schools elected officials to occupy the most important 
positions in city hall, which the adults quite willingly left 
to them for that day. The Nuremberg radio station even 
provided the town with its own branch, which a young reporter 
supplied with the news of the day. Emerick thought that all 
candidates the young people had selected were "exceptionally 
good". As a first sign of changing times, the young people 
chose a girl for second mayor. She was the first female ever 
to hold an office in the town. All parties involved agreed 
that the idea had been a success and should be carried on the 
next year.46
Hands-on experience in democratic procedures was just 
one of GYA's reorientation features. Its managers encouraged
^OLCBY, Resident Officer Fiirth to OLCBY, FOD, 29 Mar. 
1950; special report, Jugendregierung Zirndorf, Landkreis 
Fiirth; enclosure in Essential Elements of Information for the 
period 10 Mar. to 7 Apr. 1950; NA RG 466 OLCBY, ID, Elements 
of Essential Information 1950-1951; "GYA 'Youth day' at 
Zirndorf Deemed Success by Officials," YW, vol. 4, no. 4, 1 
Apr. 1950: 1; "Die Jugend von Zirndorf hatte ihren groBen 
Tag: Wahlurne, Abstimmung, Stadtverwaltung, Rundfunk: Alles 
war fiir einen Tag in der Hand der Jugend," [Big Day for 
Zirndorf's Youth: Polls, Voting, Town Administration, Radio: 
All for One Day in the Youths' Hands] YW, vol. 4, no. 4, 1 
Apr. 1950: 3; Military Governor S.P. Sussel, head of the
Kronach detachment, actually pioneered the idea in Franconia 
as early as December 1948.
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young people to initiate or participate in community projects 
which ranged from playing music in hospitals to constructing 
playgrounds or youth centers. To help them overcome their 
previous isolation, the Army introduced its Youth Helps Youth 
program which provided groups and individuals with pen pals 
in the United States. In the Nuremberg Post area alone the 
Army was able to initiate contacts between more than 4,000 
German and American boys and girls. GYA also provided many 
of the quiz bowl programs which HICOG initiated in the 1950s 
with the necessary facilities.47
Of course much depended on the way staff and volunteers 
interacted with young Germans. Reorientation in the 
Nuremberg GYA often had a very personal note. Lore Falter 
had been a member of the Nazis' girls organization where she 
mainly participated in folk singing groups. She took 
advantage of the possibilities the GYA center offered to 
revive a singing group. Since nothing else was available, 
she used a book the Nazis had printed. Besides the usual 
Nazi lore, the book also contained traditional and 
unpolitical German folk songs. Falter took great care to
47James 36-38; "GYA to Copy HICOG with Reorientation 
Quizzes," YW vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 1; "Quiz Programs
enjoy Increasing Popularity," YW vol. 5, no. 4, Apr. 1951: 4; 
for specific activities in the Nuremberg area see, for 
example, "Dutzenteich Singing Group Practises Community 
Service," YW vol. 5, no. 6, June 1951: 5; "Sorghof Youth
Center - Community Service Project," YW vol 5., no. 13, Dec. 
1951: 3; "4000 Deutsch-Amerikanische Freundschaften
vermittelt," [4000 German-American Friendships Arranged] YW 
vol. 6, no. 4, Apr. 1952: 8.
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hide the book from American eyes, but one day Selsor asked 
her to show it to him. Falter was afraid that he would 
either confiscate her book or even might regard her as a Nazi 
and terminate her appointment as singing instructor. The 
Major, who was certainly no stranger to the lack of suitable 
singing materials, did nothing of the sort. He took the book 
with a smile and promised to look the other way if he found 
anything that should not be in there. Instead of censorship 
and punishment, Falter got a valuable lesson in tolerance, 
understanding and respect which she never forgot.48
Surprisingly, even young people with a solid Nazi 
background participated in GYA activities. The Selsors took 
great care to be especially attentive to them, since they 
felt that this group needed reorientation most. One girl 
came from an ardent Nazi family and was herself the prototype 
of an enthusiastic and unrepentant admirer of Hitler in 1947, 
when she visited the Nuremberg center for the first time. 
June Selsor never challenged her convictions or excluded her 
from the girls' activities, but rather spent more time with 
her which even included driving lessons. On one of these 
excursions the car was passing in front of the tribune where 
Hitler had made his appearances during the party rallies. As 
if in a trance the girl stood up in the car with the Nazi 
salute and her foot firmly on the accelerator. Mrs. Selsor 
finally managed to push the girl's foot off the accelerator
48Lore Falter, personal interview, 29 June 1995.
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at almost fifty miles per hour just in time to prevent a 
nasty accident. According to Mrs. Selsor, the girl's Nazi 
convictions slowly subsided. She became a close friend of 
the family with whom she remained in contact over the next 
five decades.49
The German-American Youth Club
One of Selsor's first initiatives in the realm of 
reorientation actually caused a considerable stir within 
Military Government. Apparently unaware of the very real 
differences between Military Government Detachment B-211 and 
the Nuremberg GYA, the Niirnberger Nachrichten reported in 
November 1946 that the "Office for the Support of the German 
youth of the American Military Government" (GYA) invited all 
young Germans between fifteen and twenty-five years of age to 
attend the initial meeting of a German-American discussion 
club. With the Major's encouragement, his German secretary, 
Richard Sperber, had decided to found a club with German and 
American membership to initiate the intellectual exchange 
between the two nations. In spite of Selsor's support the 
Military Government detachment's public safety officer 
refused to grant the new club a license because at that time 
joint German-American ventures were not officially permitted. 
Selsor decided to take the case to the leading youth officer 
in Bavaria, Hans Thomsen. He explained to him that OMGUS 
could not accept several passages in the statutes as well as
49Selsor 13; personal correspondence with Mrs. Selsor.
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the name of the club, because German-American cooperation was 
still illegal. The Major did not give up and ended up with 
Lawrence Norrie, the man in charge of all youth activities in 
the American zone. Norrie showed more understanding. He 
thought that the club could have a license as long as Selsor 
promised that he would supervise its activities closely.50
Norrie's support notwithstanding, the affair reached 
tragicomical dimensions during the following months. 
Apparently headquarters did not disseminate the news about 
the granting of the license to all divisions. In January 
1947 the CIC became involved in the affair. Sensing the 
brewing of a subversive storm of sizable proportions, a 
special agent decided to conduct a "discreet investigation," 
after he had learned form the Nuremberg security officer that 
the club was operating without a license. In best secret 
service fashion he employed an infiltrator who was working 
for the GYA in Fiirth to become a member of the club for 
spying purposes. The agent dutifully reported that the club 
was still functioning and even accepting Americans as members 
in clear violation of Military Government directives. He 
provided personal profiles of the two leading German members 
together with their Third Reich backgrounds. Further 
evidence included a membership card of the infiltrator, as
S0"Deutsch-Amerikanischer Diskussionsclub," [German- 
American Discussion Club] NN, 23 Nov. 1946: 4; Hans Thomsen, 
OMGBY to Director, OMGBY, 5 Mar. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY,
Intelligence Predecessor Organizations, Box 11, 10/87-3/11.
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32. Membership Card GAYC Nuremberg, 1947 (Courtesy of Gerhard 
Knochlein, Nuremberg)
well as an invitation to a costume ball in January 1947, 
undoubtedly an ideal setting for sinister purposes. Although 
the club received its license by the end of January, the CIC 
investigation made sure that it would receive further 
attention. In March the news reached the director of the 
Bavarian Land Detachment who demanded and received an 
explanation from Hans Thomsen. Information control continued 
to keep a close eye on the club's activities, but obviously
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Norrie understood the complete nonsense of the whole affair. 
Apparently due to his initiative, OMGUS issued new directives 
in July 1947 which permitted Americans to become involved in 
joint German-American ventures as long as they "promoted 
understanding of democracy" or furthered "worthy projects in 
the local communities." The Club and Selsor had made an 
important step towards officially changing the relations 
between victors and vanquished into those of more equal 
partners.51
The directive opened the way for similar ventures 
throughout the Nuremberg Post. In October 1948 Ansbach and 
Hof inaugurated their own German-American youth clubs. 
Erlangen followed suit in March 1949.52
Untouched by internal Military Government affairs the 
Nuremberg club flourished. Local Military Government and 
German dignitaries, among them the Bavarian Government's 
Representative for Middle Franconia, Lord Mayor Ziegler, and
5IHeadquarters, Sub-region Niirnberg, Counterintelligence 
Corps Region VI, memorandum Julius Stein, Special Agent, to 
Headquarters, 11 Jan. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Intelligence 
Predecessor Organizations, Box 111, 10/87-3/11; Det B-211, 
ICD to OMGBY Political Affairs Division, Bericht iiber den 
Diskussionsabend am 26.3.47 im Kiinstlerhaus; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
ID, Director, Box 17 [Envelope containing classified 
material]; OMGUS, Commanding General, Berlin, 28 July 1947, 
subject: formation of Military Government (US) discussion
clubs; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Intelligence Predecessor 
Organizations, Box 104, 10/86-3/7.
52,1 Two New Youth Clubs Open in Nbg. M.P.,".YW, 1 Oct. 
1948: l; Erlangen Sub-Post, weekly information bulletin, 30 
Mar. 1949; NA RG 338 Unit Records, Nuremberg Military Post, 
Box 121.
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Mayor Levie participated in the inauguration ceremonies in 
December 1946. One year after its inauguration it boasted 
over seven hundred members.53
From the start, Lamm tried to make the club a truly 
joint venture. In November 1948 he alerted the director of 
the OMGUS Education and Cultural Relations Division which had 
just recently relocated from Berlin to Nuremberg, to the 
existence of the club and invited him and "and all members of 
your Division" to attend a meeting in the club home located 
in the city's youth bunker.54
Using his connections with the IMT, Lamm brought 
together members of his club and American high school 
students in the courtroom to hold their discussions there. 
Participants debated whether the tribunals were fair or if 
world government could solve their present problems. To help 
developing this spirit and apparently upon the request of the 
club members, Selsor provided the Club with 1,000 verbatim 
translations of the American constitution, of which 950 were 
distributed within a few weeks. The change of rules and 
these very constructive activities apparently induced the 
local MG detachment to throw its full support behind the 
venture. In December 1948 it reported to headquarters that
53Chronik der Stadt Nurnberg 1945-49: 209, 7 December
1946; NCA F2 no. 48.
^Letter from Hans Lamm to Director, E&CRD, 1 Nov. 1948; 
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 
5/294-1/17.
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Approximately two hundred American and German youngsters 
gathered in the main court room of the Palace of Justice in 
Nuremberg, where Goering, Ribbentrop and other bigwig Nazis 
had to account for their atrocious misdeeds. The youth 
gathered in this impressive hall to discuss a question which 
may decide their fate and ours: "Will world government save 
us?" With amazing maturity and alertness, with refreshing 
candor and frankness, opinions were exchanged. There was no 
uniformity and no regulated thinking, but agreement on one 
issue; that the peoples of the world must learn to live 
together and must force their governments to adopt effective 
measures for preventing war. The German youngsters, former 
members of the Hitler Youth, and the Americans, high school 
students, demanded world unity for freedom and peace for all 
peoples. A lengthy question and answer period was conducted 
in the style of American town hall meetings and gave youth 
the opportunity to express their doubts, hopes, and 
convictions. This is democracy in action, reeducation in 
practice and groundwork for a better future without ado and 
fanfares.
33. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 315814, 20 Dec. 1948
the German-American Youth Club was "what has been needed for 
so long in Germany." The authors suggested that local school 
officials should become actively involved in this interchange 
of ideas between Americans and Germans. MG observers noted
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that the majority of the participants in the latest
discussion round in the halls of the IMT
both German and American, raised their hands in favor of 
one World Government. They felt that the only way out 
of the present dilemma is for the establishment of one 
World Government. The result of this forum speaks for 
itself.55
During the next years the Club continued to discuss 
topics of current interest ranging from the Nuremberg Trials 
in 1947, school reform in 1949, to West Germany's social 
problems, or the role Germany would have to play in defending 
the West in 1951. Lamm succeeded in interesting prominent 
Americans such as Chief Justice Telford Taylor or Land 
Commissioner Murray van Wagoner in addressing the club. In 
February 1950 Helen McCloy, the High Commissioner's wife, not 
only gave a presentation about "The Responsibilities of Young 
People in a Democracy” but also promised to attend an 
informal discussion with club members after the end of her 
official program. With these high calibre speakers it comes 
as no surprise that local German politicians became frequent 
guests at these events.56
55Caption photos 315814, 315815; NA RG 111 SC 1941-54; 
Det. B-211, bi-weekly reorientation report, 16-31 Dec. 1948; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, FOD, Headquarters Records, Box 342, 10/54- 
2/20.
56,lSchulreform im Bild," [School Reform in Pictures] NN, 
9 Feb. 1949: 3; "Mrs. McCloy Gast beim GAY Club," [Mrs.
McCloy Guest of GAY-Club] YW, vol. 4, no. 2, 1 Feb. 1950: 3; 
"Deutsche Schicksalsfragen": 5 Jahre Deutsch-Amerikanischer 
Jugendclub," [Vital Questions For Germany: 5 Years German- 
American Youth Club] NN, 24 Oct. 1951: 5; "Alle Parteien sind 
'sozial': Ein Diskussionsabend beim Jugendclub," [All Parties 
are "Social Minded": A Discussion Evening at the Youth Club]
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Not all local dignitaries were willing to help with the 
re-education effort. The director of Nuremberg's art 
collections, Schulz, for example, displayed a lively interest 
in the Nuremberg GYA's efforts to revive the city's cultural 
life and even offered to participate in these ventures. In 
March 1950 a member of the German-American Club approached 
Schulz and inquired if he would be willing to inform its 
members about the current state of the city's reconstruction. 
Apparently thinking that the Club was part of Major Selsor's 
domain, Schulz approached him in May about the possibility of 
giving such a presentation. After a considerable amount of 
confusion which Selsor helped to clarify, Schulz became aware 
that the club was not connected with the American staff. 
Schulz's reply to the major's request to support the club in 
spite of this fact came promptly. He wrote to Selsor that he 
would support the American authorities, but that he had no 
intention of wasting his time with the German-American Youth 
Club. At the same time Schulz informed the club that 
preparations for the city's impending 900th anniversary were 
taking up all his time, making it impossible for him to 
accept the club's invitation. Apparently lecturing Americans 
about progress in Germany was one thing, supporting young
NN, 17 Nov. 1951: 5. The Chronicler for the Nuremberg City 
Archives dedicated considerable space to the German-American 
Youth Club. See, for example, Chronik der Stadt Niirnberg 
1945-1949: 284, 22 July 1947; 387, 13 February 1948; NCA F2 
no. 48.
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Germans' attempts to become informed citizens quite 
another.57
At the end of 1947 Lamm, by then one of the chairpersons 
of the club, began to reach out to other organizations with 
similar interests and prepared a conference of German- 
American clubs in Bavaria. Since statewide organizations 
were not yet permitted, both Selsor and Raymond Spahn of 
OMGBY Youth Section thought that the idea was premature. 
Instead of insisting on his original plan, Lamm settled for 
a community wide discussion meeting to which he invited the 
man in charge of Bavaria, Governor Murray van Wagoner. These 
meetings developed into Nuremberg's widely publicized youth 
forums. The organizers always were able to find topics of 
current interest and distinguished speakers for these events. 
Even when prominent people were not able to come to 
Nuremberg, they usually found the time to respond to Lamm's 
requests with enthusiasm. Lamm received messages from Lucius 
D. Clay, John McCloy and even Eleanor Roosevelt.58 Under the
57Letter Demleitner, GYAC, to Schulz, 21 Mar. 1950; 
Schulz to Selsor, 2 May 1950; Schulz to Demleitner, 4 May 
1950; Selsor to Schulz, 11 May 1950; Demleitner to Schulz, 13 
May 1950; Schulz to Selsor, 16 May 1950; Schulz to 
Demleitner, 16 May 1950; NCA C34 no. 17.
58See, for example, his exchange of letters with John 
McCloy throughout his tenure as High Commissioner. Although 
McCloy never was able to attend one of the forums, he made 
sure to comply with Lamm's request for a letter addressing 
the participants and that a high caliber speaker from HICOG 
would be available. Lamm to McCloy, 23 Apr. 1950; McCloy to 
Lamm, 26 Sept. 1950, 11 Oct. 1950; Lamm to McCLoy, 23 Jan. 
1951; McCloy to Lamm, 12 Feb. 1951; Lamm to McCloy, 7 Nov. 
1951; McCloy to Lamm, 15 Nov. 1951, 6 Dec. 1951; NA RG 466
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guideline "We Build Our World", the first youth forum 
featured representatives of Military Government, of the 
Bavarian State, as well as of local authorities who 
introduced the participants to the different functions of a 
democratic government and engaged in lively discussions on 
the role young people would have to play in this process. 
Although the newspaper dedicated a full page to the forum, it 
did not mention that the east-west conflict had begun to 
encroach on reorientation. Major Selsor, who attended the 
forum as well, reported to headquarters that the Free German 
Youth had been the most vocal group during the event. 
According to him, they designed their questions "to embarrass 
the speakers" and "appeared to have a political import."59
Political agitation notwithstanding the club continued 
along the lines it had set. A second forum took place in the
HICOG, Security-Segregated General Records, 1949-1952; see 
also Maar 110-111 for a list of important personalities with 
whom GYA members became acquainted. Much of the HICOG 
material is still classified, which makes working with this 
source difficult.
S9Memorandum Dr. Spahn re.: German-American Youth Club, 
22 Dec. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., 
Box 37, 10/43-2/2; "Frankisches Jugendforum diskutierte: 'Wir 
bauen unsere Welt:' 300 Jugendliche aus 40 Stadten trafen 
sich in Nurnberg - Vertreter der Militarregierung, der 
bayerischen Regierung und der Stadt Nurnberg beantworteten 
Fragen zu Gegenwartsproblemen," [Franconian Youth Forum 
Discussed "We Build Our World:" 300 Young People from 40 
communities met in Nuremberg - Representatives of MG, the 
Bavarian State Government, and the City of Nuremberg Answered 
Questions About Current Problems] NN, 27. Apr. 1949: 3;
Nuremberg Military Post, GYA Office, to Commanding General, 
Headquarters EUCOM, ATTN. Director of GYA, Monthly Narrative 
Report for Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 45, 10/47-1/7.
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fall of the same year, in which prominent men and women from 
France, the Untied States, India and Germany, among them 
Frank Klier who was still in Nuremberg in 1949, and Franz 
Joseph StrauB, the man in charge of youth for the State of 
Bavaria, tried to analyze the current crisis. In 1951 
Germany's role in Europe aroused much interest.60
Interestingly, some Germans began a witchhunt against 
suspected communist agitators even before the infamous 
Senator Joseph McCarthy took center stage in Washington in 
1950. Lutheran ministers in Nuremberg consistently had 
warned the Americans from 1945 on that they should 
concentrate on the fight against ,,Bolshevism,, instead of 
trying to denazify, re-educate, and democratize Germans.
60,1'Die Zeitkrise und ihre Losung:' 2. Internationales 
Jugend-Forum des Deutsch-Amerikanischen Jugendklubs 
eroffnet," [The Crisis of Our Times and Solutions: Second 
International Youth Forum of the German-American Youth Club 
Opened] NN, 10 Sept. 1949: 14; "Jugend diskutierte die Krise 
der Zeit: 2. Internationales Jugend-Forum des Deutsch-
Amerikanischen Jugendklubs beendet," [Youth Discussed the 
Crisis of Our Times: Second International Youth-Forum of the 
German-American Youth Club Ended] NN, 12 Sept. 1949: 6;
"Professor Hale wird Jugendforum eroffnen," [Professor Hale 
will Open Youth Forum], YW, vol. 4, no. 11, Nov. 1950: 3; 
"Third Nuremberg Youth Forum Saw Heated Discussions," YW, 
vol. 4, no. 12, Dec. 1950: 2; "'Gesprach mit der Jugend:' Das 
Vierte Nordbayerische Jugendforum," ["Discourse with Youth:" 
The Fourth North Bavarian Youth Forum] NN, 5 May 1951: 20; 
"'Familiarize Youth With Self Government Early!' First Youth 
Forum Brought Many Suggestions," YW vol. 5, no. 9, Sept. 
1951: 1,2,7.
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These efforts would invariably drive Germans into the arms of 
the Soviets.61
During the following years the presence of Soviet troops 
and a Stalinist regime in the Soviet zone of occupation 
certainly had an impact on Nuremberg and the surrounding 
region. The Nuremberg Military Post bordered the Soviet zone 
in the north and Czechoslovakia in the east. Events like the 
Berlin blockade made Americans and those Germans who had cast 
their lots with them apprehensive about the future. June 
Selsor recalled that a number of dependents who were living 
with their husbands in Nuremberg decided to return to the 
United States in 1948. German rumors that communists had 
marked the houses the Americans occupied for "plunder and 
murder" in case the Russians were coming, certainly did 
nothing to ease the tension. Mrs. Selsor and her husband had 
to deal with worried GYA employees who inquired if the 
Selsors would be able to secure a place for them and their 
families on American planes in case of an evacuation. Others 
related to their American friends or employers that they were 
on ominous lists which the communists allegedly had written. 
Selsor and German GYA workers also found that many boys and
61See, for example, Dean Schieder's "Ansprache vor den 
amerikanischen Kriegspfarrern, 17.12.45 in Zirndorf." 
Schieder's answers to an ICD survey conducted by Hans Feiler 
in Nuremberg showed that he had not changed his mind in 1947. 
As far as the political future of the world was concerned, 
Schieder commented that it was clear to everyone that earlier 
or later there would be a confrontation between East and West 
and possibly war (LCA Kreisdekan Nurnberg 138) .
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girls were reluctant to visit their centers or to become 
involved in GYA activities because they were speculating that 
the communists might come and did not want to face 
retribution in case of an American withdrawal. The obvious 
success of the Berlin airlift in 1949 seemed to boost 
confidence in the Americans. Attendance numbers throughout 
the Post increased dramatically from May of that year on.62
The Cold War brought to light that even some of those 
people who were much in favor of the American presence in 
Germany and of a reorientation of German thought sometimes 
did not understand the American mission. Richard Sperber, 
the first president and founder of the German-American youth 
club, who had been secretary in Selsor's office in 1946, 
found himself at odds with Hans Lamm in 1949. A letter to 
Lamm under the headline "About Freedom of Speech in the Club" 
strongly objected to the Club's invitation of former Lord 
Mayor Hans Ziegler— a Social Democrat who had been expelled 
by his own party— to talk about his recent journey to Moscow. 
According to Sperber, Ziegler had previously accused the 
United States of trying to provoke a war and to "slander the 
American nation, the same nation, to which you have the good 
fortune to belong," without being punished for it. Sperber 
demanded the immediate cancellation of Ziegler's appearance 
at the club because Ziegler would certainly use it as a forum
62Selsor 10-11; "Participation Booming," YW vol. 4, no.
2: 2 .
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for further anti-American and pro-Soviet agitation. He
thought that such an action certainly would disrupt the
rather fragile beginning of the German-American friendship.
Sperber suspected that Ziegler's invitation was just part of
a sinister plot on Lamm's behalf. He constructed the fact
that Lamm had publicly protested against Ziegler's decision
to invite only Free German Youth members to a peace rally as
a clear indicator of Lamm's intentions. Sperber also noted
that Lamm had invited three prominent communists to the
previous youth forum, which "was quite a lot for such a small
and insignificant party." Unwittingly using vocabulary which
clearly had its roots in the Third Reich, Sperber concluded
that he had not
founded the German-American Youth Club so that you 
permit it now to be abused as a welcome propaganda stage 
for communist fellow travellers!
The healthy and democratically thinking members of the 
club therefore should defend themselves with all its 
energy against attempts to carry the virus of 
disintegration in its youth organization.63
aRichard Sperber to Hans Lamm, 2 Nov. 1949 (underlined 
in the original). Apparently American officials had not 
forgotten the 1947 order of monitoring the Club's activities. 
The letter and Lamm's reply found their way into the 
intelligence reports which Hans Feiler, still in Nuremberg as 
intelligence officer for HICOG, sent to Munich (NA RG 466 
OLCB, ID 1949-1950, Bi-weekly Reports from Nuremberg Field 
Office) .
Sperber's choice of words betrays the deep and lasting 
impact of antisemitic vocabulary even after the Third Reich 
was gone and discredited. Daniel Goldhagen (Hitler's Willing 
Executioners: Ordinary Germans and the Holocaust (New York: 
Alfred A. Knopf, 1996) esp. 64-65) cites impressive evidence 
that comparing Jews with vermin and deadly diseases, 
depicting Jews as an evil enemy in the midst of Germany, was 
not just a Nazi invention. The Nazis expanded the target 
group to Bolsheviks and legitimized the phraseology.
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Lamm's answer revealed his commitment to fairness and
his faith in the strength of democratic principles. He
pointed out to his predecessor, who, according to Lamm, had
not attended Club activities for years, that the Club's
executive committee was convinced that
it can only serve the healthy and democratically 
thinking club members if they deal with representatives 
of all [political] directions. It appears to be a 
matter of course to us that we do not make an exception 
to the principle of free speech in the case of a man 
whom the SPD has expelled.
Lamm rejected any form of pre-selection or censorship of
people scheduled to speak at the club. He found that
Sperber's anticommunist zeal often led him to misrepresent
the facts or at least to misinterpret them. The Club
president pointed out to Sperber, who was a member of the
Social Democratic Party and was working for the Social
Democratic newspaper, that none of his party's leading men
had found it necessary to attend the youth forums to which
they had been invited while the Communists apparently had
regarded them to be sufficiently important to be present.
Lamm further noted that three Germans had talked about their
experiences in the United States during the previous months
so that it would only be fair to give another German— who
Sperber's letter supports Goldhagen's argument about a deeply 
ingrained racist antisemitism in Germany's population, 
although his conclusions are certainly open to dispute. 
Apparently Sperber was neither aware of its racist 
implications, which must have been all too familiar to Lamm, 
nor of the irony that he was actually verbally continuing 
Hitler's fight against the enemy that had survived World War 
II and Germany's racial cleansing.
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still considered himself a Social Democrat and not a
Communist— the chance to talk about his experiences in the
Soviet Union. He thought that the members of the club were
sufficiently mature and critical to resist any pro-Soviet
propaganda that might occur. The interpreter also called
Sperber's attention to the fact that the Communists made no
bones about their dislike of the German-American Youth Club,
because it resisted any attempts to be abused for party
politics. Lamm concluded that
we are and will remain above party politics and defend 
the freedom of speech for everybody, as long as he 
respects existing laws; as little as we permit the KPD 
to order us about, as little we can and want to become 
dependent on the party to which the esteemed founder of 
this club happens to belong at the time.64
Apparently the matter did not stop there. According to
Lamm's former secretary, McCarthyism caught up with the IMT
interpreter. CIC repeatedly interrogated him, a fact that
considerable dampened his enthusiasm for his reorientation
work. Nevertheless he organized one more forum in Nuremberg.
In 1952 he left the city to return to the United States.
Without Lamm's support and untiring efforts in this realm,
this promising initiative came to an end.65
“Lamm to Sperber, 7 Nov. 1949; NA RG 466 OLCB, ID 1949- 
1950, Bi-weekly Reports from Nuremberg Field Office.
65Maar 84-85, 139-140; for a short biography of Lamm see 
Joseph Volk, Kurzbiographien zur Geschichte der Juden 1918- 
1945 (Munich: Leo Baeck Institute, 1988) 212; Lamm's
Departure from Nuremberg did not go unnoticed: see Chronik 
der Stadt Nurnberg 1952: 503, 15 July 1952; NCA F2 no. 49; 
Nuremberg Post Journal, 15 Sept. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit 
Records, Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122.
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For a while GYA tried to continue the tradition. In 
September of 1951 another forum for Northern Bavaria took 
place under direct GYA sponsorship at GYA center no. 1 in 
Nuremberg, but the emphasis shifted from political topics and 
intellectual reorientation towards practical suggestions, 
extensive workshops, and a good deal of entertainment. The 
American organizers also did not pass the opportunity to 
promote their own goals and included educational reform on 
the agenda. On the practical side young participants, among 
them Willy Gensmantel who represented the Nuremberg KYC,
It is not quite clear to what an extent McCarthyism 
really was responsible for the CIC actions, since Maar does 
not provide dates. At least some members of the intelligence 
community obviously disliked the Germans and at the same time 
harbored the most outrageous phantasies about German and 
Soviet designs. We have seen above that members of the CIC 
seemed to be eager to follow even the most unlikely leads to 
uncover allegedly subversive action (see, for example 
Situational Report by Donald T. Shea, Director, OMGBY ID to 
Land Director, [1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Land Director, Box 
284, 13/144-2/11) . Shea also undertook to discredit GYA with 
a "fairly hot number" a fellow intelligence officer had 
organized. He decided to circulate a very negative report by 
a German boy, who obviously was disillusioned with the Munich 
GYA, within OMGBY headquarters. The result of this type of 
action should not be underestimated. Information which 
obviously came from the boy's report suddenly appeared in a 
number of MG's evaluations of the Army's program (Jim Clark 
to Mr. Don Shea, 23 Aug. 1948; Shea to Clark 23 Aug. 1948; 
Clark to Shea 24 Aug. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Director, 
Box 17, 10/110-1/14). The fact that the exchange of letters 
between Lamm and Sperber went to Munich, reveals the interest 
which intelligence in Bavaria had in the affair. It remained 
at the state level, however. McCloy's correspondence with 
Lamm in 1951 does not indicate any knowledge of the CIC 
interviews and allegations. Judging from the available 
evidence it seems that Sperber's letter actually triggered 
the CIC investigation. When Feiler sent his factual report 
to Munich, he was probably not aware that he was initiating 
a witchhunt against Lamm. Joseph McCarthy simply provided a 
good way of justifying such actions from 1950 on.
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suggested that their generation should have a greater voice 
in youth work. They found that the different youth 
organizations needed to achieve a much higher degree of 
cooperation and worked out a list of suggestions for reaching 
this goal. Apart from that, the forum participants adopted 
a resolution addressed to the Bavarian State Ministry of 
Education in which they suggested that the administration 
should include social studies in curricula of Bavarian 
schools. American exchange teachers and students from the 
local high school were at hand to explain their concept of 
student and teacher participation in school affairs. 
According to the Young World, this part of the forum evoked 
much interest and considerable enthusiasm among the 
participants.66
Organizing youth forums and discussions with prominent 
persons found much attention of the newspapers and made the 
German-American Youth Club well known, but they were not the 
only club activities. Its affiliation with GYA and American 
volunteers provided the members with ample opportunities for 
occupying their leisure time. To further their understanding 
of parliamentary procedures, club members travelled in 
American trucks to Munich to attend the sessions of the state 
legislature. Their "roving reporter" even found his way to 
the floor where— much to his surprise— he discovered that
6611 'Familiarize Youth With Self-Government Early!' First 
Youth Forum Brought Many Suggestions," YW, vol. 5, no. 9, 
Sept. 1951: 1,2,7.
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leading politicians such as Thomas Dehler, Wilhelm Hogner, 
and even Alois Hundhammer proved to be accessible and 
listened to his questions. The reporter conveyed another 
lesson to his readers. Although Hogner, Hundhammer, and 
Dehler belonged to different political parties and certainly 
had opposing opinions about issues such as school reform, 
they did not seem to harbor any personal animosities.67
Apart from politics, American literature and culture 
became popular topics for workshops. The club had its own 
theater group. Music, hiking, and "unforgettable excursions" 
on Army trucks or buses formed part of the agenda. Well 
attended and apparently rather wild parties, in which 
American music became a standard feature, remained one of the 
club's most popular features.6*
In view of the popularity and the activities of the club 
it is surprising that it did not maintain its momentum and 
failed to carry the torch of German-American understanding 
much beyond 1951. Just as in any other organization, much 
depended on capable leadership which was hard to come by. It
67"Nvirnberger Jugendclub besuchte Landtag: Minister Dr.
Dr. A. Hundhammer spricht mit Jugendreporter - 'Wie lange 
soli Schulreform in Bayern dauern?' Dr. Dehler und Dr. Hogner 
begriiBen Mitglieder des Deutsch-Amerikanischen Jugendklubs 
Nurnberg," [Nuremberg Youth Club Visited State Legislature: 
Minister Dr. Dr. A. Hundhammer Speaks with Youth Journalist - 
"How Long Will School Reform in Bavaria Take?" Dr. Dehler 
and Dr. Hogner Welcome Members of the German-American Youth 
Club Nuremberg] YW, vol. 3, no. 4, 1 Apr. 1949: 7.
68Gerhard Knochlein, personal interview, 24 July 1995; 
Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug. 1994; Maar (70- 
135) provides an excellent picture of the club activities.
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also seemed that the post war situation provided an 
environment for such an organization which it was impossible 
to continue once life returned to normal. Since most of the 
club's members were students, it was natural for them to move 
on to universities or careers in other locations. The 
increasing wealth and the pursuit of their careers did not 
leave them the time and energy they had been able to dedicate 
to the enterprise. Last, but not least, negative experiences 
with individual soldiers, for example the murder of a 
Nuremberg taxi driver, who was a popular member of the club, 
by a GI, as well as CIC activities did much to dampen 
enthusiasm for the enterprise. Although initially he 
belonged to the occupiers, Hans Lamm's further career is 
symptomatic of that of many Germans. He only returned 
briefly to the United States. In 1955 he went to Munich, 
where he pursued a successful career, during which he held 
many distinguished positions and became the head of the 
Jewish community. Many other club members became professors, 
doctors, managers, notaries and lawyers. A number of them, 
among others Richard Sperber, decided to emigrate to the 
United States.69 
The Girl's Club
While the German-American Youth Club took care of many 
intellectuals among young men and some women, June Selsor, 
Mark Selsor's wife decided with a number of other American
69Maar 110, 113, 116-123; Volk 212.
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Twelve members of the GYA prepare to write the constitution 
for GYA Center no. 1, Nurnberg, Germany. The constitution 
will be put to a vote before the members of the club as soon 
as it is prepared. The Nurnberg girls council has spent the 
last eight months studying "democratic practice" before 
undertaking this important step in the foundation of the 
club. Three of the officials of the club [GYA] help the 
girls put it in writing.___________________________________
34. U.S. Army Signal Corps Photo no. 294874, 15 Dec. 1947
women to become active with GYA and to do something for the 
less progressive members of the opposite sex. She had been 
approached informally by many girls who were looking for 
somebody to help with their problems or to ask for advice. 
In April 1947 Mrs. Selsor issued official invitations to 
initiate a girls club within GYA. Over two hundred young 
ladies appeared for the first meeting. They came from a wide 
variety of social backgrounds. It took Mrs. Selsor and her 
co-volunteers some time to introduce democratic rules, and 
even more importantly, to instill a democratic spirit and a
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willingness to take up responsibilities in the group members, 
some of whom still were ardent and unabashed admirers of 
Hitler. Under the leadership of Mrs. Selsor and other 
American volunteers the girls wrote their own constitution 
and practiced democratic procedures. The girls club 
organized its own summer camps and skiing excursions. GYA 
provided transportation and equipment, but the food had to 
come from a different source. After the first camp had 
almost ended in nutritional disaster, Mrs. Selsor made sure 
that the girls club never left without a considerable stock 
of American supplies which the local military community as 
well as the Selsor family generously contributed. Other 
allied volunteers and workers operated in a similar fashion. 
It is noteworthy that GIs and volunteers provided all drinks, 
food, and candy available at the American youth activities 
out of their own pockets or collected the items within the 
military community.70
On the lighter side, American women introduced German 
girls to the mysteries of being a modern woman. A zone wide 
GYA publication, The Idea Exchange reported in December 1947 
that
two former stateside models, American dependents,
inaugurated the Nuremberg Charm School. In addition to
70Selsor 4-6, 20; "Nuremberg Girls' Club: The work of US 
Dependents in Army's Assistance to GYA," OMGUS Information 
Bulletin No. 151, 28 Dec. 1948: 15-18; Lore Falter, personal 
interview, 29 June 1995; Helga Stadtlander, personal 
interivew, 15 Aug. 1995; Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 
11 Aug. 1994.
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lessons in graceful movement, the girls are taught the 
art of rising and sitting with ease, proper posture and 
balance. Useful hints are given the girls to enable 
them to dress to the best advantage on the limited 
clothing available to them.
The women's section of the local newspaper had much praise
for the course. Even in this realm reorientation could be an
issue. The article noted that the Third Reich had tried to
transform the opposite sex into uniformed paramilitary "birth
machines." The charm school provided the girls with the
means to become more independent and to take care of their
own interests with a "secure, self-evident grace." The paper
lauded the attempt to show the girls one side of their
personalities which they should not neglect.71
"Reorientation" could acquire many different faces and
reach very different people. We have seen how Hans Lamm
exercised spiritual and intellectual guidance in the German-
American Youth Club. Approached by Lamm, Arno Hamburger also
found his way into GYA as a volunteer. Born in Nuremberg, he
had experienced Nazi discrimination, prosecution, and the
burning of the synagogue first hand before he managed to
leave Germany in 1938. During World War II he served in the
British Army and returned to the city in 1946 to help his
lxGerman Youth Activities Idea Exchange, 22 Dec. 1947; 
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 
5/295-3/5; "Darf ich vorstellen: meine Charm-Klasse," [May I 
introduce my Charm-Class] NN, 17 Apr. 1948: 4; see also "Mrs. 
Charkoff kampft gegen Mauerblvimchen: GroBer Erfolg der ersten 
Charm-Klasse - Wie komme ich mit Grazie und Wiirde durchs 
Leben?" [Mrs. Charkoff fights against wall-flowers: First 
Charm-Class Great Success - How do I Master Life with Grace 
and Dignity?] YW, vol. 2, no. 5, 10 May 1948: 2.
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parents— who had survived the Holocaust— rebuild their 
existence. The girls under his care did not attend 
discussions, but rather participated in one of the many 
sports groups which GYA sponsored. Nevertheless, Hamburger, 
an excellent athlete, saw a chance to help them understand 
what their fathers and grandfathers had refused to learn. He 
organized outings and week-end trips. Whenever his group did 
not have enough supplies, he made sure that they would not go 
hungry by obtaining food in the Army stores to which he had 
access as an employee of the IMT. Under his guidance the 
girls not only did physical exercise, but also were able to 
discuss the fate of the Jews in Nuremberg with a witness who 
spoke like them, who had grown up in the city, and who was 
able to relate to them first hand what most of their parents 
and grandparents chose to repress. The girls learned in this 
way not only about the terrible consequences of their city's 
recent past for people who were just like them. They also 
came to understand that practicing tolerance and 
understanding, as well as building a democracy would help 
them to lay the old demons to rest. According to Hamburger, 
the girls began to ask and he was able to provide some 
answers in a way which the group could understand and to 
which it could relate. The bond went so deep that the girls 
actually called him "Dad." Some of them remained in 
occasional contact with him fifty years later.
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Interestingly, not only the girls benefitted from this 
relationship. Looking back, Hamburger did not think highly 
about the older generation in Nuremberg. After his return he 
found that most people had not changed and never would, but 
working with the girls gave him hope that not all might be 
lost. He considered the time he spent with his GYA group to 
be the best he had had in Germany.72 
German Perceptions
Of course the widespread American support for young 
Germans did not go unnoticed and certainly was not unwelcome. 
When GYA celebrated its fifth anniversary in 1951, many local 
dignitaries, among them the President of Middle Franconia's 
government, the Catholic dean in Nuremberg and even the 
Lutheran youth pastor in charge of the city, sent their 
congratulatory notes. All of those who wrote were grateful 
for the material help they had received from the Army without 
which their youth work would have been next to impossible. 
The Catholic dean spoke of "five years of good will, sincere 
concern, advice, and active support" which the GYA 
"idealists" had invested in German youth. The Lutheran 
pastor pointed out that young Germans "came to know far away
^Arno Hamburger, personal interview, 11 Aug 1994; see 
also Maar 63-70; Frank Stern's The Whitewashing of the Yellow 
Badge is an excellent study of the way in which West Germans 
dealt with the Holocaust and Jews after World War II.
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countries and their peoples projected on the walls of our 
narrow rooms.,|73
In spite of much praise not everybody was happy with 
the American activities. At the end of 1947 a Nuremberg 
journalist criticized the trend in Germany to concentrate 
American re-education efforts on the younger generation. 
According to him, young people had never known anything else 
but Nazi ideology. This brainwashing had made young people 
"stubborn, obstinate, and diabolical," and therefore a 
hopeless target for re-education. According to him, people 
over thirty-five years still remembered the Weimar Republic 
and therefore would be more open to the American efforts.74
A conference of Bavarian youth leaders in November 1947, 
at which no Americans were present, also brought to light 
some interesting opinions about the American activities in 
Nuremberg. Church leaders in general seemed to be far more 
reserved about the Army's GYA program than anybody else and 
made no bones about their dislike. Other leaders of
73"Five Years of Army Assistance to German Youth," YW 
vol. 5, no. 7, July 1951: 1,3.
The following section deals exclusively with the 
Nuremberg GYA. A detailed study on GYA throughout Bavaria 
which the Intelligence Division of HICOG carried out in 1950 
indicates that the situation in the city and in Northern 
Bavaria was very similar to that in other areas (Office of 
Intelligence, HICOG, Essential Elements of Information on 
GYA, 25 May 1950; NA RG 466 OLCBY, ID, Elements of Essential 
Information 1950-51).
74"Deutsche Gegenwart: Ein Informationsbrief," edited by 
Karl 0. Paetel, 8-43 Burns Street, Long Island, N.Y., 1 Dec. 
1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 
142, 5/296-1/15.
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Nuremberg youth groups did not have much positive to say 
about GYA either, although everybody present seemed to 
appreciate the helping hand of Major Selsor. "Materialism" 
became the catchword of the day. Many thought that the 
Americans were far too generous with their material support 
which was spoiling the young people and raising too many 
expectations from the side of the youth which German clubs 
and authorities would never be able to fulfill. Others 
complained that GYA youth centers attracted and protected 
young criminals. Apparently the youth leaders did not see 
eye to eye with Americans in Nuremberg about educational 
values, but opinions on what exactly GYA was doing wrong 
differed considerably. Some complained that American 
soldiers simply transferred the military tone and behavior to 
the centers, while others detected a lack of discipline and 
order which would ultimately lead to the deterioration of 
moral standards.
As far as GYA successes were concerned, a number of 
Nuremberg youth leaders and city officials were skeptical. 
In general the new and freer education methods did not meet 
much approval. One Nuremberg school principal revealed that 
he was clearly aware of the American goals, but remained 
completely entrenched in his authoritarian thinking. 
According to him, "German children want to be told what to do 
and not to be educated according to American free methods." 
Re-education apparently had not reached this educator, but
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more progressive youth leaders and teachers welcomed the 
changes which they detected in the children who attended the 
American programs. Another school principal thought that the 
contact with Americans had led to an increased interest of 
students and awakened the desire to become more active in 
their school affairs.75
A zone-wide GYA study conducted in 1950 confirmed the 
director's observation. Young Germans in general revealed 
that they were still not as convinced about democracy as 
teenagers in the United States. While 65% of young Americans 
indicated that they regarded a free government under the 
control of their constituents as the most desirable form of 
government and 3 5% did not have an opinion on the issue, 15% 
of young Germans were against such a government, 47% had no 
opinion and only 37% supported the democratic form of 
government. GYA participants revealed a stronger support of 
democracy than those who did not attend the program. 51% of 
GYA members supported democracy, 40% had no opinion and only 
9% were against it. While the results were certainly not 
ideal, Weldon Shofstall, the GYA's civilian adviser who had
75"Appendix to Report on Attitudes Towards the Army 
Assistance Program to GYA," 26 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/245-3/4. The
appendix actually is a report about a youth leader meeting of 
the Bavarian Youth Committee. The author noted that no 
Americans were present and the Germans took the opportunity 
to voice their opinions freely.
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conducted the survey, noted that these results were 
encouraging.76
Nevertheless GYA was facing a constant uphill battle. 
The program did not reach a considerable number of young 
people in Nuremberg.77 Others did not find their way to a 
youth center because they and their families avoided contact 
with Americans.78 Although incidents between soldiers and 
German civilians were rare, they tended to undermine what 
Selsor and his colleagues were trying to build.79 The Major 
repeatedly had to defend the program against attacks from
76,,Attitude of Youth Towards Control of Government by the 
people," "GYA Hits the Target," YW, vol 4, no. 5, 4 May 1950: 
5. Fiissl (162-63) suggests that this survey should be used 
with caution since, according to him, it was conducted with 
the intention to justify the GYA program against attacks from 
MG and Germans. The rather extensive sources on GYA and MG 
conferences, however, indicate that the Army and its civilian 
adviser, Weldon Shofstall, made an honest attempt to evaluate 
the program. This chapter also shows that reorientation 
indeed was a concern for the Nuremberg Military Post GYA 
personnel and had the desired results.
^Some of the people I interviewed were not aware of its 
existence or only became acquainted with parts of the program 
(see, for example, Peter Fries, personal interview, 8 Aug. 
1995; Gerhard Springer, personal interview, 1 Aug. 1995).
78Marga Guthmann, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1995; Helga 
Kohler, personal interview, 13 July 1994. Helmut Stiihler 
also recalled that some parents instructed their children to 
go to the German homes of the open door instead of GYA when 
they opened in 1950 (Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12 
Aug. 1994).
79Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; see 
also Maar 84, 124.
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members of the Bavarian Youth Committee or other 
organizations.80
Although dissatisfaction was widespread in some circles, 
many other Germans did not share these opinions. In May 1947 
the Army's program in Nuremberg was just beginning to embark 
on a more sophisticated approach. Nevertheless Nuremberg's 
school superintendent Raab defended GYA against criticism 
from local OMGUS officials even at that early stage. The 
Military Government officers had demonstrated their 
solidarity with some German critics by publicly declaring 
that it was time to give German youth something for their 
minds instead of sports equipment and Coca Cola. Raab 
thought that the GYA approach actually was serving the 
American reorientation mission quite well. According to the 
superintendent, young Germans were suspicious of any kind of 
ideological instruction and needed above all food and jobs. 
He argued that sports activities helped raise morale, 
occupied the youths' idle time, and provided hope for the 
future. Participating in sports activities with Americans
80See, for example, Nuremberg Military Post, GYA officer 
to Commanding General, Headquarters EUCOM, Attn.: Director of 
GYA, subject: monthly narrative report for July 1949.
Intelligence reported in 1949 that Martin Faltermeyer, the 
President of the Bavarian Youth Committee, added much to the 
dissatisfaction about GYA when he claimed that his 
organization had to pay thirteen million marks for 
maintaining GYA, a figure that turned out to be ten times the 
real amount (letter from Donald Shea, Director OMGBY 
Intelligence to Mr. Arndt, Director, OMGUS Intelligence, 24 
Mar. 1949, in which he also sent the "guinea pig report" of 
the German boy from Munich to headquarters; NA RG 2 60 OMGBY, 
Director ID, Box 17, 10/116-1/1).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
566
and sharing their Coca Colas would ultimately result in an 
increased confidence in American ideas and intentions. More 
on the practical side, a trade unionist noted in 1950 that 
his youth work would not have been possible without GYA 
support and that he simply could not understand how anybody 
who was active in youth activities still managed to criticize 
a program that was doing so much for young people.81
The discrepancy between the actual operations of the 
Nuremberg GYA and the opinions which a number of youth 
leaders and even some city youth officials voiced is 
striking. A closer look at German complaints reveals some of 
the difficulties the Germans were having with the American 
program. In one of its monthly reports to the Bavarian 
Military Government the Bavarian Youth Committee, for 
example, severely criticized the lack of cooperation between 
GYA and youth groups in 1947. Its authors also complained 
that American support went mainly to GYA activities and not 
to German youth groups, an opinion which Martin Faltermeyer, 
President of the Bavarian Youth Committee, reiterated in 
1949. The example of Nuremberg shows, however, where the 
real problem lay. While Selsor did support organized groups 
he was also stressing the need to concentrate the program's 
focus on those who did not want to join youth organizations.
81Det. B-211, W.B. Morell, Deputy Director, Weekly 
Intelligence Report, 15-22 May 1947; NA RG 2 60 OMGBY, FOD, 
Det. B-211, Box 1426, 9/124-1/2; "GYA hat Pionierarbeit
geleistet," [GYA Has Done Pioneer Work] YW, vol. 4, no. 1, 1 
Jun. 1950: 4.
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The Major considered himself to be the spokesperson for these 
people. This emphasis did not escape the Germans' 
attention.82
The results of a HICOG investigation of GYA activities 
in Bavaria in September 1949 proved that Selsor was 
addressing a real problem. According to the youth 
specialists from Munich, Germans in general were not aware of 
the problems unorganized youth were facing. The commission 
commended Selsor for his cooperative attitude, but found that 
both Andreas Staudt and Theodor Marx, the most important city 
administrators in the field, displayed a rather negative 
attitude towards the program.83 This was not surprising. 
The fact that GYA provided opportunities for young people 
without forcing them into a firm structure was a novelty 
which completely undermined the very essence of German youth 
organizations. The program threatened their reason for 
existing by offering attractive programs which otherwise were 
only available by joining a club. GYA would go away, but the 
principle of open youth work might not. In this context the 
constant demands by the Germans that American help should be 
channeled through German youth organizations and the 
complaints that the Americans did not adapt their activities
82OMGBY, Field Research Section, Bi-weekly Intelligence 
Report, 8 Sept. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 3, 
10/107-1/49.
83Monthly Report of Public Education, OLCB, Sept. 1949; 
NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files 1948-52, Box 1, 120.5/1.
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to the German situation reveal the anxiety of the old school 
youth leaders in Nuremberg. They were very much afraid to 
lose control of a large segment of young people in Nuremberg 
and with that, the basis of their organizations' power.
Occasionally the conflict erupted openly. In Zirndorf, 
the GYA officer reported in July 1949 that he was making some 
progress towards "building up better cooperation in that 
town." According to him, the local sports club was the main 
obstacle to reaching good relations. Its leadership did not 
want to make the town's only gymnasium available to non­
members because it would undermine its power. The officer 
concluded that "some manipulation is still in order in 
Zirndorf, but should succeed in the near future in bringing 
about the desired results."84
German fears were not unfounded. Hans Werner, who 
became director of a GYA center in Furth in 1948, recalled 
that a number of young people decided to open a photo group 
at his facility. Werner had to adjust to many changes. 
First, the center was relocated, then consolidated with 
Nuremberg center no. l which also moved to a new location. 
Werner remained director of the center when it came under the 
control of the Nuremberg city administration. According to 
him, the members of his photo group as well as others decided 
to relocate with Werner and remain under his guidance because
mGYA, 16th Infantry Report of 8 July 1949; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-2/5.
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they found the traditional German club life with its 
membership requirements rather restrictive. The group 
continued to meet long after it had outgrown the youth 
centers. Werner still received invitations to its get- 
togethers in 19 9 5.85
Of course youth leaders who criticized the Americans for 
being materialistic knew that they could not compete with 
candy, cookies, and even cigarettes one could obtain at GYA 
centers. These incentives, as well as the fact that the 
centers had so much more to offer than any German youth group 
at the time, undoubtedly made many of the youth leaders 
apprehensive about the strong competition which had emerged 
for their own organizations.86
The less democratically inclined the leadership was, the 
more problems it had with the American approach. An American 
survey revealed that Lutheran church youth leaders were among 
those who did not practice a democratic regime in their youth 
groups. We have seen already that Bavarian youth pastor 
Helbich, who had his offices in Nuremberg, from the start 
opposed any movement that threatened to infringe on his 
domain and on the control he exercised over his youth groups. 
Not surprisingly, Nuremberg Lutheran youth leaders proved to
85Hans Werner, personal interview, 21 Aug. 1995; for more 
details on the further history of the GYA centers in 
Nuremberg see chapter XI, below.
86See, for example, Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4 
Aug. 1994 and 4 Aug. 1995; Hans Eckstein, personal interview, 
6 July 1995.
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be the group most opposed to the American youth program. Of 
course the older generation in general also remained strongly 
nationalistic. Quite a few youth leaders expressed their 
resentment or at least their discomfort with the impact which 
American culture had on young people.87
Older youth leaders and the churches had reason to fear 
the new currents. The youth leader meeting of 1947 revealed 
that especially children who were not organized appreciated 
the opportunities the centers offered to them. Many found a 
warm room and company in the GYA facilities. Even one of the 
most outspoken critics conceded that in general parents did 
not object to their children becoming involved in the local 
GYA activities. GYA also gave young elites an opportunity to 
become acquainted with the outside world by means of 
magazines and books. One youth leader even thought that 
especially those between fourteen and fifteen years were 
attracted to GYA activities because they represented the
87|lAppendix to Report on Attitudes Towards the Army 
Assistance Program to GYA,11 26 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/245-3/4. An OMGUS 
survey on youth actually found that 70% of all religious 
groups in the American zone appointed their leaders while 70% 
of all other groups followed democratic procedures. Members 
of the church groups also tended to have more pronounced 
anti-democratic attitudes than those of other youth groups. 
OMGUS, I CD Opinion Surveys, report no. 99, 5 Mar. 1948: 8-9. 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID Director, Box 17, 10/116-1/13. The
surveys were conducted at about the same time in which the 
meeting took place.
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complete opposite of the Hitler Youth which many had come to 
dislike.88
The last observer revealed a sound judgement. Young 
people found more in the Nuremberg GYA center than meets the 
eye. After years of strict discipline at home and in the 
Hitler Youth, GYA offered them new ways of getting to know 
themselves and the world. Fifty years after their stay in 
Nuremberg, Major Selsor and his wife evoke respect, fondness 
and even strong emotions because of their humanity and their 
genuine concern for the needs of the young people under their 
care. June Selsor actually decided to initiate her girls 
club because German girls had approached her on a personal 
basis with their concerns and problems. The fact that two 
hundred girls from all walks of life showed up for the first 
meeting of the club documented this search for something new 
and humane in a harsh environment.89
The Army's GYA program undoubtedly was one of the most 
extensive and quite successful relief programs of the United 
States in its zone of occupation. A look at the Nuremberg 
Post revealed that the Army did far more than simply provide
88|,Appendix to Report on Attitudes Towards the Army 
Assistance Program to GYA," 26 Nov. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/245-3/4; for young 
people's reactions to the Nazis' attempts to completely 
absorb them into their state see Detlev J.K. Peukert, Inside 
Nazi Germany: Conformity, Opposition and Racism in Everyday 
Life (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1982) 145- 
174.
89Selsor 4; see also Maar 106.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
572
candy and sports. Many of GYA's programs offered new 
approaches to young people and youth work in general. It 
remains to be seen, however, to what an extent young people 
and the Germans who were responsible for youth work were 
willing and able to continue on the way which American 
reorientation programs were trying to pave for the future.
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CHAPTER XI 
Reorientation Continued: 1948-1952
The Office of the High Commissioner for Germany under 
John McCloy continued and in some ways intensified the 
reorientation course for young people on which OMGUS had 
embarked, although it had relinquished all its mandatory 
powers in this realm. The American focus shifted from school 
and administrative reform to political pressure on German 
governments, an increased support of German projects, and on 
the formation of individual attitudes. On the local level 
German-American cooperation assured that many new ideas and 
concepts made lasting contributions to the way Germans 
conducted youth work.
American Policy Formulation. 1948-1952
1948 was an eventful year for Germans and Americans in 
Germany. The Berlin Blockade and currency reform dominated 
the agendas, but Military Government officials also received 
notice that the political changes and the move towards 
forging the three western zones into one state would bring 
the long envisioned transition of American authority from the 
Department of Defense to the State Department. The latter 
set up an organizational structure in Washington that would 
slowly bring the programs in Germany in line with the same 
operations elsewhere in the world. The State Department also 
had come to the conclusion that OMGUS needed to reorganize as
573
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well to streamline the command structure and to avoid 
duplication and waste of funds. One of the central 
propositions of a fact finding mission from Washington in 
1949 was that all reorientation efforts should come together 
in one office which should have equal rank with other offices 
and direct access to the High Commissioner. McCLoy took up 
the idea and created the Public Affairs Office (PAO) in 1949 
which reflected the fact that HICOG and the State Department 
regarded reorientation as one of the most important missions 
the Americans still had in Germany. PAO consistently 
employed more than 50% of the entire HICOG staff in 
headquarters as well as on the state levels. In December 
1950, for example, the office had 3345 employees of a total 
of 6123 at headquarters. On the State level the ratio was 
less impressive with about 1,500 employees for PAO against a 
total of 4,374.1
The administrative reorganization meant that most 
divisions needed to take stock and define their missions to 
secure their continuation under the State Department. Clay 
had successfully carried out his program of bringing 
civilians into MG. This meant that the High Commissioner for 
Germany, John McCloy, would be able to rely on an experienced
‘Kellermann 80-93; the figures for 1950 are in Guy A. 
Lee (ed.), Documents on Field Organization Docs. 22, 23.
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staff in the areas in which he would continue the work of 
OMGUS.2
Alonzo Grace and his Education and Cultural Relations 
Division were no exception to the rule. At a conference in 
Berchtesgaden in November 1948 Grace charted the future 
course of his Education and Cultural Relations Division 
which, according to him, would have to play a far more 
important role than it had previously in order to achieve the 
objectives of the occupation. Grace emphasized that the 
material reconstruction of West Germany in form of the 
Marshall
Plan certainly was useful and important, but that Germany's
"spiritual, moral, intellectual, and cultural redemption"
from Nazi rule and Hitler's successful indoctrination could
not be neglected.
To deal with minds and hearts which have thus been 
conditioned, plus the effect of the war, presents a 
problem far beyond the comprehension of those who would 
view education or cultural relations as something that 
should occur only after material reconstruction has been 
completed.
Clearly departing from Alexander's re-education concept which 
emphasized structural reform, Grace found that "true reform" 
could only "come from within". According to him, 
organization or structure of German schools probably would be 
less important for the future of Germany than the contents of 
the curricula or the quality and convictions of the teachers.
2Tent, Mission 307.
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Grace maintained that the future of American efforts would 
depend on a higher degree of coordination between American 
agencies. GYA, for example, could provide tremendous help if 
the Army found ways to cooperate more closely with the Youth 
Activities Section. Ultimately, however, Grace insisted that 
only cooperation with German authorities and citizens would 
bear fruit. He advocated an expansion of the exchange 
program which should include all social classes, not just an 
elite, and an increase in American cultural activities in 
Germany.3
Grace's address clearly reflected the evaluation work 
his field officers had done during the previous months. 
Harold Patrick, OMGBY youth activities officer in Munich, for 
example, sent a detailed analysis to Grace through Norrie in 
November 1948. According to him, OMGUS needed to address 
several serious shortcomings in its activities to date. 
While he recognized that schools, teachers, and educational 
reform were certainly necessary, Patrick provided statistical 
evidence that young Germans actually were spending as much or 
more time out of the classrooms than at school. He continued 
that OMGUS had done nothing to address the issue of leisure 
time although experts agreed that these activities were vital 
for forming the personalities of young people and developing
30ut of the Rubble: An Address on the Reorientation of 
the German People by Alonzo G. Grace, Director E&CRD given at 
the Berchtesgaden conference, 8-12 Oct. 1948; NA RG 260 
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 112, 5/292-1/12; 
see also Tent, Mission 306-307.
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their political habits. The youth officer argued that the 
youth groups to which OMGUS tended to delegate its work, 
often aggravated the problem. The OMGUS approach to work 
through the traditional German organizations tended to 
reenforce the typical "Central European" authoritarian 
behavior patterns and did nothing to change the social 
structure. Since youth organizations generally had a 
monopoly on resources and facilities, young people were 
exposed to "political, religious or ideological influences 
before they are mature enough to make their own decisions." 
Patrick also alerted Grace and Norrie to the fact that so far 
only 25-30% of all young people had chosen to become part of 
youth groups. This meant that about 70% had much leisure 
time at their hands which they could use creatively if they 
had opportunities and facilities available.4
Patrick suggested that OMGUS should take action on 
several levels. He proposed that OMGUS would have to use its 
leverage far more than previously to induce state and local 
governments to develop programs for all youth, not just the
4,lBrief analysis of task facing Youth Activities 
Section," by Harold Patrick, OMGBY, Youth Activities Section, 
18 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education 
Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18. Patrick's report is just one of 
many. American youth experts in general believed that 
progress had been made but that German youth leaders still 
tended to use authoritarian methods and did not pay attention 
to their membership. Many reports also critically commented 
on the exclusiveness of German youth organizations which only 
tended to look after themselves and their members. See, for 
example, Situation Report by Charles Winning, Director, 
E&CRD, OMGBY, [1949]: 15-20; NA RG 260 OMGBY, Land Director, 
BOX 284, 13/144-1/19.
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organized groups. Patrick thought that OMGUS also would have 
to make sure that the German authorities clearly understood 
and shared the American concept of a democratic education. 
To help with this task Military Government should shift the 
emphasis of its programs to young people in general 
regardless of their affiliations. Patrick argued that youth 
leadership programs were an essential tool for accomplishing 
that mission. He estimated that Bavaria alone needed between 
ten and eleven thousand trained youth leaders in 1949, and 
German institutions did not seem to be willing to take up the 
task. The cultural exchange programs which OMGUS was 
developing would provide youth leaders with opportunities to 
acquire first hand knowledge of different approaches to youth 
work. Patrick thought that the 150 GYA centers operating in 
the American zone were actually serving as the type of 
community centers he was envisioning for German youth, but 
that the Army needed advice in administration and program 
development. Therefore OMGUS and GYA would have to cooperate 
much more closely. The youth officers also would have to 
determine the amount of support they might be able to receive 
from the Amerika Hauser, Education Centers and the film 
program. Patrick informed Grace and Norrie that his staff 
was already developing projects along the lines he had 
outlined, but that the Youth Activities Section would need 
additional personnel to be effective. Although Grace chose 
not to include Patrick's main concern in his address at
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Berchtesgaden, it became one of the major pillars of the 
HICOG reorientation efforts.5
Apparently headquarters maintained close contact with 
its officers in the states. Lawrence Norrie submitted a 
summary of the activities of his Group Activities Branch and 
an outline for further action to his superiors just before 
the Berchtesgaden conference, which essentially went along 
the lines Patrick had suggested. He dedicated most of the 
paper to youth activities. Norrie did not waste any time 
with the discussion of directives or policy statements but 
rather provided Grace with nine "specific aims" most of which 
had been on the agenda since 1946.
(a) Through active encouragement and aid to increase 
and widen German voluntary efforts to develop an 
educational and recreational program for the 
leisure time of all German youth.
(b) To afford German youth a wide choice of activities 
and interests, aimed at the development of 
individual initiative, personal dignity and 
integrity, civic responsibility and a social 
conscience.
(c) To encourage approved German public and private 
youth serving agencies to work on selected 
projects as part of a total community plan; to 
fit non-German agencies and resources in integral 
part of the German plan.
(d) To assist youth itself in assuming responsibility 
for the planning and conduct of its own programs 
with a reasonable amount of adult guidance.
(e) To discover and train young German leaders in a 
type of program planning and operation consistent 
with a changing German social structure and 
present-day German youth needs.
s"Brief analysis of task facing Youth Activities 
Section," by Harold Patrick, OMGBY, Youth Activities Section, 
18 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education 
Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
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(f) To aid in the establishment of a voluntary, 
coordinating committee responsible for the 
supervision, coordination, and development of 
youth organizations in every Kreis and other 
designated local areas.
(g) To encourage German youth serving agencies to 
experiment in training for responsible and 
constructive citizenship through such means as 
youth rings,international work camps, cooperative 
community service projects, international 
conferences and community youth centers.
(h) To facilitate opportunities for German adult youth 
workers and older youth to study youth 
organizations and method in democratic countries.6
The list shows that Norrie and his section did not modify
their goals in any way, but rather supplemented them.
Leadership training would provide an effective tool for
securing the American mission in the long run. OMGUS also
recognized for the first time that it would have to pay much
more attention to those who did not join any kind of
organizations, since many of the German youth groups did not
show much interest in furthering democratic goals.
Interestingly, Norrie and his officers did not find it 
necessary to refer in any way to the developing Cold War. 
Just as Grace did at Berchtesgaden, the head of the Group 
Activities Branch and his youth activities officers continued 
to emphasize the necessity of reorienting German youth away 
from their traditional patterns of behavior towards 
democratic ideals. They did not seem to recognize the 
potential benefits for their cause and their section which
6E&CRD, Report of Group Activities Branch, 10 Oct. 1948; 
NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Group Activities Br. , Box 129, 5/294- 
1/17.
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transformed their crusade against the Nazi past into a fight 
against the communist threat, which increasingly captured the 
attention of the American public and politicians, might 
bring.7
The comments to a proposed Senate investigation which 
was to examine the alleged renazification of West Germany and 
the failure of American programs in June 1949 reveal MG's 
foremost concerns. In reply to the question "whether or not 
there is development in German youth of appreciation and 
devotion to democratic institutions", John Fixley, Norrie's 
Deputy Chief, wrote that less than one percent of young 
Germans were affiliated with the communist party or the 
"communist front organization" Free German Youth. He thought 
that "this is significant since the communist party more than 
any other political party offers the external trappings of 
National Socialism. These include: symbols, flags,
organization structure, authoritarianism." Fixley also 
presented a number of additional facts to show that youth 
actually had made progress in the field or reorientation but 
he warned that "many cultural elements which permitted 
National Socialism to rise in 1932 still exist." According 
to him, Americans needed more time to teach these young
7Apart from Norrie's analysis see also "Brief analysis 
of task facing Youth Activities Section," by Harold Patrick, 
OMGBY, Youth Activities Section, 18 Nov. 1948; NA RG 260 
OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18. 
The question of the influence of communism on young people in 
West Germany did not arise until the beginning of 1950.
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people the practical side of democracy which they had never 
experienced.8
At headquarters, however, reorientation did not make 
much headway. Wells had been able to awaken Clay's interest 
in German re-education and had helped the educators to 
acquire Division status, but plans for HICOG clearly 
envisioned cuts on a broad front and certainly not the 
expansion of personnel which Grace and youth officers were 
hoping for. Grace also was disturbed by the fact that 
education would not be one of the areas over which Americans 
were planning to maintain direct control. Although he 
mobilized American educators, above all Herman Wells, in the 
United States he was unable to change the provision. The 
reduction of his Division to Branch status within the HICOG 
PAO in September 1949 brought about Grace's immediate 
resignation.9
It seems that the loss of its prominent head and the 
power to order changes did not affect HICOG's reorientation 
work for youth adversely. Norrie, Patrick, and many other MG 
veterans remained in charge of youth activities under HICOG 
and undoubtedly continued the work they had outlined. McCloy 
and his staff apparently were happy with the OMGUS approach.
8Memo from John Fixley, Community Education Branch to 
Alonzo Grace, E&CRD, 22 June 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
9Kellermann 75-80; Tent, Mission 307-311.
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HICOG officially adopted OMGUS policy statements as its 
own.10
Not just the higher echelons stayed on. Harald Lund, 
for example, had assumed his first assignment as Military 
Governor of Kronach in the summer of 1946. His family had 
emigrated from Norway to the United States after his birth. 
He and his wife spoke German. Lund later moved to Schwabach 
as Security and Liaison Officer, and succeeded James Barnett 
as Director of the Nuremberg MG detachment. In 1950 he 
became HICOG Kreis Resident Officer for Upper and Middle 
Franconia which included Nuremberg. HICOG's decision to 
officially accept OMGUS policies as the basis for its own 
actions ensured continuity in youth affairs.11
Contrary to Grace's fears and allegations, John McCloy 
focused much more on reorientation and especially on youth 
than his predecessor had done. The apparent Soviet attempt 
to win over young people to the cause of socialism in a giant 
Whitsuntide youth meeting in East Berlin in 1950 during which
10Lawrence Norrie, oral history interview conducted by 
Lewis Schmidt, Georgetown University Library, 18 Jan. 1990: 
3-7.
llFor Lund's career see "Our Hall of Fame," YW, vol. 5, 
no. 3: 2; "Kinderfest der GYA und der Militarregierung,"
[Party for Children by GYA and MG] NN, 27 Sept. 1947: 3;
"Fremde Lander im Film," [Foreign Countries Presented in 
Movies] NN, 12 Mar. 1949: 5); for the continuity of HICOG 
policy see Pilgert, Community 19; see also OMGUS, E&CRD, "The 
Aims, Goals and Programs of the Community Education Branch," 
[1949-50]; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., 
Box 128, 5/294-1/14. This memo repeats the goals Norrie set 
forward in 1948 almost verbatim.
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the communists made every conceivable attempt to impress 
young people with their culture and the progress of the 
Soviet System alarmed Americans.12 The outbreak of the
Korean War in the same year seemed to make it necessary for
HICOG to pay special attention to young people and win their 
allegiance. McCloy and his deputy Benjamin Buttenwieser 
repeatedly emphasized that the future of Germany depended 
very much on the attitude of its young people. In July 1950 
McCloy met with youth representatives for the first time. It 
was clear by then that the American democratization mission
not only had to deal with the past but also with a new
totalitarian threat, communism. McCloy told the young men 
(women had not yet entered the top ranks of West German youth 
organizations) that he was not willing to revive "the old 
Hitler system of marching masses" as the East German 
government had done. According to him, Americans would not 
exert any pressure on young people or "put young Germans in 
shirts of a different color and have them march through the 
streets with flags". HICOG rather wanted to help alleviate 
the bleak employment situation in the new Federal Republic 
and provide assistance for its young citizens' "self- 
education" . At the end of his speech he encouraged the youth
l2Lawrence Norrie, oral history interview, Georgetown 
University Library, 18 January 1988, 37-38.
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leaders to come forward with their own suggestions to use 
American help more effectively.13
HICOG youth activities officers tried to capitalize on 
the attention youth was getting from the highest echelons. 
Harold Patrick once again wrote an extensive report outlining 
the goals and shortcomings of the reorientation programs so 
far. He thought that the policies and goals which had 
evolved since 1945 were basically sound and still valid but 
that support of German activities could only be successful 
under sufficient American supervision. This meant that HICOG 
would have to expand its personnel in youth activities 
considerably because it was "quite impossible to do more than 
has been done with a staff as woefully inadequate in size as 
the one in Bavaria."14
In August 1950 McCloy invited Norrie to provide a 
detailed picture of the work his section was carrying out.
13Rupieper 153-55; the complete speech is in Erika 
Fischer and Heinz-D. Fischer (eds.) , John J. McCloys Reden zu 
Deutschland- und Berlinfragen: Publizistische Aktivitaten und 
Ansprachen des amerikanischen Hochkommissars fiir Deutschland 
1949-1952 (Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1986) 105-109
(quotes are on 107-108). The book contains a representative 
sample of McCloy's speeches in Germany and in the United 
States. He not only spoke to young people frequently, but 
also deemed the subject important enough to consistently 
incorporate it in his speeches on both sides of the Atlantic. 
See also minutes of HICOG staff meeting, 11 July 1950: 28-29; 
NA RG 466 United States High Commissioner for Germany John M. 
McCloy [hereinafter HICOM], Extracts from HICOG Staff 
Conference Meetings 1949-1950.
I4Proposal for Furthering the Development of Youth 
Activities in Bavaria as a Democratic Force. 7 July 1950; NA 
RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, 1948-52, Box 28, 570.5.
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After an in-depth orientation Norrie pointed out that his 
office had been understaffed for a long time, but still had 
been able to carry out its objectives in cooperation with the 
Germans. Although he was talking to a perceptive audience, 
he had to give up any hopes for expanding his office 
significantly. At the meeting the HICOG staff also discussed 
the outlook for the future. Norrie learned that Congress 
would probably cut its appropriations for the High Commission 
by 10% in the next fiscal year. This meant that the present 
level of personnel could be maintained but would not be 
expanded. He was assured, though, that in view of the high 
priority his work began to enjoy, he might get additional 
help through shifting personnel within HICOG. Norrie also 
was informed that this would probably be the best solution 
anyway because the economic boom in the United States made it 
increasingly difficult to recruit qualified people. 
Americans were not willing to sacrifice secure and well paid 
jobs for the rather uncertain year to year appointments HICOG 
was able to offer. In 1951 his branch, which also dealt with 
women's affairs, community activities in general and other 
programs, consisted of eleven Americans at headquarters and 
thirty-five in the different states and in Berlin. Bavaria 
had ten American officials at its disposal, only one of whom 
seemed to be in charge of youth activities. The youth 
officer's staff in Munich consisted of ten German 
consultants, two secretaries, and two stenographers to do the
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work. Each consultant was in charge of a special area of 
youth work which included leadership training, youth forums, 
or youth centers.15
The High Commission also did not make any changes in the 
field. OMGUS Liaison and Security Officers in the 
communities simply became Resident Officers under HICOG. 
Headquarters recognized their importance as key figures in 
the German communities who not only maintained liaison with 
headquarters but also became the first ones whom German 
authorities approached with wishes or problems they might 
have. Often they served as mediators between German 
authorities and the U.S. Army whenever problems arose.16 In
l5Minutes of HICOG Staff Conference, 8 Aug. 1950; NA RG 
466 HICOM, Extracts from HICOG Staff Conference Meetings 
1949-1950; for personnel numbers see Pilgert, Community 12; 
for Bavaria see monthly report, OLCB, PAD, E&CR Br., Dec. 
1950; NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, Box 2, E&CR, Monthly 
Reports.
16Rupieper 83-110. The situation in Nuremberg was 
typical in many ways. One of the biggest bones of contention 
was the American refusal to return the Opera House which it 
was using as a recreation center for its soldiers to the 
city. After much negotiations between the local Resident 
Officer, his superior, the High Commissioner, Army 
headquarters in Heidelberg, and the city in 1950, the city 
finally decided to build a movie theater for the Army which 
the occupiers would return to the city as soon as they would 
not need it anymore. HICOG provided almost one third of the 
projected costs and the Army paid another third as well as a 
substantial amount for renting the building. In spite of the 
publicly displayed cordiality demonstrated at the opening of 
the building in September 1951, city officials were not 
satisfied with the American efforts. Apparently some 
administrators took additional American help for granted when 
they permitted construction costs to exceed the original 
projections by about 50%. There was much haggling over the 
responsibility for paying permanent fixtures in the new 
building which the Americans had not requested but the
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view of their importance, HICOG actually increased their 
number in 1949. They had to be very dedicated, well versed 
in many different areas, possess diplomatic and 
organizational skills, and needed to be able to speak German. 
Many of them took a special interest in reorientation and in 
youth activities. Harald Lund had been involved in youth 
work already in his previous assignment in nearby Schwabach. 
In Nuremberg he kept close ties to the German American Youth 
Club and participated in the club's activities whenever he 
could.17
Although McCloy apparently did not need any prodding, 
the State Department informed him in September 1950 that a 
Conference in Washington on German youth had emphasized the 
importance of youth work in Germany. Washington admonished 
its High Commissioner that he should not limit his objectives
Germans had put in for the later use of the building as city 
theater, for example. Once again the Resident Officer was 
called in to negotiate with the Army as well as with HICOG 
headquarters. Not surprisingly HICOG declined a request for 
more funding. City officials even took offense that the 
money for the parking lot of the new theater came from 
occupational funds, not the Army's budget. Apparently some 
frugal members of the administration regarded it as 
Nuremberg's right to have the Americans pay for the city's 
new theater (NCA C3 5/II nos. 160, 161).
l7See for example his correspondence with the German- 
American Youth Club in 1949 and his opening address of a 
youth discussion group in April of that year (NA RG 260 
OMGBY, FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1425, 9/126-3/7, Box 1427 9/122- 
3/1). In his previous appointment as MG representative Lund 
had also organized special events for young people (see, for 
example, "Kinderfest der GYA und der Militarregierung," [GYA 
and MG Organize Childrens' Festival] NN, 27 Sept. 1947: 3).
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to "'playground' activities, but must encompass political, 
economic, and social aspects as well."18
HICOG surveys indicated that American reorientation 
efforts to date had not yet attained the desired effects on 
German youth. Studies conducted in 1950 and 1951 found that 
most young Germans still maintained their critical distance 
to the occupiers and to democratic ideas. According to the 
surveys, most members of the younger generation, above all 
refugees, females, and those who had not had much formal 
education, did not demonstrate any interest in politics. 40% 
of the sample did not even know the chancellor of the Federal 
Republic, Konrad Adenauer.19 Clearly reflecting that their 
economic plight occupied them most, many of those who had 
been in the Hitler Youth thought that the government should 
reintroduce mandatory work service years for all young 
people.20
In the same vein the majority of the young Germans did 
not think that diversity in youth work was a good thing.
18Airgram from Dept, of State to HICOG, 30 Sept. 1950; NA 
RG 466 HICOM, Office of the Executive Director, Security
Segregated General Records, 1949-1955, Box 137, Sept. 50.
19HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth
View the American Program VII: Acceptance of Democratic
Responsibility and Related Political Issues," report no. 50, 
series no. 2, 30 Nov. 1950; NA RG 306 United States
Information Agency, Reports on German Public Opinion.
20HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth
View the American Program I: Some General Evaluations,"
report no. 38, series no. 2, 9 Oct. 1950; NA RG 306 Reports 
on German Public Opinion.
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They preferred a central organization which would give youth 
power and respect.21 Although the efforts of the politicians 
in the Soviet zone to woo young people to their cause did not 
go unnoticed, a majority of those living in the American zone 
did not think that the communists were doing more for their 
generation than politicians in the west. The "appreciable 
minority" which stated that the East German government gave 
more attention to the young people there, felt that "the kind 
of attention is often quite other than desirable."22
The surveys also indicated that many young people did 
not particularly like American reorientation efforts. 
According to the pollsters, less than half of the young 
people living in the American zone welcomed OMGUS and HICOG 
attempts to familiarize them with democratic values and a 
different culture. Youths even more than adults rejected the 
idea that Germans could learn something from Americans in the 
realm of culture and education, although old and young alike 
thought that German youth was more susceptible to new ideas 
than adults.23
21HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "Do Germans Want 
a Single Youth Organization in West Germany?" Report no. 73, 
series no. 2, 13 Apr. 1951; NA RG 306 Reports on German
Public Opinion.
“HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth 
View the American Program I: Some General Evaluations,"
report no. 38, series no. 2, 9 Oct. 1950; NA RG 306 Reports 
on German Public Opinion; see also Fiissl 164-167.
“HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth 
View the American Program II: American Reorientation
Efforts," report no. 40, series no. 2, 23 Oct. 1950; NA RG
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The young people's rather negative outlook should not 
have come as a surprise, even five years after the war. 
Unemployment ran high and the scars of the war remained very 
visible in many cities, including Nuremberg. The programs 
they had come to know and appreciate under Hitler provided 
the only models which had effectively given young people jobs 
and security. The leading politicians of the Federal 
Republic belonged to a generation which was removed from 
young people and did not seem to deal with the very real and 
urgent problems of the younger generation. Those who were 
less reflective might have objected to some of the Hitler 
Youth's features but certainly not to the attention and the 
privileges they had gotten from the Nazis. Americans 
recognized that communists gained an advantage among some 
young people by exploiting the younger generation's desire 
towards recognition. They appointed very young people to 
prominent political positions and focused their attention on 
youth much like Hitler and his henchmen had done.24
The picture was not as bleak as the surveys indicated. 
The American zone of occupation actually served as a testing 
ground for social scientists who were exploring this rather 
new field of examining public opinion. Although the
306 Reports on German Public Opinion.
MSee, for example the Land Commissioner's of Hesse 
evaluation of youth activities and the communist attempts to 
sway youth in its favor in the Soviet zone and in his state 
in his report of 19 Mar. 1951; NA RG 466 HICOM, Classified 
Central Files, Box 25, D (51) 264/B.
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pollsters were recognized for their pioneer work and found 
Germans in general cooperative, their surveys may not have 
been entirely reliable. Even today surveys in general do not 
always reflect public opinion accurately. Modern pollsters 
have not been able to develop a consistent theoretical basis 
for developing surveys. The design of the questionnaires has 
a profound influence on the results since it can channel 
opinions in preconceived ways. Equally important is which 
information to include and which to leave out. We have seen, 
for example, that pollsters completely overlooked AFN in 
their surveys on radio listening. Some historians argue that 
the designers of the surveys tended to incorporate American 
value systems and expectations to such an extent into the 
questionnaires that they were unable to detect specific 
German features in the democratization process, for example. 
They also seemed to expect rather negative results from their 
surveys. Their evaluations of the data often emphasized 
discouraging features while minimizing progress.25
^For an excellent overview of the problems which survey 
designers and sociologists are still trying to solve see 
Enrique de la Garza Toledo, ed., Hacla una Metodologia de la 
Reconstmccion: Antologla para la Actualizacion de los
Profesores de Licenciatura (Mexico City: Universidad Autonoma 
de Mexico-Editorial Porrua, 1988) ; for a brief introduction 
to the work of OMGUS and HICOG pollsters in Germany see Leo 
P. Crespi, foreword, Public Opinion in Semisovereign Germany: 
The HICOG Surveys, 1949-1955, eds. Anna J. Merritt and 
Richard L. Merritt (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
1980); Eckart (19) discusses specific problems of the OMGUS 
surveys which historians have detected over the years.
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Neither McCloy nor Norrie were convinced that the 
pollsters provided an entirely accurate picture of the 
situation of young people in Germany.26 Although the 
pollsters reached rather pessimistic conclusions in their 
interpretations of the surveys, some of the data they had 
collected actually substantiated Norrie's and McCloy's points 
of view. The surveys revealed, for example, that young 
people in the cities tended to be more positively disposed 
towards American ideas and programs than those living in the 
countryside. Additional studies indicated that many young 
people displayed a remarkable curiosity towards the United 
States and made ample use of the programs the Americans 
offered. 73% of all young people, a higher percentage than 
that of the adults, knew the Amerika Hauser, for example. In 
the cities the percentage jumped to over 90%. About twice as 
many young people than adults claimed to have visited these 
American institutions. 25% of all young Germans listened to 
the Voice of America broadcasts from Washington. 50% of the 
youths polled knew the American documentary film program, 
although only 17% claimed to have seen at least one American 
movie. Within the youth group, 25% of all teenagers had
26Norrie, for example, expressed this view in a staff 
conference in August 1950, shortly after McCloy had met the 
West German youth leaders. McCloy seemed to agree. In his 
public speeches in the United States and Germany between 1950 
and 1952 he consistently assessed the mind frame of young 
people in West Germany much more positively than the 
pollsters had done (see Fischer and Fischer (eds.) 107-108, 
126, 148, 231).
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visited the American shows while only 10% of those between 15 
and 25 had done the same. The film program was the only 
American project which more rural than urban youths knew and 
attended. Clearly HICOG, GYA, and private sponsors had 
correctly assessed the need for this kind of program.27
The pollsters did not seem to attach much importance to 
the presence of American troops on the outlook of young 
Germans and did not explore this venue in any way in 1950. 
Surveys studying the differences in opinion between young 
people living in cities and towns with American garrisons and 
those who did not may have provided an additional field of 
investigation. An intelligence report from the previous year 
provided some interesting insights. Its author arrived 
basically at the same conclusions as the HICOG surveys a year 
later and recorded an interesting additional phenomenon. The 
intelligence officer found that the attitude of young Germans 
towards an African American unit stationed in a little 
Bavarian town was "favorable and in many cases friendly". 
The author noted that young people did not object to
^HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth 
View the American Program III: the Voice of America and
General Radio Listening Among Youth," report no. 41, series 
no. 2, 23 Oct. 1950; HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, 
"German Youth View the American Program IV: Awareness and 
Patronage of Amerika Haeuser Among Youth," report no. 42, 
series no. 2, 25 Oct. 1950; HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis 
Staff, "German Youth View the American Program V: Audiences 
of US Overt Magazines and US Documentary Film Program," 
report no. 43, series no. 2, 25 Oct. 1950; NA RG 306 Reports 
on German Public Opinion; see also Pilgert, Information 
Services 74.
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interracial relationships as long as they were based on love,
not a "mercenary attitude" displayed by some German women
which exploited the "Negroes' generosity". According to him,
Nazi propaganda, which had depicted African Americans as
animals with no sexual restraints, probably did much to make
them more attractive once they were in Germany, but that
these perceptions were not the only ones responsible for the
African Americans' popularity. The author continued that
the Negroes gained widespread approval, not only for 
their sexual prowess, but for their great courtesy, 
cheerfulness, and kindness. Their attractive voices 
were frequently remarked on. It was difficult to elicit 
any comment indicating that young people resented the 
presence of the Negroes more than they would white 
troops. In fact, several volunteered the opinion that 
they preferred the Negro troops to the white tactical 
unit that had preceded them. The investigator's 
conclusion was that the Nazi propaganda on racial 
purity, however effective it may have been, was not 
strong enough to resist the influence of amiable 
personal relations.28
There are additional clues that direct contact with 
Americans, their institutions, and their culture may have had 
some influence on young Germans. All surveys indicated that 
young people in the cities consistently displayed more 
interest in democracy and a higher degree of awareness and 
approval of American programs and culture. The pollsters 
quite correctly attributed the phenomenon to the fact that 
city youths in general were better informed than those living 
in the countryside, but they also established that apparently
28OMGBY Youth and Youth Groups Intelligence Report, 2nd 
draft [1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, ID, Analysis Br., Box 188, 
10/51-3/12.
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young Germans from all walks of life were interested in these 
programs and used them whenever they had a chance to do so. 
Naturally those living in the cities had many more 
opportunities in this field.
The HICOG survey on the radio listening habits of young 
people also revealed this remarkable lack of awareness of the 
armed forces' impact on young people. It included questions 
on the Voice of America program from Washington, but never 
took into account the American broadcast station in the 
American zone of occupation, AFN. We have already seen that 
the military radio network had an impact on many people in 
the Nuremberg region. Since only 25% of the people surveyed 
listened to VOA, it must have come as a surprise to the 
pollsters that one of the few areas in which a majority of 
young Germans thought they could learn something from the 
United States was in the field of radio broadcasting. AFN 
probably had much to do with this result.29
The extensive HICOG surveys certainly helped to maintain 
the problem at the top of McCloy's agenda. By March 1951 the 
High Commissioner was ready to reevaluate the efforts of 
American youth activities to date. He asked the Land
29HICOG, PAO, Reactions Analysis Staff, "German Youth 
View the American Program II: American Reorientation
Efforts," report no. 40, series no. 2, 23 Oct. 1950; "German 
Youth View the American Program III: the Voice of America and 
General Radio Listening Among Youth," report no. 41, series 
no. 2, 23 Oct. 1950; NA RG 306 Reports on German Public
Opinion; interviews corroborate this assumption (see Winfried 
Bliimel, personal interview, 28 July 1994; H. Wisura, 
personal interview 1 Aug. 1994).
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Commissioners to submit detailed reports and recommendations 
and to comment especially on the threat of communism for 
young Germans. In view of the attractive features which some 
of the commissioners as well as the surveys detected in the 
youth work of the communist regime, the reluctance of young 
Germans to team up with the Free German Youth must have been 
surprising. Although the Land commissioners differed 
considerably in their assessments of the state of youth work 
in their domains, all of them agreed that to date communism 
and the Free German Youth had not made any headway in the 
Federal Republic. Membership numbers bore them out, but the 
commissioners cautioned that this did not mean the victory of 
Western ideas. They pointed out that many young Germans 
still maintained a skeptical neutrality towards democratic 
ideas, the United States, and its representatives. Basically 
they repeated the argument American youth officers had made 
since 1945, just with an additional enemy in mind. If 
Americans were not able to fill the void the collapse of the 
Nazi regime had left, the propaganda and ideology of the 
communists might ultimately succeed. It would therefore be 
necessary to maintain or even intensify American efforts, 
although some like George G. Shuster, who was in charge of 
Bavaria, thought that Americans probably had given away their
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chance to reorient young Germans in 1947 or 1948. Now it 
might be too late to achieve anything.30
In spite of the general focus on the fight against 
communism, Americans by no means were blind to developments 
on the extreme right of the political spectrum. The virulent 
anti-communist rhetoric of a newly founded ultra-conservative 
youth group, the Bund Deutscher Jugend (Alliance of German 
Youth), in 1950 and 1951, for example, did not endear it to 
American authorities. The Alliance, which claimed 16,000 
members at its peak at the end of 1950, openly appealed to 
former soldiers and Hitler Youth members and advocated an 
immediate German rearmament to fight the communists once 
again. With the exception of Bavaria's conservative party 
and its youth specialist, Franz Josef Strauss, almost all 
German youth groups and youth committees refused to recognize 
the group or to cooperate with it. Interestingly, the youth 
organizations used the same argument with which they had 
confronted the Free German Youth before: Since the Alliance
pursued a largely negative anti-communist program and had 
nothing constructive to offer, it was not worth any support. 
In spite of some German suspicions of American backing for
30Report by C.P. Gross, Land Commissioner for 
Wiirttemberg-Baden, 12 Mar. 1951; Report by James R. Newman, 
Land Commissioner for Hesse; Report by Charles R. Jeffs, Rear 
Admiral, U.S. Navy (ret.), 21 Mar. 1951; NA RG 466 HICOM, 
Classified General Records, 1949-1952, Box 25, D (51) 264
A,B,C; Memo from George G. Shuster to John McCloy, 23 Mar. 
1951; NA RG 466 HICOM, Classified General Records, 1949-1952, 
Box 26, D (51) 376; see also Rupieper 168-170.
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the group, whose considerable wealth surprised many, the High 
Commission's intelligence section painted a very different 
picture. Although it apparently welcomed the strong anti­
communist stand of the Alliance, it was unwilling to accept 
the old demons to get rid of the new ones. In June 1951 
Intelligence reported to the State Department that
[The Alliance's] relations with other groups and youth 
organizations have been marked by several unfortunate 
[ 1 ] faux pas which have isolated the BDJ from all groups 
except those on the right fringe. This outcast status 
plus the lack of a really democratic internal 
organization, characterize the BDJ as another political 
youth group with fascist potential.31
HICOG published its new youth directive no. M-4 in 
October 1951. Its provisions clearly revealed that the 
Americans were looking for ways to combat the new enemy but 
certainly had not given up their older reorientation goals. 
The directive stated that Americans had made "significant 
progress" in their reorientation efforts of Germany's youth. 
The authors recognized that they still needed to "strengthen 
their [young Germans] confidence in Germany's democratic 
future" and "further among German youth loyalty to the ideals 
of Western democracy". HICOG's six specific objectives 
demonstrated the continuity in American youth work. They
31Fiissl 144-146; the intelligence report is quoted on 
146; see also the assessment of the formation of new youth 
groups in Bavaria at the end of 1950 in OCLB, E&CR monthly 
report, January 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, ID, Essential Elements 
of Information Reports, 1950-1951, Box 2, E&CR Reports, Dec. 
50-Feb. 51.
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simply made the nine aims Norrie had outlined three years 
before official in a slightly modified form:
1. To help youth realize the inter-relationship between 
individual freedom and social responsibility. To 
this end civic and political educational programs 
are to be furthered.
2. To generate among German youth active resistance to 
totalitarianisms of both the Right and the Left, and 
dynamic support for German participation in the 
defense of the free world.
3. To stimulate interest and confidence in democratic 
governmental and political institutions and 
practices, as well as to encourage active 
participation in local community organizations 
working for the public benefit, and in public 
affairs in general.
4. To interpret and increase the understanding of the 
American way of life.
5. To develop and strengthen the cultural, political, 
economic, and social ties between Germany and 
Western democratic countries.
6. To cooperate with Germany youth agencies working 
toward the integration into the community of 
homeless and unemployed youth.
To reach these objectives HICOG would
encourage, advise, and assist German youth, youth 
organizations, and youth serving agencies in carrying 
forward desirable plans of action in behalf of German 
youth through publications, radio, press, conferences 
and workshops, training projects, youth centers, and 
demonstrations which further the education of German 
youth towards citizenship in the Western political and 
cultural world.
HICOG would also continue to conduct its own evaluations of 
"needs, interests, and attitudes" and launch pilot projects 
to support research.32
With the new policy statement in place, McCloy was ready 
to take part in a conference with representatives of the
32HICOG Policy Directive No. M-4, 26 Oct. 1952; printed 
in Pilgert, Community 20-21.
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three Western Allies in London at the beginning of 1952. 
They discussed the successes and shortcomings of their 
programs to date. American, British, and French participants 
agreed that they had by no means won the battle for young 
Germans yet. To fill the vacuum which Hitler Germany had 
left they would have to intensify the international 
integration of Germany and their efforts to replace 
nationalism with the idea of a united Europe. The three 
allies would cooperate more closely in the future, but would 
not resort to any overt propaganda measures although this 
would make their reorientation efforts more difficult in view 
of the massive communist indoctrination in the Soviet zone. 
The meeting clearly reflected the rather limited choices the 
three countries had at their disposal seven years after the 
war. It also revealed a consensus that Germans had just 
begun to embark on their way towards a true democracy. The 
Americans were doing everything they could to assure that 
they stayed on their path.33
33Fiissl 143-44; see also Rupieper (168) for the concept 
to replace nationalism with the pan-European idea.
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CHAPTER XII
Reorientation as Cooperation: American Initiatives,
1948-1955
Since the new HICOG youth directive came at a time when 
the Americans were actually withdrawing from their active 
participation in the communities and dissolving their local 
and state offices, it is easy to assume that the new American 
policy did not have any impact on youth work in Germany 
anymore. Directive no. M-4 was not so important for what it 
would do in the future, but rather for summarizing the work 
American officials had been doing in the previous four years; 
it reflected their attitude towards German youth very well. 
Interestingly, the rather close contact between tactical 
units, American dependents, and the local population which 
had existed throughout the occupation began to give way to a 
segregated coexistence. This pattern determined German- 
American relations at the grassroots throughout the American 
presence in Germany at a time in which military cooperation 
between Americans and Germans became the order of the day.
Although McCloy and the High Commission had to carry out 
their tasks with a reduced staff, they made considerable 
amounts in American and German currency available for 
reorientation and especially youth work between 1950 and 
1952, the peak of HICOG activities. Youth and community 
activities had over ten million marks and one million dollars
602
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at their disposal. This amount did not include expenditures 
for GYA or John McCloy's special project funds. In addition 
to that, other divisions sponsored programs from which youth 
benefitted directly. Lawrence Norrie estimated that the 
Americans were spending about fifty-two million marks (at the 
time about fifteen million dollars) for the reorientation of 
German youth in 1951. The next year the PAO received about 
$48 million, almost half of the entire HICOG budget, for its 
reorientation programs. Youth activities undoubtedly got a 
considerable portion of the budget.1
1952 marked a turning point because HICOG was unable to 
maintain its level of involvement and aid. It depended on 
Congressional appropriations, and many people in the United 
States still seemed to doubt the wisdom of the American 
reorientation policy. In February 1952 Lyndon Johnson, at 
the time already an influential senator from Texas and member 
of the Committee on Armed Services, forwarded the following 
letter from one of his constituents to the State Department: 
Honorable Sir:
I noticed that you were back in Texas for a few 
days, and that you are on one of the "Watch Dog" 
com[mittees] on expenditures.
Well, looks like some should be a watch dog on 
$10,000,000 for US culture on Germans. Senator, such 
truck that the Fair Deal is putting out, and spending 
the USA citizens' hard earnings is nothing else than the 
stealing in the tax collection officials. Senator, you 
boys better wake up.
•pilgert, Community 10-11; Kellermann 84.
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Johnson requested that the matter be given "serious 
consideration" and a prompt reply. In March State explained 
to Johnson that "much blood has been given by United States 
citizens largely because of events originating in Europe and 
especially Germany." The Department argued that German 
attitudes as well as the "durability of the new democracy" 
were vital for American interests in the Cold War. 
Apparently the argument did not meet widespread approval in 
a Congress that wanted to save money. It cut HICOG's 
appropriations for 1952/53 in half which brought an end to 
its field organization.2 The dissolution of the local HICOG 
offices in 1952 also curtailed all of the High Commission's 
community and youth projects. From then on it would be up to 
the Germans to show if American efforts and expenditures had 
been successful.
Looking for Partners
Entering Nuremberg by car today the attentive observer 
notices signs listing the partnerships between the city and 
many other European communities. Unlike smaller towns in the 
surrounding region Nuremberg does not boast of a sister city 
in the United States. Americans and Germans actually thought
2Charley Cook, McKinney, Texas, to Senator Johnson, 
Washington, D.C., 14 Feb. 1952; Johnson to State Dept., 18 
Feb. 1952; State Department to Johnson, 10 Mar. 1952. 
Interestingly, the Department not only chose to justify the 
money spent for German reorientation but also explained to 
Johnson at length that the American libraries in Germany 
indeed contained no communist literature (NA RG 59 Decimal 
Files 1950-54, 511.62A1/2-1852) . For the HICOG budget see 
Pilgert, Community 10-11.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
605
about the idea of creating closer ties with an American
community after the war, but their motives were too different
to make it work.
In the course of its reorientation efforts OMGUS had
devised a plan to provide German communities with "parent
cities" in the United States. For Nuremberg the Information
Control Division envisioned Houston, New Orleans, or
Indianapolis as suitable matches, but Nuremberg's city
council reacted rather coolly to the idea. The welfare
committee simply took notice of a letter from OMGUS without
any further action.3
Apparently inspired by the American suggestion, but for
entirely different motives, Lord Mayor Ziebill decided to
act. He tried to enlist the services of a leading
industrialist to support him in his search. His motives for
connecting with an American city were twofold:
Nuremberg wants to demonstrate that it is not the City 
of the Nazi Party Rallies or of the Nuremberg Laws, but 
wants to be a German center of culture and the economy 
with a cosmopolitan outlook. We would like to ask our 
American partner city to support us with our exterior, 
economic, and cultural reconstruction, possibly to 
deliver books to our libraries, instruments and 
medication to the hospitals, to conduct an exchange 
between artists and scientists, and to provide our 
undernourished children with opportunities for their 
recuperation.
3OMGUS I CD Berlin to C.S. Wright, Chief, Exhibitions and 
Information Centers Br., 6 Jan. 1947 [sic/ 1948]; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, ICD, Information Centers Br., Box 314, 5/314-3/20; 
minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 13 May 1948; NCA 
C7/IX no. 1234.
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Ziebill thought that Philadelphia or Cincinnati would be good 
targets and asked his partner to use his connections to 
establish contact with his American acquaintances "in high 
places." The Lord Mayor made his priorities abundantly clear 
when he delegated authority for future negotiations to the 
city's finance department because of "possible negotiations 
for loans" in the future. Apparently the industrialist's 
connections were not as good as Ziebill had hoped. Nothing 
ever came of his proposal, and Nuremberg remained without an 
American partner. At any rate Ziebill's wishes were coming 
true without establishing official ties to one community.4 
International Exchanges
Some of the projects the State Department considered to 
be vital lived much longer than the High Commission. One of 
them was the exchange program. Since Americans were trying 
to reintegrate Germany into the international community, it 
was only natural that they would assign exchanges a high 
priority. As we have seen, the State Department and Congress 
laid the foundation for a global cultural exchange Program in 
1946, but did not include Germans in the original provisions 
of the American legislature. Nevertheless OMGUS had received 
explicit orders to begin an exchange program with the United 
States in 1947. With the help of Herman Wells it devised an
4Letter from Lord Mayor Ziebill to Egbert Fischer, MAN 
Niirnberg, 5 July 1948; NCA C35/II no. 159. Ziegler had most 
of his wishes fulfilled by OMGUS, HICOG, GYA and the 
generosity of GIs.
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efficient system by 1948 to bring American experts to their 
zone of occupation and to let Germans travel to the United 
States to observe the democratic process and life in a free 
society first hand.5
Under John McCloy the program expanded dramatically. 
HICOG actually created a new division within the Public 
Affairs Office which was exclusively in charge of channelling 
and coordinating all exchange projects. Offices within the 
administration were advised accordingly. The number of 
people who travelled to the United States under the auspices 
of HICOG went from a total of eight in 1947 to over nine 
hundred in 1949. 1950 and 51 saw a peak with almost 2,500
exchangees per year which declined to about 1,800 in 1953, 
less than 600 in 1954 and a mere 173 in 1955, its last year 
of operations.6
The HICOG and OMGUS programs for Germany actually showed 
some remarkable differences compared with other exchange 
programs the state Department had initiated under the 
Fulbright and Smith-Mundt Acts. While the State Department
5See chapter VI above.
^ellermann 261, 263-65. Kellermann, one of the
organizers of the German exchange program in the State 
Department, wrote the definitive story about it. He tends to 
overemphasize HICOG and State Department achievements at the 
expense of OMGUS, however. This point of view creates the 
impression of a dramatic new departure under HICOG which, at 
least in the realm of youth work, did not exist. See also 
Henry Pilgert, The Exchange of Persons Program in Western 
G erm any ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. High
Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive Secretary, 
Historical Division, 1951).
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concentrated almost entirely on elites and academics, HICOG—  
following the precedents OMGUS had set— made community 
leaders its priority. The Americans were aware that 90% of 
all Germans at that time never obtained any college 
education. Nobody denied that university students actually 
formed a significant part of Germany's political elite, but 
McCloy and his advisers did everything to reach out to other 
parts of society as well. The most important program 
targeted German leadership in the broadest sense. 885 German 
educators formed the strongest group of those who went to the 
United States between 1951 and 1953. HICOG was aware that 
extracurricular activities needed special attention, so 314 
youth leaders went to the United States to study specific 
aspects of youth work. Actually the number was higher 
because the groups of trade unionists and religious leaders, 
listed as separate categories, also included youth leaders in 
their groups. With the exception of the first full year of 
the program's operations, university students remained a 
minority among those who spent between three months and a 
year in the United States until the end of the HICOG program 
in 1955.7
None of the Germans came just as tourists to the United 
States. In Germany OMGUS had developed a large number of 
projects, all of which were designed to introduce topics of 
special interest to small groups of specialists in a
7Kellermann 98-123; Pilgert, Exchange 58-65.
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particular field. HICOG continued along the same lines. The 
State Department set up an intricate organizational structure 
with private sponsors which would provide the necessary 
network in the United States. Youth leaders became mostly 
charges of social agencies coordinated by the National Social 
Welfare Assembly. Projects included the "Observation and 
Experience of Urban German Youth in the United States" 
Assistance to Youth Self-Help Projects", "Planning and 
Administration of Youth Organizations and Programs", or 
"Community Recreation and Sports".8
Although the programs had no precedents and required a 
considerable amount of extra time and effort, the American 
sponsors cooperated closely with OMGUS officials and 
generally tried their best to accommodate the particular 
needs of groups. Elizabeth Lam, the officer in charge of the 
exchanges of OMGUS Youth Activities Section, for example, 
established direct contact with the National Welfare Assembly 
in New York which had already established an advisory 
committee of outstanding youth specialists who came from the 
national organizations of the YMCA and the Girls Scouts, the 
CIO, the American Friends' Service Committee, the US 
Childrens' bureau, the New York School of Social Work and a 
university. Although Lam was not even able to determine
8Kellermann 109-113, 133-150; for specific Programs see 
Pilgert, Exchange 80-86. 41 of the 131 HICOG projects in
1951 were designed for teachers, seven were specific youth 
projects.
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whether there would be finances available for her youth 
projects, planing went ahead at full speed. Cooperation 
between the OMGUS youth expert and the Assembly was close. 
Lam received extensive reports and evaluations of the German 
participants and their American hosts immediately after their 
departure.9
Apparently the Assembly did not have problems mobilizing 
its members. In 1950 thirty-eight communities throughout the 
United States hosted Germans and an additional forty stood by 
for future assignments. Interestingly, the South, with the 
exception of Houston, Texas and Winston, North Carolina, did 
not seem to share the interest in German reorientation. 
Eleven colleges and universities had accepted German students 
and visitors who also participated in conferences throughout 
the nation.
Young people increasingly benefitted from the programs. 
24% of the German participants came under youth program 
projects. Apparently Americans targeted especially those 
young people who had been exposed most to the indoctrination 
of the Hitler regime at school. 44% of the visitors were 
between eighteen and twenty-three years old, an additional
9From Alonzo Grace to Youth Division, National Social 
Welfare Assembly, New York, 2 Sept. 1948; Elizabeth Lam, 
OMGUS Youth Activities Section to Bernice Bridges, Director, 
Youth Division, National Welfare Assembly, New York, 23 Dec. 
1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 
129, 5/294-1/17; Mabel Shannon, Coordinator, German
Leadership Project [New York], to Lawrence Norrie, OMGUS, 11 
Aug. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., 
Box 143, 5/296-1/21.
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24% were between twenty our and twenty-eight, which meant 
that they had received their entire education during the 
Third Reich.10 In 1949 Americans introduced an additional 
program exclusively for teenagers. In that year the AFSC had 
arranged for 100 of them, mostly refugees and expellees, to 
come to the United States. During the next six years over 
two thousand German teenagers packed their mostly meager 
belongings for the journey across the Atlantic.11
American officials soon encountered special problems 
with this program. Almost all of the teenagers adapted 
quickly to their new living conditions after their initial 
culture shock. In fact they became so well integrated into 
life in the United States that many teenagers and their host 
families requested extensions of their stays or even to 
remain in the United States permanently. Obviously these 
requests alarmed the State Department since they defeated the 
very purpose of the program. Consequently extensions were 
rarely granted.12
Returning to Germany was just the beginning of a 
difficult time for many teenagers. They experienced severe
10German Leadership Project, National Social Welfare 
Assembly, Preliminary Report, May 1950; NA RG 59 Decimal 
Files 1950-54, 511.62A3/6-1550.
"Kellermann 121-23; Pilgert, Exchange 60-62; see also 
United States, Department of State, Preparation for Tomorrow: 
German Boy's Year in America, European and British 
Commonwealth Series 20 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing 
Office, 1951) 1-16.
12Preparation for Tomorrow 39-41.
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cases of reverse culture shock. It was hard to readjust to 
Germany's poverty, but also to a very different way of 
thinking and a much more regimented life. Often those who 
had stayed at home regarded the returnees as "Americanized" 
and rejected any proposals for changes at schools or clubs 
which the young boys and girls advocated with much fervor. 
Not surprisingly, teenagers frequently looked for ways to 
return to the promised land, or at least to escape Germany. 
A young participant of a conference which the State 
Department had arranged for teenage returnees in Germany 
recalled that one of the most popular topics was not on the 
official agenda. Since the American government would not 
permit them to emigrate to the United States for several 
years, they looked for alternatives, such as emigration to 
Canada. The fact that the largest portion of former German 
exchangees who emigrated to the United States came from this 
program indicates that the problems indeed were very serious 
for some.13
In spite of these difficulties, an internal State 
Department study of 1956 revealed that the benefits by far 
outweighed the problems, although the long term results of 
course could not yet be assessed. Vaughn DeLong, who had
13Pilgert, Exchanges 62; Kellermann 122-23. Professor 
Dr. Lehmann, Director of the Max-Planck-Institute of History 
at Gottingen, was one of the teenagers selected in the 
fifties to go to the United States. He provided the 
information on the proceedings at returnee meetings when we 
talked about my research project in the summer of 1995.
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given up his job as re-educator in Germany for that of an 
exchange specialist in Washington, pointed out that the teen­
age program was by far the most popular American undertaking 
in the exchange field. According to him, this type of 
exchange produced much positive publicity and attracted so 
many private sponsors that the Department was unable to 
satisfy the demand. Many American families apparently did 
not mind the considerable expenditures which hosting a young 
German boy or girl incurred for them. DeLong reported that 
the program produced much grassroots support and pressure 
from the private agencies involved which prevented members of 
Congress from cutting appropriations for exchanges in 
general. The exchange specialist concluded that it would be 
a serious mistake to phase the program out, since it provided 
a "considerable segment" of the American population with an 
opportunity to play an active role in American foreign 
policy. The exchanges operated as "two way streets" in which 
not just the Germans learned something but their hosts also 
became acquainted with the problems of Germany and would 
better understand American foreign policy. The program's 
popularity with private sponsors ultimately enabled the State 
Department to completely withdraw its support without 
jeopardizing the enterprise. It still forms a significant 
part of the German-American exchange programs today.14
140ffice Memorandum from Mr. DeLong, IES, to Mr. Richard 
Staus, GER/P, 15 Sept. 1954, subject: effectiveness of German 
teenager programs: justification for 1956 budget request; NA
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To support its reorientation efforts in Germany, OMGUS 
and HICOG also relied on the services of specialists it 
brought from the United States to investigate or provide 
guidance for specific projects. Initially there seemed to be 
much confusion, which slow administrative procedures 
aggravated even more. Many specialists came ill prepared or 
did not have a clear idea of what OMGUS expected them to do, 
some just wanted to take a nice vacation in Europe or pursue 
their own research in Germany. The language barrier proved 
to be another detriment to the effectiveness of American 
specialists. HICOG officials agreed in one of their first 
sessions with McCloy that only about 50% of the specialists 
were effective and worth their money. McCloy and his staff 
consequently decided to scale down the program and invest the 
money they saved in bringing more Germans to the United 
States. Nevertheless, between 1947 and 1955 more than 800 
specialists had been in Germany.15
In spite of the skepticism within HICOG, many American 
specialists made lasting contributions to youth work in
RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A3/9-1954. My oldest
brother and I participated in a three week teenage exchange 
program sponsored by the Bavarian Youth Committee in 1973 and 
1975. In spite of the considerable cost for transport to the 
United States at the time there were enough participants to 
fill a chartered jetliner. In 1978/79 the United States 
hosted 880 high school students and 330 trainees from 
Germany, three times as many as in 1954 (Max Planck Institute 
48) .
15Kellermann 123-27, 264-65; Pilgert, Exchange 66-67;
minutes of a HICOG staff meeting, 11 Oct. 1949; NA RG 466 
HICOM, Extracts from HICOG Staff Conference Meetings 1949-50.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
615
Germany. Emigres like Hertha Krauss or Annemarie Schindler, 
another professional youth worker who had had to flee Hitler, 
returned to Germany in that capacity. Schindler travelled 
throughout the American zone to render advice to schools for 
social workers as well as to the recently established youth 
leadership schools. Klara Kaiser from Columbia University 
was scheduled to spend three months in 1949 in one of the 
leadership schools as a resident faculty. Eight out of 
seventy-six specialists had specific youth projects in 1949. 
All of them either occupied leading administrative positions 
in youth offices of American communities or were involved in 
practical youth work.16
Like Mrs. Schindler, most experts travelled throughout 
the American zone. Ruth Norris, who came from the New York 
School of Social Work, focused her efforts on developing 
curricula in youth leadership schools. She also emphasized 
hands-on experience. In June 1949 she travelled to Nuremberg 
to conduct a two day workshop in amateur theater with youth 
leaders there. According to her, playing theater was not 
just fun, but also taught communication and understanding. 
Apparently she found a perceptive audience. Just one month 
later one of the participants of the course began to organize
16Report on visiting expert projects, 1 Apr. 1949; NA RG 
260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Cultural Affairs Br. , Box 212, 5/334-2/12; 
index for visiting experts for reporting year ending 30. Apr. 
1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 
126, 5/293-3/14; Brief on Annemarie Schindler, scheduled to 
arrive in Germany, 12 May 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/19.
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his own theater workshop at youth castle Feuerstein to which 
he invited a Swiss specialist.17
American specialists also helped Germans to identify the 
needs of their youth. In 1950 HICOG brought Jay M. Ver Lee, 
a specialist in planning, to Germany to assist with the 
development of all encompassing plans for the development of 
youth work in Munich and Nuremberg. Interestingly, this time 
the American officials did not act on their own initiative 
but brought the expert after the two cities had requested 
their help. Ver Lee began his work on Nuremberg in November 
1950 and submitted a detailed report to the city in January 
1951. The youth specialist made eight youth centers the 
center of his proposal. He suggested locations for them and 
maintained that they should be open to all young people. 
Although the "Ver-Lee-Plan" was never implemented entirely, 
it provided the basis for Nuremberg's blueprints in this 
field.18
The American academic exchange programs followed the 
trail of the general political developments. In 1952 the
nLetter from Ruth Norris to OMGBY, 10 June 1949; letter 
from Toni Budenz to OMGBY, 26 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3.
18Jay M. Ver Lee, "Eine Ubersicht iiber Jugendbauten und - 
Freizeitprogramme:" Eine gemeinsame Arbeit der Stadt Niirnberg 
und des Landeskommissariates Bayern, Niirnberg, im Januar 
1951; Bavarian State Archives, Nuremberg [hereinafter BSA] 
Kreisjugendring Niirnberg Stadt, 1/1; "Acht neue Heime der 
'Offenen Tiir'," [Eight New Homes "of the Open Door"] NN, 16 
Mar. 1951: 10; I will discuss the further development of
Nuremberg's youth centers below.
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three Western Allies finally reached an agreement with 
Chancellor Adenauer which ended the occupation, although it 
did not yet grant the Federal Republic its sovereignty.19 
Nevertheless the time was ripe to acknowledge Bonn as an 
equal partner, and the official resumption of international 
exchanges offered a good way for doing it.
Negotiations to include the Federal Republic in the 
Fulbright program started in 1951, but Germans and Americans 
actually could look back to a long tradition of academic 
exchanges. Many influential American intellectuals and 
researchers had attended German universities during the 
nineteenth century to pursue their studies at what was 
considered to be the world's most advanced system of higher 
education. This initial phase of academic contacts was 
almost entirely a one way street with the Germans gladly 
serving as mentors for their American students and German- 
Americans emulating the German educational system and 
philosophy to the highest possible degree.20
World War I interrupted the exchange and also altered 
the parameters. The strident nationalism, chauvinism, and 
totalitarian attitudes which most German academics, high 
school teachers, and students displayed alienated American
I9Schwartz provides the most recent and complete account 
of the role the United States and John McCloy played in the 
formation of the Federal Republic. See especially chapter 9 
for the contractual agreements.
20Max Planck Institute (ed.) 1-11.
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intellectuals and severely damaged German prestige in the 
United States. Before, during, and after the war 
technological and research breakthroughs as well as the rise 
of the United States to the status of global power boosted 
American self-esteem considerably. During the 1920s
educators in Germany tried to overcome their country's 
isolation by creating two government agencies, the Alexander- 
von-Humboldt Foundation and the Academic Exchange Service, to 
promote closer ties with the United States. Both agencies 
cooperated with the Institute of International Education, a 
pattern they would reestablish in the 1950s. Already in the 
1920s a growing number of German students went to the United 
States, while at the same time many private donations helped 
German universities through their chronic lack of funding 
caused by Germany's economic woes. Starting with just
thirteen German students in 1922, the numbers increased to 
over 400 ten years later. They sharply declined after 
Hitler's rise to power, although the exchange service 
continued its operations well into the war.21
During the Third Reich the transatlantic connection 
became once again mainly a one way street, but this time from 
east to west. Only those interested in studying National 
Socialism first-hand found their way to Germany, while many 
prominent German scholars were driven out, followed by others 
when Hitler's armies occupied their countries. Their exodus
2IMax Planck Institute (ed.) 15-26.
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had a dual effect. German universities experienced a drain 
of highly qualified researchers from which they never 
recovered, while those in the United States proportionally 
benefitted from this unprecedented influx of scientists and 
scholars, many of whom enjoyed a world wide reputation. 
World War II completely cut all academic connections between 
Germany and the United States. HICOG and the Bonn government 
would have to start in this field where they had left off in 
1932.22
McCloy and Adenauer signed the treaty shortly before the 
contractual and European Defense Community Agreements on 18 
July 1952. The Fulbright treaty took the academic community 
away from HICOG's administration and integrated West Germany 
into the State Department's worldwide programs. Mutual 
understanding replaced the reorientation concept. The 
commission in charge of administering the program in Germany 
consisted equally of Germans and Americans. During the first 
year of its operations 178 graduate students, 33 professors, 
and 8 teachers went to the United States. At the same time 
German universities accepted 192 students, 19 professors and 
lecturers, and 12 teachers. In 1955 over 700 German students 
went to the United States. The program enabled more than 800 
Americans to study or teach in Germany that year. Initially 
Fulbright just supplemented many other HICOG programs, but
^Max Planck Institute (ed.) 35-46.
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from 1955 on it became the United States' only exchange 
program in Germany and stressed German cooperation.23
The Bonn government took its share in this "two way 
street" seriously. Even before negotiations for including 
West Germany in the Fulbright program began, the Americans 
noted in March 1952 German universities had invited fifteen 
professors from abroad for teaching assignments. The state 
ministries for education also had taken steps to support the 
cultural exchange. The states revived the German Academic 
Exchange Service (Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst or 
DAAD) and were preparing to send twenty-five teachers to the 
United States with their full salaries paid. This time they 
wre not snet to demonstrate the superiority of the German 
educational system but to promote mutual understanding. To 
The DAAD invited twenty-five American teachers ot Germany to 
provide German secundary school students who could not go to 
the United States the opportunity to become acquainted with 
the culture on the other side of the Atlantic. Washington 
also took notice that only two of 104 youth leaders who 
attended an international conference in Paris had been unable 
to come up with their own travel funds. The author of the 
report found this remarkable because the youth leaders had 
actually been sent by the State Department. Bonn did not 
stay behind. The Federal government's financial
contributions to the Fulbright program soon began to outweigh
^Kellermann 173-205.
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the American ones. It remains to be one of the most 
prestigious and coveted exchange programs among German 
students to this day.24
Pursuing Their Own Course: The Churches
OMGUS and HICOG would not have been able to manage such 
a diversified program without the cooperation of a large 
number of private organizations which Wells had managed to 
mobilize. As usual the churches were not content with a 
supporting role. We have seen that the Friends initiated the 
teenage exchange program. The WCC and a number of other 
religious groups also began to play a significant role in 
reviving the contacts between young Germans and people from 
all over the world. They continued to send their own 
specialists to Germany. When Carl Baird returned to the 
United States in 1949, the WCC replaced him with William
24Report from Sam H. Lynch to Mrs. M.E. Allen, 20 Mar. 
1952; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-1954, 511.62a3/3-2052;
Kellermann (176-177) provides the information on German 
financing of Fulbright. Since the Fulbright program 
continued beyond the scope of this study, it does not receive 
the attention it actually deserves. Interest in the program 
remains high. Even almost fifty years after the program's 
inauguration the Fulbright commission never has a shortage of 
applicants. Interestingly, it was not until the 1980s that 
young Fulbright returnees decided to create the German 
Fulbright Alumni Association. Although it is fairly young, 
it boasts around 700 paying members and organizes very 
informative conferences. It also takes an active interest in 
forwarding the idea of cultural exchanges and openmindedness 
in any conceivable way.
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Graffam who came from Boston where he had studied psychology 
before deciding to become a reverend.25
Graffam was already familiar with the city when he came. 
He had visited the city as a participant in an international 
work camp and was a friend of Baird. Graffam seemed to be 
less reluctant to become a visible presence in Nuremberg. He 
stayed with the Bavarian Youth Ministry for six years. Like 
his predecessor, Graffam participated in the ministry's 
activities such as youth retreats, but he also became editor 
of one of its monthly Das Baugeriist and managed to increase 
its circulation considerably. The American wrote about 
topics such as celebrating Christmas in the United States, 
but he also introduced new ways of thinking and behaving in 
his contributions to the youth publications. In June 1953, 
for example, he told his readers that "actions speak louder 
than words." Graffam suggested to young Germans that they 
should follow the example of some young Christians in 
Philadelphia who were carrying out small community projects 
without waiting for the authorities to solve problems. He 
not only admonished his readers to do the same but also 
provided them with practical tips for organizing this type of 
activity in their own communities. Probably without being
^"Mr. Baird sagt Ade," [Mr Baird Says Good-Bye] Hand in 
Hand (Oct. 1949) 10: 17; "Wir stellen vor:" [We Introduce:] 
Hand in Hand (Nov. 1949) 11: 20; see also Hans Martin
Helbich, Im Dienst der jungen Generation: Erfahrungen und 
Erkenntnisse in der Arbeit der evangelischen Jugend in Bayern 
(Niirnberg [Nuremberg]: n.p. [1955]): 101.
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aware of it, Graffam promoted the same democratic principles 
as OMGUS and HICOG officials: he suggested electing a
committee which should not just include the reverend but also 
the local mayor or other important people. Graffam also 
recommended that Christian youth groups cooperate closely 
with youth rings and other youth organizations. Writing did 
not just mean articles but also theater plays which Graffam 
produced with youth groups. The American also tackled 
difficult problems such as the meaning of modern life or what 
consequences "being different" actually could have for a 
young Lutheran.26
One of Graffam's main fields of operation was ecumenical 
work. With the support of the WCC the American began to 
organize services in English and German in the town of 
Oberammergau, site of a world famous passion play, in the 
summer of 1950. Oberammergau was such a success that the 
Bavarian church decided to make gatherings with other 
Protestants an integral part for young people and reverends 
alike. With Graffam as interpreter the Bavarians' first tour 
abroad led them to East-London where they visited a 
congregation who had suffered the loss of its church and 
community center from German V 1 rockets during World War II. 
The next year they set out for Scotland and also hosted
26"Anders als die anderen," [Different from Others] Das 
Baugeriist (1952) 6: 146-147; "Actions speak louder than
words," Hand in Hand (Jun. 1953) 6: 12-13; "Bill Graffam,"
Das Baugeriist (1955) 10: 265-66.
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international camps with participants from the United States 
and many European countries in Germany. In 1955 Graffam 
defended this "ecumenical work" against "parochialists" as 
necessary. He found it comforting to find that the Christian 
church had "world wide dimensions." Graffam also thought 
that the international work had a political dimension. 
According to him, "the church must not only preach peace and 
love but also demonstrate them at a time of hatred between 
the peoples of the world."27
Before Graffam left Nuremberg in 1955, he wrote about 
his impressions and experiences in Germany. He did not just 
have praise in his farewell note. He maintained that the 
shabby way in which the Lutheran church treated the women it 
employed drove many of them away from the church. Graffam 
thought that theology was indeed important for working with 
young people, but that at the same time an exclusive emphasis 
on theology did not take the fact into account that many poor 
theologians turned out to be excellent youth workers. 
Graffam's major criticism was the lack of practical 
experiences of most theology students. He noted their 
complete detachment from real life and even from their 
colleagues at other faculties of their university. The guest 
from the United States pointed out that German theology 
students received one lecture on youth work during their 
entire course of study. He found it not at all surprising
^Helbich 101-103.
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that most vicars were completely helpless in the presence of 
young people and often did not understand that they needed to 
take practical issues such as laws or working hours into 
consideration in their attempts to reach out to young 
people.28
In spite of Graffam's severe criticism of the German 
Lutherans in 1955, he seemed to prefer the imperfections of 
Germany to those of the Protestant churches in the United 
States. Getting married to a German lady was the outward 
sign that he felt comfortable and welcome in Nuremberg. When 
he returned to his home land it did not hold him long. After 
some years of missionary service in other countries Graffam 
decided to return to Germany and join the Lutheran church 
there. He became reverend in a North German congregation 
where he continued to write theater plays for young people. 
He is still living there after his retirement.29
From 1948 on church organizations also introduced 
international work camps in Germany. Young people from 
abroad and from Germany would provide their labor free of 
charge in self-help projects to German communities or groups 
in special need. This would not only generate good will but 
also enable young Germans and their peers from all over the
28Helbich 104-107.
29Marianne Hassel, personal interview, 23 Aug. 1995.
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world to get to know, to understand, and to respect each 
other.30
Youth camps also took place in and around Nuremberg. As 
usual the AFSC was among the pioneers of this type of work. 
In 1947 one of the initiators of the Peace Village asked the 
AFSC if it might not be possible to support the project with 
international volunteers. The AFSC replied promptly. By the 
end of 1947 the Friends obtained permission for one of their 
representatives, William Weber, to take up residency in 
Nuremberg. Weber went to work immediately and by June 1948, 
just a few months after the laying of the cornerstone for the 
project, international volunteers began to arrive to help 
with the construction of the project, but also to promote a 
better understanding between young people from around the 
world. Weber made no bones about the difficulty of the task. 
In his project description he informed applicants that they 
were not just expected to do heavy construction work free of 
charge, but also to participate actively with contributions 
to the spiritual life of the work camp. Those who wanted to
30See, for example, minutes of the OMGUS Youth Activities 
Staff Meeting, 14 and 15 Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18; Beryl R.
McClaskey (The History of U.S. Policy and Program in the 
Field of Religious Affairs under the Office of the U.S. High 
Commissioner for Germany ([Bad Godesberg]: Office of the U.S. 
High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the Executive 
Secretary, Historical Division, 1951) 26-29) provides a very 
general overview over the international contacts of the 
churches.
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come generally were expected to pay their travel expenses out 
of their own pockets.31
In spite of Weber's "job description" about fifty 
international volunteers arrived at Nuremberg to help the 
inhabitants of the Peace Village with their construction 
work, but currency reform wiped out the funds for the 
project, so that the volunteers had a difficult time 
continuing the work they had begun after June. The 
participants of the youth camp did not just have material 
problems, however. Communication was difficult since none of 
the Germans spoke any English and few of the volunteers 
commanded German so that discussions were cumbersome. Bad 
weather made living under normally difficult conditions in 
crowded quarters with a meager diet even harder. Building an 
"effective democratic organization without falling into the 
extremes of formless laissez-faire or over-authority" proved 
to be another challenge for the organizers. Nevertheless, 
the Friends' representative regarded the experiment as a 
success. An average of twenty volunteers per day had 
provided fifty-five work days in labor, but the Quakers found 
the less tangible results equally important:
In a spirit of good will, service, and seeking, through
the medium of cooperatively and democratically shared
310gden Hannaford, AFSC, Paris, to Raymond Spahn, Youth 
Activities Officer for Bavaria, E&CRD, OMGUS, 31 Dec. 1947; 
American Friends Service Committee, "Work Camps in Germany. 
Unsere Freiwillige Arbeitsgemeinschaft zum Wiederaufbau in 
Niirnberg;" [First Quarter 1948] NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 38, 10/43-2/8.
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work, play, meditation and discussion, our work camp has 
been a humble attempt to lessen the occasion for war by 
building positive attitudes towards the world's 
problems.32
During the next two years the Peace Village received further 
help from international volunteers, who were not just 
recruited by the AFSC but also by the World Council of 
Churches.33
Of course exchanges between the United States and 
Germany were not the only avenue to international contacts. 
OMGUS and HICOG did not ignore the possibilities which 
exchanges between Germany and its European neighbors offered. 
The British and the French had established their own exchange 
program early on, but the Americans were the first to broaden
32Bradford Rowland (AFSC Paris) c/o William Weber, 
Nuremberg, Germany to Dr. Swanson & Dr. Raymond Spahn, 
Educational & Youth Division OMGBY; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 127, 5/294-1/1.
33Apparently international work camps were one of the 
areas in which Chester Baird became active. In July 1949 he 
requested an extension of stay from OMGUS for various 
Americans who were participating in a work camp in 1949 (NA 
RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43- 
1/3); "Jugend ohne VolkerhaB: Deutsche und Amerikaner,
Franzosen und Hollander, Schweizer und Indochinesen zu Arbeit 
und Spiel vereint im 'Friedensdorf'," [Youth Without Hatred 
Towards Other Peoples: Germans and Americans, French and
Dutch, Swiss and Indochinese Joined in Work and Play at the 
"Peace Village"] NN, 1 Aug. 1949: 5; "Geist und Kraft
Vereint: Internationales Treffen im Friedensdorf, [Spirit and 
Power United: International Meeting at Peace Village] NN, 22 
July 1950: 14. Of course these camps were not the only ones: 
We have seen that international students spent time at the 
Nuremberg GYA center in 1952. The Lutheran Church 
institution in Stein, a suburb of Nuremberg also became the 
site of an international youth camp in 1950 ("Praktische 
Arbeit, keine Ideologien: Internationales Studentenlager in 
Stein," [Practical Work, No Ideologies: International Student 
Camp in Stein] NN, 19 Aug. 1950: 11) .
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their horizons beyond the boundaries of their own zone. A 
steady stream of European specialists went to Germany and 
many Germans were able to travel to their neighboring 
countries with American aid. At the end of this part of the 
exchange program over two thousand German leaders had gone to 
other European countries and 532 European specialists had 
spent time in Germany to take care of reorientation.34
The Nuremberg YMCA seemed to be especially active in 
this realm. Possibly with the help of Lawrence Norrie, who 
maintained close contact with Nuremberg's YMCA, eighteen 
Nurembergers went to Switzerland in August 1949. At the same 
time twelve others got the opportunity to travel to Sweden. 
Members of other church youth groups were able to travel to 
Holland. Trade unionists re-established contacts with France 
and later began to organize journeys to Italy and Yugoslavia. 
Young Germans were taking advantage of all opportunities to 
break through the isolation the Third Reich had created.35
wKellermann 127, 261.
35Report on exchanges, 6 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Cultural Affairs Br., Box 17, 10/120-1/11; for
Norrie's close ties to the Nuremberg YMCA see letter from 
L.E. Norrie, Chief, Group Activities Br., OMGUS, to Dr. 
Dannemann, YMCA, Stuttgart, 26 Aug. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 151, 5/297-1/24; for
other journeys see, for example, "Eine war mit in Amsterdam," 
[One Girl Travelled to Amsterdam] Die Junge Gemeinde (Nov. 
1948): 14-15; "Erster Preis: Nach Danemark," [First Price: To 
Denmark] Die Junge Gemeinde (Nov. 1948): 15-16; for the Trade 
Unions' international contacts see Karl Schmidbauer's 
comments in Grieb, ed., 65-66.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
630
American planners of the cultural exchange program were 
aware that the seeds they were sowing probably would need a 
long time to bear fruit. Their own evaluations of the 
exchange program were cautiously optimistic. According to 
their first impressions and surveys, many of the exchangees 
in fact became the multipliers the Americans had hoped they 
would be. Interestingly, briefing conferences and returnee 
meetings seemed to indicate that university students were 
least likely to benefit from their overseas experiences.36
Young Nurembergers as well as youth leaders had ample 
opportunity to travel to the United States from the start. 
Two students were the first ones who left for a journey 
across the Atlantic. The American YMCA sponsored one of 
them, Church World Services enabled a theology student from 
the Lutheran college in nearby Neuendettelsau to continue his 
studies in the United States. In 1948 eleven members of
36Kellermann 209-252. Since Bavaria was considered to be 
a stronghold of the "traditionalists", American experts paid 
special attention to the effects of returnees there and were 
satisfied with the immediate results the exchanges showed in 
all age groups and among participants in a wide variety of 
projects designed for helping young people. See, for 
example, despatch from HICOG, Frankfurt to Department of 
State, Washington, 17 and 26 Jan. 1952; NA RG 59 Decimal 
Files 1950-1954, 511.62A3/1-1752 and 511.62A3/1-2652; for an 
evaluation of returnees and a very clear opinion about German 
university students see Russel S. Wise, Consul General, 
Hamburg, to Dept, of State, Washington, 22 Aug. 1952; NA RG 
59 Decimal File 1950-54, 511.62A3/8-2252; a study conducted 
by the Institut fur Sozial- und Wirtschaftsforschung for the 
USIA in 1955 confirmed his impressions (USIA, Research Staff, 
Report no. 224, Study of Impressions and Disseminations by 
Information Specialists and Students from the Exchange of 
Persons Program, 3 0 Dec. 1955; NA RG 306 Research Reports on 
German Public Opinion).
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various youth groups in Nuremberg left Germany with a grant 
from the Rockefeller foundation. 1949 saw youth specialists 
like Karl Maly, the third man in Nuremberg's youth work 
behind Marx and Staudt, together with Armin Schrotberger, an 
elementary school teacher who worked for OMGUS, participating 
in one of the youth leader projects. Martin Helbich went to 
the United States with another pastor from Nuremberg and two 
from the surrounding region under the sponsorship of the 
Federal Council of Churches. The first group of Fulbright 
scholars in 1953 was still very much connected to 
reorientation, but demonstrated well the new approach of 
targeting persons instead of institutions which the OMGUS 
youth section had pioneered. The Americans brought 105 
teachers to the United States. Five of them, two ladies and 
three men, came from Nuremberg. By that time State 
Department objectives were not just to prove Nazi propaganda 
wrong, but also to counteract erroneous impressions which 
Hollywood movies seemed to cause. During the next years 
trade unionists, students, teenagers, young farmers, more 
teachers, and members of the Churches followed in their 
footsteps.37
37List of Students to attend US Colleges 1947/48; NA RG 
260 OMGUS, E&CRD, Cultural Affairs Br., Box 217, 5/335-3/29; 
list of Rockefeller Grantees of 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, 
Group Activities Br., Box 48, 10/43-3/9; list of individuals 
travelling to the US, 21 Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Cultural Affairs Br., Box 215, 5/334-3/23; report on project 
in foreign teacher education, German Teacher Education 
Program 1952-53; NA RG 59 General Records, Bureau of Public 
Affairs, International Education Exchange Service, Box 2. I
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All Nurembergers who went to the United States were most 
impressed with their host country. It seemed that the United 
States had something to offer for everyone. Karl Maly spent 
most of his time in the North-East. As a Social Democrat he 
did detect differences between rich and poor, but also noted 
that the poor in the United States still had more than the 
average German. Maly found the absence of any deference 
towards higher social classes or authorities one of the most 
striking features of the country. He also reported back to 
Germany that the United States in fact was the "Country of 
Youth" because it seemed that youth activities and education 
received almost unlimited public and private support. In 
view of the Peace Village and the other Boys7 Town project in 
Nuremberg it is not surprising that Maly also wanted to 
become acquainted with a Boys7 Town in the State of New York. 
His sponsors complied with his wishes. Maly was impressed 
with the democratic procedures the young people practiced 
there.38
Bavaria7s Youth Pastor had a different approach. 
According to him, America in many respects was not much 
different from Germany. Martin Helbich talked about New York
found the names of the five Nuremberg teachers in newspaper 
clippings which had been included as an appendix in the 
report and was able to locate three of them in Nuremberg in 
1995. Another had passed away and one could not be found. 
The Nurnberger Nachrichten maintained a steady supply of 
reports of exchangees throughout the 1950s.
38|,Ein Bericht aus dem 7Lande der Jugend7," [A Report 
from the "Land of Youth"] NN, 29 May 1949: 5.
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precincts in which German was still the predominant language 
and he related to his readers back home— undoubtedly with 
satisfaction— that he had discovered a Cafe Hindenburg, named 
after the ultraconservative general, German World War I hero 
and last President of the Weimar Republic. Although Helbich 
came from the conservative camp, he shared a number of Maly's 
observations. Like Maly, Helbich commented that he had ample 
opportunities to meet with leading experts in his field of 
Protestant youth work and to learn about youth work not just 
in theory but also in practice. He was impressed with the 
way in which American teachers managed to interest their 
teenage students in political issues and tried to practice 
democracy in the classrooms. Helbich also noted the 
prosperity which, according to him, made youth work much 
easier over there than in poor Germany, but the Bavarian 
Youth Pastor thought that this wealth was not always a 
blessing. He noted that the American YMCA had really fancy 
houses, but at the same time had become a secular service 
operation which seemed to forget its foundation in faith. 
Interestingly, Helbich reported that he had not fallen into 
unlimited enthusiasm but that getting to know that part of 
the world was well worth the trouble. He recommended to 
everyone who had the chance to take the trouble and make the 
j ourney.39
39Letter from Hans Martin Helbich to his friends in 
Germany, 23 May 1949; LCA Landeskirchenrat, VI, 1178a, vol. 
IV.
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Not all Lutherans shared this view. Nuremberg's Dean 
Theodor Schieder, for example, maintained his distance from 
the occupiers throughout his tenure. When HICOG approached 
his superiors in Munich to recommend people for the exchange 
program in 1951, he informed them that he "could not think of 
one man who would be able above all to stay away from his 
profession for such a long time." Schieder consistently 
declined invitations by the Nuremberg Amerika Haus to 
participate in or at least to attend discussion evenings. In 
1950 he declined to participate in a German-American Easter 
service which Army chaplains were trying to organize. 
According to Schieder, the time was not yet ripe for such an 
undertaking. "One has to respect the feelings of the people 
which happens to be the vanquished". Schieder thought that 
Americans first would have to "practice" community by 
visiting German services and "respectable Christian German 
families" .40
Although Schieder was one of the leading men in Bavaria, 
he was unable to stop American advances in areas which were 
not under his jurisdiction. In spite of his reservations, an
40Schieder to the Lutheran State Council in Bavaria, 26 
Oct. 1951. The folder contains numerous letters in which 
Schieder declines to participate in discussions or other 
events at the Amerika Haus in spite of repeated attempts by 
the director of the institution to involve him (see, for 
example, Dr. Ernest G. Schweibert, Director, Amerika Haus 
Nuernberg to Oberkirchenrat D. Schieder, Nuernberg, 8 Feb. 
1950; LCA Kreisdekan Niirnberg 138) . For Schieder's position 
on the Easter service see his Erklarung des Sachverhaltes, 13 
Apr. 1950; LCA Landeskirchenrat, 525.
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Easter service took place in Munich the same year. It seems 
that especially youth reverends had less problems with the 
occupiers. In July 1949, for example, youth reverend 
Bammessel from Nuremberg invited Harold Patrick, the Bavarian 
OMGUS youth officer to observe the Lutheran Church's own 
youth leadership training.41
Bammessel also provided the Americans with names of 
students who were willing to go to the United States. In 
spite of Schieder's opinion, other Bavarian reverends 
continued to travel to the United States. Especially the 
staff of the Mothers' Home in Stein, who were very active in 
youth leader training, had the opportunity to expand their 
horizons and to learn something new in the United States. 
The head of the Bavarian Inner Mission travelled to America 
as well. He took the opportunity to thank American 
congregations in person for their charity work, which, 
according to him, had done so much good for the still 
devastated country.42
American churches did not just welcome German reverends 
and lay persons to the United States, but also took every
41Youth Pastor Bammessel to Mr. Patrick, 3 0 May 1949; NA 
RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/5.
42List of Candidates for study in the US submitted by 
youth reverend Bammessel, 11 July 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3; final report 
of Reverend Heinz Diez, Director, Innere Mission of his trip 
to the United States, 27 Sept.-19 Dec. 1951 (Diez's report 
also contained train and bus tickets); LCA Diakonisches Werk, 
2427; for the journeys of the Mothers' Home staff see LCA 
Gemeindehelferinnen, Box 5, HICOG.
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opportunity to gather information and observe the situation 
first hand. Delegations of reverends and theology students 
arrived at Nuremberg as well as individuals who wanted to 
observe specific problems for which they were trying to find 
solutions or funds back home.43
Heinrich Schiller was one of the first students to 
obtain a degree in the United States. He went to the 
University of Minnesota to study social work with Gisela 
Konopka, a German emigree who was teaching in Minneapolis. 
Schiller not only acquired theoretical knowledge of a new 
approach to social work, but also got the chance to test the 
theory in the field. Schiller lived and worked in several 
institutions for children and teenagers in Minneapolis. He 
returned to Berlin with his Master's degree in 1951, but two 
years later went to Nuremberg to teach social work there. 
Schiller's dissertation which contained the new approach to 
social work became a standard textbook throughout Germany. 
Schiller continued his career first as director of
43"US Studenten in Niirnberg: Sie besichtigen kirchliche 
Einrichtungen," [US Students in Nuremberg: They Visit Church 
Installations] NN, 6 July 1951: 11; "Sie wollen die Not
kennenlernen: US Kirchenvertreter besuchen auch Niirnberg," 
[They Want to Get to Know the Misery: US Church
Representatives Also Visit Nuremberg] NN, 14 Jan. 1952; "US 
Pastoren besichtigen Niirnberg," [US Reverends Inspect 
Nuremberg] NN, 18 July 1952: 10; see also correspondence
between Nuremberg ministers and their American colleagues 
regarding their visits, for example Pastor Henry 0. Yater, 
Ann Arbor, Michigan to Reverend Diez, Nuremberg, 8 Feb. 1952, 
in which the American thanks for the hospitality he received 
on his visit and asks Diez to take care of a German student 
who is about to return home from Ann Arbor (LCA Diakonisches 
Werk, 778c).
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Nuremberg's own School of Social Work, from 1967 as director 
of a completely new school of social work the Lutheran church 
established in the city. He also served as president in 
international organizations and helped the United Nations to 
promote social work in Thailand.44
Schiller was not the only person to become involved in 
looking for new ways in social work. In September 1951 
German community and church social workers who had been to 
the United States met in Stuttgart to collect and evaluate 
their experiences. They adopted a resolution which 
recommended the introduction of "case work" and "group work" 
and demanded that "concurrent field work" become part of the 
education of social workers. They also demanded that social 
work— up to then a domain of the opposite sex— be opened to 
men. The assembled social workers further thought that 
"child guidance" and "team work" were useful concepts and 
that the child should be the center of all attention, 
apparently something which was new in Germany. The Bavarian
^Heinrich Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995; 
see also "Dr. Schiller leitet evangelisches Sozialinstitut: 
Einem neuen Ruf gefolgt: Der anerkannte Fachmann ging von der 
Sozialen Schule an die neue Bildungsstatte," [Dr. Schiller 
Head of Lutheran Social Institute: Followed a New Call: the
recognized expert went form the School of Social Work to the 
New Educational Institution] NN, 7 Sept. 1967: [n.p.].
Newspaper clipping, NCA C74 no. 138.
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participants agreed on a follow-up meeting six months 
later.45
Almost from the start of the program OMGUS followed up 
on the returnees' plans and activities. In May 1949 Charles 
Winning and the German advisory committee sent a 
questionnaire to all returning Germans. Wining asked for 
their full cooperation so that Americans and Germans involved 
in the planning and selection progress would be able to 
improve the program. In the summer OMGBY invited Karl Maly 
and Armin Schrotberger to participate in one of various 
conferences "to discuss further plans in youth activities in 
the light of your experiences in the States." The Americans 
paid for the expenses and made sure that the school 
superintendent for Munich was present to listen to any 
suggestions.46
OMGUS and HICOG did not have to twist many arms to have 
people attend their follow-up conferences. Returnees in 
general decided to remain in contact in Germany. Almost all 
Bavarian exchangees reacted positively to an initiative in 
1950 to found what was to become the Society for
4SMinutes of a meeting of exchangees in social and health 
services in Stuttgart, 24/25 Sept. 1951; LCA Diakonisches 
Werk, 947. The social workers did not have German 
equivalents for the American terms, so they simply adopted 
them.
^Letter, Charles Winning to returning Germans, 31 May 
1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Cultural Affairs Br., Box 17, 
10/120-1/1; letters, OMGBY to Karl Maly and to Armin 
Schrotberger, Nuremberg, 2 Aug. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, 
Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3.
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International Exchange (Gesellschaft ftir internationalen 
Austausch). Even the Bavarian Lutherans deemed the new 
association important enough to send a representative.47
All of these activities of returnees clearly indicated 
that in fact they were doing what the State Department had 
hoped they would do: they served as multipliers. Most of the 
exchangees did their part of the reorientation work in a 
quiet manner. They brought ideas back to Germany which they 
were trying to implement in their own environment and 
sometimes in rather unexpected places. Willy ProlB, for 
example, went to the United States in his capacity as a youth 
leader for the Falcons in Nuremberg. Like so many others 
ProlB was impressed with the American openness and 
hospitality. He also noted with disapproval the dark side of 
a completely segregated social system in the South, but 
almost fifty years after his journey to the United States, 
ProlB, then mayor of Nuremberg, regarded the most valuable 
experience in the United States his practical lessons in 
dealing with a car oriented society. He remembered that he 
was very impressed with the modern systems of traffic lights 
in smaller communities when the city of Nuremberg did not 
have more than five of these innovations to regulate the city 
traffic. ProlB thought that he made good use of these
47OLCB to Bavarian State Church Council, 15 Mar. 1950; 
Council to OLCB, 29 Mar. 1950; OLCB to Council, 20 Apr. 1950; 
LCA Landeskirchenrat, 525.
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experiences during his long and distinguished career in the 
city's political arena.48
Many other returnees decided to put their knowledge to 
good use, although the teachers were not always impressed 
with the American educational system.49 Karl Kunze, 
participant in the Fulbright teacher exchange of 1953, 
founded the Niirnberg Kolleg, an institution that opened up 
alternatives in formal education for people who had jobs. 
His companion on that journey, Karl Ritter, English teacher 
at a secondary school in Nuremberg, introduced American 
studies in his classes as much as the curriculum permitted. 
He used materials and books he had bought in the United
48Willy ProlB, personal interview, 4 Aug. 1994.
49Karl Ritter as well as another of the participants, 
Elisabeth Oberndorfer thought that the German school system 
provided more opportunities for advanced learning. While the 
American system was democratic the German system seemed to 
take better care of its academic responsibilities. A little 
frustrated by the reorientation efforts which did not seem to 
find anything good in the German educational system, 
Oberndorfer confided to her diary that the Americans actually 
could learn quite a bit in regard of academic standards from 
the Germans. (Karl Ritter, personal interview, 26 July 1995. 
Elizabeth Oberndorfer, Diary, in the possession of the 
author). In general, however, the teachers did not differ 
from others in their assessment of their trips as extremely 
valuable for learning about their profession and about 
Americans. See the reports of Karl Kunze, Peter Moritz, 
Elizabeth Oberndorfer, Karl Ritter, and Ingeborg Seelig to 
the State Department. Four of them are in excellent English, 
only one was written in German. Although the five teachers 
went to different locations, their evaluations were 
remarkably similar. Interestingly, the teacher who spent 
most of his time in Tennessee came to adopt the racial views 
of his white hosts, something the State Department surely 
regarded as counterproductive (NA RG 59 General Records, 
Bureau of Public Affairs, IES, German Teachers Program, Box 
3) .
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States. He also tried to incorporate the different method of 
teaching in his classes whenever he could. In the seventies 
the Bavarian Ministry for education put Ritter in charge of 
supervising the training of young English teachers in the 
region. Whenever he could, Ritter included a visit to one of 
the American High Schools the Army maintained for the 
dependents of the many military installations in Middle 
Franconia.50
Not everybody in Germany was happy with the cultural 
exchange. The wife of one of the exchangees, a Foreign 
Service trainee, who lived in Hersbruck near Nuremberg while 
her husband was in the United States, received an anonymous 
note:
Don't you think that we do not know what your husband is 
doing in the United States against Germany. What has he 
done in Switzerland two years ago?
We know it all and we warn you. Watch your 
children and yourself closely so that nothing happens. 
We hate all who sabotage German unity and have many of 
them blacklisted and will soon take action.51
Since the lady's husband did not want to jeopardize his
career, he did not think it necessary to start a police
investigation and asked HICOG to be discreet about the
S0Karl Kunze, personal Interview, 17 July 1995; Karl 
Ritter, personal interview, 26 July 1995. HICOG also found 
much evidence for this type of grassroots activity of many 
returnees, regardless of age. See, for example, Telegram 
(Confidential security information) John McCLoy to Secretary 
of State, Washington, 26 Jan. 1952; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 
1950-54, 511.62A3/1-2652.
51Telegram, Dept, of State, Washington to HICOG, 23 Jan. 
1951; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A3/1-2351.
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matter. He took the threat serious enough, however, to move 
his family from Hersbruck to his mother-in-law in another 
village near Nuremberg.52
Occasional unpleasant notes notwithstanding, Senator 
Fulbright would have been pleased with the success of the 
program if he had been able to follow the public relations 
activities in Nuremberg of returnees and those who still were 
spending time in the United States. A considerable number of 
articles of globetrotters from Nuremberg appeared in the 
city's newspapers. With the exception of one businessman who 
probably was the first person to travel through the United 
States at his own expense, all of those who had been in the 
United States as specialists, university students or high 
school students, in one way or another provided factual, 
perceptive, but above all positive information of the United 
States. Germans at home learned that Americans did "not just 
chew gum" or dwelled in riches. They got a glimpse of life 
at high schools and universities. They found out about New 
York and life in small communities. They got an eyewitness 
account of Christmas in Arizona or the beaches in Florida. 
American friendliness and hospitality as well as hard work 
were recurring themes.53
52Telegram, Dept, of State, Washington to HICOG, 23 Jan. 
1951; NA RG 59 Decimal Files 1950-54, 511.62A3/1-2351.
53See, for example "Ein Nurnberger berichtet aus den 
Vereinigten Staaten: Als deutscher Student in Amerika," [A 
Nuremberger Reports from the United States: As German Student 
in America] NN, 25 Mar. 1950: 8; "In den USA gut aufgenommen:
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Those who did not make it into the local news 
nevertheless disseminated the same message. Nuremberg's 
first exchange student, a YMCA member, wrote about his 
experiences in a Lutheran youth publication.54 Armin 
Schrotberger, one of the youth specialists, gave 
presentations about his journey.55 Even youth pastor 
Helbich's extensive article for the Baugeriist, the Bavarian 
Lutheran's youth publication, was surprisingly positive. 
Helbich repeated his criticism of superficial work of which 
he found especially the YMCA guilty, but he also had praise 
for the way in which American congregations involved their 
young members in the everyday church work which began with 
Sunday school and ended with participation in the choir and 
in the eucharist. Helbich shared with his readers that the
Plauderei mit Niirnbergern, die 'driiben' waren," [Good 
Reception in the USA: Chat with Nurembergers who were "over 
there"] NN, 29. Aug. 1951: 4; "35 Nurnberger fahren nach USA: 
Zum Studienaufenthalt bis zu einem Jahr," [35 Nurembergers 
Travel to USA: Study Trips of up to One Year] NN, 27 June 
1952: 10; "Dora schreibt jetzt in elf Lander: Niirnbergerin 
kam nach einem Jahr USA wieder heim— 'Die kauen nicht immer 
Gummi'," [Dora Now Writes to Eleven Countries: Nuremberger 
Returned Home— "They Do Not Always Chew Gum] NN, 3 Sept. 
1954: 9. The only article expressing a largely critical 
attitude I found was a wealthy business man's "Kritik an 
'Gottes eigenem Land': Nurnberger Photo Kaufmann erlebte die 
Vereinigten Staaten," [Criticizing "God's Own Country": 
Nuremberg Photo Dealer Experienced the United States] NN, 24 
Nov. 1953: 7. His experiences did not indicate a hostile 
attitude towards Americans in general. The same man 
supported GYA activities and sponsored the Young World.
^"Jorg der Amerika-Fahrer," [Jorg, America Traveller] 
Die Junge Gemeinde (Nov. 1948): 13-14.
55Armin Schrotberger to OMGBY, 24 July 1949; NA RG 260 
OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 35, 10/43-1/3.
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Germans were in dire need of emulating the example which 
Americans were setting in training young people in the art of 
discussion at an early age. He continued that he was 
surprised and humbled by their willingness to listen to his 
opinion, to take it seriously, and to correct mistakes on the 
spot without much ado. Helbich even came out in favor of co­
educational activities, although he cautioned that separating 
the sexes certainly also had its place in the church's youth 
work. All in all Helbich's commentaries demonstrated that he 
had gone to the United States with an open mind and a 
willingness to learn which certainly justified the 
expenditure and the effort the Americans had made. He was 
just one of many.56
And many more wanted to go. A journey to the United 
States remained the dream of a good number of those who did 
not belong to the select few. Helmut Stiihler, who became 
director of one of Nuremberg's new youth centers in the 
fifties, was one of those for whom a journey to the United 
States would have meant the opportunity of a lifetime to get 
to know youth work as it should be done and to apply it to 
his youth center in Nuremberg. Stiihler was fully aware that 
the city had as much to say in the selection of candidates as 
had the Americans. Although he understood that he was
56Hans Martin Helbich, "Die christliche Jugend in Amerika 
I," Das Baugeriist 10 (Oct. 1949): 257-60; Hans Martin
Helbich, "Die christliche Jugend in Amerika II," Das 
Baugeriist 11 (Nov. 1949) : 287-88.
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urgently needed in Nuremberg, he was never quite convinced 
about the wisdom of the selection process. Not quite five 
decades later he thought that it might have been better to 
send a man who practiced the trade to America instead of an 
administrator.57
While Stiihler did not even get a chance for an 
interview, others did not make it through the selection 
process. Hermann Glaser, one of Germany's most prominent 
cultural historians, for example, did not have fond memories 
of the interview process. Although he had applied repeatedly 
for scholarships as a student, he had never been selected. 
Glaser suspected that only those who demonstrated decidedly 
pro-American attitudes and fit into American stereotypes were 
actually allowed to go, whereas those who proved to be overly 
critical usually did not survive the screening process. 
Glaser's observation may not have been entirely true. He may 
have overlooked the fact that Americans were trying hard to 
win students over to their concept of democracy. Since he 
belonged to the rather rare species of students in the 
fifties who were convinced democrats and believed in 
progressive education there was no need for him to go to the 
United States. McCloy made clear in 1952 that Americans did
57Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994.
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not "need internationalists on the Exchange Program as much 
as we do nationalists; it might cure them."58
Not surprisingly, Glaser found out when he finally made 
it to the United States in the sixties that American 
educators were just humans and their schools and teaching 
methods often far from the ideals which the education experts 
had preached in postwar Germany— and which Glaser was trying 
to implement in the classroom. But experiences like Glaser's 
were rare in the fifties and possibly belonged to a later, 
more critical generation.59 
Material Help
When John McCloy came to Germany in 1949 he was 
impressed with the lack of essential equipment in hospitals 
and other public facilities which these institutions simply 
were not able to acquire because they did not have the funds. 
The Marshall Plan would take care of Germany's infrastructure 
and housing, but beyond that the misery could still be seen 
and felt everywhere. Although the situation was improving, 
the economic miracle had not yet taken off. McCloy thought 
that it would be a good idea to set aside a special fund to
58Hermann Glaser, "Die Regel war trist: Ein Riickblick auf 
'padagogische Hoffnungen'," Facing America: 104-106; memo
McCloy to Shepard Stone, Mr. Burns, 29 Jan. 1952; NA RG 466 
HICOM, Central Classified Records, Box 36, D (52) 281.
59Hermann Glaser, "Die Regel war trist: Ein Riickblick auf 
'padagogische Hoffnungen'," Facing America: 104-106. Glaser 
finally made it to the United States when he was a teacher in 
the 1960s. He later became a regular guest and lecturer in 
the United States.
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satisfy these needs. After the legality of such an 
undertaking had been established, the High Commissioner 
immediately set aside fifty million marks from GARIOA 
(Government and Relief in Occupied Areas, Department of the 
Army) funds and one million dollars from the funds that 
Congress had set aside to finance HICOG which had not yet 
been allocated for any other purpose. McCloy wanted the 
program to help especially young people.60
In January 1950 the High Commission inquired with German 
political and church leaders which areas it should target for 
special projects. The Federal Republic's first President, 
Theodor Heuss, immediately appointed an official who would be 
in charge of coordinating the German side of the program. 
Refugees and expellees, invalids, students and returned POWs 
stood highest on the German list of the needy. McCloy 
emphasized self-help and American cooperation in German 
efforts. German institutions and government agencies were 
expected to match the funds for which they applied with an
“J.F.J. Gillen, The Special Projects Program of the 
Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany (Office of 
the U.S. High Commissioner for Germany, Office of the 
Executive Secretary, Historical Division, 1952) 3-4.
The American contribution to Nuremberg's reconstruction 
was in fact considerable and would deserve a study of its 
own. The Marshall Plan did much to accelerate the planning 
and construction of affordable apartments for the lower 
classes. Nuremberg architects went to the United States to 
observe modern city planning. Americans with ties to the 
city contributed millions to the reconstruction of churches 
and even an orphanage. Since these projects were not
connected to youth work, I did not include them in this 
study.
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equal amount of their own money. The High Commission would 
only support long term projects which contributed to the 
reorientation efforts and whose future funding was secured. 
In this way McCloy hoped to lay the foundation for many 
projects which would continue long after American help would 
no longer be available.61
HICOG tried to spread the money evenly throughout West 
Germany and Berlin. In August 1950 the other two Allies were 
informed that the French would have nearly four million and 
the British nearly eight million marks available for projects 
within their zones of occupation. Of the areas under 
American control Bavaria received almost one fifth of the 
total funds.62
McCloy kept his course to make youth the main target of 
the program. HICOG spent twelve million marks to support 
youth activities and self-help projects. This meant that 
young people continued to receive massive support. The 
nature of the grants also forced organizations as well as 
local and state administrations to fund projects if they did 
not want to loose the money, effectively doubling the amount 
set aside for these projects. Another twenty million marks 
went into education, half of it to universities. Apparently 
there was no lack of projects. Not even a year after the 
program's inauguration, the McCloy Fund administrators had to
61Gillen, Special Projects 5-7.
62Gillen, Special Projects 7-8.
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advise Kreis Resident Officers not to accept any more 
applications. HICOG allocated an additional four million
marks to pending projects.63
Contributions (DM) 
German American
Education
Model School 
Student Residence Hall
213,420 
130,000
171.000
190.000
Youth Activities
Residence Club for Young Women 
Friedensdorf 
Youth Castle Feuerstein 
Home for Young Men and 
Community Center Sterntor 
Trade Union Center, Hersbruck
145,161
75.000 
none
1, 000
75.000
97,787 
82,000
13.000
96.000 
175,000
Welfare
Refugee Women's Work Program 
Mother's Home, Stein
9,285 
48,000
11,121 
69,500
Cultural Affairs 
Theater
(planned construction costs) none 225.000
Total 696,866 1,131,408
35. McCloy Fund contributions to projects in Nuremberg 
(Sources: Gillen, Special Projects 49-76; Chronik der Stadt 
Niirnberg 1951: 326, NCA F2, no. 49)
Nuremberg benefitted substantially from the McCloy Fund. 
In the city as well as elsewhere, projects to help young 
people received the lion's share of the allocations. The 
city administration was able to construct a model school and 
a student residence hall. The Bavarian Association for Labor 
Welfare (Arbeiterwohlfahrt) constructed eighteen homes for
63Gillen, Special Projects 8.
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apprentices throughout Bavaria with substantial contributions 
from HICOG, of which at least one was probably slated for 
Northern Bavaria's industrial center. The YMCA received 
funds for a home for young men which would also function as 
a community center. To maintain the balance HICOG financed 
part of a residence project for young women in Nuremberg. 
McCloy also injected vital funds in the Peace Village. The 
Lutheran Church received aid to maintain a retreat for 
exhausted mothers in Stein, one of Nuremberg's suburbs, which 
OMGUS and HICOG used for youth leadership training as well. 
The Lutheran nurses who ran the facility got additional help 
from a German emigree who donated 300,000 of the 450,000 
marks needed for building a new orphanage on the premises. 
The newspaper reported that it would incorporate the latest 
American models in child education in its activities and run 
its own school. Since Nuremberg's trade unions were among 
the most active in youth work, HICOG helped them with the 
construction of the Hans-Bockler-Haus, a youth retreat in 
nearby Hersbruck under the condition that it had to be open 
to all youth. The nearby Feuerstein castle of the Catholic 
church also got a facelift with the help of American money.64
^Gillen, Special Projects 49-76; see also Chronik der 
Stadt Niirnberg 1951: 326; NCA F2 no. 49; for the Lutheran 
orphanage see "Ein Kinderparadies am Stadtrand: Eine
groBherzige Spende aus Amerika half der Diakonissenanstalt 
'Martha Maria," [A Generous Gift from America Helped Lutheran 
Nurses Home "Martha Maria"] NN, 28 Nov. 1952: 12; for the 
provisions on Hersbruck see Willy Gensmantel, personal 
interview, 10 Aug. 1995.
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McCloy made sure that not just the big city youth 
profited from the funds. Upper and Middle Franconian 
communities received funds for fourteen projects related to 
youth in addition to several model schools, community 
centers, child guidance and welfare programs, kindergartens, 
and even hospitals. By 1953 the McCloy Funds had supported 
65 projects in Northern Bavaria with DM 3,800,000 the 
equivalent of almost one million dollars.65
In addition to the allocations by headquarters the Land 
Commissioners received special funds for supporting small 
projects, such as buying sewing machines for a refugee camp 
in Nuremberg or equipment for youth centers. These 
contributions could not exceed 1,000 marks, nevertheless the 
Land Commissioners regarded the program as such a valuable 
asset to their reorientation efforts that they soon requested 
more money.66
The High Commission did not just spend its own money for 
youth projects, but also tried to convince the Federal 
Government that this was a vital area which deserved support 
from Bonn. In 1950 Bonn complied. The Federal Government 
announced in December its first youth plan for which it
65Gillen, Special Projects 49-76; Hynes R. Mahoney, 
Information Officer, Nuremberg Public Affairs Region, 
"Investment in Democracy," HICOG Information Bulletin 
(February 1953): 7-8, 12.
•^Gillen, Special Projects 9-10; "Child's Play Becomes 
Woman's Work," HICOG Information Bulletin, (August 1951) : 23- 
24.
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36. HICOG Special Project Grants for Upper and Middle 
Franconia (Source: J.F.J. Gillen, Special Projects VI)
slated 52,700,000 marks. Most of the money went to projects 
which would alleviate the dire job and housing situation of 
apprentices and young workers in Germany. Adenauer also 
allocated two million marks to the border region with the 
Soviet zone to combat communist influence there. Established 
youth organizations received one million marks to operate on 
the federal level, youth leadership training centers and
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institutions which promoted the concept of a unified Europe 
also received sizable allocations.67
Bonn continued its support of youth work during the next 
years. In 1952 the government spent over fifty million marks 
again, mainly for rehabilitating work shops and living 
quarters of apprentices. It also supported the newly founded 
Bundesjugendring which served as the parent organization of 
the different state youth committees. Bonn apparently had 
learned something from the set up of the McCloy funds as 
well. It reserved five million marks for grants-in-aid.
Some funds went to international exchanges and an
international camp at above the Rhine river.68
In spite of the rather massive allocations to youth 
related issues the Federal government did not show any 
inclination to embark on a new departure in youth work in 
Germany. Most of the support went into reconstruction
measures designed to create and secure jobs for young people. 
Bonn allocated some money for leadership training sites, but 
did not demonstrate any inclination to support projects which 
would help young Germans who did not belong to the
traditional youth groups.
Nuremberg benefitted substantially from the plan. 
During the first two years the federal government supported 
twenty-three projects in the city, above all the construction
67Pilgert, Community 21-23.
68Pilgert, Community 23-25.
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of dormitories which would provide 2,360 apprentices from the 
surrounding region with places to stay while they were 
learning a trade. The city received almost two million marks 
during the first three years of the plan's operation.69
Bonn's financial policy reflected the outlook of those 
in charge of the formulation of youth policy. From 1946 on 
German administrators, among them Theodor Marx, had begun to 
discuss the future of German youth work. American attempts 
to create a network for youth activities which would remain 
independent of government influence met the decided 
resistance of German officials who immediately began to 
create semi-official organizations in which the specialists 
discussed the future of youth work and a revision of the 
youth legislation of 1926. Even progressive welfare 
specialists like Marx thought that the federal and state 
governments should make youth work their legal 
responsibility. Although German authorities left the youth 
committees in place and granted them a representative body on 
the federal level, some committees soon lost their interest 
in representing all young people and developed into an 
official lobby for youth organizations. The power of the 
purse and some legal maneuvering in Bavaria, for example, 
left Americans apprehensive about the future of the youth 
committees they had created. The new youth legislation of
69Excerpt of a list with projects which were supported by 
the Federal Youth Plan; NCA C75 no. 124/1.
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1953 did not give the Americans much to cheer for either. 
The only new provision the federal government passed was that 
from 1953 on communities and states had an obligation to 
become involved in youth work. Bonn maintained the 
traditional framework which did not take care of unorganized 
youth and left HICOG alone with the burden of 
reorientation.70 
Leadership Training
We have seen above that OMGUS officials had realized 
early on that one of the biggest problems for young Germans 
was the lack of trained youth leaders. OMGUS had opened the 
Wannsee school in Berlin in 1948, but a similar school in 
Bavaria for which the Bavarian Youth Ring was responsible 
always was on the brink of faltering between 1948 and 1949. 
OMGBY on various occasions admonished the Bavarian Ministry 
of Education that funds for such a venture were available, 
but that Munich would have to show stronger support than in 
the past for the idea.71
70Fiissl 133-137; Pilgert, Community 29-31. Marx played 
a leading role in the Association of German Cities, an 
influential organization of all large communities in the 
Federal Republic. See, for example, "Nurnberger Referat auf 
dem 'Deutschen Stadtetag' im 1900 jahrigen Koln fordert: 
Jugendbetreuung als staatliche Pflicht," [Nuremberg's 
Presentation at the "German City Congress" in 1900 year-old 
Cologne Demands: Youth Care a Must for Government] NN, 1 July 
1950: 7.
7I0MGBY, Report on Youth Leadership Training Site, 27 
Oct. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 
39, 10/43-3/18; Clayton Jones, Report on Niederpocking youth 
leadership school, 2 Aug. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br. , Box 35, 10/43-1/6; Esther Test, Youth
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By 1950 the youth leadership school was finally in place 
and its financing secured mostly with funds from OMGUS and 
later on, HICOG. OMGUS officials also had developed a 
curriculum for the training of professional youth workers in 
1949. We have seen above that OMGUS and HICOG invested 
heavily in the Nuremberg region, establishing and expanding 
youth leadership training facilities in Stein, at Burg 
Feuerstein, and for the trade unions in Hersbruck. Many 
Germans in charge of training their youth had gone to the 
United States and were convinced about the necessity of 
focusing on young people who were not organized.72
Despite this encouraging development, the proponents of 
traditional youth work were by no means defeated. Youth 
organizations had restructured the Bavarian Youth Ring in 
such a way that they were able to retain control over its 
operations, which included the budget of the youth leadership 
school in Niederpocking although it was financed by HICOG. 
Not surprisingly the youth organizations preferred to use the
activities expert, Cleveland, Ohio, Report on Leadership 
Training and Youth Activities, Jan. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, 
E&CRD, Community Education Br., Box 138, 5/295-2/7; for
American attempts to gain support of Bavarian authorities see 
Charles Winning, OMGBY, to Minister President of Bavaria, 3 
Jan. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 
35, 10/43-1/5; Charles Winning to Bavarian Minister of
Education, 9 Dec. 1948; Winning to Minister President of 
Bavaria, 22 Dec. 1948; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 39, 10/43-3/17.
^Pilgert, Community 32-33; minutes of a youth activities 
staff meeting, 14-15 Apr. 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 129, 5/294-1/18.
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money and the facilities for their own benefit while HICOG 
and the leadership school's staff wanted to emphasize open 
youth work. It seems that ultimately both parties reached a 
compromise. Niederpocking began to train professional youth 
workers, but at the same time continued to train the youth 
organizations' youth leaders.73
Helmut Stiihler and Karl Kleyer, two of the four 
directors of the city's youth centers, received their 
training in Niederpocking. Both had become involved in youth 
work immediately after the war. Kleyer had become active in 
one of the Friends' youth centers in Berlin, where he also 
had met Heinrich Schiller. Stiihler had been in charge of 
administering the camping equipment for the Bavarian Youth 
Ring from 1947 on. Although the staff at Niederpocking 
consisted only of Germans at the time Stiihler attended his 
courses, he thought that everybody was aware that their 
training was based almost entirely on American ideas and 
concepts. According to him, the training provided him with 
the essential tools he needed in his work in Nuremberg. 
Stiihler regretted that he had so little time to explore these 
concepts. As we have seen above, he would have liked to 
complete his education in the United States. Once Stiihler 
and Kleyer graduated from Niederpocking they became directors
73Pilgert, Community 32-34; OLCB, Monthly Report, Feb. 
1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, District Land Office Activity Reports 
1950-52, Box 2, Monthly Reports 1951.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
658
of two of the new youth centers the Nuremberg Kreis Youth 
Committee was opening in Nuremberg in 1950.74
The Kreis Youth Committee was not content with hiring 
staff for the new centers. In the same year it decided to 
rely more on professional support and employed a youth worker 
whose task it was to coordinate its activities and to develop 
new programs. Georg Wolfring, another graduate from 
Niederpocking with close ties to the trade union youth, 
became the city's first professional youth worker. True to 
his training, Wolfring emphasized that he would concentrate 
his efforts above all on unorganized young people. Wolfring 
remained in Nuremberg for several years before he relocated 
to Munich. Apparently he had proven the position's worth. 
A professional youth worker became a permanent presence with 
the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring. Even today in times of 
severe cutbacks the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring continues to 
hire professional youth workers to help with its work.75 
GYA in Troubled Waters
In spite of the expansion of GYA activities in 1949 and 
1950, the program was in trouble from 1948 on. The first
74Helmut Stiihler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994; Karl 
Kleyer, personal interview, 22 Aug. 1995. Stiihler and Kleyer 
actually met in Niederpocking, where the Nuremberger alerted 
the Berliner about possible employment opportunities in the 
Franconian city. Kleyer applied and got the job.
75,1' Arbeitsgebiet unerschopf lich:' Jugendpfleger Georg 
Wolfring iiber seine Plane," ["A Field of Work Without 
Limits:" Youth Worker Georg Wolfring About his Plans] NN, 16 
Aug. 1950: 11; Helmut Stiihler, personal interivew, 12 Aug. 
1995.
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complaints came from tactical troops who maintained that the 
emerging Cold War and the Berlin crisis did not leave them 
enough time for looking after young Germans and asked to be 
released from this responsibility. General Clay reacted 
accordingly. He revised the GYA instructions and streamlined 
the program, without, however, curtailing the activities.76
A more serious threat came in the form of Military 
Government officials. They had always been critical of the 
Army running this program without permitting GYA officials 
any control. Alonzo Grace regarded GYA as "Candy and Coca- 
Cola Program" with little educational value. GYA had been 
able to attract much attention in the United States which 
apparently caused some jealousies. Lawrence Norrie, who 
always had felt that the program could not be adequate as 
long as it was not under his control, led the charge. 
Although he maintained that he had been much in favor of 
creating GYA in 1946, he thought that currency reform and the 
returning prosperity were rendering the Army's program 
superfluous. In addition to that, Norrie told prominent GYA 
supporters from the United States that, based on his own 
observations, the program suffered from poor management, a 
lack of qualified personnel, and drew considerable hostility 
from the Germans because of unpleasant incidents. Norrie in 
fact could substantiate his claim, but he also chose to 
withhold the ample evidence at his disposal about GYA
76James 40-43.
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successes. His presentation of the Nuremberg GYA clearly 
shows his rather selective choice of arguments. As we have 
seen above Norrie had resided in Nuremberg and indeed knew 
the operation in the city firsthand. He told the visitors 
that GIs involved in the Nuremberg GYA had left sports 
equipment with a group of young boys but preferred to spend 
the next hours with their girlfriends instead of supervising 
the boys' activities.77 In view of the overall quality of 
the program in and around the city and the close cooperation 
between the MG detachment and GYA, of which Norrie certainly 
was aware, he must have known that this kind of behavior was 
not the rule but rather the exception in the Nuremberg Post 
area.
On first sight it seems that Norrie, who came from the 
American YMCA, and Grace, a university educator, were 
unwilling to concede that the Army actually was capable of 
planning and carrying out qualified youth work, but their 
reasons for attacking the Army's youth program lay deeper. 
OMGUS and HICOG consistently pursued a policy of working 
through German channels and trying to bring all young Germans 
into democratically structured youth organizations. GYA 
activities often seemed to run contrary to these goals. The 
Army's concept of youth centers which were open to everyone 
apparently diverted many young people away from youth groups. 
Norrie may also have looked with some envy on the extensive
^James 43-44.
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Army program which was not under his control while he had to 
make due with a very small staff, although he was officially 
in charge of American youth programs in Germany. In 1948, 
for example, the Youth Activities Section consisted of twelve 
Americans, with Clay refusing to increase that number, 
whereas 263 officers and enlisted men worked full time for 
GYA.78
Interestingly, Norrie and Grace were depriving those 
groups whom HICOG surveys had identified as the ones who were 
most in need of reorientation of an opportunity to become 
acquainted with the Americans and possibly with democratic 
ways of thinking and acting. Most Kreis Resident Officers in 
Bavaria agreed that GYA actually was reaching those who did 
not have anything. According to the officers, the lower 
classes as well as outsiders, especially young refugees and 
expellees, tended to use GYA facilities and to praise the 
Army's program. The higher classes and established groups, 
especially when they came from a conservative background, 
seemed to have a more difficult time accepting it.79
Money became a major bone of contention in the civilian 
youth officers' struggle against GYA. In 1949 Alonzo Grace 
began to argue that the Army had been using German occupation 
funds illegally for the program. In view of this situation 
he instructed the Community Education Branch that he did "not
78For the employment figures see James 40.
79Rupieper 158-59.
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want us in any way associated with an organization supported 
in any way by occupation costs." Norrie was informed that 
consequently OMGUS should "do nothing at any time that would 
appear we were endorsing GYA." A withdrawal of the funds in 
German currency would lead to the immediate collapse of all 
GYA activities because the Army would not be able to pay the 
rent or the buildings and the salaries of its German 
employees. Since OMGUS had control over all counterpart 
funds in German currency, Grace's move either would have 
eliminated the competition or brought it under OMGUS control. 
In this situation John McCloy, who had just arrived in 
Germany, came to the military's rescue. He agreed to provide 
the necessary mark funds for the next fiscal year from HICOG 
funds. In return EUCOM promised to transfer its centers 
gradually to German organizations and authorities.80 
Transfers. New Beginnings. Disappointments
Although the new source of funds eliminated the legal 
problem, it also meant that the Army had to compete with 
other HICOG offices for constantly decreasing funds. In 1951 
GYA got only 50% of the 8.4 million Marks it had requested 
and consequently was forced to give up half of the centers it 
had maintained.81
80James 40-47; Memo from John Pixley, Community Education 
Br. to Lawrence Norrie, 19 May 1949; NA RG 260 OMGUS, E&CRD, 
Community Education Br., Box 140, 5/295-3/6.
81 James 49-59.
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For GYA officers attempts from outside agencies to take 
over their programs was nothing new. OMGUS officials had 
made it abundantly clear that they wanted to control GYA. In 
many cases German authorities also had set an eye on the well 
equipped centers which usually offered much needed additional 
space. Military Government's Internal Affairs division had 
found it necessary as early as 1947 to inform its field 
detachments that all communities who tried to take over GYA 
centers would have to maintain them open for young people. 
Exceptions could be granted if communities clearly had 
greater priorities or if there was no support at all for 
youth activities. These instructions left the door wide open 
for community leaders to reclaim the facilities without 
taking care of young people.82
Apparently Major Selsor had had his own share of 
negative experiences when Andreas Staudt approached him to 
discuss the possibility of a German takeover in November 
1949. Staudt reported to the city's welfare committee that 
Selsor was willing to discuss possibilities to make GYA homes 
available to more people and to accommodate the needs of the 
younger generation, but, according to Staudt, he 
"emphatically declined" to turn over control to the city 
administration. The major argued that his experience had 
taught him that German authorities were not interested in the
82A1 D. Sims, Acting Chief, Internal Affairs Division, 
OMGBY to Field Detachments, 11 Aug. 1947; NA RG 260 OMGBY, 
FOD, Det. B-211, Box 1427, 9/122-3/1.
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kind of youth work GYA promoted and usually closed the 
centers as soon as they could lay their hands on them.83
His successors did not have much choice in the matter. 
Following instructions from headquarters they began to 
explore the possibilities of a German takeover of the 33 Army 
youth centers in the region. A number of communities reacted 
positively. The mayor of Neumarkt, for example, cooperated 
closely with the Americans in the takeover of the local GYA 
center. In Schwabach negotiations needed more time but also 
led to the desired result.84
Other communities did not show any interest. In April 
1951 GYA closed nine of its youth centers in the region. One 
year later just a few centers remained open. Negotiations 
continued with mixed success. The Fiirth city administration 
refused to take over any of the five centers located within 
its jurisdiction. GYA finally consolidated all youth centers 
and opened one center to the army barracks of a unit which 
was willing to sponsor youth activities on a voluntary basis. 
Fiirth officials commended GYA for its efforts. In view of 
their reluctance to take over these responsibilities the GYA 
officer took their remarks as a sign of improving relations.
83Report on conversation between Mark A. Selsor and 
Andreas Staudt to city welfare committee, 17 Nov. 1949; NCA 
C7/IX no. 1235.
mA complete list of the GYA installations of the 
Nuremberg Military Post is in YW, 4 May 1950: 6; "The Sign of 
Progress: Neumarkt," YW, March 1951: 6; "Schwabach Youth
Center now under German Sponsor," YW, July 1951: 2.
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Fiirth GYA activities had survived downsizing and continued 
their reduced activities until the discontinuation of the 
program.85
In Coburg negotiations had been underway already in 
December 1951. A German working group which was sponsored by 
HICOG and whose goal was to support "suitable open door 
projects" signalled its interest in maintaining the youth 
center open. Based on this promise the Americans obtained a 
commitment by the mayor to make even more rooms available to 
young Germans in January 1952, but just a few weeks after 
their meeting with the mayor the group which had sponsored 
the two employees for the center suddenly withdrew its 
support. When German authorities took over the facility in 
June 1952 its future was by no means secured.86
Nuremberg's Youth Center no. 1 faced several obstacles 
before it was clear that it would remain open. While 
negotiations were underway to transfer the centers in the 
region to German authority, the GYA officer was not yet ready 
to concede defeat in the city. In 1952 the center moved to 
a smaller and more affordable location, but had to share the 
building with a hotel for American women who worked for the
“Nuremberg Military Post Journal, 18 Feb. 1952, 25 Feb. 
1952, 9 May 1952, 9 Jul. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records,
Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122, Folders 2, 3; see also
"Fiirth Continues," YW, June/July 1953: 5.
“Nuremberg Military Post Journal, 5 Dec. 1951, 31 Jan. 
1952, 15 Feb. 1952, 4 Jun. 1952; NA RG 338 Unit Records,
Nuremberg Military Post, Box 122, Folder 2, 3.
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Army. There GYA continued operations with reduced staff and 
a new director for another year, but in June 1953 the Army 
had to close its last youth center as well, but help was just 
around the corner. The city negotiated with the Army about 
a possible takeover of the facility. In August Karl Maly, 
who had replaced Staudt as director of the Nuremberg Youth 
Office, signed a very favorable contract with the Americans. 
The Army would continue to provide the space free of charge 
as long as it was not needed otherwise. GYA donated the 
entire inventory, including an expensive and very popular 
photo laboratory, to the Germans. The city had no obligation 
to continue the Army employees but maintained Hans Werner, 
long time GYA employee and director of the center, in his 
capacity. The Army promised to continue providing logistic 
support.87
This arrangement lasted two years, but when the Army 
annnounced that it needed the space for other purposes the 
Germans had to look for a new location. The youth center 
with Hans Werner and most of its visitors moved to the
87Hans Werner, personal interview, 21 Aug. 1995; minutes 
of welfare committee meetings of the city of Nuremberg, 8 
June, 18 June, 16 July 1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1324, 1325; "GYA 
Heim wird iibergeben: 'Haus der Jugend' unter stadtischer
Leitung," [GYA Center Will be Transferred: "Youth Home" under 
City Control] NN, 3 Aug. 1953: 5.
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recently established city youth house at the old Imperial 
Fortress where it still remains open to young people today.88
Not surprisingly attendance throughout the American zone 
dropped proportionally. Whereas in July 1950 over half a 
million young people had participated in GYA activities, the 
number dropped to about 180,000 in July 1951 and 100,000 in 
July 1952. The Army continued to modify the program, but by 
July 1954 only 32,000 children found their way to GYA centers 
of activities. The program lingered on for another two 
years, but on 30 June 1956 the Army's excursion into the 
realm of youth work officially came to an end. It had 
outlasted HICOG which had ceased to exist the previous 
year.89
The German-American Advisory Council
The retreat of HICOG and GYA from the local scene did 
not mean that contacts between Americans and Germans in the 
communities suddenly died. In July 1952 a representative of 
the Nuremberg Military Post invited Lord Mayor Otto 
Barnreuther to participate in an advisory council in which 
prominent Germans and Americans would be able to discuss 
problems of mutual interest which the Kreis Resident Officer
88Hans Werner, personal interview, 21 Aug. 1995; minutes 
of a welfare committee meeting of 30 June 1955; NCA C7/IX no. 
1354; "Mobel zwischen Himmel und Erde: Seltsamer Umzug des 
'Heims der Offenen Tiir' in den Turm 'Luginsland' auf der 
Burg," [Furniture Between Heaven and Earth: Strange Move of 
the 'Home of the Open Door' into the Tower 'Luginsland' at 
the Castle] NN, 13 Oct. 1955: 9.
89James 49-59.
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had previously managed. Barnreuther declined to participate 
but nominated Mayor Julius LoBmann to represent the city. 
Other Germans were less reluctant to send their top 
representatives. The President of Middle Franconia's 
government, Hans Schregle, responded to the call as well as 
Gustav Schickedanz, owner of one of Europe's largest mail 
catalog businesses located in neighboring Fiirth. Less
prominent members included Lt. Lorraine Schultz, the
Nuremberg GYA officer, Pauline Schwickert, a school expert 
who had returned to Nuremberg from American exile after the 
war, the principal of the local American dependents' school 
as well as various teachers and principals of Nuremberg 
schools. To facilitate communications the Army provided one 
interpreter and a secretary for each subcommittee.90
The committee was designed to be a cooperative venture 
in which Germans and Americans had equal rights and shared 
the chair. Its members decided to constitute four
subcommittees, one of which was in charge of education.
Schregle made clear after his election to the German chair 
that he did not want the committee to be just a debating club 
with no connection to the community but wanted the committee
^Minutes of the second meeting of the German-American 
Advisory Council, 2 Oct. 1952; NCA C 85/1 Verkehr mit 
Stationierungskraften, no no.; see also Chronik der Stadt 
Nurnberg 1953: 24, 213; NCA F2 no. 50.
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to have an impact on the communities in its guest for 
fostering German-American friendship.91
The subcommittee for education took Schregle's wishes to 
heart. Just one month after its foundation the committee 
members reported about their first project. They invited ten 
girls from the American school in Nuremberg and ten girls 
from a Nuremberg secondary school to participate in a day 
tour to the old town of Rothenburg, about fifty miles away 
from Nuremberg. The girls would have ample opportunity to 
get to know each other on the trip. A photo contest in which 
the girls could develop their pictures in the Nuremberg GYA 
center would ensure a follow up encounter. The subcommittee 
further reported that it was working on a teacher exchange 
between the American and German schools as well.92
During the next months an intensive exchange between the 
American and German schools began to develop which boded well 
for the future. The committee also reported that contacts 
between American students and the German-American youth club 
had intensified again. In March 1953 the subcommittee 
decided to launch a pilot project to investigate the
9IMinutes of the second meeting of the German-American 
Advisory Council, 6 Oct. 1952; NCA C85/I Verkehr mit 
Stationierungskraften, no no.
^Minutes of the third meeting of the German-American 
Advisory Council, 28 Nov. 1952; NCA C 85/1 Verkehr mit 
Sationierungskraften no no.
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feasibility of letting Germans and Americans experience life 
in the other schools for extended periods of time.93
By May the committee was ready to launch its pilot 
project. Accompanied by local press representatives, Peter 
Fries became the first German exchange student in Nuremberg 
who did not have to go to the United States to get the 
American experience. Born in 1937, Fries had met his first 
Americans in a little village in 1945. They had provided him 
with huge quantities of chocolate and had not even entered 
the house in which his family was living when they became 
aware of an old aunt who wore her Red Cross dress. According 
to him, the attitude towards Americans among his peers and in 
his family after the war was generally positive. Fries loved 
the GYA's youth film hour, but did not get the chance to see 
American films very often because his parents restricted his 
visits. According to him, they did not consider actors like 
Frank Sinatra or Hollywood Westerns to be suitable for young 
people.94
Fries enjoyed his stay at the American school and with 
the American family. He thought that at that time American
93Minutes of meetings of the subcommittee for education 
of the German-American Advisory Council, 28 Nov. 1952, 29 
Nov. 1952, 17 Mar. 1953, 24 Mar. 1953; minutes of the fifth 
meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, 31 Mar. 
1953; NCA C 85/1 Verkehr mit Stationierungskraften, no no.
^Peter Fries, personal interview, 8 Aug 1995; "Fur acht 
Tage ein 'waschechter Ami': der 16 jahrige Peter Fries geht 
in die US Schule," [A "Real Ami" for Eight Days: 16-Year-Old 
Peter Fries goes to US School] NN, 23 May 1953: 10.
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Post Exchanges displayed the signs and goods of an affluent 
society whereas the Germans still were on their way to 
recovery. Fries found the atmosphere at the American high 
school more informal, but most of his teachers at his German 
school managed their students in a humane way as well. 
Learning about American football and baseball, as well as 
getting a first shot at golf which was and still is a very 
exclusive game in Germany, in just a week proved to be 
impossible. Fries was surprised to find that Americans took 
their school prayer, the Pledge of Allegiance, and the 
American flag in every classroom very seriously. His 
feelings revealed not just the long standing secularism in 
German public schools but also that Fries belonged to a new 
generation of young Germans who preferred to discuss a united 
states of Europe to any nationalistic tendencies and did not 
feel overly comfortable with displays of national pride. 
What impressed him most was that neither his host family nor 
anybody at the school or at one of the numerous barbecues he 
attended displayed any hostility or arrogance towards him.
The American's visit with the Fries family seemed to 
have been equally successful.95 According to Fries, not just 
the young people established contacts but also their parents 
who continued their private contact long after the exchange.
95"Ein junger Amerikaner als Gast bei einer Niirnberger 
Familie: Gordon lebte als Deutscher," [A Young American Was 
Guest of a Nuremberg Family: Gordon Lived as German] NN, 4 
July 1953: 11.
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He remembered that young Germans and Americans were curious 
to find out more about each other. Fries was sufficiently 
impressed with his visit that he actually discussed a journey 
to the United States as an exchange student with his parents 
but did not meet any enthusiasm on their side.
Fries went on with his life and became a lawyer in 
Nuremberg. He did not forget the lesson he had learned in 
1953 and maintained a friendly and very positive attitude 
towards the United States, even through the turbulent 1960s. 
He later sent one of his own children on the one year student 
exchange to the United States which he could not have and 
stated that it in fact had had the positive impact on his 
daughter he had hoped for.96
The pilot program was a success in every respect so that 
both sides agreed to continue and extend it in the future. 
At the same time exchanges between American and German 
teachers became more frequent as well.97
wPeter Fries, personal interview, 8 Aug. 1995. 
Interestingly, Fries' father displayed a very rare 
openmindedness. After the war the Americans had sentenced 
him to several years in prison for his participation in 
hiding the imperial jewels so that they would not be returned 
to Vienna from where Hitler had brought them to Nuremberg in 
1939. Instead of turning bitter because of this treatment, 
however, he encouraged his son to be open minded, never had 
anything negative to say about the occupiers, and had no 
objections about his son's application to become an exchange 
student which included hosting an American at his house.
^Letter, Lowell Bennett, Public Affairs Field Center, 
Nuremberg to City of Nuremberg, 27 June 1953; minutes of the 
eighth meeting of the German-American Advisory Council, 25 
Sept. 1953; minutes of a meeting of the committee for school 
and cultural affairs, 5 Nov. 1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1307;
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While there was considerable enthusiasm on both sides 
for this type of activity during the first half of the 1950s, 
it seems that it was not enough to make the programs a 
standard feature of German and American schools in Nuremberg. 
The German-American advisory council increasingly became what 
Schregle had not wanted. When Schregle retired from his 
chair in 1959 the fate of the Council was set. From 1960 on 
prominent Germans met with American officers to organize 
welfare parties and a German-American friendship week each 
year which included a fair, sports events between Germans and 
Americans and open houses held by the Army for German 
civilians, but left out student and teacher exchanges or 
activities in which both sides had to communicate. A German- 
American women's club became an equally formal affair which 
emphasized welfare activities, but also sponsored a German 
student to go to the United States every year.98
minutes of a meeting of the subcommittee for education of the 
German-American Advisory Council, 23 Oct. 1953; NCA C 85/1 
Verkehr mit Stationierungskraften, no no.
98It is not clear when the Advisory Commission abandoned 
its more active approach. By 1960 its activities and 
membership very much fit the pattern which I got to know in 
Ansbach from the late 1960s on. Compare, for example the 
programs for the First German-American Friendship week in 
1954 with that of 1960 (Chronik der Stadt Niirnberg, 10-16 May 
1954; 1-8 May 1960; NCA F2 no. 50, 53). Tina Hoekstra ("Der 
Deutsch-Amerikanische Frauenclub Niirnberg-Fiirth: Geschichte, 
Organisation, Struktur, Aktivitaten und Zukunftsaussichten," 
Zulassungsarbeit zur ersten Staatspriifung fur das Lehramt fur 
Grundschulen in Bayern (Spring 1993)) provides an interesting 
and detailed history of Nuremberg's German-American Women's 
Club.
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It is not clear why relations cooled off after such a 
promising start. The construction of American housing areas 
in which everything from electrical outlets to washer and 
dryer facilities was American probably provided American 
families with all the amenities they needed without having to 
deal with the language barrier and a different culture. In 
spite of repeated American protests to the contrary, many 
families preferred the isolation and security the housing 
areas provided to the challenges contacts with Germans could 
bring. The German chairperson of the German-American women's 
club, for example, found it increasingly difficult in 1958 to 
invite American families to German homes. At the same time 
German dignitaries in Nuremberg never had German-American 
relations very high on their list. None of Nuremberg's Lord 
Mayors ever appeared in a meeting of the German-American 
Advisory Council, while their wives also did not find the 
German-American women's club important enough to join or to 
display any interest in its activities. An observer who was 
very well acquainted with both sides of the story in Germany 
thought that both sides had missed the incredible 
opportunities which the presence of American soldiers and 
dependents offered for really promoting mutual 
understanding.99
""Mehr Tuchfiihlung schafft Freunde," [Closer Contact 
Creates Friends] NN, 15 Sept. 1956; newpspaper clipping; NCA 
C74 no. 30; minutes of a meeting of the German-American 
Advisory Council, 26 June 1958; NCA C85/I Verkehr mit 
Stationierungskraften, no no.; Winfried Blumel, personal
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Other actions by Nuremberg authorities during the 1950s 
also betrayed a sometimes rather cool relationship with the 
occupiers. In September 1954 the city council's committee 
for school and welfare discussed the possibility of 
continuing the Meistersinger contest from which the Army was 
about to withdraw. Although some of the participants of the 
discussion acknowledged the public relations effect the 
contest had had in the past, it seemed that Nuremberg's city 
fathers were not aware that the Americans had initiated an 
outstanding cultural event which took place in packed houses 
and at the same time provided young singers with a nationwide 
audience and Nuremberg with much needed positive publicity. 
The committee members did not investigate any alternatives 
such as private sponsoring which the Americans had done 
successfully, but simply decided that the Army had had the 
luxury of simply ordering its units to organize the 
preliminaries and send the finalists to Nuremberg. Nobody 
seemed to be aware that GYA officers had had to rely on their 
own organizational skills to build the program from scratch 
and that the program took place throughout West Germany. It 
included the French and the British zone where the Americans 
did not have any possibility to rely on the tactical commands
interview, 28 July 1994; Dr. Renate Propper was one of the 
charter members of the German-American Women's Club. In a 
conversation with me shortly before her death in 1995 she 
expressed her frustration at the indifference which 
Nuremberg's first lady had displayed throughout the thirty 
year tenure of her husband in the office of Lord Mayor.
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for support. In the end the committee agreed that spending 
considerable amounts of money for an event which, according 
to them, promised little in return, could not be justified. 
It unanimously voted not to participate in any way in the 
organization of future Meistersinger contests. The decision 
meant that 1955 was the last year of the Meistersinger 
contest.100
The American Education Center in Nuremberg which had 
become an international center with an American director and 
a French and British library had a similar fate. Americans 
and later on their two Allies had opened the institute with 
the expectation that the city of Nuremberg or other agencies 
ultimately would take them over. In December 1954 the 
Committee for Schools and Cultural affairs discussed the 
issue. Its members came to the conclusion that it was 
unreasonable to spend 60,000 marks per year for an 
institution which the occupiers had introduced and from which 
the city could not expect to derive any material gains in the 
future. Nuremberg's city fathers determined that the 
institute was a regional affair and therefore should be 
sponsored by the regional government in Ansbach or the state 
government in Munich. Those agencies, however, had decided 
that such an institution was entirely the city's 
responsibility. The committee followed the recommendation by
IOOMinute of a meeting of the committee for schools and 
cultural affairs, 3 Sept. 1954; NCA C7/IX no. 1320.
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the Lord Mayor's office to inform the public that the city of 
Nuremberg would be unable to maintain the institute although 
it recognized the valuable work it had done in the past. The 
city would certainly welcome a continuation of the 
institute's activities as long as those who had been 
sponsoring it in the past would also pay the bills in the 
future. Needless to say that the institute closed its doors 
for good in 1955.101
Despite these disappointments American initiatives on 
the whole were quite successful. The American programs 
provided the framework and the skills for many Germans to 
develop their own initiatives. They also helped them to 
carry projects on once American money would not be available 
for them anymore. Nuremberg was no exception to that rule.
10,Minutes of a meeting of the committee for school and 
cultural affairs, 10 Dec. 1954; NCA C7/IX no. 1320; Chronik 
der Stadt Ntirnberg 1955; NCA F2 no. 51.
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CHAPTER XXII
Joint Ventures: German Initiatives at the Grass Roots
1948-1955
1948 marked the beginning of a new era in youth work in 
the Federal Republic. Although currency reform had crippled 
public finances in the short run, it provided the basis for 
long term planning. Progressive planners in communities such 
as Nuremberg were looking for ways to improve the lot of 
young people in many ways. Relying on German traditions as 
well as on new American ideas, they targeted health care, 
school counseling, providing young people with jobs or places 
to stay, and last, but not least, continued the concept of 
open youth work which GYA had initiated and HICOG had come to 
endorse as well. The extensive network of exchanges, 
material help, professional advice, and leadership training 
which OMGUS and HICOG had created helped the Germans 
considerably at a time when want was still very visible in 
the Federal Republic. Through this type of cooperation many 
American concepts and ideas showed results long after HICOG 
and GYA had ceased to exist.
Youth Welfare
1949 provided Theodor Marx with the opportunity to make 
Nuremberg one of the most progressive cities in caring for 
its children. In June of that year OMGBY invited him to name 
capable social workers who had to be under thirty years old
678
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and had to be "receptive to new ways of thinking". English 
was another requirement for those who would be chosen. One 
month later Marx had selected four city employees, one of 
them a former POW in the United States.1
In December 1949 Marx approached HICOG about the 
possibility of supporting a new kind of counselling service. 
Nuremberg had pioneered the idea of psychiatric help for 
young people in Germany during the Weimar Republic. After 
the war Marx and his coworkers recognized that Germany had 
completely missed out on vital developments in the field 
between 1933 and 1945, while researchers in the United States 
had done pathbreaking work. One first step to help young 
people was the Kreis Youth Committee's counselling service, 
which, according to him, the Youth Office in fact operated 
and staffed. To pool resources and assure cooperation, Marx 
initiated the formation of the Association for the 
Cultivation of Welfare in Nuremberg (Verein der Niirnberger 
Wohlfahrtspflege e.V.) in which the leading welfare 
organizations within the city as well as the city 
administration came together to promote especially youth 
welfare. Marx found open ears at HICOG which tried to 
introduce these new concepts in child guidance to German
‘Albert Schweizer, CAD, OMGBY, to Welfare Administra­
tion, Nuremberg, 10 June 1949; Marx to Schweizer, 13 July, 27 
Sept. 1949; Interoffice memorandum from Erna to Mrs. Groves, 
12 Nov. 1949, re.: telephone conversation with Theodor Marx; 
NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43- 
3/21.
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communities at about the same time. German emigres had 
played a leading role in developing new approaches to social 
work and welfare in the United States. We have seen that a 
number of them returned to Germany to work for OMGUS and 
HICOG. Hertha Krauss and Hedwig Wachenheim, for example, 
were important voices in HICOG's Welfare Division. They 
could rely on the support of many other emigres who were 
willing to lend a helping hand and came for shorter periods 
of time as advisers and specialists.2
In view of the favorable disposition on both sides it 
was no surprise that HICOG reacted promptly and favorably to 
Marx's request. Just six months after Marx had sent his 
letter the Nuremberg Child Guidance Clinic opened its doors. 
HICOG had arranged for Gisela Konopka to come from 
Minneapolis to lend her support during the initial phase of 
the operation. She discussed with Nuremberg's leading 
welfare officer and others the necessary details for 
introducing the American model of child guidance— especially 
the new concept of case work and operating in teams— and 
provided many practical solutions to initial problems.3
2Theodor Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst Niirnberg 
(Niirnberg [Nuremberg], Ortsverband der Niirnberger Wohlfahrts- 
pflege e.V., 1954) 5-12; Marx to Hedwig Wachenheim, HICOG, 14 
Dec. 1949; NCA C7/IX no. 1235. Interestingly, the emigres 
working for OMGUS and HICOG enjoyed an exceptional degree of 
authority and respect.
3Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 11.
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One of the greatest handicaps at the start was the lack 
of suitable facilities in the still largely destroyed city. 
Marx and the Welfare Association set out to remedy the 
situation quickly. In November 1950 Nuremberg had a new 
welfare Center which American observers found "simple, 
bright, and cheerful." The only problem was that it soon 
proved to be too small for the growing numbers of people who 
desired welfare services.4
The clinic turned out to be such a success that the 
association expanded it considerably after its first year of 
operation. Once again Marx's call for financial support
found receptive ears at HICOG headquarters which provided 
almost half of the clinic's operating budget.5
Gisela Konopka was not the only American specialist who 
provided support and guidance to the German teams. Three
other German and Austrian emigres took time off from their
faculty positions in the United States to come to Nuremberg. 
Psychiatrist George Frankl stayed several months and played 
a crucial role in reorganizing the clinic and making sure 
that the workers remained focused on their most essential 
tasks. Kurt Reichers spent a summer explaining the concept
4Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 9; for a brief
description of the child guidance clinic see also Dept, of 
State, Young Germany: Apprentice to Democracy, European and 
British Commonwealth Series 24 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1951) 56-58; the quote is on 56.
sMarx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 9-10; Jahresbericht des 
Sozialen Beratungsdienstes, l Apr. 1951-31 Mar. 1952; NCA C74 
no. 3.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
682
of case work to Nurembergers in 1952, while Susanne Schulz 
arrived from Chicago in 1953 to hold a seminar at Nuremberg's 
college of Economics and Social Science which dealt with the 
training of new social workers.6
The clinic became an immediate success. Its staff 
registered rapidly rising attendance numbers which included 
more and more young people who came on their own initiative 
seeking advice. From 1953 on the clinic had to deal with an 
additional task it had not expected. Experts from all over 
the Federal Republic descended on Nuremberg to seek advice 
for launching their own clinics or to participate in formal 
seminars the city had set up with American support to prepare 
social workers, psychiatrists and other people involved in 
the teams for the task. Since the clinic was unable to 
expand its staff and the numbers of people seeking help 
exceeded even the wildest expectations the clinic's employees 
were booked to the limits of their capacities. With several 
other clinics in place across the country, however, 
conditions normalized after 1953. Child guidance clinics 
became permanent institutions in Nuremberg and many other 
communities.7
^arx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 11.
7Marx, Sozialer Beratungsdienst 10-11; see also a report 
on the visit of the students and faculty of the Women's 
School for Social Work in Stuttgart of June 1951. The group 
stayed at the American Institute of Education which had moved 
to the former witness house of the Nuremberg trials in 1949 
and had much space to offer. Its members did not just visit 
the child guidance clinic but also a number of other new
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Marx was not content with creating a clinic. As early 
as 1946 he had suggested to hold conferences to prepare 
curricula for courses designed to train social workers, a 
task he considered to be essential for securing the supply of 
trained social workers which would be much needed in light of 
the social disruption the war and Hitler's regime had caused. 
With the help of Andreas Staudt, the director of the city's 
Youth Office, Marx developed a curriculum for a two year 
evening course which would end in a state examination and 
certify the participants as social workers. Marx received 
the approval of the Bavarian authorities and in November 1947 
the first course began. The curriculum was highly technical 
with an overwhelming emphasis on legal and administrative 
matters. It also introduced the students to all fields of 
social work, but focused especially on youth welfare. The 
course was not easy for the participants who had a demanding 
workload apart from their day jobs and life in a devastated 
city in which survival still was high on the agenda. 
Nevertheless most of them came through and were the first 
social workers in Nuremberg to successfully pass their state 
examinations in 1949.8
institutions in Nuremberg such as the Peace Village, but they 
were particularly impressed with the Child Guidance Clinic. 
(NCA C74 no. 137).
8Auszug aus einem AbschluSbericht iiber einen Sonder- 
lehrgang fur Sozialbeamte, city of Nuremberg to OMGBY, 1 Aug. 
1949; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group Activities Br., Box 40, 
10/43-3/21.
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The course was just a first step. Marx informed
Bavarian authorities that he was thinking about ways to
replace Nuremberg's School for Female Social Workers with a 
more modern institution which would also admit men into the 
ranks of social workers. He discussed the idea one year
later with Ms. Wachenheim and Krauss when he attended a
seminar they held on basic problems of training for social 
workers.9
Once again the Nuremberg city councilman struck a nerve 
with the OMGUS representatives. Hertha Krauss reported one 
year later that the Education Branch had completely 
overlooked the aspect of social work in its leadership 
training program. The exchange program could do much to 
remedy the situation, but clearly Germans and Americans would 
have to do something more in this realm.10
Marx, by then the representative of municipal 
organizations in the executive committee of the newly founded 
German Working Association for Youth Welfare and Youth Work 
(Deutsche Arbeitsgemeinschaft fur Jugendpflege und 
Jugendfiirsorge) , continued to push for his plans in 
Nuremberg. He approached the problem on several tracks.
^arx to Bavarian Youth Office, 6 Feb. 1947; memorandum 
by Marx about his participation in an OMGUS seminar on basic 
questions of training in social work on 10-12 Sept. 1948 
which he pursued further with local MG officials; NCA C74 no. 
137.
I0Report on Education for Social Work in Germany by 
Hertha Krauss [Summer 1949]; NA RG 260 OMGBY, E&CRD, Group 
Activities Br., Box 40, 10/43-3/21.
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Since Nuremberg already had a college for Economics and 
Social Sciences it appeared to be easiest to develop a 
curriculum for social workers within its framework. Although 
American specialists came to teach at this institution, the 
entirely theoretical approach of the college and a lack of 
qualified faculty made this approach unfeasible.11
Marx also had to fight against intrigues within the city 
administration. In a memorandum he described the rather 
unpleasant situation which he was confronting in January 
1950. On the one hand it seemed that the men in charge of 
schools in Nuremberg did not appreciate Marx's intrusion into 
what they considered to be their realm. Marx also found out 
that the director of the Woman's School of Social Work in 
Nuremberg was conspiring to unseat him and save her 
institution and her job. Should she be successful, Marx 
warned his superiors, many of the pledges of support he had 
obtained for the new undertaking had been given to him 
personally and would not be binding if somebody else took 
over his post.12
Obviously Marx won the struggle and went on with his 
plans. By January 1951 he had secured HICOG financial 
support for the project which he wanted to use for the 
development of a library as well as payment of an assistant
"Report A.S. Wheelan, OLCB, PAD to Florence Black, 
HICOG, PAD, 12 Dec. 1951; NA RG 466 OLCB, Central Files, Box 
29.
l2Memorandum Theodor Marx, 25 Jan. 1950; NCA C74 no. 137.
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and a professor for two years, but had not been able to solve 
the space problem. An attempt to house the school in the 
American Education Center did not succeed because the 
Americans had actually withdrawn most of their support from 
the institution which continued to operate as an 
international institute on a much reduced scale.13
It was not until the next year that Marx finally was 
able to bring all the parts together. In January of that 
year Dora von Caemmerer accepted a call as director of the 
institute from Nuremberg. Caemmerer had studied in England 
and had been to the United States after the war to become 
acquainted with American methods of social work. She came 
from West Berlin where she had trained social workers in the 
American methods in a program financed by HICOG and was 
probably the best expert in the field at the time. Von 
Caemmerer insisted that she would only come if her assistant, 
Heinrich Schiller, would be given a full time position as 
tutor or supervisor. The future director regarded Schiller's 
role as essential since German schools of social work so far 
had completely neglected the individual development of their 
students. Schiller would supervise their work on a one on
I3Memo of a conference between Marx, Staudt, directors of 
schools of social work, and HICOG representatives about 
possibilities of obtaining financial support for their 
institutions; application for a HICOG grant for the planned 
institute for practical social work [1950]; memo re. : support 
of School of Social work from HICOG, 23 Jan. 1951; Marx to 
Dr. Ackermann, Director Education Center, Nuremberg, 15 May 
1952; Ackermann to Marx, 6 June 1952; NCA C74 no. 137.
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one basis and would also pay attention to developing mature 
personalities. A few days later the city's welfare committee 
approved the school. Marx also obtained the promise from the 
Bavarian Ministry of Education to fully support the measure. 
The Ministry requested in its letter that Marx cooperate in 
developing similar curricula for the entire state. Just one 
day later it officially accredited the school, explicitly 
welcoming the new teaching methods and curricula which were 
based on American models in spite of the higher costs 
involved. On 21 January 1953 the Nuremberg city council 
voted unanimously in favor of the new school of social 
work.14
In April 1953 Marx was finally able to officially open
the new school. Proudly he declared that
the second full time lecturer, Mr. Schiller, is one of 
the few and possibly the only active teacher in Germany 
with a degree in social work from an American 
university. Therefore we find ourselves in the 
fortunate position— without Americanizing— to transfer 
the many experiences from the other side of the Atlantic 
to our German conditions just as we did it with 
recognized success in our Child Guidance Clinic.15
14Dora von Caemmerer to Marx, 11 Jan. 1953; Marx to 
Bavarian Youth Ministry, 14 Jan. 1951; minutes of a welfare 
committee meeting, 15 Jan. 1953; memorandum of conference 
with Ministry of Education, 16 Jan. 1953; memorandum of a 
telephone conversation with Min. Dir. Ritter, Munich, 19 Jan. 
1951; minutes of city council session, 21 Jan. 1953; NCA C74 
no. 137; for von Caemmerer's previous experiences see "German 
Social Work," HICOG Information Bulletin (November 1952) : 26.
150pening speech by Theodor Marx, 27 Apr. 1953; NCA C74 
no. 137.
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Marx was right, but neither von Caemmerer nor Schiller 
were quite happy with the arrangement. The curriculum was a 
curious mixture between old and new, still emphasizing 
heavily the administrative and legal aspects of social work. 
The city fathers also did not want to spend too much money on 
the enterprise which remained a point of friction throughout 
von Caemmerer's and Schiller's tenure. With the exception of 
the two full time employees all of the school's eleven 
teachers came from the city administration. The only other 
lecturer trained in American social work concepts was the 
director of the child guidance clinic who taught 
psychology.16
In spite of these handicaps the students immediately 
recognized the dramatic departure in teaching methods. Von
l6List of lecturers at School of Socila Work, April 1953; 
NCA C74 no. 137; Heinrich Schiller, personal interview, 26 
July 1995. Schiller recalled that the school was fairly 
protected from cuts and outside interference as long as Marx 
was in office. After his death, however, the situation 
deteriorated steadily because the new head of the Welfare 
Office did not have his predecessor's imposing personality 
and was unable to defend the institution. When Schiller was 
appointed director, he found the situation far from 
satisfactory. At that time the Lutheran Church in Bavaria 
had decided to thoroughly reform its own training for social 
workers and asked Schiller to take over the task in 1967. 
Schiller was granted a free hand and a considerably larger 
budget. Since the school opened in Nuremberg, he did not 
even have to move. He remained there until he retired. See 
also "Dr. Schiller leitet evangelisches Sozialinstitut: Einem 
neuen Ruf gefolgt: Der anerkannte Fachmann ging von der
Sozialen Schule an die neue Bildungsstatte,11 [Dr. Schiller 
Head of Lutheran Social Institute: Followed a New Call: the
Recognized Expert Went from the School of Social Work to the 
New Educational Institution] NN, 7 Sept. 1967: [n.p.];
Newspaper clipping, NCA C74 no. 138.
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Caemmerer remained a rather authoritarian person who 
instilled respect in the students. In contrast, most of them 
were impressed with and thoroughly enjoyed Schiller's 
tutorial style which was easy going, very personal, but at 
the same time remained demanding. Of course it helped that 
Schiller was not much older than many of his students who 
were thrilled to go out and do actual casework and discuss 
their experiences in class. These practical experiences 
seemed to make up for the dryness and drudgery of some of the 
other courses which emphasized the traditional legal and 
administrative issues. With the opening of the school 
teaching social work had entered a new era in Germany. The 
first class of graduates found work in Nuremberg and the 
surrounding region, but also went to far off places such as 
Hamburg, Liibeck, Kassel, and Wuppertal.17
The new breed of social workers did not have an easy 
time in the field. Horst Volk, for example, found a job with 
the city of Nuremberg and was assigned to one of its homes 
where difficult young people were literally kept under lock
17For the student's experiences see "Unsere Soziale Welt: 
Eine Festschrift iiber den Galgenhumor der 13 Priifungs- 
kandidaten, Ostern 1958;" NCA C74 no. 136; Heinrich 
Schiller, personal interview, 26 July 1995; Horst Volk, 
personal interview, 2 Aug. 1995. Volk belonged to the first 
class to graduate from the school. Frederike Noetel, 
personal interview, 14 Aug. 1995. Ms. Noetel had previously 
done social work for the Lutheran Church and described her 
experiences at the school in the 1950s as a revelation. 
According to her, the difference between her schooling at the 
church institutions and the new school were "like day and 
night."
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and key. Volk remembered that none of the older social 
workers there thought that one could or should do anything 
with those hardened cases whom they considered to be 
hopeless. Volk met ridicule when he began to work with the 
worst offenders, but did not need long to prove the old 
school wrong. He did not spend much time at his first 
assignment because of the intransigence of his colleagues, 
but Volk continued a lifelong commitment to the new brand of 
social work he had studied and put it to good use. His 
career culminated in the construction and management of one 
of the most successful enterprises employing handicapped 
people in Germany.18
Although American support was most visible in the city's 
welfare department, others also tried to embrace the new age, 
although it seemed to be harder for some than for others. 
Nuremberg's educators, for example, had to deal with one of
18Horst Volk, personal interview, 2 Aug. 1995. 
Interestingly Volk made no bones about his rather negative 
feelings towards the United States, a common feature among 
intellectuals in a city that up to last year was a Social 
Democratic stronghold where it was not fashionable to show 
much sympathy for American policies. When I interviewed him, 
however, I had the impression that he had many features which 
one finds more in the United States than in Germany. Volk 
was very easy going and informal in spite of his position 
when I visited him in his office. Since he was one of 
Schiller's most successful students, he certainly 
internalized the American models and the practice oriented 
approach Schiller taught at the school. Volk did not seem to 
have much patience for the all powerful and cumbersome German 
bureaucracy, looking rather for practical and pragmatic 
solutions to problems. So in fact I found a person who 
seemed to be very American in outlook and behavior but at the 
same time was convinced that not much good could come from 
the other side of the Atlantic in the political realm.
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the few emigres who actually decided to return to their 
former work places. Pauline Schwickert had been in a leading 
position in the city's school administration when the Nazis 
dismissed her in 1933. She emigrated to the United States in 
1936 and became professor at Ohio State University. She 
returned to Nuremberg in 1949 to resume her work there, but 
found considerable resistance from members of the city 
administration who argued that her twelve years in exile had 
"alienated" her and accused her of wanting to experiment too 
much with influences of the American education system. 
Schwickert took these charges head on and said that indeed 
she wanted to fight for changes in the vocational school 
system which should also teach some theoretical subjects to 
its apprentice students. She planned to support especially 
economics and social sciences since the United States 
demonstrated that people who were educated in these subjects 
were able to make independent decisions. Apparently she won 
the argument and was reinstated.19
In 1951 Schwickert took the initiative and proposed to 
offer English as an optional subject for all vocational 
students. Nuremberg's school committee had no objections as 
long as enough rooms could be found and a certain academic 
standard could be maintained, but it rejected Schwickert's 
suggestion to introduce a fee for the course to insure the
19Minutes of of a school committee meeting, 1 Apr. 1949; 
NCA C7/IX no. 1285.
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participating students' motivation. This case revealed a 
dilemma in American efforts. Schwickert wanted to introduce 
an idea with which she had probably become acquainted in the 
United States, but it ran against the intentions of OMGUS and 
HICOG officials who had been working hard to abolish school 
fees. In this case the city of Nuremberg had long advocated 
such a policy so that the council members rejected one 
American idea while at the same time supporting another which 
had long been on their reform agenda anyway.20
The committee demonstrated that it was willing to act on 
new ideas from the United States in another case. It adopted 
a welfare measure at scyhools which was in common use in the 
United States but had not been found necessary in German 
institutions. In 1951 HICOG approached the city to create 
positions of psychologically trained counsellors at all of 
its schools. In the spring of 1952 the school committee had 
agreed to introduce two year training courses for 
counsellors. The American director of the International 
Institute, the former Education Center, agreed to support the 
project with rooms and his own expertise in August. In 
January 1953 the State Department granted 10,000 marks for 
the project and sent a psychologist who gave a number of 
presentations and helped set the program up. The 
International Center arranged for a conference with foreign
20Minutes of a school committee meeting, 20 Apr. 1951; 
NCA C7/IX no. 1285.
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experts in Nuremberg that dealt with the topic. By October 
1954 the first participants had passed the course 
successfully and began their work in Nuremberg's schools. 
With the first results in, the Committee for Cultural Affairs 
decided to recommend the continuation of the program in 
November 1954. The city council had supplemented it earlier 
that year with a small library to help teachers orient 
themselves in the latest trends in education and 
psychology.21
Children of the Occupiers
The Americans did not always provide support for welfare 
agencies but sometimes also created problems for them. Not 
surprisingly relations between GIs and German women often had 
rather undesired consequences. In 1952 an estimated 94,000 
children had fathers who belonged to the occupying forces. 
Nuremberg's statistics in the 1950s reveal that between 10 
and 20% of all children under the city's guardianship had an 
American father. Of those less than 10% came from a 
relationship with an African-American GI. Most soldiers 
accepted their fatherhood and supported the mothers even if 
the couples did not get married but many others did not. 
German authorities or civilians could not expect any help 
from the Army in these cases, since Americans were not
2lMinutes of meetings of the committee for schools and 
cultural affairs, 6 Feb. 1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1306; 20 Feb. 
1953; NCA C7/IX no. 1307; 12 Mar. 1954, 26 N O V .  1954; NCA
C7/IX no. 1320.
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legally obliged to provide child support for their offspring 
in Germany.22
Although the numbers were minute, children from African- 
American soldiers provided a special and highly visible 
challenge for Nuremberg's society and welfare authorities. 
In May 1952 fifty-two of the 3758 first graders registered 
for school had an African-American father. Most of them 
lived with their families and tried to lead normal lives, 
although all had to cope with the problem of being physically 
different which meant that they were stared at in public 
places and often became targets of other children as well as 
of discrimination by adults. A sympathetic social worker 
observed that they developed a strong sense of independence 
and pride which many were willing to defend anytime 
anywhere.23
Interestingly, the presence of African-American soldiers 
had done much to improve their image in Germany. We have 
seen evidence that many of them felt more comfortable in 
Germany than in the United States because they did not have 
to live with the open racism and discrimination they were
^"Eine Umfrage der 'NN': Tausende von Kindern ohne
Vater," [A Survey by "NN": Thousands of Children Without 
Father] NN, 21 Sept. 1949: 10.
^"Eine Umfrage der 'NN': Tausende von Kindern ohne
Vater," [A Survey by "NN": Thousands of Children Without 
Father] NN, 21 Sept. 1949: 10; Helmut Stiihler, personal
interview, 12 Aug. 1994. The city administration asked
Stiihler on several occasions to accompany these children on 
special trips to Denmark. He also seemed to have some of 
them as guests in his youth center.
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still facing at home, but the Germans' apparent tolerance 
towards African Americans should not be overestimated. A 
look at the welfare administration in the 1950s demonstrates 
that many Nurembergers were unable to shed prejudice and 
racial stereotypes. Welfare officers usually segregated 
children of African-American fathers who came under foster 
care into special homes. One lady in a small village near 
Nuremberg, for example, provided a foster home for five mixed 
children. In November 1953 she requested extra support for 
heating materials and clothing from the welfare authorities. 
According to her, it was a well known fact that children of 
African-American descent were extremely susceptible to colds 
so that it was necessary to maintain the entire house well 
heated.24
Her reasoning was by no means unique. In 1955 the 
Nuremberg welfare office wrote an extensive report to the 
regional government of Middle Franconia. The author of the 
report argued that the city of Nuremberg had to take care of 
the development of about 260 children who had African- 
American fathers. According to the author, extensive 
analyses had revealed that about half of those children had 
developed "their characters and sentiments in an incorrect 
way". The office detected the reason for this trend in the 
fact that these children, "even if the environment does not
24Letter from Ms. S. to Nuremberg Welfare Office, 26 Nov. 
1953; NCA C25/I no. 489.
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reject them", were developing an inferiority complex because 
they felt their physical difference strongly. The author 
thought that this complex pushed the children towards being 
violent or insidious, while others became shy and 
intimidated, "in one word: unfit for life". The welfare 
officer argued that this development took place regardless of 
the place in which the children lived. He continued that the 
children in foster care suffered more from belonging to an 
"alien race" than those who lived in families. With those 
alarming signs on the wall the Nuremberg welfare office 
thought it necessary to take steps early so that these 
children would not become a burden to society or failures 
later in their lives.
The office's cases to support its argument once more 
reveal the deep seated prejudices which foster parents and 
the welfare officials shared. The reports stressed that the 
children in general suffered considerably from their "alien 
heritage" and sometimes tried to take revenge for belonging 
to a different race on white children. Most of the reports 
described children of an African-American heritage in foster 
homes as wild and hard to control. Many only seemed to be 
happy when they were together with other mixed children. The 
welfare authorities thought that all of these features 
clearly had their roots in the different race to which those 
children belonged. With this racial explanation it was not
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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necessary to examine the causes of the young boys's and 
girls' feelings of alienation in any depth.
The welfare officer in charge accumulated all this 
evidence to convince the authorities in Middle Franconia that 
more money was necessary to provide the children of black 
soldiers with the means to master their later lives. To 
achieve this goal, Nuremberg wanted to send a number of 
especially difficult children to international camps in 
Switzerland to provide them with a more suitable environment. 
While the intention was laudable, the ultimate reason for 
sending them abroad revealed the unwillingness of Nuremberg's 
authorities to actually deal with this new phenomenon and to 
integrate these children into the community. Their reason 
for sending the children abroad was to accustom them to a 
foreign country and to provide them with an education in such 
an environment. The welfare officers expected them to 
emigrate from Germany later in life.
Middle Franconia's welfare officials did not share these 
opinions. They reminded their colleagues in Nuremberg that 
the children indeed were Germans and would have to decide by 
themselves if they would want to emigrate or not. One should 
not expect such a move and preparing them for such an 
unlikely eventuality early on in life would simply be a waste 
of money.25
^Nuremberg Welfare Office to Bavarian Welfare 
Association in Middle Franconia, 28 March 1955; Middle 
Bavarian Welfare Association in Middle Franconia to Nuremberg
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Nuremberg's welfare officials did not yet realize that 
their own evaluations actually were the largest part of the 
problem. The frequency in which the words "alien" or 
"foreign" appear in all reports clearly indicated that 
Nuremberg authorities— and with them probably many 
Nurembergers— were not prepared to accept that being a 
Nuremberger or a German did not depend on the color of your 
skin or your race, but was determined by your environment. 
No attempt was made to integrate the children into the rest 
of the community. The authorities did not seem to be aware 
that their segregation policies contributed to the childrens' 
psychological problems. Treating these children differently 
and regarding them as strangers only aggravated the problems 
which many of them had growing up in unstable homes. They 
felt that they did not belong and were not welcome anywhere 
except among their peers. This constellation certainly could 
lead to the behavioral deviations which authorities 
documented. The projected remedies were not designed to 
solve the problem. Instead of trying to change the 
preconceptions and prejudices of the community, the 
administrators thought that the only solution would be to 
provide the children with some help to cope with their 
preconceived fates. Since they were perceived as "aliens", 
it was just logical to assume that they would certainly want 
to leave Germany sooner or later.
[n.d.]; NCA C25/I no. 489.
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Mixed children could look to a few bright spots, 
however. The largest local newspaper tried its best to 
disseminate the message of tolerance and understanding. The 
authors of articles dealing with the subject made clear that 
the children who had black fathers were no different from 
others: they spoke the same easily detectable Nuremberg
dialect and for the most part had the same names as other 
children of their age group. Some relief for these children 
came in the form of invitations to spend their summer 
vacations in Denmark. The Danes had proven their integrity 
and tolerance during World War II and they demonstrated once 
again an exceptional sensitivity. In 1955 Stig Guldberg, who 
had pioneered the idea of integrating handicapped people into 
society, invited sixty children of African-American descent 
to Denmark. Many other families followed his example so that 
almost half of the 260 school children were able to spend a 
vacation abroad, since all of them came from poor families 
or foster homes, the welfare office provided the train 
tickets for the eighteen hour ride. The newspaper reported 
that many Danish families had indicated their desire to adopt 
the young outsiders. They would provide them with homes in 
a society which seemed to be more ready for them than the one 
into which they had been born.26
26Minutes of the Welfare Committee meeting of 21 Apr. 
1955; NCA C7/IX no. 1354; "44 Mischlingskinder fuhren gestern 
von Niirnberg zu danischen Familien: Ferienwochen im 'Land des 
Specks'," [44 Mulatto Children Left Nuremberg Yesterday to Go 
to Danish Families: Weeks of Vacation in the "Country of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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Children of American soldiers often had at least their 
mother's family to fall back on, but the war had left many 
others without parents and homes. Americans successfully 
promoted the idea of Boys' Towns modeled after Father 
Flanagan's self-help institutions which not only took care of 
the boys' physical needs but also introduced them to 
democratic procedures, taking up responsibilities, and an 
education. Nuremberg's Peace Village was one of these 
communities and recognized the debt to Flanagan— who had died 
in Berlin while promoting his idea in Germany— by naming the 
main square of the future settlement after him.27
With supporters from all over Europe, the local GYA and 
MG officers, and the city of Nuremberg the undertaking seemed 
to rest on a solid foundation and enjoyed much attention in 
the press as well as by international authorities. The State 
Department also reported favorably about this new experiment
Bacon"] NN, 20 July 1955: 9; "Die kleine 'Toxi' erobert die 
Herzen: Ein Film von R.A. Stemmle um ein Mischlingskind," 
[Little "Toxi" Conquers Hearts: A Film by R.A. Stemmle About 
a Colored Child] NN, 15. Oct. 1952: 9. It would be
interesting to investigate this issue further, but most 
welfare records of the time in Nuremberg are still closed to 
the researcher. One also has to take into consideration that 
the welfare offices only dealt with problem cases. The 
children who grew up under more normal conditions never 
attracted the attention of the authorities.
^Chronik der Stadt Niirnberg 1945-49, 19 June 1949: 457. 
NCA F2 no. 48; see also "Cornerstone for Peace Village Laid," 
YW, 1 July 1948: 1. One of the first American feature movies 
OMGUS brought from the United States was Boys' Town with Kirk 
Douglas as Father Flanagan.
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in which young people were building and administering their 
own homes and workshops.28
During the first years of its operation the Peace 
Village seemed to be on the right path. Nuremberg's welfare 
administration watched with interest. Apparently the city 
fathers were sufficiently impressed with its work that they 
decided to merge their own plans for a youth home at the 
location with those of the Peace Village. In February 1949 
about fifty young men between the ages of fourteen and 
eighteen had decided to try it out; eight months later their 
number had almost doubled. By 1951 115 homeless young people 
had decided to make the Peace Village their home.29
In spite of the publicity the experiment was in 
financial trouble from the start. A Nuremberg newspaper 
commented as early as 1949 that the village would need 
considerable support from German authorities and
28Chronik der Stadt Nurnberg 1945-49, 19 June 1949: 457. 
NCA F2 no. 48. OMGUS had sponsored the international 
conference from which prominent participants, among them Carl 
Zuckmayer who had emigrated from Germany to the United States 
and Elisabeth Rotten, the director of one of the leading 
Swiss international welfare organizations, went to Nuremberg 
for laying the cornerstone of the future peace village. For 
press coverage see "'Das Experiment scheint zu glucken'," 
["The Experiment Seems to Succeed] NN, 29 July 1950: 10; the 
State Department's evaluation is in Young Germany 53-56.
29Minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 12 Aug. 1948. 
NCA C7/IX no. 1234; for the numbers see "Das Friedensdorf in 
Wiirnberg: Eine zeitgemSBe Jugendhilfe," [The Peace Village in 
Nuremberg: A Modern Way of Helping Youth] NN, 26 Feb. 1949: 
6; Report on Institutions supported by the Bavarian 
Association for Youth Welfare Work; NCA Ref X no. 113/1; 
Young Germany 54.
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organizations in addition to the help the Friends and other 
international institutions provided to be able to survive, 
but the project continued to suffer considerably from the 
lack of funds. The frugal city fathers decided to support 
the venture only after serious admonitions from Marx with a 
one time shot in the arm of 10,000 marks in November 1950. 
Construction contracts between the city and the bricklayer 
apprentices of the institution in the city's projects for 
young people secured additional funding. Peace Villagers 
provided much of the professional work force in 
reconstructing Hoheneck Castle, the city's youth retreat and 
training center, and participated in the ambitious 
reconstruction of a part of the old imperial fortress which 
became the Nuremberg's new youth home. The city saved a 
considerable amount of money since the apprentices were much 
cheaper than private contractors, but when the local 
construction industry complained about the competition, the 
cooperation came to an end in 1953.30
The material support from the city was not enough to 
maintain the project afloat. In March 1951 John McCloy 
rescued the village from bankruptcy with a check over 82,000 
marks to finish the construction at least of the first two
30|,Das Friedensdorf in Nurnberg: Eine zeitgemaBe
Jugendhilfe," [The Peace Village in Nuremberg: A Modern Way 
of Helping Youth] NN, 26 Feb. 1949: 6; minutes of a welfare 
committee meeting, 23 Nov. 1950; NCA C7/IX no. 1237; minutes 
of a welfare committee meeting, 18 Apr. 1951; NCA C7/IX no. 
1238; minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 17 Dec. 1953. 
NCA Cl  f i x  no. 1325.
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houses which had been dedicated the year before. Two years 
later the director of a British organization dedicated to 
help European refugees decided to support the Peace Village 
with finances and machinery since it not only housed refugees 
who by then largely came from the Soviet Zone, but also 
provided Czech and other Eastern European Youth who were 
living in the nearby refugee camp with opportunities to learn 
a trade.31
Although the village survived until the end of the 
decade, it never became the Boys' Town its founders had 
envisioned. By 1959 its situation had not changed. An 
inspection by the city's welfare committee revealed that 
nothing had changed since 1953. About 120 young men, 80% of 
whom had fled from the Soviet Zone, were still living in 
unfinished facilities and did not have the money to carry the 
project through, but by then the Boys' Town was not necessary 
anymore. Those whom the war had orphaned had grown up. In 
1961 the East German government decided to effectively lock 
up its citizens. With typical German thoroughness it 
constructed an extremely sophisticated and deadly system of 
border fortifications which ended the influx of refugees from 
the east for good. This action eliminated the last group of
31"Die Mittel erschopft— Halbfertige Bauten verfalien: 
Ein Scheck rettet das Friedensdorf," [Funds Exhausted— Half 
Finished Buildings Deteriorate: A Check Saves Peace Village] 
NN, 17 Mar. 1951: 5; "Niirnberg Besuch zeitigt schon Friichte: 
10,000 Pfund fur 'Friedensdorf'," [Visit in Nuremberg Shows 
First Fruits: 10,000 Pounds for "Peace Village"] NN, 6 Nov. 
1953: 1.
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young people who had come to live at the Peace Village and 
the experiment came to an end in Nuremberg.32 
Youth Work
While Nuremberg's city administration was actively 
looking for American cooperation in the field of youth 
welfare, the Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring took the lead in 
promoting and implementing the new ideas in youth work the 
Americans had introduced. Le Van Roberts, the local Resident 
Officer reported to Munich in October 1950 that the mood of 
people in Nuremberg in general was quite gloomy. According 
to him, Nurembergers regarded the current economic upswing as 
only temporary. The dire housing situation remained the most 
popular topic in the city, while people did not seem to be 
interested at all in occupation costs or cultural matters. 
In spite of their proximity to the Iron Curtain and the 
Korean war, Nurembergers also did not seem to be worried 
about the outbreak of a war in Germany. Roberts noted that 
Nuremberg's young people as well as the city's youth 
officials were the notable exception to the rather sad 
picture. The expulsion of the Free German Youth from the 
Youth Ring for "lack of cooperation" demonstrated to Roberts
32Chronik der Stadt Niirnberg, 1958: 478; 1959: 356; NCA 
F2 no. 52, 53.
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that they certainly took a stand against totalitarian 
ideas.33
Nuremberg's Kreis Youth Ring gave evidence of its 
democratic convictions in other ways as well. Combining the 
ideas of a youth parliament and permitting young people to 
"run" a community for a day, the Kreis Youth Ring came up 
with the concept of "Political Education in the Community" 
(Gemeindepolitische Erziehung). Together with the city 
administration the committee started a program in 1949 which 
was designed to help young people understand the function of 
city government and the possibilities it offered for help and 
employment. For several weeks all departments of the city 
administration opened their offices to young people. 
Prominent administrators and politicians gave presentations 
on topics of interest. Not surprisingly, the job situation 
remained high on young people's agendas. American observers 
were impressed with this new approach of introducing 
democracy to the younger generation.34
33From Le Van Roberts, Resident Officer, Nuremberg, to 
George N. Shuster, Land Commissioner for Bavaria, Report on 
the Mood in Nuremberg, 13 Oct. 1950; NA RG 466 OLCB, District 
Land Office Activity Reports, Box 2, 120.5/2 0.
^Circular from Nuremberg Kreis Youth Committee to all 
schools in minutes of a welfare committee meeting, 10 Mar. 
1949; NCA C7/IX no. 1235; "Jugend hat wertvolle Arbeit 
geleistet: Der Kreisjugendring Niirnberg berichtet iiber seine 
Tatigkeit im vergangenen Jahr," [Youth Has Done Valuable 
Work: Kreis Youth Committee Reports About its Work During the 
Previous Year] NN, 21 Sept. 1949: 10; Le Van Roberts, RO
Nuremberg, to K. Van Buskirk, Chief, FOD, 25 July 1950; NA RG 
466 OLCB, Central Files, Box 28; see also Chronik der Stadt 
Niirnberg, 17 Mar.-17 May 1952; NCA F2 no.49.
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The Youth Ring's commitment to democracy and peace 
manifested itself in other ways as well. In December 1949 
the committee targeted the famous Nuremberg Christmas market 
to protest the reappearance of militaristic toys on the 
stands. Eric Feiler reported that about eighty youths 
marched from city hall to the trade union building while 
about forty others marched to the market and picketed the 
market lanes. According to Feiler, some middle aged people 
tried to interfere with the demonstration while the older 
generation "expressed their approval". The Intelligence 
Officer also noted that the police did not interfere with the 
demonstrators in spite of complaints of the stand owners. 
Although the demonstration never reached large proportions, 
it was successful. A city ordinance which is still in effect 
today banned the sale of militaristic toys in the future.35
Although Americans certainly could be pleased with their 
efforts of demilitarizing German youth, their previous policy 
of demilitarization had some unwelcome side effects. The 
Kreis Youth Ring did not stop with protesting military toys 
at the Christmas Market. Two days before Christmas of 1949 
Andreas Staudt, acting as chairman of the Kreis Youth Ring, 
sent a resolution the committee had adopted to the American 
High Commissioner. In this resolution Nuremberg's youth
35Intelligence Report by E. Feiler, 3 Jan. 1950; NA RG 
466 OLCB, ID, Bi-Weekly Reports of the Nurnberg Field Office, 
1949-50, Box 1, 1; Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 
Aug. 1995; Karl Schmidbauer, personal interview, 5 Aug. 1995.
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representatives protested all attempts of German political 
parties and government representatives to promote the 
rearmament of Germany. The members of the Nuremberg Youth 
Ring thought that it would be wiser to concentrate on vital 
issues such as unemployment which was especially high among 
young people.36
The Youth Ring did not shrink back from political 
issues, but it did not neglect the practical work for its 
constituents either. The employment of a professional youth 
worker was just one of the steps to improve the situation 
especially for those who were not organized. In January 1950 
Trade Union Youth Secretary Loni Burger and Karl Maly decided 
to explore the possibilities for erecting centers for young 
people throughout Nuremberg. Apparently they had taken a 
close look at GYA center no. 1 and kept in mind that many of 
their constituents came from the working class. Maly and 
Burger thought that it would be best to combine open youth
36Letter from Kreis Youth Ring Nuremberg to John McCloy, 
22 Dec. 1949; NA RG 466 HICOM, Security-Segregated General 
Records 1949-52, Box 136. McCloy had to deal with this 
attitude constantly. He had to walk a diplomatic tightrope 
in this respect. On the one hand he had to reassure 
Germany's neighbors that Americans did not want to 
reestablish Germany's military might unchecked. On the other 
hand he needed to convince Germans about the necessity of 
rearmament for defensive purposes. Americans expected 
Germans to contribute to the defense of the free world. 
McCloy told Germans that nobody would force them to take up 
arms for the democratic cause if they did not want to, but he 
also made clear that there probably would be dire 
consequences for a free Europe if they decided against 
rearmament. See, for example, his speech to trade unionists 
in Hamburg, 25 Nov. 1950 in Fischer and Fischer, eds. 127- 
135. See also Schwartz, chapter V.
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work with dormitories and workshops for apprentices. They 
contacted the Bavarian Association for Youth Welfare to find 
out about the possibility of funding such a project. The 
association's representative promised that he would sit down 
with them to discuss the issue but also thought that it would 
be more fruitful to assemble all interested parties and 
discuss the issue in depth.37
By July 1950 the strategy for implementing the plan was 
set. The Nuremberg Kreis Youth Ring solicited 7,000 marks 
from the McCloy funds for the erection and maintenance of 
Nuremberg's first "home of the open door". One professional 
youth worker and several volunteers would be in charge of the 
center which would render its services free of charge. Karl 
Maly, the author of the application, emphasized the need for 
supporting unorganized young people. The Kreis Youth 
Committee had already located a suitable building part of 
which the city administration had repaired. The Peace 
Village had submitted an estimate of about 9,000 marks for 
making the other part of the building suitable for a youth 
center. Maly also reminded the HICOG administrators that 
Resident Officer in Munich, Harold Patrick, had already 
assured the committee of HICOG support informally in March.38
37Memo of a telephone conversation with the Chairman of 
the Bavarian Association for Youth Welfare, 3 Jan. 1950; NCA 
C74 Vorakt Ref. X, no. 113.
38Kreis Youth Ring to HICOG, Application for a grant from 
McCloy Funds, 15 July 1950; BSA Kreisjugendring 1/1.
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The application was successful. Actually HICOG footed 
the whole bill. It provided the Bavarian Youth Ring who 
officially funded the facilities as well as the personnel 
with the money for the enterprise. In October 1950 the Kreis 
Youth Ring opened Nuremberg's and Bavaria's first of five 
planned youth centers under German control. The new center 
was unable to compete with GYA's luxurious accommodations but 
it functioned along the same lines. The center's three rooms 
were open to all young people and functioned as library, 
discussion rooms or as movie theaters. The center also 
planned to install a small workshop in which, according to 
the newspaper, working youth would be able to deepen their 
vocational education. A large playground completed the 
picture.39
The new director of the center, Eberhard Schmall, had 
his hands full from the start. So many young people wanted 
to come and stay that initially he had to limit access to 
the facilities to those who needed it most. Schmall tried to 
establish contact with the young people and with their 
parents.40
39|,Das erste von f unfen: 'Heim der offenen Tiir' am
Herschelplatz," [the First of Five: "Home of the Open Door at 
Herschel Square] NN, 7 Oct. 1950: 9.
40,1 'Das Haus soil zu einer kulturellen Bindung fiir die 
Jugendlichen werden': Eine Tiir ist jeden Tag fiir alle Kinder 
offen," ["The House is Planned to Foster a Cultural 
Connection for Young People": Every Day a Door is Open to All 
Children] NN, 29 Dec. 1950: 9.
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While the center at the Herschelplatz had received all 
of the press's attention, the Kreis Youth Ring had created 
two additional youth centers which were located in refugee 
camps to provide those young people who were still there with 
opportunities to spend their leisure time in a meaningful way 
and to escape the drab and crowded living conditions and were 
financed by HICOG through Munich. Interestingly, the Germans 
justified their actions in the same way the Army had done: 
since young people in the refugee camps tended to become 
frustrated and angry, one had to do something to keep them 
out of trouble and away from the streets.41
As we have seen, the Germans had solicited the help of 
an American specialist to develop an all encompassing plan 
for Nuremberg's youth work in the future, but before Jay Ver 
Lee began working on his project Theodor Marx introduced his 
own plan. Although the city had a long standing tradition of 
supporting youth organizations with club rooms in its own 
city youth house, Marx envisioned a completely new approach 
to youth work for the future which would intensify and 
professionalize youth work and at the same time try to reach 
out to that part of Nuremberg's youth who in all probability 
would never join any youth organization in their lives. 
According to him, the post war years had clearly demonstrated 
that youth organizations only had a limited appeal to the
41Theodor Marx, "Aufbau und Ausbau der Jugendarbeit in 
Niirnberg: Entwurf zu einem neuen Plan" [hereinafter Marx, 
Entwurf]: 4; NCA C74 no. 3.
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city's young people and would never be able to attract more 
than about one third of all youth in the city. It was 
therefore urgently necessary to recognize the needs of 
unorganized young people and to devote a considerable part of 
the resources available for youth work to them. The city 
councilman thanked the Kreis Youth Ring for its valuable 
contribution, but he wanted more. Although he had not been 
in the United States Marx apparently was determined to 
introduce the idea of voluntarism in Nuremberg. He wanted to 
introduce youth councils in every district of the city. 
These councils would consist of volunteers who would become 
the liaison between those people in need and the authorities 
who often did not understand the realities of the world 
outside their offices. Marx proposed that the councils 
should work hand in hand with professional youth workers.42
Marx did not want those workers to operate in a vacuum. 
He thought that they should also be in charge of a center 
which would be open to everyone. Marx found the idea of open 
youth work which GYA practiced successfully in its center no. 
1 was very good, but thought that the Americans were doing 
too much of a good thing. According to him, the costs for 
running a center of this type were prohibitive and German 
authorities would never be able to take it over from GYA in 
its present form. Marx suggested open youth work on a far 
more moderate basis: the city would need six small homes of
42Marx, Entwurf: 1-7.
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the open door: five in the more outlying districts and one in 
the city's new and very generous youth facility which Marx 
had been planning since March 1950 at the old Imperial 
Fortress. He maintained that such homes of the open door 
were certainly affordable. Since three existed already and 
the city would certainly be able to reach an agreement with 
the Army about taking over GYA Youth Center no. 1, Nuremberg 
would only have to finance two more centers. One could be 
sponsored somehow while the sixth would be incorporated into 
the new facilities where Marx sought to bring the traditional 
and the new together. The city youth house would include a 
youth hostel, rooms for the existing organizations, a 
dormitory for apprentices, facilities for meetings and movies 
as well as a home of the open door. It would serve as the 
nerve center of Nuremberg's youth work and replace the Bunker 
which youth organizations were still occupying at the time. 
Nuremberg's welfare committee agreed to make the plan the 
basis for the future youth work of the city in October 1950, 
one month before Jay Ver Lee began his evaluation of the 
situation in Nuremberg.43
43Marx, Entwurf: 1-7; minutes of a meeting of the welfare 
committee, 19 Oct. 1950; NCA C7/IX no. 1237; Marx introduced 
his plans for the city youth house in March 1950 (see 
"Finanzierung des Stadtjugendhauses," [Financing the City 
Youth House] NN, 6 Mar 1950: n.p. (newspaper clipping, NCA 
C74 no. 4)); for Marx's opinion about the GYA center see 
minutes of conference between Mr. Textor, Marx, Staudt, and 
Maly, 23 Aug. 1950; BSA Kreisjugendring 1/2.
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Ver Lee agreed with the concept of youth work Marx had 
developed, but neither the new concept nor Marx's plans for 
an admittedly expensive youth house met with general approval 
in Nuremberg. The Kreis Youth Ring was not happy with the 
city's sudden emphasis on open youth work. As long as the 
Americans were paying for the enterprise, the youth leaders 
apparently were willing to support open youth work, but as 
soon as the interests of their youth organizations were in 
jeopardy their attitude changed. The majority of the Kreis 
Youth Ring members were not happy at all with the 
competition. They questioned the value of this type of youth 
work and argued that only a minority of all young people 
would benefit from the youth centers for which the city was 
planning to spend ten times the money it had allocated for 
the youth organizations, although the members of the 
organizations felt that they were doing the most valuable 
youth work. Marx countered that youth organizations would 
never be able to attract more than just one third of all 
young people and that international experiences had amply 
demonstrated the value of homes of the open door.44
Some people also were not happy with the new project at 
the castle. Willy Gensmantel was one of the youth house's 
most outspoken opponents. He thought that the city would be
‘“Minutes of a meeting of the Youth Welfare Committee, 15 
Mar. 1951; NCA C74 no. 3; "Acht neue 'Heime der offenen Tiir': 
Der Ver Lee Plan wurde beraten," [Eight New Homes of the Open 
Door: Ver Lee Plan Was Discussed] NN, 16 Mar. 1951: 10.
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much better advised to invest the enormous sums it was 
planning to spend on this prestige object in practical youth 
work or in help for unemployed young people, but youth 
representatives had no chance against the energetic and quite 
authoritarian Marx.45
Although the city's leading welfare official and the 
American expert agreed in principle, they differed on 
important issues. Ver Lee's evaluation of the situation
called for eight youth centers in Nuremberg. The one in the
inner city was last in priority since the American did not
expect its reconstruction to take place any time soon. None 
of the youth centers would be located at or near the castle. 
Ver Lee suggested that the Nuremberg youth house at the 
fortress probably would serve its purpose as youth hostel and 
administrative center for the city's youth work well, but 
that he doubted that the planners would be able to provide 
adequate facilities for a modern youth center.46
Marx was not happy with Ver Lee's report. Throughout 
1950 he had carefully enlisted all Americans within his reach 
such as Major Selsor and Hedwig Wachenheim to support the 
project. Wachenheim alerted him to the McCloy Funds even
45Willy Gensmantel, personal interview, 10 Aug 1995.
‘Ver Lee Plan: 4; BSA Kreisjugendring Niirnberg Stadt
1/1. The State Department included Ver Lee's evaluation in 
its booklet Young Germany: Apprentice to Democracy. Marx was 
seriously offended when he became acquainted with its
contents in 1952 (Marx to Lowell Bennett, Foreign Service of 
the US, Public Affairs Regional Center, Nuremberg, 20 May 
1952; NCA C74 no. 7).
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before application procedures were established and Marx had 
not lost any time in sending his application.47 Since he 
expected the McCloy Funds to provide about a quarter of the 
construction costs for the new youth house, he called 
conferences with American officials in February and March 
1951 to point out the flaws in Ver Lee's argument, set the 
record straight, and to explain to them once again what he 
hoped HICOG and GYA would do for him and the city. Harold 
Patrick, OLCB's youth officer in Munich, however, had to 
dampen his enthusiasm. While he pointed out that he 
personally supported the project, he alerted Marx to the fact 
that the competition was keen and that the city of Nuremberg 
would have to lower its expectations at least by two thirds 
of the targetted sum. Even then it was not certain if it was 
going to receive any money at all.48
Apparently Marx could not take no for an answer. 
Clearly irritated he enlisted the help of everyone who 
possibly could help from Hans Lamm to Franz-Josef Strauss who 
had moved to Bonn in the meantime. The fight for the money 
dragged on throughout 1951 and a good part of 1952. Neither 
Marx's persistence nor his obvious opinion that the Americans 
had a moral obligation to help him and Nuremberg's young
47Application for a grant for Nuremberg's youth house, 
Marx to Le Van Roberts, OLCB, 2 May 1950; NCA C74 no. 7.
48Minutes of a meeting of the youth-welfare committee, 15 
Mar. 1951; minutes of a conference with Le Van Roberts on 16 
Feb. 1951; NCA C74 no. 3.
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people out after supposedly promising their support did 
anything to advance his cause. In April 1952 the Americans 
informed the welfare specialist in no uncertain terms that he 
should not have counted on money for which he had applied but 
never received a written agreement. The author of the letter 
also reminded Marx that the McCloy Funds had already provided 
the city with close to one million marks. Nuremberg 
apparently had gotten far more than its share. In spite of 
this slap in the face Marx still was not willing to give up. 
When John McCloy visited Nuremberg on his farewell tour Marx 
took the last opportunity to ask for American help. In a 
detailed letter which included all of the evidence in the 
case Marx expressed his disappointment at the runaround and 
the final denial of support. According to Marx, the American 
attitude and actions in this case were not just very 
unpleasant for him and the city administration but also were 
undermining American prestige among young people, a statement 
that probably would not have held up under close scrutiny.49
Even without American support the new facilities grew 
rapidly. In August 1952 Marx presided over the inauguration 
of the youth hostel, the dormitory for apprentices, and
49Marx to Strauss, 26 Sept. 1951; NCA C74 no. 4; Marx to 
Lamm, 20 May 1952; Lowell Bennett, Public Affairs Officer, 
American Consulate General, Public Affairs Regional Center, 
to Marx, 8 Apr. 1952; Marx to McCloy, 25 June 1952; NCA C74 
no. 7. No answer is recorded, but McCloy clearly signalled 
that he did not like the quarrelsome city on his farewell 
tour. He spent just enough time to satisfy the protocol in 
Nuremberg before he went on to the small town of Rothenburg 
to spend the night there.
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facilities for conferences and concerts. In 1953 an 
expensive film studio followed which carried on the tradition 
of the GYA film hour as well as Nuremberg's own youth film 
stage which the city had constructed in 1924 and lost in 1942 
through Allied bombs. This time a committee made sure that 
young people only saw approved movies, but even under this 
close scrutiny young Germans continued to see American 
documentaries which a newly established film service 
distributed. The city's oldest structure, a tower adjacent 
to the reconstructed youth buildings, became the home for 
Nuremberg's youth groups in 1954. In 1955 Marx finally was 
able to complete the project. When the Army decided to 
terminate the city's contract at the old location, Hans 
Werner and the former GYA youth center no. 1 found a new home 
in another of the Imperial Castle's old towers.50
While Marx obviously was disappointed with the American 
contribution to Nuremberg's youth house, he demonstrated that 
he had not developed his youth plan just to receive money for 
his prestige project. In November 1951 the Bavarian Youth
S0Theodor Marx, 5 Jahre Ortsverband der Niirnberger 
Wohlfahrtspflege e.V. (Nurnberg [Nuremberg]: Ortsverband der 
Niirnberger Wohlfahrtspflege e.V., 1954) 13-25; "Im Turm der 
Niirnberger Burg zog das 'Heim der offenen Tiir' ein: Freizeit 
im 'Luginsland',11 [Home of the Open Door Moved to Tower in 
the Nuremberg Castle: Recreation at the "Luginsland"] NN, 20 
Oct. 1955: 9; for the youth film program see report of
Nuremberg's Association for the Cultivation of Welfare, Feb. 
1954 (NCA C74 Vorakt Ref VI no. 120a) and an invitation to 
the showing of six short movies by the Film Service for Youth 
and Public Education (NCA C 74 Vorakt Ref. X no. 113/1) . 
Three of the six were American and, according to the 
invitation, popular with audiences.
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Ring informed the city that HICOG had suddenly cut its grants 
for the youth centers. Without the American funds the Youth 
Ring would not be able to keep the centers open. Marx 
immediately stepped in. In spite of some continuing 
resistance from committee members who did not want to see 
more competition for Nuremberg's youth organizations, Marx, 
Staudt, and Maly were able to convince the welfare committee 
to include the support of the three homes of the open door in 
the city's budget and assure their survival. One year later 
the city also took over youth center no. 1, but it never 
carried out plans for further expansion. The city fathers 
had considered the erection of a special youth center for the 
Eastern European refugees in camp Valka, but never went 
beyond the planning stage. Helmut Stuhler, whose youth 
center was not far from the camp, would also have to take 
care of those young people who came to visit his house of the 
open door from the camp.51
Although the city fathers never provided the youth 
centers with the luxurious equipment and personnel that GYA 
had been able to afford, the homes of the open door had 
extremely dedicated staff who devoted their lives to the 
centers and the young people who visited them in spite of a
slMinutes of a meeting of the welfare committee, 29 Nov. 
1951; NCA C7/IX no. 1239; minutes of meetings of the welfare 
committee, 11 Feb. 1952, 17 Apr. 1952; NCA C7/IX no. 1299; 
minutes of a meeting of the welfare committee, 10 July 1952; 
NCA C7/IX no. 1300; Helmut Stuhler, personal interview, 12 
Aug. 1994 and 12 Aug. 1995.
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constant battle over allocations and priorities. Over the 
years the barracks at the refugee camps gave way to permanent 
structures. They remain open to young people to this day.52
Although relations between Americans and Germans were 
not always without misunderstandings at the grassroots, 
Nuremberg city officials and youth leaders demonstrated that 
they were quite willing to adopt American ideas and concepts 
and incorporate them into their own youth work and welfare 
activities. American material support as well as HICOG's 
extensive reorientation programs created the framework and 
educational possibilities for those who were willing to 
learn. With HICOG financial support Germans were able to 
initiate many programs for which they assumed the 
responsibility when HICOG withdrew and the economic situation 
had improved.
52Helmut Stuhler, personal interview, 12 Aug. 1994 and 12 
Aug. 1995; Karl Kleyer, personal interview, 22 Aug. 1995; 
Hans Werner, personal interview, 21 Aug. 1995.
The city actually ventured into the realm of self- 
determination for young people in the sixties when Hermann 
Glaser— then in charge of cultural affairs in Nuremberg—  
invited Nuremberg's youth basically to run their own center 
in a building the Americans had requisitioned until 1955 and 
for which the city did not have any other use. In theory the 
center came closest to the ideal which GYA had promoted in 
the forties and fifties, but it caused much controversy from 
the start because of alleged drug trafficking, violence, and 
the inability by young people to manage the center. Nobody 
seems quite to know what to do with it today (Kett 115-143) .
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Forty years after the official end of the occupation, 
the question remains what long-term effects the American 
presence may have had in Germany after World War II and how 
successful American re-education efforts towards young people 
actually were. Washington needed a long time to define a 
clear re-education mission for the American zone, but those 
in charge of the field work developed a remarkable degree of 
initiative to help the Germans in their communities back on 
their feet and to start the process of re-education at the 
earliest possible moment. They actually developed the 
programs which Washington's policy statements officially 
approved. While this approach took time to evolve, often led 
to confusion, duplication, and much waste, it also kept 
American programs practice-oriented and in close touch with 
the needs of German communities. The occupiers reached a 
surprising number of young people from all classes in many 
different ways.
Americans who did not try to impose their will were most 
successful in implementing their policies. Although Germany 
had lost the war, the occupiers had to rely on the German 
administrative apparatus to carry out their policies and 
consequently provided them with leverage to negotiate which 
enabled them to resist drastic reforms. The fight over 
Bavaria's school system is symptomatic for this struggle.
720
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Field officers recognized the problem much earlier than OMGUS 
headquarters did. They looked for ways to cooperate with the 
Germans and to open up a dialogue which would help them to 
implement their re-educational goals. Establishing a 
dialogue proved to be the Americans' most successful 
strategy. They did not become preachers in the desert but 
found many Germans ready to cooperate who regarded change was 
inevitable and necessary. These Germans were quite willing 
to take up offers and suggestions which came from the 
occupiers as long as they were permitted to participate 
actively in the decision-making process which enabled them to 
adapt new models to the situation in their community. As a 
result many American ideas successfully took root in German 
thought and actions, sometimes forming a symbiosis with 
German traditions in which the American origins became 
indiscernible. This process in youth work suggests that 
American re-education and reorientation efforts could have a 
profound and lasting impact which went far beyond the end of 
the occupation. Youth administrations, welfare agencies, and 
youth organizations adopted organizational models but also 
new views of treating young persons which emphasized the 
individual and tried to develop independent, creative 
personalities. For the first time an individual did not have 
to join youth organizations for his leisure time activities, 
while welfare workers, many youth groups, and government 
agencies began to rethink their traditionally authoritarian
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approaches. Undoubtedly, the American re-education efforts 
in this realm had a considerable impact which spread 
throughout the Federal Republic as time went by.
Contrary to the assertions of many contemporary 
observers and some scholars, the American personnel who 
occupied key positions in youth work in the American zone and 
in Nuremberg generally were qualified for doing their job 
well and dedicated to their tasks. When the American YMCA 
refused to grant Lawrence Norrie another year of absence, he 
resigned from a job which undoubtedly was financially more 
lucrative and burdened with less controversy and frustrations 
to remain in charge of youth activities in Germany. He later 
joined the State Department. Equally Mark Selsor probably 
would have been able to find assignments in the Army which 
would have advanced his career. Both men, as well as many 
others in youth work, stayed on their posts because they felt 
that they had an important mission in Germany which needed 
time to accomplish its re-educational goals. These goals 
remained a constant in American policy in the field from 1945 
on to the end of the occupation. OMGUS and HICOG officers 
came to regard communism as just another brand of 
totalitarianism, very similar in its appearance and goals to 
National Socialism. Consequently they just added the new 
threat to their list of enemies, but did not have to modify 
their agenda, since reorientation would provide the best 
results against either system.
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Interestingly, the only program which neither Military 
Government nor the Germans were able to control provided the 
most radical departure from traditional German youth 
activities. The Army's GYA introduced the Germans to a model 
for open youth work which initially neither German officials 
nor the members of traditional youth groups nor Military 
Government youth specialists regarded as necessary or 
desirable. Luckily for them, the Army maintained the program 
until some Germans and Military Government officials began to 
recognize its value.
While it is possible to trace American influences within 
Nuremberg's youth work and welfare administration, the impact 
of the American presence on young Germans themselves is 
harder to assess. Interviews and documents revealed that 
many Germans in Nuremberg had contacts with Americans during 
the immediate postwar period. People wore American clothes, 
ate American food, smoked American cigarettes, or landed a 
job with the occupiers. Undoubtedly some Germans took 
American aid and generosity after the war for granted or 
regarded it as a kind of compensation for the destruction the 
occupiers had brought on Nuremberg and for the problems the 
occupation was causing, but many others genuinely appreciated 
American aid. Through their generosity, American authorities 
and individuals opened an avenue of communication and evoked 
in many people a respect or at least a benevolent attitude 
towards the United States. When the hard times were over,
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most Germans returned to their normal lives in which 
Americans generally did not occupy any significant role, but 
looking back after fifty years, many of them still maintained 
a positive attitude towards the American people— although 
they often voiced criticism of American domestic and foreign 
policy over the last five decades. This might explain in 
part why a majority of politicians from the left and from the 
right as well as their constituents supported the Federal 
Republic's integration in the Western Alliance under American 
leadership even beyond the end of the Cold War.1
Young Germans increasingly looked to the United States 
for their role models, copied American fashion trends, and 
listened to American music, a behavior which many observers 
interpreted as "Americanization." Kaspar Haase's intriguing 
study on young people's behavior and attitudes during the 
second part of the 1950s, however, leads in a different 
direction. According to him, this generation adapted 
American ideas and American fashions to their own needs and 
environment, often changing the original meaning in the 
process, just like their grandparents had done in the
•interestingly, the only serious critic of the Federal 
Republic's western integration was Oskar Lafontaine, a 
younger Social Democratic politician from the Saarland, the 
only region which had not been exposed to American post-war 
policies and programs. Although Lafontaine remained very 
popular in the Saar region, his ideas regarding the Federal 
Republic's place in the international community never found 
much public favor even in his own party.
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political realm.2 What is interesting about this behavior is 
not that it was exceptional (it took place in very similar 
fashion in France, Great Britain and elsewhere), but that 
young Germans for the first time did not remain outside a 
general current. They embraced it like their peers in other 
countries.
Their older brothers and sisters, the members of the 
Hitler Youth generation, probably had a harder time to 
reconcile their old values and with the new. They needed to 
make a conscious effort to replace Nazi ideas with new ones 
about which they were learning in schools, in their youth 
organizations, or from the Americans directly. We have seen 
that a much larger number of young people than had previously 
been thought actually took advantage of the many different 
opportunities to have a look at the outside world and to 
break out of the intellectual and spiritual isolation they 
had experienced during the Third Reich. Here, as with their 
younger siblings, a majority most likely would have correctly 
rejected claims that their activities led to an 
Americanization, but that would not have meant that American 
programs had no impact on them. Many of them seemed to 
accept the new political system and to embrace the basic 
values of a democratic culture: freedom of expression, a
higher degree of tolerance, and at least participation in the
2Kaspar Maase, BRAVO A m e r ik a :  E rku n d u n g e n  z u r
Jugendkultur der Bundesrepublik in den funfziger Jahren 
(Hamburg: Junius Verlag, 1992).
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electoral process. West Germany's voter participation 
throughout the 1950s and 1960s remained at very high levels. 
This generation also was the first one to travel to foreign 
lands (in the 1950s Italy was the preferred spot) and in 
general did not have problems accepting other European guest- 
workers in their midst.3 But many also retained a feeling of 
national pride which even today expresses itself in 
surprising ways.4
To what extent Americans succeeded in introducing not 
just a democratic political system in their zone of
3Interestingly, the arrival of Turkish guest-workers 
changed some of their attitudes. Throughout the 1970s and 
1980s negative feelings towards foreigners living in Germany 
seemed to be directed exclusively against Turkish guest- 
workers. While working on the shop floor in a major car 
factory in the middle of the 1980s, I had the impression that 
Germans and other Europeans from Spain, Italy, Greece, and 
Yugoslavia, most of them skilled workers, got along with each 
other well. All of them seemed to regard Turks, who 
generally were unskilled and whose different religion had 
many implications for their dress and behavior, as outsiders. 
The most vivid and probably honest expression of this current 
was graffiti in the bathrooms, which almost exclusively 
depicted tensions between Turkish and German workers.
4See, for example, "Marlene's Street of Dreams? To the 
Barricades!" New York Times, 16 Dec. 1996: CF 258. Just as 
Times correspondent Alan Cowell did, many observers even 
within Germany interpret this occasional appearance of a very 
strong patriotism among this generation of Germans as an 
indicator for the survival of Nazi attitudes. Given what we 
have seen in this dissertation this view probably 
oversimplifies the rather complex adaptation process that 
took place within young Germans after the war. The curiosity 
and desire of so many to break out of the Nazi imposed 
isolation certainly documents a widespread search for new 
ideas. To expect young people to throw all of their 
sentiments overboard, especially regarding the sacrifices 
they had made and witnessed during the war, would be as 
unrealistic as maintaining that most of them refused to 
change at all.
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occupation but also in instilling democratic convictions in
the Federal Republic's young constituents is almost
impossible to answer, but five decades later there are some
indicators that Americans helped West Germany's citizens on
their way towards changing fundamental attitudes. Hildegard
Hamm-Briicher, one of Germany's most prominent politicians
after the war, had been among the first young Germans who had
travelled to the United States. Many years after her journey
she stated that
unlike a constitution, one cannot develop a democratic 
culture on the drawing-board, proclaim it, and 
promulgate it. It is something like an inner 
constitution— which takes shape from unconscious, 
possibly subconscious, historical preconditions and 
vibrations of a community [Gemeinwesen] and determines 
the political climate5
If she is correct, there is good reason to believe that the
American presence and American re-education programs did
contribute to changes in the shape of that inner constitution
of many young Germans in the American zone. Since large
numbers of them took advantage of American offers to widen
their horizons or simply experience a different way of
dealing with each other, the exposure to American behavior
and programs provided them with food for thought and new
perspectives. These experiences could serve as building
blocks for changing young people's outlook on their own
lives, on the world around them, and also on their political
convictions. It seemed that Senator William Fulbright had
sQuoted in Eckart 3.
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assessed the situation correctly: American ideas and society 
had something to offer for many people. If others had the 
chance to observe American society first hand, they would 
come to understand the United States but also the very 
principles of a democratic society better and might cast 
their lots with the western world.
Those who expected young Germans to completely adopt and 
copy American society and institutions certainly went home 
disappointed. An Americanization of this generation and 
those which followed never took place. This undoubtedly 
disappointed many Americans and led to the conclusion that 
American policy had failed. For the same reason it must have 
delighted the older Germans who remained on the watch against 
this kind of foreign influence. Even those who went to the 
United States or harbored a positive attitude towards the 
occupiers, maintained some reservations. In fact, most young 
Germans probably did not become enthusiastic fans of the 
United States. They often remained critical observers of 
American policy and American institutions. This did not 
mean, however, that the re-education mission had not 
succeeded. The very process of choosing, criticizing, 
arriving at one's own conclusions, and expressing them freely 
are strong indicators for the presence of a truly democratic 
thought process. Many of the young Germans who had spent 
some time in the United States in the late 1940s and early 
1950s assumed leadership positions in political parties on
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the federal, state, and local levels, in the trade unions, in 
schools, in higher education, and in administrations. Having 
been overseas at that time opened doors because it provided 
an experience which was apparently much in demand. This 
generation took over the political reins from those who had 
still known Weimar. It helped to manage the economic and 
political crises of the 1970s and 1980s and successfully 
negotiated the re-unification of Germany at the end of the 
Cold War without giving up the country's integration into the 
West.
Many of their younger brothers and sisters also 
demonstrated an unequivocal commitment to democracy. The 
students of West Berlin's Free University, the very symbol of 
a joint American and German commitment to American ideas and 
ideals, assumed the leadership in the student protests of the 
1960s. Those who took to the streets to demonstrate for 
education reform, but also against the Shah of Persia or 
America's war in Vietnam, were not directed by any 
government, but did so defying their representatives' wishes. 
The demonstrators had internalized American values. They 
used democratic means to protest against a policy which must 
have struck many as going against the very grain of American 
culture and the rhetoric with which they had grown up. The 
behavior of both generations over the last forty years is 
probably the clearest indicator for the success of American 
reorientation efforts among them between 1945 and 1955.
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